Parks

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

:

TAJMIR PARKS and ROSELMY RODRIGUEZ, : CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiffs, :

: No. 25-cv-263-JMY

v. :

:

PA STATE TROOPER ROBERTO ARIAS- :

GARCIA, et. al., :

Defendants. :

:

MEMORANDUM

Younge, J. June 24, 2026

When on a routine patrol, Pennsylvania State Police Troopers Anthony Lannutti

(“Lannutti”) and Roberto Arias-Garcia (“Arias-Garcia”) (collectively, “Defendants”) ran the

license plate of a Ford Taurus and discovered the car was registered to a woman with an active

warrant for a violent felony. Defendants initiated a high risk stop, which involved cutting off the

Taurus, drawing their guns, and handcuffing the vehicle’s occupants, Tajmir Parks (“Parks”) and

Roselmy Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). After several minutes, Defendants

confirmed that neither Plaintiff was the target of their search and released both of them. Plaintiffs

have brought suit, claiming that Defendants’ conduct constituted excessive force and false

imprisonment in violation of Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. Currently before this Court is

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 25 (“Motion”), as well as various filings in

support of and in opposition to that Motion, ECF Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33.1 While this Court

1 When applicable, the Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing

system, which does not always match the document’s internal pagination.

understands that Plaintiffs allege they suffered substantial trauma and other injuries as a result of

this unfortunate incident, Defendants’ Motion is granted because the doctrine of qualified

immunity shields Defendants from liability in this suit.2

I. Background

A. Factual Background3

This case arises from Defendants’ stop of Plaintiffs’ vehicle and Defendants’ treatment of

Plaintiffs during that stop, which Plaintiffs allege constituted excessive force and false

imprisonment.

1. Defendants Identify Vehicle Registered to Person with Active Warrant

On the evening of February 24, 2023, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Anthony Lannutti

was on a routine patrol on Interstate 76 Eastbound (“I-76”) near Upper Merion, Pennsylvania. ECF

No. 25-1 (“Def. SMF”) ¶ 1. Lannutti observed a Ford Taurus driving ahead of him. Id. ¶ 4. Lannutti

ran the Taurus’ license plate, as is routine while on patrol, and discovered that the vehicle was

registered to Rhonda Alvin (“Alvin”) and Tajmir Parks. Id. ¶ 7; ECF No. 30 (“Pl. Resp. to Def.

SMF”) ¶ 7. Lannutti saw that Alvin had an active warrant issued by the Philadelphia Police

Department for aggravated assault involving the use of a firearm, a serious felony warrant. Def.

SMF ¶ 7. A flag indicated that Alvin was “armed and dangerous” and owned two firearms, despite

her permit to carry those firearms having been revoked. Id. According to Plaintiffs, Lannutti’s

computer system also would have alerted Lannutti to the fact that Alvin was a 43-year-old black

female with a head tattoo. Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 5.

2 The Court finds this Motion appropriate for resolution without oral argument. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7.1(f).

3 The information provided in this section comes from the parties’ statements of fact that

have not been disputed by the other party. Disputed facts are indicated as such.

2. Defendants Execute a Stop of the Vehicle

At 6:56 PM, Lannutti sent a radio transmission requesting backup. Def. SMF ¶ 8. Lannutti

considered the stop to be “high risk” because its purpose was to apprehend an offender with a

warrant for a violent crime using a firearm and because the offender was said to be “armed and

dangerous” and may unlawfully have been in possession of firearms. Id. Trooper Arias-Garcia

arrived at Lannutti’s area shortly thereafter. Id. ¶ 9.

Mobile Video Recorder (“MVR”) footage from Lannutti’s vehicle shows that Lannutti

moved from the left lane, behind the Taurus, to the right lane, and drove parallel to the Taurus. Id.

¶ 10. The parties agree that it “was dark out,” Id. ¶ 5, and the Taurus’ windows were “up” and

“dark,” but the nature and extent of tint and what was observable within the Taurus are in dispute,

Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 4. According to Defendants, Lannutti tried to determine who was in the

Taurus. Def. SMF ¶ 11. He could see that the Taurus was occupied by a male driver and a female

passenger, but he could not determine the occupants’ ages, races, or ethnicities or whether Alvin

was in the vehicle. Id. Plaintiffs counter that Lannutti did not make reasonable efforts to determine

the Taurus’ occupants and merely looked once through the passenger side window while driving.

Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 11.

Lannutti activated his lights and sirens and entered the left lane ahead of the Taurus, where

he stopped and reversed to get closer to the Taurus. Def. SMF ¶¶ 13–14. Arias-Garcia also

activated his lights and parked his vehicle behind the Taurus, so as to block the Taurus in. Id. ¶¶

13, 15. No Precision Immobilization Technique (“PIT”) was attempted, though Plaintiffs assert

they felt threatened by the possibility of such a maneuver, Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 16, and that the

stop “almost caused” a vehicle collision, ECF 29 (“Pl. Opp’n Br.”) ¶ 10.

The MVR captures Lannutti’s observations until he parked in front of the Taurus and

thereafter shows the front-facing view of the roadway ahead of Lannutti’s vehicle. Def. SMF ¶ 17.

Thus, after Lannutti parked, the MVR contributes only partially discernable audio of the

Defendants’ interaction with Plaintiffs. See Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 17.

3. Defendants Order Plaintiffs Out of the Vehicle

Lannutti exited his vehicle and said, “let me see your hands.” Def. SMF ¶ 18. Lannutti

ordered the occupants to show their hands for safety reasons. Id. Lannutti gave the occupants

multiple commands to put their hands out the car windows. Id. Lannutti wanted to make sure that

neither had a weapon, and that he would be able to see if either reached for one. Id. Defendants

then approached the Taurus with their guns drawn. Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 19. Lannutti

approached the passenger, Rodriguez, while Arias-Garcia approached the driver, Parks. Def. SMF

¶ 20.

Arias-Garcia ordered Parks out of the Taurus and handcuffed him. Def. SMF ¶ 21.

According to Plaintiffs, Arias-Garcia did so “aggressively” by “pull[ing] and dragg[ing] Parks out

of the vehicle “with a gun pointed at his head causing him to fall on the highway.” Pl. Opp’n Br.

¶ 18.

Lannutti opened Rodriguez’s door and ordered her to get on the ground. Def. SMF ¶ 25.

According to Defendants, this involved, “grabb[ing] hold of Rodriguez’s wrist and forearm as she

exited the vehicle for officer safety purposes in case she became non-compliant.” Id. In Plaintiffs’

telling, “Lannutti yanked Ms. Rodriguez out of the vehicle by her right arm and threw-pushed her

onto the middle lane of highway I-76 while pointing his gun at her head.” Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF

¶ 25. Lannutti told Rodriguez to get on the ground and that she was “just being detained.” Def.

SMF ¶ 27. Rodriguez told him that she was pregnant and that she could not lay flat. Id. ¶¶ 26, 29.

Lannutti responded that he would “get [her] up.” Id. ¶ 29. Lannutti then helped Rodriguez to her

feet, and stated “alright, let’s get up,” “I’ll help you up,” and “I got you.” Id. In total, Rodriguez

was on the ground for approximately thirty-two seconds. Id. ¶ 30.

4. Defendants Detain Plaintiffs While Determining Their Identities

After helping Rodriguez up, Lannutti asked Rodriguez what her name was. Def. SMF ¶ 31.

Rodriguez responded with her name and directed Lannutti to where her bag was in the car with

her wallet and license. Id. Lannutti asked for permission to open her purse. Id. At her deposition,

Rodriguez testified that she gave Lannutti permission to get her license. Id. Lannutti then asked

Rodriguez who the car belonged to. Id. ¶ 32. Rodriguez said it belonged to her child’s father. Id.

Lannutti explained to Rodriguez that the owner of the vehicle had a serious warrant out for her

arrest. Id. ¶ 33. At her deposition, Rodriguez recalled that she knew the Taurus was registered to

Alvin. Id. Lannutti asked Rodriguez, “are you okay? You’re not injured?” Id. ¶ 34. Rodriguez did

not tell him that she was injured or in any pain. Id. Rodriguez testified that she could not recall if

she was injured but remembered that she told Lannutti she was “fine.” Id. Lannutti then directed

Rodriguez to walk with him to the rear of Arias-Garcia’s vehicle and sit on the bumper. Id. ¶ 35.

Lannutti then asked Parks if the Taurus belonged to him. Id. Parks identified himself, and

told Lannutti that the car is registered to him and his mother. Id. Lannutti asked Parks for his

mother’s name, and he responded “Rhonda Alvin.” Id. Parks asked Lannutti if his mother had a

warrant, and Lannutti responded, “yes.” Id. During this interaction, Parks expressed shock that

Defendants were pointing guns at him and Rodriguez. See id. ¶ 37. Lannutti responded that this

was because it was a high risk stop involving a serious warrant, that the warrant belonged to a

woman, and while he could see a woman in the car, he could not tell if she was the person with

the warrant. Id. Parks reminded Lannutti that Rodriguez was pregnant and that he needed to be

careful with her, to which Lannutti responded, “yes, yes, absolutely, absolutely.” Id. ¶ 38. Arias-

Garcia asked Parks if his wallet was in the car, and Parks told Lannutti where to find his license.

Id. ¶ 39.

Lannutti asked Rodriguez, “you don’t have anything on you, right?” and then proceeded to

take the handcuffs off of her. Id. ¶¶ 40–42. Rodriguez was handcuffed for at most three minutes

and thirty-one seconds. Id. ¶ 43.

Arias-Garcia then went back to his car to run Parks’ and Rodriguez’s licenses to confirm

their identities and make sure they did not have any warrants. Id. ¶ 46. Lannutti noted that he and

Arias-Garcia would be leaving shortly and apologized to Plaintiffs for the inconvenience. Id. ¶ 47.

“It’s a serious warrant, okay? We’re just doing a high risk stop and I don’t want anyone to get

hurt,” Lannutti said. Lannutti then took the handcuffs off of Parks. Id. ¶ 48. Parks was handcuffed

for at most five minutes and four seconds. Id. ¶ 49. Lannutti then told Plaintiffs they were “free to

go,” remarking, “I appreciate you guys; sorry for the inconvenience.” Id. ¶ 50.

Parks and Rodriguez drove off first, after which Lannutti and Arias-Garcia drove off

separately. Id. ¶¶ 51–52. In total, eight minutes and thirty-two seconds elapsed between Lannutti

pursuing the Taurus and Lannutti telling Plaintiffs they were free to go. Id. ¶ 54.4

5. Aftermath

Neither Rodriguez nor Parks suffered physical injuries as a result of their interactions with

Defendants, and neither sought medical attention nor has medical bills related to the incident. Def.

4 Plaintiffs also allege that Parks was detained inappropriately and longer than necessary

while Defendants sought Parks’ assistance in contacting his mother, Alvin, the target of the

warrant. Pl. Opp’n Br. ¶ 20. However, this theory of false imprisonment and unlawful detention

was not alleged in the complaint, ECF No. 1, and Plaintiffs may not amend their complaint in a

responsive pleading. Bell v. City of Philadelphia, 275 F.App’x 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2008).

SMF ¶¶ 55–56; Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 55–56. However, Rodriguez claims to have suffered

“emotion[al]” and “mental” injuries such as fear of police and of driving by herself, stemming

from her fear of being shot by Defendants. Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 55. Rodriguez testified that it

hurt when Lannutti removed her from her vehicle and that she has ongoing trauma from the

incident. Id. Likewise, Parks claims to have suffered “mental injuries” such as having “dreams

about the incident for two nights” and panic every time he sees a cop car behind him. Id. ¶ 56.

B. Procedural Background

On January 17, 2025, Parks and Rodriguez filed their complaint. ECF No. 1. The complaint

brings claims of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of Parks (Count I)

and Rodriguez (Count II), as well as claims of false imprisonment and unlawful detention in

violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of Parks (Count III) and Rodriguez (Count IV). On

March 16, 2026, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts.

II. Legal Standard

A movant is entitled to summary judgment if it shows first “that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact” and second that “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Regarding the first prong, “[g]enuine issues of material fact refer to any

reasonable disagreement over an outcome-determinative fact.” In re Energy Future Holdings

Corp., 990 F.3d 728, 737 (3d Cir. 2021). “A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of

fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in

light of his burden of proof.” Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007)

(citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248–52). Thus, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the

nonmoving party's position is generally insufficient to defeat summary judgment; “there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 252. Regarding the second prong, a moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

where the “nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of

her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must “view the record and

draw inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” In re Ikon Off. Sols., Inc., 277

F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 2002).

