The opinion
1
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10 MARLENE WAGMAN-GELLER, Case No.: 25-cv-824-BJC-SBC
individually and on behalf of all others
11 ORDER:
similarly situated,,
12
Plaintiffs, (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
13 MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF Nos. 57,
v.
58]
14
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,
15 WELLS FARGO & CO., AMERICAN AND
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
16
INC., and DOES 1 through 5, inclusive, (2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
17 MOTION TO COMPEL
Defendants.
ARBITRATION [ECF No. 59]
18
19 Before the Court is Defendant American Arbitration Association, Inc. (AAA)
20 Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 58, and Defendants Wells Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo
21 Bank, N.A. (together, “Wells Fargo”) Motion to Compel Arbitration. ECF No. 59. For the
22 reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS both motions.
23 I. BACKGROUND
24 A. Current Action
25 On June 24, 2011, Plaintiff Marlene Wagman-Geller opened a checking account
26 with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ECF No. 59-1 at 9. When Plaintiff opened her Account, she
27 received and agreed to be bound by the terms of Wells Fargo’s Deposit Account Agreement
28 (the “Account Agreement”). Id. The Account Agreement included an arbitration provision
1 (the “Arbitration Provision”), subjecting all disputes between Wells Fargo and the account
2 holder to arbitration. ECF No. 24-3 at 36. The Arbitration Provision explained that Wells
3 Fargo sought to resolve disputes with customers “as quickly and easily as possible” and
4 stated that arbitration provides “a legally binding decision in a more streamlined, cost-
5 effective manner than a typical court case.” Id.
6 The Account Agreement also included a Debit Card Overdraft Service (“DCOS”),
7 which allowed Wells Fargo to charge overdraft fees on certain debit card and ATM
8 transactions. ECF No. 24 at 18. Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo assessed overdraft fees
9 without proper disclosure or consent, in violation of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
10 (“Regulation E”). Id. On January 31, 2025, Plaintiff, through counsel, McCune Law
11 Group (“MLG”), filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), substituting
12 herself as the named plaintiff after the death of the previous plaintiff (Joseph Bacigalupi).
13 See ECF No. 24. Plaintiff seeks to represent multiple classes based on alleged improper
14 overdraft fees and purported deficiencies in the arbitration process. See id. at 4–7.
15 B. Relevant Background
16 On November 25, 2020, MLG filed a class action complaint on behalf of
17 Mosanthony Wilson (“Wilson”) and all others similarly situated, alleging similar
18 Regulation E and California UCL violations as alleged by Plaintiff. Wilson v. Wells Fargo
19 & Co., No. 3:20-cv-02307-DMS-WVG, (S.D. Cal. filed Nov. 25, 2020). On May 8, 2021,
20 the Court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the litigation.
21 Wilson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 2021 WL 1853587, at *2–4 (S.D. Cal. May 10, 2021).1
22 While MLG and Wells Fargo were engaged in the Wilson arbitration, MLG filed
23 3,965 arbitration demands against Wells Fargo on behalf of customers. ECF No. 59-3 at
24 5. AAA informed the parties that AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules and AAA
25
26
27
1 On September 9, 2022, the Court issued an order lifting the stay and confirming, pursuant
to 9 U.S.C. § 9, the final award issued by AAA. See Wilson v. Wells Fargo & Co., No.
28 2022 WL 4125220 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2022).
1 Supplementary Rules for Multiple Case Filings (“Supplementary Rules”) would govern
2 the proceedings. ECF No. 59-1 at 11. AAA also appointed a Process Arbitrator. Id.
3 On October 27, 2022, the Process Arbitrator issued an order requiring each claimant
4 to provide basic factual information sufficient to support a colorable Regulation E claim
5 against Wells Fargo (the “October 27 PA Order”). Id. at 12. On December 13, 2022, MLG
6 filed a new action in this Court, seeking to overturn Process Arbitrator’s order. Mosley v.
7 Wells Fargo & Co., 2023 WL 3185790, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2023), aff'd, 2024 WL
8 977674 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2024). On May 1, 2023, this Court granted Wells Fargo’s motion
9 to compel arbitration and directed the Mosley plaintiffs back to arbitration. Mosley DC
10 Order, 2023 WL 3185790 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 2023). The Court held that the October 27
11 PA Order was “not an award on the merits but a procedural order that addresses claim filing
12 requirements.” Id. at *4. Because the order addressed “procedure, namely pleading and
13 filing requirements, to provide an orderly process for the [mass arbitration]—all based on
14 [the Process Arbitrator’s] interpretation of the Supplementary Rules to which the parties
15 agreed,” the Court concluded it was not a final order subject to judicial review. Id.
