Woolsey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

TIMOTHY RYAN WOOLSEY, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v. No. 4:25-cv-0788-P

NORTHWEST INDEPENDENT SCHOOL

DISTRICT, ET AL.,

Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Northwest Independent School

District (“NWISD”), Michelle McAdams (“McAdams”), Erin O’Shea

Johnson (“Johnson”) and Mark Foust (“Foust”) (together, “Defendants”)

Motions for Summary Judgment (“Motions”). ECF No. 53, 55, and 58.

Having reviewed the Motions, the docket, and the applicable law, the

Court will DENY the Motions.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a dispute between Defendants and Plaintiffs

concerning administrators at Kay Granger Elementary School,

McAdams and Johnson, picking up, carrying, and then dropping a

special needs student (R.W.W.) on the ground during the school day.

ECF No. 78–1 at 9. R.W.W. had kicked another student, and McAdams

and Johnson were called to remove him from the classroom. ECF No. 60

at 4. While at first R.W.W. complied with the administrators, he soon

refused to continue going to McAdam’s office, and after 5 minutes of

sitting on the ground, he attempted to return to the classroom. Id. At 9.

McAdams and Johnson claim they needed to take more physical action

because R.W.W. began to kick McAdams and had a history of returning

to hit students he had previously injured. Id. They thus picked him up

and dragged him to the office in a manner which left bruising,

fingerprint marks, welts, and a scratch on his body. ECF No. 78–1 at 9.

McAdams and Johnson also prevented R.W.W. from attending a

scheduled counseling session, with Johnson stating that R.W.W. was not

deserving of it. Id. at 10. R.W.W. was also placed in In-School

Suspension multiple times, excluding him from educational activities.

Id. at 16.

The Woolseys are not the only family to claim other instances of

abuse from the administration at Kay Granger Elementary School (“Kay

Granger”). Id. One family claims their son started self-harming in

response to emotional damage he suffered at Kay Granger. Id. Another

family claimed that McAdams was more concerned with protecting

teachers than taking care of their son. Id. Notably, NWISD let multiple

employees’ work despite lacking de-escalation training or whose

training lapsed. Id. At 24. Faculty were also not trained on how to

properly transport children prior to the 2023-24 school year. Id

Plaintiffs now sue Defendants for disability discrimination under

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, as well as Fourteenth Amendment due process

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 9. Defendants move for summary

judgment claiming that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under Fee v.

Herndon, state law and Qualified Immunity. ECF No. 60; ECF No. 56 at

1; ECF No. 54 at 1. Based on the facts of the case, Plaintiffs argue there

is sufficient questions of material fact to deny summary judgment. The

Court agrees.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on

file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). “[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are

material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct.

2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if

the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

non-moving party.” Id. The movant makes a showing that there is no

genuine issue of material fact by informing the court of the basis of its

motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there

are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The pleadings,

depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that

no genuine issue of material fact exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Once the movant makes this showing, the non-movant must then

direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to

establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323–24. To carry this burden, the “opponent

must do more than simply show ... some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Instead,

the non-movant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a

resolution of the factual issue in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to

the motion's opponent, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)),

neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will

satisfy the non-movant's summary judgment burden. Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc); Topalian v.

Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.1992). Summary judgment in

favor of the movant is proper if, after adequate time for discovery, the

motion's opponent fails to establish the existence of an element essential

to his case and as to which he will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

Generally, the pleadings of a plaintiff who is proceeding pro se must

be liberally construed in his favor. See Hurd v. Doe, 2003 WL 21640569,

3 (N.D.Tex. July 10, 2003). However, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, the Court does not have an obligation to “‘sift through

the record in search of evidence’ to support the nonmovant's opposition

to the motion for summary judgment.” Crane v. Bowles, 2004 WL

1057771, at 1 (N.D.Tex. May 6, 2004) (quoting Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d

1527, 1533 (5th Cir.1994)). Instead, “the party opposing summary

judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to

articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his

claim.” Id. (citing Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458

(5th Cir.1998)).

ANALYSIS

As the Fifth Circuit recognized in Crane, “the party opposing

summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record

and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his

claim”. Id. Accordingly, this analysis proceeds in analyzing Plaintiff’s

claimed material issues to determine if there are sufficient questions of

material facts when viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs. The

Court will address each in turn.

First, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants discriminatorily denied

R.W.W access to his protected rights to counseling and other educational

services. ECF No. 78–1 at 12. To establish a case of discrimination under

the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he is a qualified

individual under the ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from

participation in, or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or

activities for which the public entity is responsible or is otherwise being

discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such denial of

benefits or discrimination is by reason of his disability. See Wilson v.

City of Southlake, 935 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2019). Defendants concede

prong one, but argue prongs two and threecannot be satisfied by

Plaintiff. ECF No. 60 at 45-46. However, Defendants knew of R.W.W.’s

disability and denied services on the day of the incident and multiple

times after. ECF No. 78–1 at 14. In fact, R.W.W.’s school therapist

testified that Johnson claimed his therapy was a privilege, which he did

not deserve given his conduct. Id. A reasonable jury could find that these

instances are sufficient to meet prong two, and which creates a material

question.

Defendants claim prong three cannot be established because

McAdams and Johnson say they did not treat R.W.W. as they did by

reason of his disability, but instead would have treated any child

similarly given his behavior. ECF No. 60 at 46. While this might be true,

Plaintiff’s argument that intentionality is a jury question is persuasive.

ECF No. 78–1 at 16. Moreover, Plaintiffs cite multiple incidents when

R.W.W. was placed in In-School Suspension instead of being provided

with accommodations requested by his therapist. Id. The Court finds

this raises a sufficient question of material fact where reasonable juries

could conclude that Defendants intended to deprive R.W.W. of services

by reason of his disability.

Second, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C §

1983 for violating R.W.W.’s rights to bodily integrity pursuant to an

unconstitutional policy that NWISD adopted or knew was widespread.

Id. At 20. Plaintiffs cite multiple families’ testimonies that allege abuses

of other students as evidence that there is widespread practice of

violating student’s constitutional rights to bodily integrity. Id. At 21.

Defendants argue that under Fee, students cannot sue for injuries

sustained through excessive corporal punishment if the punishment

occurred in a disciplinary, pedagogical setting and state law provides

adequate remedies. ECF No. 60 at 17; Fee v. Herndon 900 F.2d 804, 808

–10 (5th Circ.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990). The Court concludes

that a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether McAdam's

and Johnson's actions were disciplinary in nature or instead constituted

the use of improper de-escalation or transportation techniques outside

the classroom. See ECF No. 78–1 at 27. Because determining whether

the actions were disciplinary turns, at least in part, on questions of

intent, the issue is not appropriate for resolution at summary judgment.

See id. at 28. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, including the family testimony and evidence regarding the de-

escalation techniques employed, a reasonable jury could find in

Plaintiff's favor on this issue.

Regarding adequate state law civil remedies, Plaintiffs argue Texas

law does not provide adequate relief, since liability is only available

under a finding of employee negligence or excessive force Id. at 28.

Plaintiffs argue that under § 22.0511 negligence is a question of material

fact, which should go to a jury. Id.. Moreover, Plaintiffs cite Groden v.

City of Dallas, which states that juries should be left to decide whether

an authorized policymaker has promulgated an unconstitutional policy.

Groden v. City of Dallas 826 F.3d 280, 12 (55 Cir. 2016).

Third, Plaintiffs claim that NWISD failed to adequately train

McAdams and Johnson, which constitutes “official policy” if it amounts

to deliberate indifference under Littel. ECF No. 78—1 at 22; Little v Hous.

Indep. Sch. Dist. 28 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2018). Plaintiffs cite multiple

employees whose de-escalation training had lapsed or were not certified.

Id. At 24. Moreover, Plaintiffs cite that faculty were not trained on how

to properly transport children prior to the 2023-24 school year. Id. These

facts, reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that NWISD acted with

deliberate indifference in failing to train its employees.

Fifth, Defendants claim qualified immunity for their transportation

of R.W.W. ECF No. 60 at 18. The Supreme Court in Hope v Pelzer, note

that in “obvious cases” the unlawfulness of an official’s conduct is

sufficiently clear even if existing precedent does not address similar

circumstances. ECF No. 78-3 at 19; See Hope v Pezler, 536 U.S. 730,

738, (2002). Here, there is a legitimate, material question if handling a

special needs student in a manner which leaves bruising, welts, and

scratching is clearly unlawful.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that genuine issues of

material fact exist with respect to Defendants Motion for Summary

Judgment. Accordingly, Defendants Motions for Summary Judgment

are DENIED.

SO ORDERED on this 26th day of June 2026.

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE