STEWART

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KAYSAN STEWART, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-2643

:

KEVIN STEELE, et al., :

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

MARSTON, J. June 17, 2026

Plaintiff Kaysan Q. Stewart, who is currently incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, initiated this

pro se civil action alleging his rights were violated during a state court criminal prosecution.

Stewart has paid the filing fee for this case. For the following reasons, the Amended Complaint1

will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Stewart may file a second amended complaint

if he can cure the deficiencies noted below.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

Stewart brings claims under federal and state law. Named as Defendants are:

Montgomery County Detectives Andrew Rook and Michael Laverty; Montgomery County

1 On April 20, 2026, the Clerk’s Office received Stewart’s initial Complaint. (Doc. No. 1.)

Because he failed to either pay the required fees or file an application to proceed in forma pauperis along

with a prison account statement, the Court directed him to do so. (Doc. No. 3.) On May 7, 2026, the

Court received an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 4), and on May 11, 2026, the Court received the filing

fees (see Doc. No. 5). The Amended Complaint is the operative pleading in this case. See Garrett v.

Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (“In general, an amended pleading supersedes the

original pleading and renders the original pleading a nullity. Thus, the most recently filed amended

complaint becomes the operative pleading.” (citations omitted)). The Court adopts the sequential

pagination supplied to Stewart’s filings by the CM/ECF docketing system.

2 The factual allegations in this Memorandum are taken from the Amended Complaint. (Doc. No.

4.) Additionally, the Court includes facts reflected in publicly available state court records, of which this

Court may take judicial notice. See Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).

District Attorney Kevin Steele; Montgomery County Assistant District Attorneys Karla Pisarcik,

Paul Pruitt, and William H. Highland; Montgomery County Chief Detective Mark Bernstiel; and

Montgomery County. (Doc. No. 4 at 3–4.) Defendants are sued in their official and individual

capacities. (Id.)

The allegations in the Amended Complaint are convoluted. Stewart alleges that he and

his family were sleeping at their residence in Norristown, Pennsylvania, on June 5, 2025 at 6:30

a.m., when the Narcotics Team of the Montgomery County Detective Bureau “pounded on the

front door” of the home and demanded entry. (Id. at 4–5.) The team “viciously used force

immediately and violently handcuffed a 13 year old minor (female) while pointing firearms, then

forced [Stewart’s] grandmother . . . from the second floor to the first floor.” (Id. at 5.) Stewart

descended from the third floor to the first floor, where officers “violently point[ed] firearms” at

him. (Id.) Stewart contends that he was then arrested without probable cause and transferred to

the Montgomery County Correctional facility. (Id.) He was “charged with Corrupt Organization

charges due to a Pennsylvania Wiretapping & Electronic Surveillance Act investigation by

Defendants employed by the County of Montgomery, Montgomery County Detective Bureau,

overseen by the Montgomery County District Attorney Office.” (Id. at 5–6.) Twenty or more

individuals were arrested for participating in the purported “Corrupt Organization.” (Id. at 6.)

Stewart asserts that his arrest was made pursuant to “an erroneous, misleading,

fabricated, false report” by Defendants Rook and Laverty which “falsely stated and mislead

crimes charged, fabricated identity along with omissions not yet known about” Stewart’s

residence. (Id.) According to Stewart, the charges were based on a fabricated Affidavit of

Probable Cause that “displayed excessive and unlawful derivative interception transcripts.” (Id.)

He also contends that “Defendants” could have ascertained the falsity of the charges had they

exercised reasonable due diligence in performing their duties. (Id.)

On August 11, 2025, a preliminary hearing was held, at which ADAs Pisarcik and Pruitt,

along with Detective Rook, allegedly acted together to use “unauthorized, illegally obtained

wiretap content” against Stewart in violation of the Commonwealth Attorneys Act (“CAA”), 71

P.S. § 732-205(b). (Id. at 6–7.) Stewart contends that by proceeding with prosecution of the

criminal charges, Defendants Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Rook violated his Fourth Amendment rights

and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 7.)

On December 1, 2025, Stewart received pretrial discovery containing the evidence of the

wiretap investigation. (Id.) He contends that “[t]here was no documentary record of the

Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General delegating his authority in some formal capacity

authorizing the application to a judge for the order approving the interception of the

communications involved herein.” (Id.) He further claims that ADA Pisarcik “proceeded to

prosecute preliminary hearings and file criminal informations of around 20 or more individuals,

relating to corrupt organization drug offenses, without concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction with

the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General.” (Id. at 8.) Stewart asserts that, as a result, all the

resulting arrests were invalid and in violation of the CAA. (Id.)