16 On May 26, 2023, MLG appealed the Mosley DC Order. ECF No. 59-1 at 13. The
17 Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that “Wells Fargo did not act improperly or otherwise
18 breach the agreement.” Mosley, et al. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 2024 WL 977674,
19 *2 (9th Cir. June 23, 2023). The court further explained that “Wells Fargo simply sought
20 information establishing that each Claimant had a legitimate dispute with them” and had
21 complied with the Arbitration Provision by paying “more than half a million dollars in
22 arbitration fees over several months of arbitration before Claimants filed their case in
23 federal court.” Id.
24 On January 10, 2024, the Process Arbitrator dismissed 3,503 claims without
25 prejudice for failure to comply with the minimum filing requirements. ECF No. 59-1 at
26 15. For the remaining 432 claims, AAA proceeded to appoint individual merits arbitrators.
27 Id. On April 17, 2024, AAA began appointing arbitrators for the first 187 individual
28 claimant arbitrations.
1 On July 12, 2024, MLG submitted a “Notice of Suspension in Arbitration” to AAA,
2 stating that it would suspend participation in the individual arbitrations unless AAA
3 adopted a series of procedural changes. Id. at 17–18. On August 8, 2024, AAA notified the
4 parties that it would continue administering the individual arbitrations and directed the
5 parties to present any procedural requests to the merits arbitrator assigned to each case. Id.
6 at 19. Wells Fargo alleges that MLG refused to participate in the individual arbitrations.
7 To ensure claimants were aware of MLG’s refusal to participate, Wells Fargo requested
8 that merits arbitrators order status conferences requiring the presence of the individual
9 claimants. Id. Some arbitrators granted Wells Fargo’s request, while others declined. On
10 September 26, 2024, MLG submitted notices of voluntary dismissal for all claimants who
11 had not yet been assigned merits arbitrators, including Plaintiff. Id. at 20.
12 On October 17, 2024, AAA advised the parties that it would close, as withdrawn,
13 254 individual arbitrations in which no arbitrator had yet been appointed and would refund
14 $630,000 in arbitrator compensation deposits to Wells Fargo, including the deposit
15 associated with Plaintiff’s arbitration. Id. AAA then administratively closed the relevant
16 individual arbitrations and issued statements reflecting the unused arbitrator compensation
17 to be refunded to Wells Fargo. Id.
18 C. Procedural History
19 This action was first filed in the Northern District of California on September 26,
20 2024. ECF No. 1. In October 2024, the original plaintiff, Joseph Bacigalupi, passed away.
21 ECF No. 17 at 2. On December 3, 2024, the Court gave MLG until January 31, 2025, to
22 file an amended complaint, a notice of substitution, or otherwise inform the court of the
23 status of the case. ECF No. 18 at 6. MLG then filed the operative first amended complaint,
24 replacing Bacigalupi with Plaintiff. ECF No. 24.
25 On February 13, 2025, AAA filed a motion to dismiss ECF No. 31. The following
26 day, Wells Fargo filed a motion to transfer the case under the first-to-file rule, ECF No. 34,
27 as well as a motion to compel arbitration or, alternatively, to dismiss the FAC. ECF No.
28 35. On April 4, 2025, the court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to transfer and denied as
1 moot the defendants’ motions to dismiss and to compel arbitration. ECF No. 48. The case
2 was subsequently transferred to this Court on April 7, 2025. ECF No. 49.
3 On April 28, 2025, Defendant AAA filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a
4 claim. ECF No. 58. On May 12, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, ECF No.
5 60, and on May 23, 2025, AAA filed its reply. ECF No. 62. On May 2, 2025, Wells Fargo
6 filed a renewed Motion to Compel Arbitration, or in the alternative, dismiss the FAC. ECF
7 No. 59. On May 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a response, ECF No. 61, and on May 30, 2025,
8 Wells Fargo filed its reply. ECF No. 63. For the reasons set forth below, both the Motion
9 to Dismiss and the Motion to Compel Arbitration are GRANTED.
10 II. LEGAL STANDARD
11 A. Motion to Dismiss
12 “A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
13 state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’”
14 Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro
15 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A district court’s dismissal for failure to
16 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of
17 a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
18 theory.’” Id. at 1242 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
19 Cir. 1988)).
20 “Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and
21 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ashcroft v.
22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[T]he pleading
23 standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands
24 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678
25 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “[a]
26 pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
27 cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
28 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
1 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting
2 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
3 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
4 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the
5 well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
6 misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is
7 entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
8 8(a)(2)).
9 “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be
10 granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the
11 challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight
12 Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
13 Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). “A district court does not err in
14 denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Reddy v. Litton
15 Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991)).
