BROWN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND BROWN, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff :

:

v. : NO. 25-CV-6781

:

CELESTINE C. MARTIN, et al., :

Defendants :

M E M O R A N D U M

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J. JULY 1, 2026

Currently, before the Court is an Amended Complaint (“AC” (ECF No. 9)) filed pro se by

Plaintiff Raymond Brown, a convicted prisoner currently incarcerated at SCI Dallas. The AC,

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserts alleged violations of Brown’s rights arising from his

arrest and subsequent prosecution on charges that he violated the terms of a protection from abuse

order. Brown asserts individual and official capacity claims against City of Philadelphia Police

Detectives Michael Acerenza and Michael Bransfield, and their assistant Celestine Martin. (Id. at

1.) For the reasons set forth, Brown’s official capacity claims are dismissed with prejudice for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the remainder constitutional

claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, and his state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Brown is granted leave to file

a second amended complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

The gravamen of Brown’s original Complaint is that he was arrested and tried on stalking

and related charges without probable cause, and the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor

giving rise to Fourth Amendment and related state law claims. Brown v. Detective Doe 1. No. 25-

6781, 2026 WL 659307, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2026). Upon statutory screening, the Court earlier

dismissed Brown’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims with prejudice for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at *6. His remaining constitutional claims

were dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim and his state law claims were

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Brown was granted leave

to file an amended complaint. Id. Brown now filed AC is ripe for screening.

In his AC, Brown alleges that on February 6, 2023, C.M., with whom he shares a child,

obtained a protection from abuse order (“PFA”) against him. (AC at 2.) Their child was added to

the PFA on August 23, 2024. (Id.) In September 2024, Martin provided Detectives Acerenza and

Bransfield with information suggesting that Brown had violated the PFA. (Id.) The information

included evidence that Brown had mailed letters to and called C.M. (Id.) On October 9, 2024,

based upon this information, the Defendants obtained an arrest warrant for Brown. (Id.) Brown

alleges that the information used to obtain the arrest warrant was false. (Id.) Specifically, he

alleges that one of the letters addressed to C.M. predated the PFA and that one letter addressed to

their child predated the child’s inclusion in the PFA. (Id.) Additionally, he alleges that the phone

1 Unless otherwise noted, the factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from

Brown’s AC (ECF No. 9). The Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system.

Where appropriate, grammar, spelling, and punctuation errors in Brown’s pleading will be corrected for

clarity. Additionally, the Court includes facts reflected in publicly available dockets, of which this Court

may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (courts

may consider “matters of public record” in determining whether a pleading has stated a claim).

calls described were made at 5 a.m. and 11 p.m., times when he did not have access to a telephone

because he was, on the date alleged, in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

and locked in his cell. (Id.)

Detectives Acerenza and Bransfield arrested Brown nearly a year after the warrant was

issued on August 17, 2025. (Id.) Upon hearing the nature of the charges against him, Brown

alleges that he experienced pain in his chest and head, shortness of breath, and emotional distress.

(Id. at 3.) He further alleges that Detectives Acerenza and Bransfield refused to provide him with

his blood pressure medication, although they were aware of his “medical issues.” (Id. at 2.) On

November 20, 2025, Detectives Acerenza and Martin testified at trial, allegedly falsely. (Id. at 3.)

Following trial, Brown was found not guilty of the charges against him. (Id.)

Brown claims that he was arrested and detained without probable cause because the

information used to obtain the arrest warrant was false. (Id.) Additionally, he claims that the

Defendants initiated the criminal proceedings against him without probable cause and with

malicious intent in an effort to retaliate against him, rather than to bring him to justice. (Id.) Brown

also alleges that he engaged in protected activity, including, writing letters and legal action, and

that the Defendants retaliated against him for this reason. (Id.) Brown asserts First, Sixth,2 and

Fourteenth Amendment claims, and state law claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process

and “unlawful restraint.” (Id. at 3-4.) He seeks money damages. (Id. at 4.)

