Opinion

Dorado

Court: District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed: Jun 24, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH DIVISION

JAIME DORADO

Plaintiff,

v. No. 4:26-cv-00380-P

CITY OF FORT WORTH, ET AL.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

On April 21, 2026, Plaintiff Jaime Dorado filed his second amended

complaint (“SAC”) alleging Defendant Officers J. Cardenas, R. Dozier,

C. Cardona, and the City of Fort Worth (“City”) violated his Fourth

Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 because the Officers

used excessive force when arresting and restraining him. ECF No. 21 at

1. Further, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cardenas violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right because she was deliberately indifferent

to Plaintiff’s need for post-arrest medical treatment. ECF No. 21 at 8. In

response, on May 5, 2026, Defendant Cardenas and the City filed

Motions to Dismiss. ECF No. 25, 26. Having considered the Motions, the

docket, and the applicable law, filings and for the reasons detailed

below, the Court finds the Motions should be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s claims against the City and Defendants arise out of his

arrest for public intoxication and resisting arrest. ECF No. 21 at 4.

Because of the arrest, Plaintiff alleges Defendant (1) used excessive

force against him in violation of § 1983 and his Fourth Amendment

rights; (2) Defendant failed to intervene and prevent other officers from

exerting excessive force during his arrest in violation of § 1983; and (3)

Defendant violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to post-arrest

medical treatment as Defendant showed deliberate indifference towards

his need for post-arrest medical treatment. ECF No. 21 at 12, 13, 14.

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges the City violated § 1983 and his Fourth

Amendment right by (1) ratifying an unconstitutional policy or custom,

(2) failing to train the officers, and (3) failing to discipline or supervise

the Officers, which caused the alleged constitutional harm. ECF No. 21

at 15.

A. Unlawful Force and Restraint

In the early morning hours of February 26, 2024, Defendant and

other officers arrested Plaintiff as he was exiting the West 7th Street

entertainment district in Fort Worth, Texas. ECF No. 21 at 4. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant and the officers acted in concert to rapidly surround,

converge on, and arrest him, utilizing excessive force to submit and

restrain him. ECF No. 21 at 4, 5. Additionally, Plaintiff contends

throughout this encounter, he was unarmed, awake, and not causing a

public disturbance, and the excessive force caused injuries to his head,

neck, and face. ECF No. 21 at 5, 6. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges

Defendant personally participated and was integral in the seizure,

takedown and restraint of him, though he also acknowledges

uncertainty as to whether she did exert excessive force during the

arrest.1 ECF No. 21 at 5. Alternatively, Plaintiff contends that if

Defendant did not apply excessive force, she had a reasonable

opportunity to prevent it, failed to intervene, and restrain her fellow

officers. ECF No. 21 at 18.

However, police records reflect a conflicting narrative. ECF No. 21 at

4. According to those records, Defendant and others initially found

Plaintiff asleep, tried to wake him, but as they did, Plaintiff became

combative, forcing the officers to arrest him. ECF No. 21 at 5. Yet,

Plaintiff expressly refutes the accuracy of those facts in his SAC. ECF

No. 21 at 4.

1 The Court notes the inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s SAC concerning the

allegations of Cardenas’s role in the arrest where unlawful force was used.

Plaintiff first states Cardenas was personally involved in the unlawful use of

force when arresting and restraining Plaintiff, but later states that Cardenas’s

personal role includes only that she documented the encounter, her

participation in transferring Plaintiff while he was in custody.

In response, Defendant Cardenas filed the Motion, contending that

while Plaintiff sustained serious injuries, neither she nor any officer

exerted excessive force. ECF No. 25 at 13. And injuries alone do not

transform reasonable force into excessive force. ECF No. 25 at 13.

Furthermore, her judgment should not be second-guessed because of the

specific circumstances she dealt with that night. ECF No. 25 at 13.

Additionally, Defendant points to the inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s SAC

concerning her proximity and participation during the arrest. ECF No.

25 at 14. Regardless, she asserts Plaintiff’s allegations plainly do not

overcome her entitlement to qualified immunity. ECF No. 25 at 14.

Regarding Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim, Defendant, again,

highlights the inconsistencies in Plaintiff’s SAC concerning her

proximity and awareness during the arrest. ECF No. 25 at 14.