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating Plaintiffs’

Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force and falsely imprisoning Plaintiffs. Defendants

deny liability on the merits and also contend that they are shielded from liability for the conduct

alleged by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The Court agrees with Defendants that qualified

immunity precludes Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims. At base, that is because Defendants have met their

burden of showing that their conduct did not violate a clearly established right.

A. Qualified Immunity in § 1983 Actions, Generally

The doctrine of qualified immunity may shield government officials from liability in

§ 1983 suits. As the Third Circuit has explained:

42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . provides a cause of action to any individual who has been

deprived of his rights under the Constitution or other federal laws by a person acting

“under color of law.” Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir.2007). “Police

officers, embodying the authority of the state, are liable under § 1983 when they

violate someone's constitutional rights, unless they are protected by qualified

immunity.” Id. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials

who perform discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 818 (1982). The purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid excessive

disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on

summary judgment.” Id.

Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416–17 (3d Cir. 2015).

This Court performs a “two-step inquiry to determine whether a particular government

official is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” Id. at 417. First, we ask

whether the facts—taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—show that a

government official violated a constitutional right. Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001)). “This is not a question of immunity at all, but is instead the underlying question of whether

there is even a wrong to be addressed in an analysis of immunity.” Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. Second,

we ask whether that right was clearly established at the time of the official's actions. Santini, 795

F.3d at 417 (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). This is the immunity analysis, which “addresses

whether, if there was a wrong, . . . the officer made a reasonable mistake about the legal constraints

on his actions and should . . . be protected against suit[.]” Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. “The party

asserting the affirmative defense of qualified immunity bears the burden of persuasion on both

prongs at summary judgment.” Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 227 (3d Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).

Although Saucier mandated that its two-step inquiry be performed in sequential order, Saucier,

533 U.S. at 201, the Supreme Court subsequently held that courts have discretion to perform the

Saucier inquiry in the order it deems most appropriate, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236,

(2009). In sum, to prevail on summary judgment on a qualified immunity theory, Defendants must

either show “that there was no genuine dispute of material fact to refute their contention that they

did not violate [Plaintiffs’] constitutional rights as [they] asserted them, or show that reasonable

officers could not have known that their conduct constituted such a violation when they engaged

in it.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 288 (3d Cir. 2014).

Here, the Court need only elaborate on the “clearly established” prong because the analysis

under that prong is dispositive. In analyzing whether the right was clearly established at the time

of the official's actions, “we proceed in two steps: we first ‘define the right allegedly violated at

the appropriate level of specificity’ and then ‘ask whether that right was clearly established at the

time of its alleged violation.’” Mack, 63 F.4th at 228 (quoting Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 81

(3d Cir. 2021). The Court next proceeds with those two steps.

B. Properly Defining the Rights

1. Legal Standard

The Third Circuit requires this Court to begin its “clearly established” analysis by

“fram[ing] the right ‘in light of the specific context of the case,’” with all reasonable

inferences drawn in the nonmovant's favor. Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157,

165-66 (3d Cir. 2021); accord Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (“Our

qualified-immunity cases illustrate the importance of drawing inferences in favor

of the nonmovant, even . . . [on] the clearly-established prong of the standard.”).

The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that the qualified immunity inquiry

demands a “high ‘degree of specificity’” and that courts may not “define clearly

established law at a high level of generality,” which would “avoid[ ] the crucial

question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that

he or she faced.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577,

590, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018).

Mack, 63 F.4th at 228.

The Supreme Court has emphasized that “specificity is especially important in the Fourth

Amendment context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to

determine how the relevant legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer

confronts.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (cleaned up).

