French

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

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8 TONY FRENCH,

9 Plaintiff, Case No. C26-5230-TMC-SKV

10 v. ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE

11 CLALLAM BAY CORRECTIONS

CENTER ET AL.,

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Defendants.

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14 This is a pro se civil rights action proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Tony French

15 (“Plaintiff”) is currently confined at the Washington Corrections Center in Shelton, Washington.

16 He has submitted to the Court for filing a civil rights complaint in which he alleges he was

17 denied a specific work assignment based on his race while housed at Clallam Bay Corrections

18 Center. See Dkt. 1-1 at 8. The Court has now screened Plaintiff’s Complaint and has identified

19 deficiencies that Plaintiff must correct before this action may proceed. The Court therefore

20 declines to order that Plaintiff’s Complaint be served, but grants Plaintiff leave to file an

21 amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified below.

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1 I. BACKGROUND

2 Plaintiff seeks to bring claims against various individuals (“Defendants”): Julieann

3 Smith, Associate Superintendent; Adele Roman, Job Coordinator; Jaime Simmons, G Unit

4 Counselor; Kaci Paul, G/H CUS; Jerry McHaffie, Sergeant G/H; Russel Davis, Corrections

5 Officer G/H, Jeri Boe, Superintendent; J. Echeita, CPM; Eddie Reetz, Superintendent; Cheryl

6 Hatt, CI Laundry; Judy Brown, CI Laundry; and Jesse Pearson, H Unit Counselor. See id. at 3–

7 7. Plaintiff’s proposed Complaint consists of two counts asserting violations of the Fourteenth

8 and Eighth Amendments for alleged race-based denial of a specific work assignment sought by

9 Plaintiff. See id. at 8, 19. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 23.

10 Plaintiff alleges that he is a Black inmate and worked in the Clallam Bay Corrections

11 Center laundry for approximately one year. See id. at 8–9. He alleges that, on July 1, 2025, he

12 sent a message to Defendant Roman, Job Coordinator, to ask that she “open . . . [his] referral for

13 all jobs[,]” and she did so. Id. at 9. Plaintiff further alleges that he spoke with Defendants

14 McHaffie, Sergeant G/H, and Davis, Corrections Officer G/H, to get hired as a G/H Corridor

15 Porter when that job became available. See id. He avers that Defendant McHaffie advised him

16 to have his supervisors in the laundry, Defendants Brown and Hatt, drop him from the laundry so

17 he could be hired. See id. Plaintiff states he was dropped from the laundry and hired by

18 Defendant Davis as a G/H Corridor Porter.1 See id. Just as Plaintiff commenced work,

19 Defendant Davis asked him to visit Defendant Simmons, the G Unit Counselor. See id. at 10.

20 When he did so, Defendant Simmons informed Plaintiff that he could not have the G/H Corridor

21 Porter position because such “inside unit jobs” were reserved for inmates who could not work

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1 As discussed below, Plaintiff also alleges that he was not dropped from the laundry because he had to provide

notice and have a supervisor complete certain paperwork. See Dkt. 1-1 at 11.

1 outside the unit. See id. As Plaintiff could work outside the unit, Defendant Simmons offered

2 Plaintiff alternative jobs. See id.

3 Plaintiff alleges that he then spoke to Defendant Davis about the issue, and Defendant

4 Davis informed him that he would speak with Defendant McHaffie and Defendant Pearson, H

5 Unit Coordinator, and Defendant Paul, G/H CUS, about Plaintiff being able to have the job. See

6 id. at 11. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Davis told him that Defendants McHaffie, Simmons,

7 Pearson, and Paul were all onboard with Plaintiff having the G/H Corridor Porter job. See id.

8 Plaintiff then sent a message to Defendant Roman asking her to “please open up my refer[al] for

9 staff kitchen, and the janitor position here and every other job also please take me of[f] the call

10 out for laundry[.]” Id. After following up about being dropped from the laundry, Plaintiff

11 alleges that Defendant Roman told him that he would need to provide notice to his supervisors

12 and have them complete certain paperwork. See id. He also states that Defendant McHaffie told

13 him that Defendant Roman was “the issue” for not opening Plaintiff’s referral for the G/H

14 Corridor Porter job. Id.

15 Plaintiff alleges that a white inmate, “John Doe,” who previously worked with Plaintiff in

16 the laundry and had a similar prison record began working as the G/H Corridor Porter. See id. at

17 12, 14–16. During follow-up communications with Defendant Roman, Plaintiff asserts that she

18 told him she could not open his referral for the G/H Corridor Porter job and explained that

19 “[i]ndividuals that are minimum custody and are approved to work outside of the unit will no

20 longer be able to work unit positions. Unit positions are considered entry level positions.” Id. at

21 13.