Similarly, Stewart contends that the discovery he received demonstrates that Detectives

Rook and Laverty led an “unlawful” wiretap investigation without “the ‘involvement or

assistance from the Pennsylvania State Police Department’ as directed in the applications for

approval to intercept the communications involved herein” that were authorized by District

Attorney Steele. (Id.) He further claims that Detectives Rook and Laverty knew at the time of

Stewart’s arrest, and afterward, that “physical evidence they had collected in connection with the

charges brought against . . . [Stewart] was inconsistent with his guilt” and that there was no

probable cause to arrest him. (Id. at 8–9.) According to Stewart, “all Defendants” acted in

concert to violate his rights under the United States Constitution and state law. (See id. at 9–10.)

And he seeks millions of dollars in damages. (See id. at 13–14.)

The publicly available state court docket for Stewart’s criminal prosecution shows that

Stewart was initially charged with twenty counts, including corrupt organization charges and

various drug charges. See Commonwealth v. Stewart, CP-46-CR-0004171-2025 (Pa. Ct. Comm.

Pl. Montgomery Cnty.). On May 11, 2026, Stewart entered into a negotiated guilty plea,

pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to a disorderly conduct charge, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat.

§ 5503(a)(4), and the balance of the charges were dismissed, nolle prossed, or withdrawn, see

Commonwealth v. Stewart, CP-46-CR-0004171-2025. Although the Amended Complaint is not

dated, it was filed with the Court before the entry of the guilty plea. (See Doc. No. 4.) Stewart is

currently incarcerated at SCI Camp Hill, awaiting sentencing. (See Doc. No. 6); Commonwealth

v. Stewart, CP-46-CR-0004171-2025.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although Stewart paid the filing fee in full, the Court has the authority to screen his

Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116

n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that the district courts have the authority to screen a prisoner

complaint pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1) even if the prisoner is not proceeding in forma pauperis).

Section 1915A requires the Court to “review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as

soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress

from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that “is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id.

§ 1915A(b)(1). Likewise, the court must dismiss a complaint that “seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b)(2).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1) is governed by the same

standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

Harris v. Wetzel, 822 F. App’x 128, 130 (3d Cir. 2020); see also Tourscher v. McCullough, 184

F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). This standard requires the Court to determine whether the

complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007)); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). At

the screening stage, the Court will accept the facts alleged in a pro se complaint as true, draw all

reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether that complaint contains facts

sufficient to state a plausible claim. Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021),

abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir.

2024).

As Stewart is proceeding pro se, the Court construes the allegations in the Amended

Complaint liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay

Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). Nonetheless, “pro se litigants still must

allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Conclusory

allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986

F.3d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff cannot survive dismissal just by alleging the

conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.”). Additionally, the Court must review the Amended

Complaint and dismiss the matter if it determines that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Grp. Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116,

122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised

at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua sponte”).

III. DISCUSSION

The allegations in the Amended Complaint are convoluted, and Stewart invokes a litany

of legal concepts under federal and state law, which adds to the confusion. (See generally Doc.

No. 4.) Liberally construing the allegations contained therein, the Amended Complaint is best

understood as presenting Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims,3 Fourteenth

Amendment fabrication of evidence claims, federal conspiracy claims, and state law claims.4

3 The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . .

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,

and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Stewart uses a variety of terms,

including false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and others, to assert that this Fourth

Amendment rights were violated during his arrest and prosecution. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 4 at 10–13.)

However, “[a]s the Supreme Court has explained, claims for false arrest challenge ‘detention without

legal process,’ while malicious prosecution involves seizure ‘pursuant to legal process.’” Rivera-

Guadalupe v. City of Harrisburg, 124 F.4th 295, 303 (3d Cir. 2024) (first quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549

U.S. 384, 389 (2007); then quoting Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022)). “If the plaintiff is held

pursuant to legal process, then his proper claim is a malicious prosecution claim, which is a claim

involving the ‘wrongful institution of legal process’ (not the absence of legal process).” Voorhis v.

Ginkel, No. 24-2859, 2025 WL 2556241, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 5, 2025) (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390).