2 Brown claims that the Defendants denied him a speedy and fair trial, in violation of his Sixth

Amendment rights. (AC at 3-4.) There are no facts in the AC describing conduct engaged in by the

Defendants that delayed Brown’s prosecution. (See AC.) Passing references to legal provisions are

insufficient to bring a plausible claim before the Court. See Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62

F.4th 755, 763 (3d Cir. 2023) (“A passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before

this court.”) (cleaned up) (quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy

Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994)). This claim will be dismissed.

The publicly available docket in the matter of Commonwealth v. Brown, MC-51-CR-

15255-2025 (C.P. Philadelphia) reflects that on August 18, 2025, Brown was arraigned on charges

of contempt for violation of an order or agreement, stalking – repeatedly commit acts to cause fear,

and violation of a protective order. (Id.) Following a trial on November 20, 2025, the contempt

charge was dismissed because of a speedy trial violation, the violation of protective order charge

was withdrawn, and Brown was found not guilty of stalking. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although Brown has paid the filing fee in full, because he is a prisoner, the Court has the

authority to screen his Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Shane v. Fauver,

213 F.3d 113, 116 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the district courts have the authority to

screen a prisoner complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) even if the prisoner is not proceeding in

forma pauperis). Section 1915A requires that the Court “review, before docketing, if feasible or,

in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a complaint ( an operative complaint) or

any portion thereof that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,” id. § 1915A(b)(1).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, the Court must

determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations

omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At this early stage of the litigation,

the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the

plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that amended complaint, liberally construed, contains facts

sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021),

abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024).

Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Brown is proceeding pro se, the

Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F. 4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021)

(citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). However, an

unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules that

apply to all other litigants.” Id.; see also Doe v. Allegheny Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024

WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (“While a court must liberally construe the allegations

and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it be name,’

Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an

advocate to identify any possible claim that the facts alleged could potentially support.”).

Moreover, “if the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

III. DISCUSSION

As noted, Brown asserts claims based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights. The

vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and/or laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs” to be

liable. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988); Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d

366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Personal involvement requires particular ‘allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.’” (quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207)). See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676 (explaining that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution”).

A. Official Capacity Claims

Brown asserts claims against the Defendants in their official capacities. (AC at 1.) As the

Court explained upon screening Brown’s initial Complaint, claims against municipal employees

in their official capacities are indistinguishable from claims against the governmental entity that

employs them, here the City of Philadelphia. Brown, 2026 WL 659307, at *3 (citing Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) and Monell v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

690, n. 55 (1978)). “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as

a suit against the entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-66. The Court explained that in order to state

an official capacity claim against the City of Philadelphia, Brown had to allege that a municipal

policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violations giving rise to his claims. Brown,

2026 WL 659307, at *3 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility,

318 F.3d 575, 583-84 (3d Cir. 2003)). The Court noted that the policy had to be identified

specifically, that Brown would be required to explain how the policy resulted in the constitutional

violations complained of, and that allegations that simply paraphrased the standard for municipal

liability, would be too vague and generalized to support an official capacity/Monell claim. Brown,

2026 WL 659307, at *3 (citations omitted).

Brown’s AC does not include any factual allegations describing any custom or policy of

the City of Philadelphia that resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Brown

has not stated plausible official capacity claims against the Defendants. These claims are

dismissed with prejudice because Brown has already had an opportunity to amend them, did not

state a plausible claim upon amendment, and so further amendment would be futile. Jones v.

Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transp. Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (amendment by

pro se litigant would be futile when litigant “already had two chances to tell his story”).

B. Deliberate Indifference Claims

Brown alleges that Defendants Acerenza and Bransfield “had knowledge of [his] medical

issues and refused [him] blood pressure medication.” (AC at 2.) The Court understands Brown

to be asserting a claim based on alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and

infers that the incident described occurred in the course of his arrest. This claim is not plausible.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that “[t]he Due Process Clause . . .

require[s] the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical care to persons

. . . who have been injured while being apprehended by the police.” City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.

Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Thus, “[d]eliberate indifference to the medical needs of arrestees

violates their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.” Smith v. Gransden, 553 F. App’x 173,

177 (3d Cir. 2014). To allege a claim for denial of medical treatment under the Fourteenth

Amendment, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a serious medical need; (2) behavior on the part of the

police officers that constitutes deliberate indifference to that need; and (3) a causal connection

between the indifference and the plaintiff’s injury. Pena v. City of Lancaster, 690 F. Supp. 3d 494,

512 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (citing Smith, 553 F. App’x at 177); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976); Natale, 318 F.3d at 582. “Deliberate indifference is a ‘subjective standard of liability

consistent with recklessness as that term is defined in criminal law.’” Smith, 553 F. App’x at 177

(quoting Natale, 318 F.3d at 582). Deliberate indifference exists where there is “objective

evidence that [a] plaintiff had serious need for medical care” and the need was ignored or delayed

for non-medical reasons. Id. “With respect to an arrestee, a police officer must provide medical

care to an individual who was injured during the course of an arrest when the need is so obvious

that a reasonably trained officer would recognize the necessity for attention.” Klein v. Madison,

374 F. Supp. 3d 389, 423 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (cleaned up). A serious medical need exists where “a

failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and unnecessary suffering, injury, or death,”

and the medical need “has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or . . . is so obvious

that a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Woloszyn v. County of

Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d

1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991)).

Brown’s single allegation that Detectives Acerenza and Bransfield refused to provide him

with medication is insufficient to support a plausible claim. Although he alleges that the

Defendants “had knowledge of [his] medical issues,” he does not identify the “medical issues”

giving rise to his need for medication, does not allege that the “medical issues” were diagnosed by

a physician as requiring medication, and does not identify the medication allegedly withheld. It is

thus unclear whether his “medical issues” constituted a serious medical need. Additionally, Brown

does not allege that the unidentified medication was even in the Defendants’ control at the time of

the incident, why the medication was withheld, or whether it was later provided. Moreover, he

does not describe the circumstances surrounding the incident such that the Court can determine

whether the Defendants’ alleged refusal to provide the medication rises to the level of deliberate

indifference. In these circumstances, Brown has failed to state a plausible deliberate indifference

claim and the claim will be dismissed, without prejudice. He will be granted leave to amend this

claim.

C. False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims

As noted, upon statutory screening of the initial complaint, the Court dismissed with

prejudice Brown’s Fourth Amendment false arrest and false imprisonment claims in light of the

fact that he alleged that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant obtained following an investigation.

See Brown, 2026 WL 659307, at *4. Brown, nonetheless, reasserted these claims in his AC, and

included additional facts in support of his claims. (See AC.) The Court construes Brown’s

reassertion of these claims as a request for reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of these claims

with prejudice.3 The Court grants Brown’s reconsideration request and will reconsider these

claims in light of the additional facts alleged in the AC.

In his AC, Brown alleges that Martin provided Detectives Acerenza and Bransfield with

information suggesting that Brown had violated the PFA, including evidence that Brown had

mailed letters to and called C.M. (AC at 2.) Based on this information, the Defendants obtained

an arrest warrant for Brown and later arrested him. (Id.) Brown alleges that the information that

Martin provided to Detectives Acerenza and Bransfield was false, and that as a result, the warrant

was not valid, and his arrest was not supported by probable cause. (Id. at 3.) Even as amended,

these claims are not plausible.

3 Notably, Brown filed a motion for reconsideration contemporaneously with his AC, requesting

reconsideration of the Court’s decision on statutory screening or permission to file an amended complaint.