2. Parties’ Arguments

Neither party directly argues how the right should be defined. From Plaintiffs’ briefing—

specifically their reliance on Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483 (2006)—however, it can be deduced

that in their view, the right asserted is the right to be free from being forcibly removed from a

vehicle, handcuffed, and held at gunpoint by officers who could not reasonably have suspected

either of them committed a crime. With regards to Parks, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants could

see he was male and thus did not match the description of Alvin, a 43-year-old black female with

a face tattoo, who was the target of the warrant. With regards to Rodriguez, Plaintiffs argue that

she also did not match the description of Alvin because Rodriguez is a 23-year-old Hispanic female

with no face tattoo. Plaintiffs further imply that ordering Rodriguez to lie on the ground after being

informed she was pregnant constitutes excessive force.

Defendants counter that the officers did have reasonable suspicion that the vehicle

contained an individual, Alvin, who committed a violent crime since the vehicle was registered to

Alvin and it is a commonsense inference that the owner of a vehicle is inside the vehicle. To the

extent it should have been obvious looking through the vehicle’s windows that neither Parks nor

Rodriguez matched the description of Alvin, Defendants argue that this would not have been

apparent to the officers in the exigence of their pursuit.

3. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that the officers had reasonable

suspicion to believe that the Taurus contained an individual who was suspected to have committed

a violent crime. The reasonable suspicion standard requires an officer to show he or she made the

stop based on “more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’” United States v.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). But the standard

has been described as “generally undemanding” and requires “considerably less than

preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396–97 (3d Cir.

2006). While officers must provide “specific, articulable facts” to justify their suspicion, Delfin-

Colina, 464 F.3d at 397, the Court ultimately focuses on the “totality of circumstances,” Kansas

v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 386 (2020), to assess how the officer acted based on the information

possessed at the time of the stop, taking into account the “practical considerations of everyday

life,” id. at 380. As relevant here, the Supreme Court has held that officers may have reasonable

suspicion to stop a vehicle registered to a suspected criminal, even without visually confirming the

vehicle’s occupants, based on the commonsense inference that the owner of a vehicle is likely

inside. Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 381 (2020). In Glover, the Supreme Court determined the

stop was reasonable even though the officer made no effort to determine the identities of the

passengers. Id.

Here, Defendants clear the low bar of reasonable suspicion. The registered owner of the

Taurus was wanted on serious felony charges, and at the time of the stop, Defendants possessed

no information sufficient to rebut the reasonableness of the inference that Alvin was in the vehicle.

The parties agree that it was dark out and that the Taurus’ windows were up and dark. Even making

all inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor and presuming the officers may have been able to determine

characteristics such as the age and ethnicity of the vehicle’s occupants, that does not make it

unreasonable, in the heat of the pursuit, for the officers to determine that a closer inspection was

needed to ensure a violent criminal did not escape their grasp. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have

presented no evidence that Defendants had a photograph of what Alvin looked like, let alone been

able to quickly distinguish her from Rodriguez so as to overcome the inference that Alvin was in

the vehicle. That the Taurus was registered to Alvin is a “specific, articulable fact[]” justifying

Defendant Lannutti’s suspicion that she was in the vehicle. That a male, Parks, was in the car too,

does not change this fact.

Reasonable suspicion being established, the Court identifies two rights being asserted and

frames them as follows:

(1) The right of an individual to be free from being forcefully removed from his or

her vehicle, handcuffed, and held at gunpoint by officers who have reasonable

suspicion that the individual is either wanted for committing a violent crime or is

accompanied by said person; and

(2) The right of a pregnant individual to be free from being forcefully removed from

her vehicle and made to lie on the ground by officers who have reasonable suspicion

that the individual is wanted for committing a violent crime.

C. Whether those Rights were Clearly Established

1. Legal Standard

Having defined the rights, the Court must next decide whether those rights are “sufficiently

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates th[ose] right[s].”

Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Third Circuit has

elaborated:

That is “an objective (albeit fact-specific) question, where an officer's subjective

beliefs are irrelevant.” Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 165 (cleaned up). A right is

clearly established if there is either “closely analogous” caselaw establishing that a

defendant's conduct was unlawful or “evidence that the Defendant's conduct was

so patently violative of the . . . right that reasonable officials would know [it to be

a violation] without guidance from a court.” Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 330

(3d Cir. 2011). We take a “broad view” of what makes a right clearly established,

which can be satisfied “even without a precise factual correspondence between the

case at issue and a previous case.” Peroza-Benitez, 994 F.3d at 166 (internal

quotation marks omitted). It is enough that “existing precedent . . . placed the

statutory . . . question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741

(2011); accord Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[I]f the

unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct would have been apparent to a reasonable

official based on the current state of the law, it is not necessary that there be binding

precedent from this circuit so advising.”).