The Court understands Stewart to allege that he was arrested on June 5, 2025, pursuant to a warrant that

was not supported by probable cause. (See Doc. No. 4 at 4–6); see also Commonwealth v. Stewart, MJ-

38109-CR-0000184-2025 (listing criminal complaint filed on June 4, 2025). Consequently, his Fourth

Amendment claims sound in malicious prosecution and will be addressed under that standard.

4 Stewart also lists the First and Eighth Amendments as bases for his claims. (See, e.g., Doc. No.

4 at 2.) But Stewart does not allege any facts that would suggest a violation of his First or Eighth

Amendments rights, and passing references to legal provisions are insufficient to bring a plausible

constitutional claim before the Court. See Higgins v. Bayada Home Health Care Inc., 62 F.4th 755, 763

(3d Cir. 2023) (“A passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”

(cleaned up) (quoting Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26

F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994))). Accordingly, any claim based on a violation of the First or Eighth

Amendment will be dismissed.

Additionally, to the extent that Stewart is raising claims based on any injuries suffered by the

minor who was in the home on June 5, 2025, when he was arrested (see Doc. No. 4 at 10–11), Stewart

lacks standing as to those claims, as he may not raise claims based on injuries sustained by another. See

Township of Lyndhurst v. Priceline.com, Inc., 657 F.3d 148, 154 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[A] plaintiff must assert

Even under a liberal reading of the Amended Complaint, however, Stewart has failed to present a

plausible claim. The Court will address the pleading deficiencies below.

A. Federal Claims

The vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought against state actors in

federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Local governments and municipalities are considered persons

under § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

1. Individual Capacity Claims Against DA Steele and ADAs Pisarcik,

Pruitt, and Highland

The Court understands Stewart to contend that the DA and ADAs overseeing his criminal

case violated the Pennsylvania CAA and his federal constitutional rights in prosecuting the state

court case against him. He alleges that DA Steele authorized the “applications” that were used

by Detectives Rook and Laverty. (See Doc No. 4 at 8.) Stewart also states that at the

preliminary hearing on August 11, 2025, ADAs Pisarcik and Pruitt, along with Detective Rook,

acted to use “unauthorized, illegally obtained wiretap content” against him in violation of the

CAA and that by proceeding with the charges, Defendants Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Rook violated his

Fourth Amendment rights and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id. at 6–7.) Stewart

further claims that ADA Pisarcik prosecuted the case by participating in the preliminary hearing

his or her own legal interests rather than those of a third party.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Stewart also could not assert claims on behalf of the minor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the

United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules

of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”); Osei-Afriyie ex rel.

Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882–83 (3d Cir. 1991) (a pro se litigant who is not an

attorney may not pursue claims on behalf of anyone other than himself).

and filing informations relating to corrupt organization drug offenses “without concurrent

prosecutorial jurisdiction” with the Pennsylvania AG because there is “no documentary record”

of the AG “delegating his authority in some formal capacity authorizing the application to a

judge for the order approving the interception of the communications involved herein.” (Id. at 7,

8.) Stewart concludes that, as a result, his arrest was invalid and in violation of the CAA,

specifically 71 P.S. §§ 732-205(a)(2), (a)(6), and (b). (Id.). The Court considers Stewart’s CAA

claims before addressing his constitutional claims against the prosecutors.

a. CAA Claims

The enactment of the CAA in 1980 “made it clear that the powers of the state Attorney

General are no longer an emanation from some bed of common law precepts, but are . . . strictly

a matter of legislative designation and enumeration.” Commonwealth v. Carsia, 517 A.2d 956,

958 (1986). Thus, “[t]he Attorney General’s criminal authority is limited.” Commonwealth ex

rel. Krasner v. Att’y Gen., 309 A.3d 265, 274 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2024). Section 205(a) of the Act

provides the Attorney General with the authority to prosecute certain cases in county criminal

court. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 732-205(a)(1)–(8). Section 205(b) also provides that the “[t]he

Attorney General shall have the concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction with the district attorney”

in specific situations. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 732-205(b). Relevant here, the AG and the

county district attorneys have concurrent prosecutorial jurisdiction for criminal charges involving

corrupt organizations set forth in 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 911. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 732-

205(a)(2); 732-205(b).5 However, a violation of the CAA does not, in itself, provide a basis for

a § 1983 claim because it does not create a protectible liberty interest or property interest. See

5 The section of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code pertaining to corrupt organizations also provides

that the Attorney General and county district attorneys have concurrent jurisdiction to institute criminal

proceedings under the provisions of that section. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 911(e).

Voicenet Commc’ns, Inc. v. Corbett, No. 04-1318, 2006 WL 2506318, at *10–11 (E.D. Pa. Aug.

30, 2006) (stating that the violation of a state law only gives rise to a § 1983 claim if the

violation implicates a federal constitutional right). Thus, even assuming arguendo that any of

the named Defendants could violate the CAA, which governs the authority of the AG, Stewart

cannot state a due process claim for noncompliance with the CAA. See id. at *11.

b. Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Stewart likewise may not proceed on for his Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth

Amendment claims against ADAs Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Highland. As an initial matter, Stewart

does not describe any actions taken by ADA Highland, other than to state that he replaced ADA

Pisarcik and, at the time of the writing of the Amended Complaint, continued the prosecution.

(See Doc. No. 4 at 3.) Nonetheless, the claims Stewart seeks to bring against ADAs Pisarcik,

Pruitt, and Highland are based on their actions taken during the prosecution of the state criminal

case. It is well settled that prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for

damages under § 1983 for acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the

criminal process” such as “initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976); see also Roberts v. Lau, 90 F.4th 618, 624 (3d Cir.

2024) (“Prosecutors . . . are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for engaging in

conduct that serves a quasi-judicial function.”).

“[W]hether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she

establishes that she was functioning as the state’s ‘advocate’ while engaging in the alleged

conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d

129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006). Absolute immunity extends to the decision to initiate a prosecution,

including “soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable

cause hearings,” presenting a state’s case at trial, and appearing before a judge to present

evidence. Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and citations

omitted); see also Sanders v. City of Erie, No. 26-1135, 2026 WL 1428876, at *2 (3d Cir. May

21, 2026) (“[A] district attorney acting ‘within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a

criminal prosecution’ is immune from suit, even when a litigant alleges a lack of probable

cause.” (quoting Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 (1997)). “[P]rosecutors [also] are entitled

to absolute immunity from claims for damages related to their roles in choosing when and

whether to dismiss charges or withdrawal [sic] an arrest warrant lodged against a defendant.”

Garcia v. Phila. Dist. Attorney’s Off., No. 23-1224, 2023 WL 3750604, at *2 (3d Cir. June 1,

2023) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 850 (2024).

Moreover, district attorneys and other supervisory prosecutors are likewise entitled to absolute

immunity from claims based on their role in initiating and pursuing a prosecution on behalf of

the Commonwealth, and in seeking an arrest warrant. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31; Van de

Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 348–49 (2009); Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129.

Because Stewart’s claims against ADAs Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Highland are based upon

actions taken in a prosecutorial function in the judicial phase of Stewart’s state criminal

proceedings, each is entitled to absolute immunity. Accordingly, the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment claims against Defendants Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Highland in their individual

capacities will be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2).6

6 As to DA Steele, Stewart alleges only that he was the duly elected District Attorney of

Montgomery County (see Doc. No. 4 at 3), and that Steele authorized “applications” that were used by

Detectives Rook and Laverty (see id. at 8). These allegations do not sufficiently describe the actions that

DA Steele is alleged to have taken in violation of Stewart’s constitutional rights. In a § 1983 action, the

personal involvement of each defendant in the alleged constitutional violation is a required element,

meaning a plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences giving

rise to the claims brought against that defendant. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.

1998); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a

2. Individual Capacity Claims Against Detectives Rook and Laverty

Next, the Court understands Stewart to present Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution

claims and Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claims against Detectives Rook and

Laverty. Specifically, Stewart asserts that his arrest was made pursuant to “an erroneous,

misleading, fabricated, false report” by Defendants Rook and Laverty which “falsely stated and

mislead crimes charged, fabricated identity along with omissions not yet known about” Stewart’s

residence. (Doc. No. 4 at 6.) According to Stewart, the charges were based on a fabricated

affidavit of probable cause, which “displayed excessive and unlawful derivative interception

transcripts.” (Id.) He also contends that “Defendants” could have ascertained the falsity of the

charges had they exercised reasonable due diligence in performing their duties. (Id.)