Specifically, Defendant notes the SAC barely describes the alleged

physical takedown. ECF No. 25 at 14. And because Defendant did not

believe any officer used excessive force, she argues it was impossible for

her to know of a need to intervene. ECF No. 25 at 14. Ultimately,

without a plausible allegation that any officer used excessive force,

Defendant could not have had a clear opportunity to intervene. ECF No.

25 at 14. Regardless, Defendant contends Plaintiff’s factual allegations

fail to overcome her entitlement to qualified immunity. ECF No. 25 at

15.

B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

Following Plaintiff’s arrest, Emergency Medical Services (EMS)

arrived at the scene to assess Plaintiff’s injuries and cognitive state.

ECF No. 21 at 6. Although Plaintiff sustained a left eye laceration, head

pain, and trauma, EMS’s documented Plaintiff remained on a Glasgow

Coma Scale of 15 (GCS 15), indicating he remained fully conscious. ECF

No. 21 at 6. Following EMS’s initial assessment, Plaintiff denied EMS-

offered medical treatment. ECF No. 21 at 7. However, Plaintiff contends

Defendant continued to owe him a duty to respond reasonably to his

obvious and serious injuries because she remained in custody and

control of him. ECF No. 21 at 7. Furthermore, while in custody and

control of Plaintiff, Defendant violated this duty and his right to post-

arrest medical care by showing deliberate indifference to those injuries.

ECF No. 21 at 8. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff alleges while

Cardenas transported him to jail and remained there with him,

Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s requests for medical

attention. ECF No. 21 at 8. While detained in jail, Plaintiff contends

EMS evaluated him for a second time, reporting swelling around his left

eye and head injury concerns, yet still documented Plaintiff at a GCS

15. ECF No. 21 at 7. Despite this evaluation, Plaintiff alleges no

ambulance was called. ECF No. 21 at 8. Consequently, Plaintiff

contends Defendant’s deliberate ignorance caused a twenty-hour delay

before Plaintiff received proper medical treatment, worsening his

already known injuries, preventing his unknown injuries from

discovery, and subjecting him to potential permanent damage. ECF No.

21 at 9, 10. Specifically, after Plaintiff arrived at a hospital, medical

officials found acute and orbital fractures underlying his lacerated left-

eye. ECF No. 21 at 10.

In response, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s SAC fails to meet the

stringent standard of deliberate indifference. ECF No. 25 at 15.

Specifically, Defendant argues the SAC fails to allege she knew Plaintiff

required medical assistance for his apparent injuries, or she could infer

he had underlying injuries needing treatment. ECF No. 25 at 16.

Further, Defendant points out Plaintiff’s SAC admits he initially refused

medical care in her presence, and Defendant subsequently called a

second ambulance for Plaintiff at the jail. ECF No. 25 at 11. Finally,

Defendant notes Plaintiff’s SAC does not allege Defendant remained at

the jail when the second ambulance arrived. ECF No. 25 at 11.

C. Monell Liability

In addition to his claims against Defendant, Plaintiff also alleges the

City is liable under Monell because its unconstitutional policy,

widespread custom, failure to train or supervise was the moving force

behind the violation of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 21 at 15.

Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the City maintained, tolerated or failed to

correct deficiencies in areas concerning officer conduct, including the use

of force against unarmed individuals, takedown methods during arrest,

intervention methods when an officer exerts unnecessary force, and

post-arrest medical attention. ECF No. 21 at 15. Further, he asserts the

City knew or should have known these deficiencies existed, required

correction, and maintaining such policies would obviously result in

officers using disproportionate force against intoxicated individuals and

failing to adequately monitor resulting injuries. ECF No. 21 at 15.

In response, the City asserts Plaintiff misconstrues the function of

Monell liability, emphasizing a municipality cannot be held liable under

§ 1983 based on a theory of respondeat superior. ECF No. 26 at 12.

Further, the City contends Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege an official

policy or widespread custom because he neither identifies an explicit

official policy nor pleads widespread, persistent conduct that would

notify the City of its employees’ behavior. ECF No. 26 at 15. Rather, as

the City claims, Plaintiff points to broad, conclusory deficient areas.