(ECF No. 8.) The motion was denied as moot since he filed the AC. (ECF No. 10.) In light of the additional

facts alleged in the AC, the Court will reconsider its decision to dismiss with prejudice Brown’s false arrest

and false imprisonment claims. See United States ex rel. Schumann v. Astrazeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d

837, 848–89 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669,

677 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

59(e) to alter or amend a judgment, should be granted only where the moving party shows that at least one

of the following grounds is present: “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability

of new evidence that was not available when the court [made its initial decision]; or (3) the need to correct

a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”

The Fourth Amendment requires arrests, detentions, and prosecutions to be supported by

probable cause. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190 202-03 (3d Cir. 2020); Covington v. Plymouth

Twp. Police Dept., 779 F. Supp. 3d 509, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (“To state these claims under Section

1983, a plaintiff must ‘establish that: (1) there was an arrest; and (2) the arrest was made without

probable cause.’”) (quoting Saintil v. Borough of Carteret, No. 22-2898, 2024 WL 3565308, at *6

(3d Cir. July 29, 2024) (citing Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir.

1995))); see also Noviho v. Lancaster County, 683 F. App’x 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Fourth

Amendment false imprisonment and false arrest claims rise and fall on whether probable cause

existed for the arrest.” (citation omitted)). “Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair probability’ that

the person committed the crime at issue.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000).

Courts “consider the existence of probable cause via a ‘common sense approach’ based on the

totality of the circumstances and viewed from the perspective of an objectively reasonable police

officer.” Young v. City of Pittsburgh, 562 F. App’x 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal citation

omitted). The standard is “not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but

whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the

offense.” Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).

For the “lack of probable cause” element, where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant or

a previously sworn criminal complaint, a plaintiff must allege plausibly “(1) that the police officer

knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or

omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or

omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-

87 (quotation marks and citation omitted); Pinkney v. Meadville, Pennsylvania, 95 F.4th 743, 748

(3d Cir. 2024) (same); see also Evans v. Newark City, 152 F.4th 537, 545-47 (3d Cir. 2025)

(discussing “lack of probable cause” element). An omission is made with reckless disregard if it

were something a reasonable person would realize that the judge would want to know. Wilson,

212 F.3d. at 788. To determine whether an omission is material, the Court must predict whether a

reasonable judge would conclude that a corrected affidavit was insufficient to establish probable

cause. Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997); Pinkney, 95 F.4th at 748-49.

Brown alleges that the information provided by Detectives Acerenza and Bransfield when

they applied for the warrant was false. Significantly, however, he does not allege that they were

aware that the information was false when they applied for the warrant or when they arrested him.

Because he has not alleged that they “knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for

the truth, made false statements or omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant,”

he has not plausibly alleged that his arrest made pursuant to the warrant was without probable

cause. Accordingly, his false arrest and false imprisonment claims are not plausible and are

dismissed. Brown will be granted leave to amend this claim.

D. Malicious Prosecution Claims

Brown asserts Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims against the Defendants.

(Compl. at 2.) The Court previously dismissed this claim upon screening because Brown did not

allege that the proceedings were initiated without probable cause or that the Defendants acted

maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing him to justice. Brown, 2026 WL 659307, at *5.

Additionally, he did not allege that the information used to obtain the arrest warrant was false or

that he did not engage in the conduct giving rise to the charges against him. Id. In his AC, Brown

alleges that the information used to obtain the arrest warrant was false and that he did not engage

in the conduct giving rise to the charges against him. (AC at 2.) He claims that the proceedings

against him, accordingly, were initiated without probable cause, and that the Defendants acted

maliciously and for a purpose other than bringing him to justice. (Id. at 2, 3.) This claim, as

amended, is still not plausible.

To state a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege

that a government official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable seizure

of his person. Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 558 (2024) (citing Thompson v. Clark,

596 U. S. 36, 43, and n.2 (2022). A malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 has five elements:

(1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the

plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted

maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered

deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.

Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 82 (3d Cir. 2007). That a “valid” crime was also charged along

with the charge that ended in the plaintiff’s favor does not create a categorical bar to a claim.

