Veguilla

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

JAYSON PEREZ VEGUILLA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-3114-JLB-TGW

NAPHCARE, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, Jayson

Perez Veguilla’s amended complaint (Doc. 10), which is before the Court for initial

screening. After careful review, the Court dismisses the amended complaint with

leave to amend because it does not state a claim on which relief may be granted

against some defendants.

I. Screening Standard

A prisoner who seeks to proceed in forma pauperis in federal court will have

his complaint screened in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (“The court shall review, before docketing,

if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a

civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer

or employee of a governmental entity.”). This screening procedure requires the

court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action before service of process if it determines

may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from

such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)−(iii); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

The rules governing dismissals for failure to state a claim under the

screening statutes are largely the same as those under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.

1997). And under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint “does not need detailed factual

allegations,” but it must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). A complaint may not rest on “‘naked assertions[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Likewise, a complaint may be

dismissed as frivolous when the Court discerns from its face “that the factual

allegations are clearly baseless or that the legal theories are indisputably

meritless.” Davis v. Kvalheim, 261 F. App’x 231, 235 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

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Plaintiff asserts the following:1 On October 30, 2024, while detained in

Manatee County Jail in his cell, Plaintiff had intense chest pain with pain running

down his arm. (Doc. 10-1 at 1). He pushed the emergency call button in his cell

to request help from the control room operator. (Id.). After twenty minutes,

Plaintiff pushed the button again because no one had responded. (Id.). After ten

more minutes, Plaintiff’s pain increased, and he exited his cell and went to the “day

room” where he pressed another emergency button and started banging on the

“main door.” (Id. at 1-2).

Plaintiff continued to bang on the door when he saw Deputy Mecca escorting

another prisoner. (Id. at 2). Deputy Mecca asked Plaintiff what was wrong, and

Plaintiff told him that his chest was hurting. (Id.). Deputy Mecca had the

control room operator open the door and told Plaintiff to sit down. (Id.). Deputy

Mecca then escorted Plaintiff to the medical unit. (Id. at 3).

When they arrived at the medical unit, Nurse Sterling told Plaintiff to sit

down on a bench. (Id.). Plaintiff sat there for “several” minutes while yelling

that his neck, back, chest, teeth, and arms hurt, and his “breath was out of control.”

1 At the screening stage, the Court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations (but not its

legal conclusions) as true and considers them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See

Williams v. Board of Regents, 477 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007).

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Nurse Sterling was ignoring him, Plaintiff began yelling that he could not breathe

and was going to faint. (Id.). Nurse Sterling told Plaintiff to “quiet down” and

that he just “had gas.” (Id.).

Nurse Watters walked down the hallway and noticed that Plaintiff was

sweating. (Id.). She took Plaintiff’s blood pressure, which was high. (Id.). She

brought Plaintiff to the “EKG Room.” (Id.). Nurse Watters noticed that the EKG

machine’s wires were tangled and asked Nurse Sterling and Dr. Quillian for help.

(Id.). However, Nurse Sterling said she needed to go to the restroom, and Dr.

Quillian ignored Nurse Watters. (Id.). Ms. Sterling returned and told Plaintiff to

“stop faking it.” (Id. at 4).

Deputy Corsy escorted Plaintiff to a bench where Plaintiff “died.” (Id.).

Plaintiff awoke in an ambulance, where he “died twice.” (Id.). Plaintiff had a

heart attack and was resuscitated three times. (Doc. 10 at 5). Plaintiff had two

stents placed in his arteries and requires heart medication for the remainder of his

life. (Id.).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff names as defendants Dr. Quillian, Nurse Sterling, and Naphcare,

the private company that provides medical services to Manatee County Jail. (Doc.

10 at 2-3). He contends that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

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and committed medical malpractice. (Doc. 10 at 3, 5; Doc. 10-1 at 4).

A. NaphCare

NaphCare “performs a function traditionally within the exclusive prerogative

of the state” and “becomes the functional equivalent” of the county under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 1997). However, NaphCare

cannot be liable for its employees’ acts merely on a theory of respondeat superior.

Scala v. City of Winter Park, 116 F.3d 1396, 1399 (11th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff must

show some affirmative link or connection between NaphCare’s actions and the

claimed deprivation or show that a constitutional violation occurred or was caused

by a NaphCare policy or custom. See Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Social Services, 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff alleges that NaphCare employs Nurse Sterling and

Dr. Quillian, and they delayed or denied him medical care for his serious medical

need. These allegations are insufficient to show that a NaphCare policy or custom

caused the alleged constitutional violation. Consequently, Plaintiff fails to state a

claim against NaphCare.