ECF No. 26 at 15. Furthermore, the City argues Plaintiff's failure-to-

train claim is deficient. ECF No. 26 at 17. Specifically, because he fails

to identify a specific training program or any widespread pattern of

unconstitutional activity the City knew it needed to correct. ECF No. 26

at 18. Similarly, regarding the failure-to-supervise claim, the City

asserts Plaintiff failed to allege facts establishing the City’s deliberate

indifference because Plaintiff does not allege any persistent, widespread

conduct by its employees that would notify the City of its need to correct

these deficient actions via disciplinary action. ECF No. 26 at 19. Rather,

according to the City, Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of sufficient factual

matter to plausibly state a Monell claim under any theory of municipal

liability.

Having evaluated the Parties’ arguments, alongside the

jurisdictional record, the Motion is now ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must

plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged

misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Unlike a

“probability requirement,” the plausibility standard instead demands

“more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id. Where a complaint contains facts that are “‘merely consistent with’

a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

557).

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept all

well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.,

509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007). However, the Court is not bound to

accept legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. To avoid

dismissal, pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts rather than

conclusory allegations. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281

(5th Cir. 1992). “When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court

should assume their veracity and then determine whether they

plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

B. Section 1983 and Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 “provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation,

under color of law, of a citizen’s ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Livadas v.

Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994) (quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448

U.S. 1, 4 (1980)). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

facts that show that he has been deprived of a right secured by the

Constitution and the laws of the United States, and the defendants were

acting under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S.

149, 155 (1978).

1. The Monell standard

To hold a city liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that “the

municipality itself caused” the constitutional violation at issue. City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (citing Monell v. New

York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)). Such

constitutional violations may occur due to the municipality’s official,

promulgated policies; its pervasive customs or practices; its failure to

train, supervise, or discipline employees; or decisions or acts by final

municipal policymakers. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690‒95. To state a Monell

claim, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which

(2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge,

and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or

custom.” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2020)).

If an official policy is not explicit, “widespread practice of city officials”

can suffice if the practice is “so common and well settled as to constitute

a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.” Id. If no constitutional

violation occurred, the plaintiff’s Monell claim necessarily fails. City of

Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).

A Monell claim predicated on a failure-to-train theory requires a

plaintiff to show “(1) the municipality’s training procedures were

inadequate, (2) the municipality was deliberately indifferent in adopting

its training policy, and (3) the inadequate training policy directly caused

the violations in question.” Ratliff v. Aransas Cty., Tex., 948 F.3d 281,

285 (5th Cir. 2020). Such a claim must be brought against the

municipality’s final policymaker. Harris, 489 U.S. at 389. And “[a]

municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most

tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson,

563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).

To establish inadequate training procedures, “a plaintiff must allege

with specificity how a particular training program is defective.” Zarnow

v. City of Wichita Falls, Tex., 614 F.3d 161, 170 (5th Cir. 2010). “The

inadequacy of training must be closely related to the injury.” Pineda v.

City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 332 (5th Cir. 2002). To demonstrate that

a municipality’s failure to investigate or discipline amounts to an

unlawful policy or custom, a Plaintiff must prove: (1) the city’s failure to

discipline amounts to deliberate indifference and (2) a causal link

between the failure to discipline and the violation of their rights.

Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 277 (5th Cir. 2023).

Additionally, deliberate indifference is a stringent standard under

§ 1983. To show deliberate indifference, “[n]otice [to the municipality] of

a pattern of similar violations is required.” Sanders-Burns v. City of

Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 381 (5th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). “A

pattern is tantamount to official policy when it is so common and well-

settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy.”

Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, Tex., 588 F.3d 838, 850 (5th Cir. 2009)

(quotation marks omitted). Thus, the municipal employees’ actions

“must have occurred for so long or so frequently that the course of

conduct warrants the attribution to the governing body of knowledge

that the objectionable conduct is the expected, accepted practice of city

employees.” Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir.