Stewart further avers that Detective Rook acted with ADAs Pisarcik and Pruitt to use

“unauthorized, illegally obtained wiretap content” against him at the preliminary hearing on

August 11, 2025. (Id. at 6–7.) Additionally, he asserts that the evidence of the wiretap

investigation that he received in December 2025 contained “no documentary record of the

Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General delegating his authority in some formal capacity

authorizing the application to a judge for the order approving the interception of the

communications involved herein.” (Id.) Stewart concludes that the discovery he received

demonstrates that Detectives Rook and Laverty led an “unlawful” wiretap investigation without

“the ‘involvement or assistance from the Pennsylvania State Police Department’ as directed in

the applications for approval to intercept the communications involved herein” that were

plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual

actions, has violated the Constitution.”). Thus, a proper complaint explains what each defendant did or

did not do with respect to the alleged constitutional harms. It is possible that DA Steele would be entitled

to prosecutorial immunity from Stewart’s claims, but because Stewart does not describe DA Steele’s

actions with sufficient specificity, the individual capacity claims against DA Steele will be dismissed

without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

authorized by DA Steele. (Id.) He further claims that Detectives Rook and Laverty knew at the

time of Stewart’s arrest, as well as thereafter, that “physical evidence they had collected in

connection with the charges brought against . . . [him] was inconsistent with his guilt” and that

there was no probable cause to arrest him. (Id. at 8–9.)

Based on these allegations, the Court understands Stewart to present Fourth Amendment

malicious prosecution claims and Fourteenth Amendment fabrication of evidence claims against

Detectives Rook and Laverty.

a. Malicious Prosecution

To state a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must plausibly

allege that a government official charged him without probable cause, leading to an unreasonable

seizure of his person. Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 602 U.S. 556, 558 (2024) (citing

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U. S. 36, 43, and n.2 (2022)). A malicious prosecution claim under

§ 1983 has five elements: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal

proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable

cause;7 (4) the defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to

7 For the “lack of probable cause” element, where an arrest is made pursuant to a warrant or a

previously sworn criminal complaint, a plaintiff must allege plausibly “(1) that the police officer

knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions

that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are

material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir.

2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Pinkney v. Meadville, 95 F.4th 743, 748 (3d Cir. 2024)

(same); see also Evans v. Newark City, 152 F.4th 537, 545–47 (3d Cir. 2025) (discussing “lack of

probable cause” element). The existence of probable cause is typically a question of fact for a jury, unless

the evidence “reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding,” in which case the court may

determine the existence of probable cause as a matter of law. Basile v. Township of Smith, 752 F. Supp.

2d 643, 651 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (granting Rule 12(b)(6) motion in part and dismissing false arrest claim with

leave to amend (citing Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788–89 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also

Slack v. McHugh, No. 24-2153, 2025 WL 2753671, at *2 (3d Cir. Sept. 29, 2025) (“[A] plaintiff must

adequately allege a lack of probable cause to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal” for either a false arrest or

malicious prosecution claim).

justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of seizure

as a consequence of a legal proceeding. Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 2020)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that

the person committed the crime at issue.” Id. at 199 (quotations omitted).

The Amended Complaint does not present sufficient facts that would permit the Court to

draw the reasonable inference that either Detective Rook or Detective Laverty engaged in

malicious prosecution. Stewart repeatedly asserts that he was arrested without probable cause,

but he does not allege any facts in support of that assertion. As stated earlier in this

Memorandum, the Court must determine whether Stewart’s Amended Complaint contains

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (emphasis

added). “Although the plausibility standard does not impose a probability requirement, it does

require a pleading to show more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 (3d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citations

omitted). And it requires more than “unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions couched as

factual allegations.” Falcone v. Dickstein, 92 F.4th 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2024); see also Schuylkill

Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the

reviewing court is not required “to accept as true unsupported conclusions and unwarranted

inferences” (citations omitted)).