B. Dr. Quillian and Nurse Sterling

Plaintiff contends that Dr. Quillian and Nurse Sterling were deliberately

indifferent to his serious medical needs and committed medical malpractice.

Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate medical care under the Due Process

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1574 (11th Cir. 1985). The minimum standard of medical care required by the

Due Process Clause is identical to the standard for convicted persons under the

Eighth Amendment. Id. Accordingly, to prevail on a section 1983 claim for

inadequate medical care, a pretrial detainee must demonstrate that jail officials

acted with deliberate indifference to the detainee’s medical needs. Goebert v. Lee

Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976)).

To state a claim of deliberate indifference for the deprivation or denial of

medical attention, a prisoner must allege: (1) a serious medical need; (2) deliberate

indifference to that need by the defendant; and (3) causation between the

defendant’s indifference and the plaintiff’s injury. Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d

557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010). The Eleventh Circuit has clarified that, to establish

subjective deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted

with the type of “subjective recklessness” defined in criminal law. Wade v.

McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1262 (11th Cir. 2024). And to do so, the plaintiff must

show that the defendant “was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct

caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Id. The court further

clarified that even if the defendant was aware of a risk of serious harm to the

plaintiff, he still could not be liable under the Eighth Amendment if he responded

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not every allegation of inadequate medical treatment states a constitutional

violation. “[I]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate

medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of

pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-

106 (internal quotation marks omitted). And “a complaint that a physician has

been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid

claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice

does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”

Id. at 106.

Here, the only allegation Plaintiff makes about Dr. Quillian is that he

ignored Nurse Watters when she asked him and Nurse Sterling to help her with

the tangled wires on the EKG machine. (Doc. 10-1 at 3). The allegation fails to

show that Dr. Quillian knew Plaintiff was having symptoms of a heart attack and

ignored those symptoms. Thus, the allegation is insufficient to show that Dr.

Quillian knew that Plaintiff suffered from a substantial risk of serious harm, yet

callously and deliberately chose to disregard that knowledge so that he could

withhold treatment.2

2 Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to show that Nurse Sterling knew of Plaintiff’s symptoms

and complaints but delayed treatment. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, there are sufficient

allegations supporting Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Nurse Sterling.

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against Defendants, Chapter 766 of the Florida Statutes “imposes certain notice

and presuit screening requirements” on plaintiffs who wish to bring “medical

malpractice and medical negligence actions.” J.B. v. Sacred Heart Hosp. of

Pensacola, 635 So. 2d 945, 948 (Fla. 1994); see also Fla. Stat § 766.106(2)–(3).

Compliance with these requirements is considered a condition precedent for filing a

medical malpractice action. See Ingersoll v. Hoffman, 589 So. 2d 223, 224 (Fla.

1991). The remedy for failing to comply with Chapter 766 depends on the timing

of the case. If the two-year statute of limitations for bringing a medical

malpractice claim has not yet elapsed, Florida courts may dismiss with leave to

amend—that is, with leave to properly comply with the requirements (or to allege

that they complied). See Fla. Stat. § 95.11(4)(b); Groover v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 460 F. Supp. 3d 1242, 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2020) (citing S. Neurosurgical

Assocs., P.A. v. Fine, 591 So. 2d 252, 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)). But if the

limitations period has expired, leave to amend would be futile. See Johnson v.

McNeil, 278 F. App’x 866, 872 (11th Cir. 2008).

Because Plaintiff has failed to allege that he complied with the presuit

requirements of Chapter 766, his medical malpractice claim must be dismissed

without prejudice. See Russoniello v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 2009 WL

10670810, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2009) (“If a court finds that a claimant has not

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Statutes instructs the court to dismiss the action”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly:

1. The amended complaint (Doc. 10) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

a. If Plaintiff wishes to amend his allegations to remedy the noted

deficiencies, he shall file a second amended complaint within THIRTY DAYS of the

date of this order.

b. To amend his complaint, Plaintiff must complete a new civil rights

complaint form titled “Second Amended Complaint.” The second amended

complaint must include all of Plaintiff’s claims and may not refer to or incorporate

the original complaint or the amended complaint. The second amended complaint

shall supersede all prior complaints. Malowney v. Fed. Collection Deposit Grp.,

193 F.3d 1342, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).

c. The second amended complaint shall be subject to initial screening under

28 U.S.C. § 1915.

2. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint within thirty days or

fails to seek an extension of time, this action will proceed on the amended

complaint solely on Plaintiff’s claim that Nurse Sterling violated his rights under

the Fourteenth Amendment.

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3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail to Plaintiff a copy of both the standard

civil rights complaint form and this order.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on May 6, 2026.

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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