1984); cf. Fuentes v. Nueces County, 689 F. App’x 775, 778 (5th Cir. 2017)

(holding that twenty-seven prior incidents of excessive force over a

three-year period were not sufficiently numerous to constitute a

pattern). A narrow exception to the pattern of similar violations exists

but “is generally reserved for those cases in which the government actor

was provided no training whatsoever.” Pena v. City of Rio Grande City,

879 F.3d 613, 624 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added).

2. Qualified Immunity Standard

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 231 (2009) (internal citation omitted). The qualified immunity

inquiry involves two prongs that the Court must answer affirmatively

before an official is subject to liability: (1) whether the facts that a

plaintiff alleged constitute a violation of a constitutional right and (2)

whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of

defendant’s alleged misconduct. Id. at 232. In excessive force cases, the

second prong of the test “is better understood as two separate inquiries:

whether the allegedly violated constitutional right was clearly

established at the time of the incident; and, if so, whether the conduct

of the defendants was objectively unreasonable in light of that then

clearly established law.” Hanks v. Rogers, 853 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir.

2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When confronted

with a qualified immunity defense at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff

carries the burden to identify facts which, if proven, defeats the claim of

immunity. Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590, 599 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation

omitted).2

C. Fourth Amendment

During a detention or arrest, the right to be free from the use of

excessive force is governed by the Fourth Amendment’s

“reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).

To state an excessive force claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) an injury,

which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly

excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively

unreasonable.” Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 487

(5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). The second and third elements

collapse into a single objective-reasonableness inquiry, in which the

court may consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,

and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest

by flight.” Peña v. City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir.

2018) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Courts generally examine

excessive force claims considering the “totality of the circumstances” to

determine whether an officer’s actions were objectively unreasonable.

Rockwell v. Brown, 664 F.3d 985, 991–92 (5th Cir. 2011).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against the City under

§ 1983 for an unconstitutional custom or policy.

2 Though this test appears to be straightforward, trying to make sense of

its application or finding any consistency under Fifth Circuit precedent is often

a difficult task for trial court judges. Compare Crane v. City of Arlington, 50

F.4th 453, 458–60, 462 (5th Cir. 2022) (relying on extra-record sources such as

The New York Times and The Guardian to find no qualified immunity for an

officer’s use of deadly force where suspect resisted arrest and drove over

another officer with his vehicle) with Ramirez v. Guadarrama, 844 F. App’x

710, 712–17 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that qualified immunity barred suit when

officers found a suspect doused in gasoline, knew their tasers would ignite him,

and quickly tased him, “causing him to burst into flames”). No wonder, even

the appellate court describes this uneasy analysis as the “QI dance.” Carswell

v. Camp, 54 F.4th 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2022).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City under § 1983 for an

unconstitutional policy or custom, failure to train and failure to

supervise or discipline because he fails to allege plausible facts

indicating an official policy, widespread custom or the city’s deliberate

indifference under all three claims.

A. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City under § 1983

for an unconstitutional policy or custom because he neither

pleads an official policy or custom nor a widespread practice

of city officials.

A plaintiff must identify an official policy or widespread, persistent

practice by a municipality’s employees, otherwise plaintiff’s Monell

municipal liability claim fails. See Valle 613. F.3d at 541–42. Attempting

to establish an unconstitutional policy or custom, Plaintiff alleges the

City allowed an official policy of excessive force and inadequate post-

arrest care for arresting officers. ECF No. 21 at 15. To support his

assertion, Plaintiff proffers multiple deficient areas of officer activity

including: de-escalation before using significant force on unarmed

persons; takedown methods creating an unreasonable risk injury;

intervention duties to restrain officers from using unnecessary force;

post-force medical screening and hospital escalation when a detainee

exhibits obvious head or facial trauma; and reporting practices that

preserve an accurate factual and medical record. ECF No. 21 at 15.

Accordingly, he asserts the City’s liability stems from allowing these

unconstitutional policies which directly caused his injuries. ECF No. 21

at 15. While Plaintiff’s SAC proffers deficiencies in certain “areas”, it

does not associate these areas with official policies promulgated by the

City. ECF No. 21 at 15. Consequently, Plaintiff must allege persistent,

widespread activity by officers in these areas to show their conduct is so

well-settled it represents municipal policy. Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850.

