Sera

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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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9 SUCCES SERA, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01450-RBM-JLB

10 Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING AMENDED

11 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

12 PAMELA BONDI, U.S. Attorney General, et

al.,

13 [Docs. 3, 8]

Respondents.

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16 Pending before the Court are Petitioner Succes Sera’s (“Petitioner”) Amended

17 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Amended Petition”) (Doc. 8) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

18 § 2241 and Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 3). For the

19 reasons below, the Amended Petition is GRANTED and the TRO Motion is DENIED as

20 moot.

21 I. BACKGROUND

22 A. Factual Background

23 Petitioner is a citizen of Haiti. (Doc. 8 at 2 (citing Doc. 8-1 [Declaration of

24 Petitioner] ¶ 1).) He came to the United States in 1995 “on a petition from his mother,”

25 but “was deported to Haiti in 2000.” (Id.) In 2024, Petitioner fled Haiti and went to

26 Mexico, where he used the CBP One application to apply for asylum. (Id.) On June 9,

27 2024, “Petitioner applied for entry to the United States at the Calexico West Port of Entry

28 without entry documents.” (Doc. 9 at 2 (citing Doc. 9-1 at 2–3).) He was taken into

1 custody and transferred to the Otay Mesa Detention Center, where he has remained since.

2 (Doc. 8 at 2.)

3 On May 23, 2025, an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s claims for relief and

4 ordered him removed to Haiti. (Id. at 3; Doc. 9 at 2.) Petitioner appealed this decision to

5 the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s

6 decision on January 29, 2026. (Doc. 9-1 at 11–13.) Petitioner filed a Petition for Review

7 with the Ninth Circuit on February 17, 2026. (Id. at 15–30.) The Ninth Circuit’s Docketing

8 Notice indicates that Petitioner’s “Petition for Review includes a request for stay of

9 removal. Pursuant to G.O. 6.4(c), a stay of removal is in effect until that request has been

10 addressed.” (Id. at 15.)

11 B. Procedural Background

12 Petitioner, initially proceeding pro se, filed his original Petition for a Writ of Habeas

13 Corpus (Doc. 1), TRO Motion (Doc. 3), and Motion to Appoint Counsel (Doc. 3) on March

14 6, 2026. The Court granted the Motion to Appoint Counsel and set a briefing schedule on

15 March 11, 2026. (Doc. 4.) Petitioner, now represented, filed his Amended Petition on

16 March 17, 2026. (Doc. 8.) Respondents filed their Return to Petition for Writ of Habeas

17 Corpus (“Response”) on March 26, 2026. (Doc. 9.) Petitioner filed his Traverse in Support

18 of Petition (“Reply”) on April 1, 2026. (Doc. 10.)

19 II. LEGAL STANDARD

20 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United

21 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).

22 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that

23 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal

24 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may

25 be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit

26 judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the

27 burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or

28 treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).

1 III. DISCUSSION

2 Petitioner argues that his detention has become unreasonably prolonged in violation

3 of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Doc. 8 at 3–9.) Respondents argue that

4 Petitioner is subject to a final removal order and thus mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C.

5 § 1231 for 90 days. (Doc. 9 at 2–4.) The Court finds that: (1) Petitioner’s detention is

6 governed by § 1225 rather than § 1231 because the Ninth Circuit issued a stay of removal;

7 (2) Petitioner’s detention has become unreasonably prolonged; and (3) Petitioner is entitled

8 to a bond hearing.

9 A. Detention Under § 1225 or § 1231

10 Section 1231(a) “does not provide authority to detain [a noncitizen] whose removal

11 order is administratively final, but whose removal has been stayed by a court of appeals

12 pending its disposition of his petition for review.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053,

13 1059 (9th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “[t]he statute makes clear that when a court of appeals issues

14 a stay of removal pending its decision on [a noncitizen’s] petition for review of his removal

15 order, the removal period begins only after the court denied the petition and withdraws the

16 stay of removal.” Id. (emphasis added).

17 Petitioner has a removal order that is administratively final, but his removal has been

18 stayed by the Ninth Circuit pending its disposition of his Petition for Review. (Doc. 9 at

19 2; Doc. 9-1 at 15.) The holding of Prieto-Romero thus controls: Petitioner is not yet subject

20 to § 1231. Accord Hernandez-Castro v. Lyons, Case No. 1:25-CV-01574 JLT SAB, 2025

21 WL 3771344, at *10–11 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 31, 2025) (finding a similarly-situated

22 petitioner not subject to § 1231 and collecting cases). Therefore, Petitioner’s detention is

23 governed by § 1225(b).

24 B. Prolonged Detention under § 1225(b)

25 The Court recently explained its rationale for “join[ing] the majority of courts across

26 the country in concluding that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C.