Mack, 63 F.4th at 231–32. This standard acknowledges the reality that “reasonable

mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints on particular police conduct.” Curley, 499

F.3d at 207 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Of additional note is the fact that the Third Circuit has recognized that, “[a]n officer with

reasonable suspicion that the occupants of a vehicle are armed and dangerous does not act

unreasonably by drawing his weapon, ordering the occupants out of the vehicle, and handcuffing

them until the scene is secured.” United States v. Johnson, 592 U.S. 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2010).

2. Analysis

The Court is convinced that the asserted rights—whether or not they are rights at all—were

not clearly established at the time of the incident. Defendants have carried their burden of showing

both that there is no closely analogous caselaw establishing the unlawfulness of their actions and

that Defendants’ conduct was not so patently unlawful that they would know it to be so without

guidance from the Court. See Mack, 63 F.4th at 231–32. At base, the potential dangerousness of

the stop Defendants engaged in afforded Defendants considerable discretion in their treatment of

the vehicle’s occupants, and there has been no showing that Defendants clearly acted outside the

bounds of this discretion.

Plaintiffs’ sole reliance on Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483 (3d Cir. 2006) as clearly

establishing the law governing the appropriate use of force in cases such as this one is

unpersuasive. In Couden, law enforcement officers set up undercover surveillance outside a home

in the hopes of catching a fugitive wanted for drug and weapons offenses. 446 F.3d at 489. During

the surveillance, plaintiff-appellant Pamela Couden, who lived near the target house, pulled up in

front of her home. Id. Couden's 14 year-old son got out of the car to leave his skateboard in the

garage and to summon his sister from the house. Id. Not realizing they had the wrong person, the

officers approached the Couden car with guns drawn and entered the Couden home where they

tackled and handcuffed Couden's son. Id. The Coudens filed suit, claiming constitutional and state

common law violations. Id. The Third Circuit held that the officers were not entitled to qualified

immunity because the reasonable suspicion standard was not met:

[A] young man exiting a car parked near a house, walking from the car into the

garage of the house while carrying a skateboard and then looking into a window of

the house, and the car then driving into the driveway of the house, turning on its

brights, and honking—do not provide the reasonable suspicion of illicit activity

necessary for a Terry stop. There is simply nothing suspicious in this series of

actions, and plaintiffs have not pointed to any legal authority that might cloud the

issue.

Id. at 495–96. That fact alone is enough to distinguish the present matter: Couden does not speak

to the appropriate use of force in situations where officers do have reasonable suspicion, let alone

clearly establish the law on such an issue.

While the precise amount of force used by the officers is a matter in dispute not captured

by the MVR footage, even when interpreted in Plaintiffs’ favor, the facts do not paint a picture of

the officers violating clearly established law. Plaintiffs assert that Lannutti “yanked [Rodriguez]

. . . out of the vehicle by her right arm and threw-pushed her onto the middle lane of highway I-76

while pointing his gun at her head.” Pl. Resp. to Def. SMF ¶ 25. Likewise, Plaintiffs assert that

Arias-Garcia “aggressively pulled and dragged” Parks out of the vehicle with a gun pointed at his

head “causing him to fall on the highway.” Pl. Opp’n Br. 11. The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs’

allegations suggest they experienced circumstances they felt were tense, violent, demeaning and

traumatizing, particularly given that Rodriguez was pregnant. Nevertheless, it is also true that

simply because an officer acted aggressively does not mean that officer violated clearly established

law. This is especially true when the officer had reasonable suspicion that Plaintiffs were armed.

While an officer’s reasonable suspicion does not authorize unlimited uses of force, the discovery

process has not borne out any evidence that the complained of force utilized in this case and under

these circumstances could clearly be labeled as excessive. Thus, the dispute about the amount of

force used by Defendants does not create a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary

judgment. Since Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, their motion for

summary judgment must be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted. An

appropriate order follows.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ John Milton Younge

Judge John Milton Younge