A plaintiff must do more than describe the incident giving rise to his

injury to allege widespread, persistent activities by a municipality’s

employees. See Pena, 879 F.3d at 622. Plaintiff’s SAC alleges only his

singular encounter with the officers and does not allege any past conduct

by the City’s employees like his encounter. Therefore, Plaintiff does not

plausibly state a widespread, persistent custom that fairly represents

the City’s policy. Ultimately, asserting the City had actual or

constructive knowledge cannot save the claim because such knowledge

is legally immaterially absent a documented pattern of similar past

widespread conduct. ECF No. 21 at 11.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City for an

unconstitutional policy or custom is hereby DISMISSED with

prejudice.

B. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City under § 1983

for failure-to-train because he fails to plead a formal

inadequate program and the City’s deliberate indifference.

1. Plaintiff fails to state an inadequate program.

To establish a Monell failure to train claim, a plaintiff must first

identify a specific, inadequate training program rather than generalized

areas of police activity that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. See Zarnow,

614 F.3d at 170. Here, Plaintiff contends the City failed to train the

officers in areas concerning the use of force against individuals creating

a risk of head and facial injury, intervention methods among officers

when one uses unnecessary force, and post-arrest medical attention to

reduce obvious head and facial trauma. ECF No. 21 at 15. Accordingly,

Plaintiff contends the City’s instructive failures in those areas resulted

in the officers’ actions and plausibly support the inference those failures

directly caused his constitutional harm. ECF No. 21 at 15. However,

because Plaintiff’s SAC fails to tie these broad categories of police

conduct to an official policies or programs promulgated by the City,

Plaintiff fails to “allege with specificity how a particular training

program is defective.” See Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 170.

Further, a plaintiff cannot state a plausible failure-to-train claim by

detailing his injuries and alleging better training would have prevented

it. The Fifth Circuit has explicitly held “[p]laintiffs cannot prevail by

styling their complaints about the specific injury suffered as a failure to

train claim.” Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 293 (5th Cir.

2005). Indeed, it does not “suffice to prove that an injury or accident

could have been avoided if an officer had (omitted) better or more

training, sufficient to equip him to avoid the particular injury-causing

conduct.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989). Because

Plaintiff relies on his physical trauma to infer a municipal deficiency

rather than pleading facts alleging an official policy or widespread,

persistent conduct Plaintiff’s claim fails. ECF No. 21 at 15.

2. Plaintiff fails to state the City’s deliberate indifference.

To plausibly state a municipality’s deliberate indifference in

adopting a training policy, a plaintiff must show the municipality had

notice of the policy’s inadequacy, or a municipal employee had no

training whatsoever. See Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 381; see also Pena,

879 F.3d at 624. A plaintiff satisfies this notice requirement by pleading

facts showing municipal employees engaged in persistent, widespread

unconstitutional conduct. See Webster, 735 F.2d at 842. The

municipality’s notice of such continuous conduct demonstrates it accepts

that conduct as the expected norm and practice of its employees. Id.

Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege the City’s deliberate indifference.

Noticeably, Plaintiff’s SAC details only his singular encounter with the

City’s officers and does not mention a persistent, widespread pattern of

similar misconduct. ECF No. 21 at 15. Further, this isolated incident

does not invoke the narrow single-incident exception; the SAC does not

claim any of the arresting officers completely lacked training. ECF No.

21 at 15. Instead, Plaintiff asserts the City failed to train its officers in

generalized areas of police activity, not that they received no training

whatsoever in these areas. ECF No. 21 at 15. The Court finds Plaintiff

fails to plausibly state a Monell failure-to-train theory against the City.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Monell failure-to train claim against the City is

DISMISSED with prejudice.

C. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against the City for failure to

supervise or discipline because he fails to plead the City’s

deliberate indifference.

To demonstrate a municipality’s failure to investigate or discipline

amounts to an unlawful policy or custom, a plaintiff must prove: (1) the

city’s failure to discipline amounts to deliberate indifference and (2) a

causal link between the failure to discipline and the violation of their

rights. Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 277. To adequately allege deliberate

indifference a plaintiff must plead a pattern of past widespread conduct

by municipal employees to establish the municipality had actual or

constructive of that pattern. See Sanders-Burns, 594 F.3d at 381; see

also Peterson, 588 F.3d at 850. Accordingly, a plaintiff must allege past

misconduct in his complaint.