27 § 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing violates due process.” Kydyrali v. Wolf,

28 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020); see Xie v. LaRose, Case No.: 3:26-cv-01116-

1 RBM-MMP, 2026 WL 836351, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026). The Court incorporates

2 its reasoning in Xie and arrives at the same conclusion here.

3 The Court applies a six-factor balancing test to analyze whether detention under

4 § 1225(b) has become unreasonably prolonged. See id. at 773. Under this test, the Court

5 considers:

6 (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future

detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings

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caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the

8 government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in

a final order of removal.

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10 Gao v. LaRose, 805 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111 (S.D. Cal. 2025).

11 As to the first factor, which has been described as “the most important,” Banda v.

12 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019), Petitioner has been detained

13 for 21 months. (See Doc. 8 at 2; Doc. 9 at 2.) “Courts have found detention over seven

14 months without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable.” Abdul

15 Kadir v. Larose, Case No.: 25cv1045-LL-MMP, 2025 WL 2932654, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct.

16 15, 2025) (collecting cases). The length of detention thus weighs in Petitioner’s favor.

17 As to the second factor, the Court finds that the “undetermined, but likely significant,

18 period of mandatory detention through the appeals process” weighs in favor of Petitioner.

19 Gao, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 1111; accord Guatam v. Corr. Corp. of Am., Case No.: 3:25-cv-

20 3600-JES-DEB, 2026 WL 25846, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026) (“a removal order may not

21 become final until after the appeals [the petitioner] could file, to both the Board of

22 Immigration Appeals and Ninth Circuit”).

23 As to the third factor, “[t]he more that the conditions under which the [noncitizen]

24 is being held resemble penal confinement, the stronger his argument that he is entitled to a

25 bond hearing.” Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (citation omitted). Petitioner is detained

26 at Otay Mesa Detention Center, the conditions of which other courts have found

27 “indistinguishable from penal confinement.” Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (citation

28 omitted). The conditions of confinement weigh in Petitioner’s favor.

1 The fourth and fifth factors are neutral, as there is nothing in the record to suggest

2 either Party has been responsible for delays in the removal proceedings.

3 As to the sixth factor, Petitioner’s applications for relief were denied. (Doc. 9 at 2.)

4 This makes it more likely that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of

5 removal. Cf. Abdul Kadir, 2025 WL 2932654, at *5 (finding that the petitioner’s grant of

6 asylum was a strong indication that he would not receive a final order of removal). This

7 weighs against Petitioner.

8 Three of the factors, including “the most important one,” weigh in Petitioner’s favor,

9 and one weighs against him. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention under

10 § 1225(b) has become unreasonably prolonged and that due process requires that he be

11 provided with a bond hearing. The Court thus GRANTS in part the Amended Petition.

12 C. Remedy

13 Petitioner argues that the Court should order immediate release because:

14 (1) “immigration judges’ neutrality has been compromised” and “there is a serious risk that

15 an IJ will order [Petitioner’s] continued detention even if he poses no danger or flight risk;”

16 and (2) Respondents waived their opportunity to argue that immediate release is not the

17 correct remedy. (Doc. 8 at 9–17; Doc. 10 at 3–4.)

18 The Court “declines to address the issues raised by Petitioner regarding the neutrality

19 of immigration courts generally.” Sandesh v. LaRose, Case No.: 26-cv-0846-JES-DDL,

20 2026 WL 622690, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026). “It is axiomatic that the IJ must apply

21 the proper legal standard to effectuate this Court’s order for a bond hearing.” Id. That

22 proper legal standard is set forth in the Conclusion and footnote 1, below.

23 IV. CONCLUSION

24 For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Petition (Doc. 8) is GRANTED in part.

25 The Amended Petition is DENIED to the extent it seeks immediate release. Accordingly:

26 1. Respondents are ORDERED to arrange an individualized bond hearing for

27 Petitioner before an immigration judge within ten (10) days of entry of this Order

28 to determine whether his continued detention is warranted.

1 2. Respondents SHALL BEAR the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing

2 evidence,! that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight. If no

3 hearing occurs within ten (10) days of entry of this Order, Petitioner shall be

4 released from Respondents’ custody.

5 3. On or before April 24, 2026, Respondents SHALL FILE a status report indicating

6 whether and when Petitioner received a bond hearing, and the outcome of that bond

7 hearing.

8 4. Respondents SHALL make a complete record of the bond hearing available to

9 Petitioner and his counsel.

10 5. The TRO Motion (Doc. 3) is DENIED AS MOOT.

11 IT IS SO ORDERED.

12 ||DATE: April 2, 2026

14 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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See Sadeqi v. LaRose, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is entitled

to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her

25 continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would

likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”) (citing Singh v. Holder, 638

6 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,

27 U.S. 281 (2018) (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake” warranted

28 placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that [a

noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond”’).