22 Plaintiff complained of racial discrimination. See id. at 15. He sent a message to

23 Defendant Roman to ask if it was true that she opened a referral for a white man to get the G/H

1 Corridor Porter job. See id. Defendant Roman responded, “This was at the direction of

2 Associate [Superintendent] Smith. I do not discriminate against anyone.” Id. Plaintiff then sent

3 a message to Defendant Smith asking why he was discriminated against. See id. Defendant

4 Smith responded that the intent was to ensure individuals who cannot obtain employment outside

5 of their units or require closer supervision had employment opportunities, that she was not

6 familiar with Plaintiff’s situation, and that he should speak to Defendant McHaffie about in-unit

7 jobs. See id. Defendant McHaffie referred Plaintiff to Defendant Davis, who Plaintiff alleges

8 told him that “they hired or trying [sic] to hire a white inmate[]” for the G/H Corridor Porter

9 position. Id. at 15–16. Plaintiff was offered other positions and ultimately “decide[d] to be a

10 rec. proter [sic] in the gym[.]” Id. at 16. Plaintiff filed various complaints about the incident,

11 and Defendant Echeita, CPM, interviewed him. See id.

12 II. DISCUSSION

13 A. Legal Standards

14 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, the Court is required to screen

15 complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or

16 employee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of

17 the complaint, if the complaint[:] (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

18 relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

19 relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

20 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

21 Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order for a pleading to

22 state a claim for relief it must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

23 jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,

1 and a demand for the relief sought. The statement of the claim must be sufficient to “give the

2 defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

3 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The factual allegations of a complaint must be

4 “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

5 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In addition, a complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief

6 that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

7 In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that

8 (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute,

9 and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See

10 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The causation requirement of § 1983

11 is satisfied only if a plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in

12 another’s affirmative act, or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that

13 caused the deprivation complained of. See Arnold v. IBM, 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981)

14 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The inquiry into causation

15 must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant

16 whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v.

17 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). Vicarious liability may not be imposed on a

18 supervisory employee for the acts of their subordinates in an action brought under § 1983. See

19 Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). A

20 supervisor may, however, be held liable under § 1983 “if he or she was personally involved in

21 the constitutional deprivation or a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor’s

22 unlawful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646,

23 653 (9th Cir. 2001).

1 B. Deficiencies

2 1. Improper Defendants

3 Plaintiff makes no allegations against Defendant Boe, Superintendent, or Defendant

4 Reetz, Superintendent. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his claims against these supervisory

5 Defendants, he must allege facts showing that each was personally involved in the constitutional

6 deprivations or that a sufficient causal connection exists between those supervisors’ unlawful

7 conduct and the constitutional violation.

8 2. Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment Claims

9 Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal

10 protection and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment

11 because a white inmate got a job for which Plaintiff was rejected. Plaintiff’s allegations in

12 support of those claims do not suffice.

13 First, Plaintiff’s allegations against various Defendants do not indicate wrongdoing or

14 support his claims. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Simmons merely informed him of the “inside

15 unit” jobs policy and that Defendants McHaffie and Davis supported his candidacy and spoke to

16 Defendants Pearson and Paul to advocate for him. Plaintiff alleges that Pearson and Paul

17 supported him having the job. The only alleged act by Defendant Echeita is interviewing

18 Plaintiff after Plaintiff filed complaints. With respect to Defendants Hatt and Brown, Plaintiff

19 makes contradictory allegations regarding whether he was dropped from his job in the laundry.

20 None of these acts by any of these Defendants were discriminatory, and many were favorable or

21 neutral to Plaintiff, not harmful. Only the individuals who caused or personally participated in

22 causing harm alleged in the Complaint may be identified as defendants. If Plaintiff submits an

23 amended complaint, he must remedy these defects by setting forth facts demonstrating when,

1 where, and how each Defendant personally participated in causing violations of his constitutional

2 rights.