Even under a liberal construction of the Amended Complaint, the allegations against

Detectives Rook and Laverty fail to meet this standard with respect to the elements of a

malicious prosecution claim. For example, as to the third and fourth elements (lack of probable

cause and malice), Stewart does not allege what facts were known to the detectives, identify

which statements in the affidavit of probable cause were allegedly false, explain what (if any)

information was known but not included in the affidavit that would lead a reasonable person to

think Stewart did not commit the crimes charged, or otherwise provide any context for why it

was unreasonable to pursue the criminal charges against him.8 Accordingly, the malicious

prosecution claims against the detectives must be dismissed because they are not plausible as

pleaded. See, e.g., Santiago v. Humes, No. 14-7109, 2015 WL 1422627, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30,

2015) (dismissing malicious prosecution claims because the plaintiffs failed to “affirmatively

assert facts to show that the Officer Defendants did not have probable cause” and instead,

generally alleged that all allegations against them in the underlying criminal proceedings were

false).

b. Fabrication of Evidence

Turning to Stewart’s claims for fabrication of evidence, “[d]ue process forbids the

government from using ‘falsified evidence . . . as a basis to initiate the prosecution of a

defendant.’” Dalal v. Molinelli, No. 24-2649, 2026 WL 579387, at *6 (3d Cir. Mar. 2, 2026)

(quoting Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 289 (3d Cir. 2014)). A criminal defendant who has

been convicted at trial “has a stand-alone claim under section 1983 based on the Fourteenth

Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, without the use of that evidence, the

8 As for the second element, a “favorable termination” occurs when a prosecution ends “without a

conviction.” Thompson, 596 U.S. at 49 (“In sum, we hold that a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983

for malicious prosecution does not require the plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution ended with

some affirmative indication of innocence. A plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution ended

without a conviction.”). The publicly available state court docket demonstrates that Stewart entered into a

negotiated guilty plea pursuant to which most of the charges were dismissed, nolle prossed, or withdrawn.

See Commonwealth v. Stewart, CP-46-CR-0004171-2025. However, because the Amended Complaint

was filed before the guilty plea was entered, Stewart does not address this element either.

defendant would not have been convicted.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 294. Additionally, “an acquitted

criminal defendant may have a stand-alone fabricated evidence claim against state actors under

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that,

absent that fabricated evidence, the defendant would not have been criminally charged.” See

Black v. Montgomery County, 835 F.3d 358, 371 (3d Cir. 2016). The “reasonable likelihood”

standard requires that a plaintiff draw a “meaningful connection” between the due process injury

and the use of fabricated evidence against him. Id. at 371 (citations omitted). “[T]estimony that

is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out to

have been wrong.” Id. (citation omitted).

While Stewart alleges that the affidavit of probable cause in support of the arrest warrant

contained fabricated evidence, he does not offer any facts in support of this assertion. (See

generally Doc. No. 4 at 6–8.) In other words, he does not say in his Amended Complaint what

the “evidence” was that he claims the detectives fabricated. Stewart simply does not present

sufficient facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that either Detective Rook or

Detective Laverty violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, this claim will be

dismissed because it is wholly conclusory and undeveloped and does not meet the Iqbal pleading

standard.

3. Individual Claims for Supervisory Liability Against Chief Detective

Bernstiel

Stewart’s claims against Montgomery County Chief Detective Mark Bernstiel also are

not plausible. A “defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the

alleged wrongs” to be liable. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (explaining

that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that

each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated

the Constitution”); Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 290 (“Each Government official, his or her title

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677)).

Generalized allegations that a supervisory defendant is “in charge of” or “responsible for” an

office or facility are insufficient to allege personal involvement in an underlying constitutional

violation. See Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Saisi asserted that some

defendants were ‘in charge of agencies that allowed this to happen,’ and that liability stemmed

merely from defendants’ ‘belief’ that their conduct would be ‘tolerated.’ However, a director

cannot be held liable ‘simply because of his position as the head of the [agency].’” (quoting

Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 354 (3d Cir. 2005))). Rather, “[s]uits against high-level

government officials must satisfy the general requirements for supervisory liability.” Wharton v.

Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2017).

There are “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for

unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d

307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015).

First, a supervisor may be personally liable if he or she “with deliberate indifference to the

consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused

[the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr.,

372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original)).9 “Second, a supervisor may be

personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed

9 “Failure to” claims, such as a failure to train are generally considered a subcategory of policy or

practice liability. Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316–17 (citation omitted). A claim for supervisory liability or

liability based upon a failure to train involves four elements: (1) that an existing policy created an

unreasonable risk of constitutional injury; (2) the supervisor was aware of this unreasonable risk; (3) the

supervisor was indifferent to the risk; and (4) the injury resulted from the policy or practice. See Sample

v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989); see also Chavarriaga v. N.J. Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210,

227 (3d Cir. 2015) (same).

others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the

subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct.” Id. “Although a court can infer that a defendant had

contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case,

the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Baker v.

Monroe Township, 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6).