If a plaintiff fails to plead a pattern of past widespread conduct by a

municipality’s employees like the conduct causing plaintiff’s injury, then

plaintiff fails to show a municipality had notice of that conduct.

Consequently, Plaintiff alleges only his singular encounter with the

officers and does not allege any past similar widespread conduct by the

City’s officers. ECF No. 21 at 15. Accordingly, an isolated encounter,

absent a pattern of similar constitutional violations by employees, fails

to put the City on notice, and plausibly allege it’s deliberate indifference.

Pena, 879 F.3d at 623. Therefore, this singular encounter is an

“unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation,” and

does not amount to a pattern which the city has notice of. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City for failure to

investigate or discipline is DISMISSED with prejudice.

II. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant under

§ 1983, the Fourth Amendment, and the Fourteenth

Amendment.

Plaintiff accuses Defendant of using excessive force, violating his

Fourth Amendment rights and clearly established law, thus preventing

qualifying immunity. ECF No. 21. In response, Defendant asserts

entitlement to qualified immunity. ECF No. 25. Accordingly, the Court

inquires to see if Plaintiff’s SAC alleges specific, plausible facts

demonstrating both a constitutional violation, and that the Defendant’s

conduct was objectively unreasonable under clearly established law.

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Plaintiff’s excessive force claim fails under this

standard because his SAC offers generalized, conclusory claims

concerning Defendant’s use of excessive force. ECF No. 21 at 4, 5.

Further, he fails to proffer precedent indicating similar situations of

officers acting and violating his clearly established right. Additionally,

Plaintiff’s claim Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s

post-arrest medical needs fails because he fails to allege Defendant’s

deliberate indifference.

A. Plaintiff fails to overcome qualified immunity because he fails

to plausibly allege Defendant used excessive force, or that any

other officer used excessive force, thereby precluding his failure-

to-intervene claim.

1. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Plaintiff for using

excessive force.

When a plaintiff names multiple officers as defendants in an

excessive force claim, the Court evaluates “each officer’s actions

separately, to the extent possible.” Cope, 3 F.4th at 207 (quoting Poole

v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, a

plaintiff must allege claims of specific conduct and actions by an officer

giving rise to a constitutional violation. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190,

195 (5th Cir. 1995). Conversely, a plaintiff cannot plead “conclusory

allegations failing to set forth specific facts showing (omitted) the use of

force by [each individual officer] was excessive to the need and

objectively unreasonable”. Baker, 75 F.3d at 195; (quoting Schultea v.

Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1432–34 (5th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, courts cannot

examine officers’ actions collectively in determining their entitlement to

qualified immunity; rather it must be done separately. Meadours, v.

Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir. 2007).

Although Plaintiff suffered serious injuries, the severity of his

physical harm cannot substitute his failure to plead specific,

individualized conduct by Defendant. See Poole, 691 F.3d at 633; see also

Baker, 75 F.3d at 195; ECF No. 21 at 6. Attempting to support his

excessive force claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendant personally

participated and was integral to the takedown, seizure, and restraint of

Plaintiff during his arrest. ECF No. 21 at 5. However, Plaintiff’s SAC

does not identify any specific conduct by Defendant which would allow

the Court to assess its reasonableness. Additionally, Plaintiff’s SAC fails

to identify any specific conduct by other officers at the scene concerning

their use of excessive force. ECF No. 21 at 4, 6.

Contrarily, Santander v. Salazer provides a plausible pleading of an

excessive force claim against an individual officer. See Santander v.

Salazer, 133 F.4th 471, 479–80 (5th Cir. 2025). In Santander, the

plaintiff alleged an officer violently shoved him from behind, threw him

on the concrete, and punched him repeatedly. Id. Plaintiff’s SAC does

not resemble this type of plausible pleading. Thus, Plaintiff’s SAC fails

to plausibly state an excessive force claim against Defendant or

overcome her entitlement to qualified immunity because it relies on

group collective pleading. ECF No. 21 at 4, 5. Plaintiff needed to provide

specific, individualized facts showing Defendant’s conduct was excessive

to the need and objectively unreasonable. See Meadours, 48 F.3d at 421;