Chiaverini, 602 U.S. at 562 (“The question here is whether a Fourth Amendment malicious-

prosecution claim may succeed when a baseless charge is accompanied by a valid charge. . . .

Consistent with both the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice, courts should

evaluate suits like Chiaverini’s charge by charge. (emphasis added)). A “favorable termination”

occurs when a prosecution ends “without a conviction.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49 (“In sum, we

hold that a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for malicious prosecution does not require the

plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of

innocence. A plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.”).

For the same reasons that he has not established the absence of probable cause element of

his false arrest and false imprisonment claims, Brown has not established that element with respect

to his malicious prosecution claims, either. This claim, accordingly, will be dismissed. Brown

will be granted another opportunity to amend this claim.

E. Retaliation Claims

Brown alleges that the Defendants initiated criminal proceedings against him in order to

retaliate against him, rather than to bring him to justice. (AC at 3.) He further alleges that they

retaliated against him, in violation of his First Amendment rights, when he engaged in protected

activity, including writing letters and pursuing legal action against them. (Id.) The Court

understands Brown to be asserting retaliatory arrest claims against the Defendants. These claims

are not plausible.

The First Amendment “prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to

retaliatory action, including criminal prosecution, for speaking out. Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S.

250, 256 (2006) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege:

“that he engaged in constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government responded with

retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity caused the retaliation.” George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d

562, 585 (3d Cir. 2013). Where the alleged retaliation results in arrest and prosecution, the plaintiff

must also show the absence of probable cause for the prosecution. Walker v. Clearfield Cnty. Dist.

Atty., 413 F. App’x. 481, 483 (3d Cir. 2011).

The Court notes first that this claim is conclusory and undeveloped. While Brown claims

that his arrest was retaliatory, he does not identify the protected conduct he engaged in that

prompted the arrest. He refers to pursuing legal action against the Defendants but does not identify

the legal action or state when he filed it. To the extent he refers to the current civil action, it was

filed after the criminal charges against him were dismissed and, therefore, could not have caused

the alleged retaliatory arrest or prosecution. Additionally, as with his false arrest and false

imprisonment claims, and his malicious prosecution claims, Brown has not plausibly alleged that

the Defendants lacked probable cause for arresting him and pursuing criminal proceedings against

him. Brown’s retaliation claims are dismissed. He will be granted leave to amend these claims.

F. State Law Claims

Because the Court has dismissed his federal claims, the Court will not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over Brown’s state law claims. As the Court

explained when screening Brown’s Complaint, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over his

state law claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in

which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and

costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” Brown, 2026 WL 659307, at *5. The Court

further explained that in order to plausibly allege the existence of complete diversity, Brown would

be required to allege the citizenship of the parties. Id. (citing Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652

F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011) (stating that an individual is a citizen of the state where he is

domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain); Pierro v.

Kugel, 386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he domicile of a prisoner before his

imprisonment presumptively remains his domicile during his imprisonment.”)).

Brown has not addressed the deficiencies with respect to citizenship identified by the Court

when it screened his Complaint. Again, he does not allege the citizenship of the parties. Rather,

he provides the address of SCI Dallas for himself but does not state where he was domiciled before

his imprisonment. (AC at 1.) He provides the address of the Philadelphia Police Department, 35th

District for Defendants Acerenza and Bransfield. (Id.) He provides a Philadelphia residential

address for Martin. (Id.) Once again, Brown has not sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse

for purposes of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to pursue.

These claims will be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because

he has already had an opportunity to cure this deficiency and has been unable to do so plausibly,

Brown will not be granted further leave to amend his state law claims. Jones, 944 F.3d at 483.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Brown’s official capacity claims are dismissed with prejudice

for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the remainder of his

constitutional claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim, and his state law claims are

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but without further leave to

amend.

An appropriate Order follows.

NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO, J.