Stewart alleges only that Chief Detective Bernstiel was the commanding officer of

Defendants Rook and Laverty, and was responsible for their training, supervision, and conduct,

as well as for enforcing the regulations of the Montgomery County Detective Bureau. (See Doc.

No. 4 at 3–4.) Thus, Stewart has not plausibly alleged that Detective Bernstiel established and

maintained a policy, practice, or custom with deliberate indifference that caused constitutional

harm, nor has he plausibly alleged Detective Bernstiel’s personal involvement in any alleged

underlying constitutional violation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Jankowski v. Lellock,

649 F. App’x 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of failure-to-train claim “relegated to

a single sentence in the complaint” as “merely a rote recitation of a cause of action coupled with

a legal conclusion” that was insufficient to satisfy the pleading standard).

Further, a supervisory claim requires “a showing that there was an actual constitutional

violation at the hands of subordinates” before finding liability on the part of the supervisory

official. Allen v. Eckard, 804 F. App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir. 2020) (concluding that failure to train

and supervise claims asserted against supervisor defendants were meritless where the plaintiff

failed to make a plausible showing of an underlying constitutional violation). As discussed

above, Stewart has not plausibly alleged an underlying constitutional violation by Detectives

Rook or Laverty. Accordingly, any individual capacity claim against Detective Bernstiel is not

plausible and will be dismissed.

4. Individual Capacity Conspiracy Claims Against Various Defendants

Stewart alleges throughout the Amended Complaint that the various Defendants acted

together to violate his rights. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 4 at 4, 9.) The elements of a § 1983 claim of

conspiracy to violate federal civil rights are that “(1) two or more persons conspire to deprive

any person of constitutional rights; (2) one or more of the conspirators performs any overt act in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) that overt act injures the plaintiff in his person or property

or deprives the plaintiff of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, with the added

gloss under § 1983 that the conspirators act under the color of state law.” Jutrowski v. Township

of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 294 n.15 (3d Cir. 2018) (cleaned up) (quoting Barnes Foundation v.

Township of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 162 (3d Cir. 2001)). “[T]o properly plead an

unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a conspiratorial agreement

can be inferred.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 178 (3d

Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). “[A] bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556. Here, Stewart has presented no factual allegations to support conspiracy claims;

therefore, his conspiracy claims will be dismissed. See Cromwell v. Fichter, No. 22-3169, 2023

WL 3734969, at *1 (3d Cir. May 31, 2023) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal where plaintiff

presented no factual allegations to support a conspiracy claim).10

10 Stewart also references 42 U.S.C. § 1985 in connection with his conspiracy claims. (See Doc.

No. 4 at 2.) Nothing in Stewart’s allegations plausibly suggests that he was the target of race or class

based discriminatory animus designed to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws, as would be

necessary to proceed on a claim under that provision. See Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 682, 685 (3d Cir.

1997) (“[T]he reach of section 1985(3) is limited to private conspiracies predicated on ‘racial, or perhaps

otherwise class based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’” (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.

88, 102 (1971))).

5. Official Capacity and Municipal Liability Claims

Stewart brings § 1983 claims against Montgomery County, as well as claims against the

various Defendants in their official capacities. Claims against municipal officials named in their

official capacities are indistinguishable from, and duplicative of, claims against the municipality

that employs them. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“Official-capacity

suits . . . ‘generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.’” (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55)). “[A]n official-capacity suit is,

in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Id. (citation omitted).

A municipality, such as Montgomery County, or any other suable municipal entity, is not

vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees on a theory of respondeat

superior. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (stating

“local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts’” (quoting Pembaur v.

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). There are two ways for a § 1983 claim against a

municipality to proceed: “[a] plaintiff may put forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of

the municipality led to his or her injuries, or that they were caused by a failure or inadequacy by

the municipality that reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93,

105 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final

authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action issues an official proclamation,

policy, or edict.” Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). “Custom, on the other

hand, can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct, although not specifically

endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute law.”

Id. (quoting Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). “A plaintiff must also

allege that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.” Id. (citing Kneipp v.

Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)). This can be done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative

link’ between the policy or custom and the particular constitutional violation” alleged. Id.

(citation omitted). By contrast, a plaintiff whose claim is predicated on a failure or inadequacy

must allege a failure that amounts to deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality.