3 Second, Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Smith and Roman are conclusory and

4 do not indicate racially discriminatory intent. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Smith and Roman

5 prevented him from getting his desired work assignment pursuant to a policy that purported to

6 reserve in-unit jobs for inmates restricted to their units and inmates that required more

7 supervision. Plaintiff concludes that Defendants Smith and Roman allowed a similarly situated

8 white inmate to be hired instead of Plaintiff due to Plaintiff’s race.

9 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from

10 denying to “any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.

11 Const. amend. XIV, § 1. To state an equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must show that the

12 defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon

13 membership in a protected class.” Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194–95 (citations omitted). That is,

14 a plaintiff must show defendants engaged in the acts alleged because the plaintiff belongs to

15 an identifiable, protected group or class. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1986)

16 (racial discrimination). Alternatively, under a “class of one” theory, a plaintiff must show

17 defendants “intentionally treated him differently from others similarly situated and that there is

18 no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562,

19 564 (2000).

20 Plaintiff identifies a rational, nondiscriminatory policy that disqualified him from his

21 desired work assignment and notes a host of alternative jobs offered to him. In support of his

22 assertion that the white inmate hired as G/H Corridor Porter was similarly situated to him, he

23 relies only on his opinion that “John Doe” had a similar prison record and had worked in the

1 laundry at some point. Plaintiff puts forth no allegations that plausibly indicate that, at the time

2 “John Doe” was hired, he was similarly situated to Plaintiff or that the in-unit jobs policy was a

3 pretext for discriminating against him. Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Davis told him that

4 “they hired or trying [sic] to hire a white inmate[]” for the G/H Corridor Porter position does not

5 indicate whether Defendants Smith and Roman, or any other named Defendants, made the hiring

6 decision at issue. Id. at 16. It also does not indicate whether any Defendants sought to hire a

7 white inmate over qualified inmates of other races. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended

8 complaint, he must allege facts that demonstrate the Defendants acted with racially

9 discriminatory intent.

10 The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty upon prison officials to provide humane

11 conditions of confinement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). This duty

12 includes ensuring that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and

13 taking reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates. See id. In order to establish an

14 Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must satisfy a two-part test containing both an

15 objective and a subjective component. The Eighth Amendment standard requires proof that: (1)

16 the alleged wrongdoing was objectively “harmful enough” to establish a constitutional violation;

17 and (2) the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. at 834.

18 The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is “contextual and responsive

19 to ‘contemporary standards of decency.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)

20 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). The state of mind requirement under the

21 subjective component of the Eighth Amendment standard has been defined as “deliberate

22 indifference” to an inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the “deliberate

23 indifference” standard, a prison official cannot be found liable for denying an inmate humane

1 conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

2 health or safety. Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

3 could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

4 inference.” Id.

5 Plaintiff relies upon the same allegations in support of his Eighth Amendment claim as

6 his equal protection claim. See Dkt. 1-1 at 19. He does not allege acts by any defendants that

7 threatened his health or safety and thus has not met the above standard. If Plaintiff chooses to

8 file an amended complaint relying on the same allegations, he should not include a claim under

9 the Eighth Amendment.

10 III. CONCLUSION

11 Because of the deficiencies identified above, the Court declines to direct that Plaintiff’s

12 Complaint be served on Defendants. However, Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended

13 complaint curing the above noted deficiencies within thirty (30) days of the date on which this

14 Order is signed. Plaintiff must ensure that any amended complaint carries the same case number

15 as his original Complaint. If no amended complaint is timely filed, or if Plaintiff fails to correct

16 the deficiencies identified above, the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed

17 pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

18 Plaintiff is advised that an amended pleading operates as a complete substitute for an

19 original pleading. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hal Roach

20 Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990)). Thus, any

21 amended complaint must clearly identify each intended Defendant, the constitutional claim(s)

22 asserted against each Defendant, the specific facts and actions by each Defendant which Plaintiff

23 believes support each claim, and the specific relief requested.

1 While Plaintiff lists Clallam Bay Corrections Center in the case caption, he does not list

2 the facility as a defendant or bring any claims against it. See Dkt. 1-1 at 1, 3, 5–7. The Clerk is

3 directed to remove Clallam Bay Corrections Center from the docket and case caption. The Clerk

4 is further directed to send Plaintiff the appropriate forms so that he may file an amended

5 complaint. Finally, the Clerk shall send copies of this order to the parties and to the Honorable

6 Tiffany M. Cartwright.

7 Dated this 2nd day of April, 2026.

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S. KATE VAUGHAN

10 United States Magistrate Judge

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