Forrest, 930 F.3d at 106 (citation omitted). “This consists of a showing as to whether

(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a particular situation, (2) the

situation involves a difficult choice or a history of employees mishandling, and (3) the wrong

choice by an employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id. (citing

Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999)).

Here, Stewart has failed to allege a municipal policy or custom, or deliberate indifference

attributable to the municipality. Accordingly, neither Stewart’s claims against Montgomery

County nor his claims against the Defendants in their official capacity meet the Iqbal pleading

standard, and they too will be dismissed.

B. State Law Claims

Because the Court has dismissed Stewart’s federal claims, the Court will not exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims he seeks to raise.

Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over any such claims is 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in which “the matter in

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is

between . . . citizens of different States.” Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between

all plaintiffs and all defendants,’” which “means that, unless there is some other basis for

jurisdiction, no plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.” Lincoln Benefit

Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche,

546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir.

2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the state where he is domiciled,

meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to remain. See Washington v.

Hovensa, LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). “[T]he domicile of a prisoner before his

imprisonment presumptively remains his domicile during his imprisonment.” Pierro v. Kugel,

386 F. App’x 308, 309 (3d Cir. 2010). It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish diversity of

citizenship. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 72 (1939); see also Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing

Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461 F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity

cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate complete diversity between the parties and that the amount

in controversy requirement has been met).

Stewart has not met his burden. Stewart states that he resided in Norristown,

Pennsylvania, prior to his arrest. (Doc. No. 4 at 2.) He does not allege the citizenship of the

individual Defendants, but he is suing Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, and various officials

of that municipality, which suggests that diversity is lacking. Accordingly, Stewart has not

sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of establishing the Court’s

jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to pursue and all state law claims will be

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.11

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the individual capacity claims against

ADAs Pisarcik, Pruitt, and Highland with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) based

11 Stewart is also warned that many of his state law claims seemed poised to fail. For example, to

the extent Stewart seeks damages for a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitution (see Doc. No. 4 at 12),

those claims fail as a matter of law because “Pennsylvania does not have a statutory equivalent to § 1983

and does not recognize a private right of action for damages stemming from alleged violation of the state

on prosecutorial immunity. All other federal claims will be dismissed without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. All state law claims will be dismissed

without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

An appropriate Order follows regarding amendment.

constitution.” Miles v. Zech, 788 F. App’x 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Gary v. Braddock Cemetery,

517 F.3d 195, 207 n.4 (3d Cir. 2008)); see also Plouffe v. Cevallos, 777 F. App’x 594, 601 (3d Cir. 2019)

(“[N]or is there a private right of action for damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.”); Pocono

Mountain Charter Sch. v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 442 F. App’x 681, 687 (3d Cir. 2011) (“No

Pennsylvania statute establishes, and no Pennsylvania court has recognized, a private cause of action for

damages under the Pennsylvania Constitution.” (citation omitted)). In addition, Stewart likely cannot

proceed on state tort law claims against the DA and ADAs under the facts alleged in the Amended

Complaint. In Pennsylvania, common law tort immunity protects “high public officials,” including

district attorneys and assistant district attorneys, from suit when acting in the scope of their official duties

and authority, as the individual Defendants were in pursuing Stewart’s prosecution. Poteat v. Lydon,

2023 WL 6620368, at *3 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing Heller v. Fulare, 454 F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2006);

Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 69-70 (Pa. 2001)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1123 (2024); see also

Harris v. Krasner, No. 23-2068, 2024 WL 2861848, at *4 (3d Cir. June 6, 2024) (stating that doctrine of

high official immunity applies to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and to district

attorneys and assistant district attorneys); Johnson v. City of Reading, No. 21-4860, 2023 WL 1783775, at

*16 n.23 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2023) (“The standard used to determine who qualifies as a ‘high public

official’ under Pennsylvania common law (1) depends on the nature of their duties, (2) the importance of

their office, and (3) whether the role has policy-making functions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has

held that District Attorneys and Assistant District Attorneys qualify as a high official for purposes of

immunity.” (citations omitted)); Wilson v. City of Philadelphia, No. 21-2057, 2023 WL 5186258, at *8

(E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2023) (stating that because the ADA, and by extension, DA, were participating in

“prosecutorial” activity that was absolutely protected, they were operating within the scope of their

official duties and powers, and were immune from plaintiff’s claims for civil damages based on state law

tort claims of malicious prosecution and reckless or intentional infliction of emotional distress).