16 B. Motion to Compel Arbitration
17 The Supreme Court has enunciated a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.”
18 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339, 344 (2011) (“The overarching
19 purpose of the FAA . . . is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according
20 to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”). The Federal Arbitration Act
21 (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., governs the enforcement of arbitration agreements
22 involving commerce. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 232–33
23 (2013). Under the FAA, “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
24 another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States
25 district court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided
26 for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. In deciding whether to compel arbitration, courts
27 limit their inquiry to two “gateway” issues: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate
28
1 exists, and (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue. Lim v. TForce
2 Logistics, LLC, 8 F.4th 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic
3 Sys., Inc., 207 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). “If both conditions are met, the [FAA]
4 requires the court to enforce the arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms.” Id.
5 The FAA further provides that arbitration agreements are unenforceable “upon such
6 grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.
7 District courts apply state law principles of contract formation and interpretation in
8 determining which contracts are binding and enforceable under the FAA, if that law
9 governs the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally. See Arthur
10 Anderson LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630–31 (2009); see also Wolsey, Ltd. v.
11 Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1998). “Thus, generally applicable
12 contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate
13 arbitration agreements without contravening” federal law. Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
14 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). Nevertheless, courts are directed to resolve any “ambiguities as
15 to the scope of the arbitration clause itself . . . in favor of arbitration.” Volt Info. Sciences,
16 Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).
17 III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Dismiss
18
19 “[A]rbitrators are immune from civil liability for acts within their jurisdiction
20 arising out of their arbitral functions in contractually agreed upon arbitration hearings.”
21 Wasyl, Inc. v. First Boston Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir.1987) (citations
22 omitted); see also Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 117–18 (9th Cir.1962). However,
23 “arbitral immunity does not extend to every act of an arbitrator.” Sacks v. Dietrich, 663
24 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011). Instead, “[it] extends only to those acts taken by
25 arbitrators ‘within the scope of their duties and within their jurisdiction.’” Id. (citing
26 Wasyl, 813 F.2d at 1582).
27 Courts apply arbitral immunity to acts integral to the arbitration process. In La
28 Serena Properties, LLC v. Weisbach, 186 Cal. App. 4th 893 (2010), the Court of Appeals
1 held that arbitral immunity barred claims alleging an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a
2 potential conflict of interest, rejecting the plaintiff’s “creative pleading” as an unsuccessful
3 attempt to “avoid the sting of arbitral immunity.” Id. at 904–06. The court explained that
4 the alleged nondisclosure constituted a quasi-judicial act performed in the course of
5 arbitration and was therefore protected by absolute immunity. Id. By contrast, in Morgan
6 Phillips, Inc. v. JAMS/Endispute, LLC, 140 Cal. App. 4th 795 (2006), the Court of Appeals
7 declined to apply arbitral immunity where the arbitrator allegedly withdrew from the
8 proceeding and failed to render any decision, reasoning that “[t]he failure to render an
9 arbitration award is not integral to the arbitration process; it is, rather, a breakdown of that
10 process.” Id. at 802.
11 Plaintiff claims that Wells Fargo and AAA intentionally misrepresented the nature
12 of the arbitration process to persuade consumers to agree to arbitration. ECF No. 24 at 41.
13 First, Plaintiff alleges that AAA promoted arbitration as “more streamlined” and “cost-
14 effective” than court litigation while knowing that the actual process they administered was
15 “difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.” Id. Second, Plaintiff contends that AAA
16 promised to provide a “neutral, independent” adjudicator, but AAA knew that it had a
17 “collusive relationship” with Wells Fargo. Id. at 16. In support of her theory, Plaintiff
18 points out that AAA is allegedly influenced by law firms representing Wells Fargo and
19 other large companies, resulting in arbitration procedures that favor corporations over
20 consumers. ECF No. 60 at 8–9. In sum, Plaintiff seeks to void the Arbitration Provision
21 on the ground that Defendants fraudulently induced Plaintiff and the Class Members to
22 enter the agreement by misrepresenting the true nature of arbitration, upon which they
23 relied to their detriment. Id. at 41.
24 In response, AAA argues that all claims against it must be dismissed because they
25 are barred by arbitral immunity. ECF No. 58 at 8. Even if immunity did not apply, AAA
26 contends that Plaintiff forfeited any civil claims related to conduct during arbitration
27 because her contract with Wells Fargo incorporates AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules. Id.
28 at 11. AAA also maintains that Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to state a viable
1 fraudulent-inducement claim. Id. at 12. Accordingly, AAA moves for dismissal of all
2 claims against it, with prejudice and without leave to amend. Id. at 16.
3 Here, the Court finds that arbitral immunity applies to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s
4 allegations arise from AAA’s administration of the arbitration proceedings. She challenges
5 the manner in which the arbitrations were conducted, including the scope and volume of
6 briefing, the use of in-person depositions and hearings, allegedly duplicative discovery,
7 and motion practice addressing common issues across multiple cases. ECF No. 60 at 13.
8 These are case-management decisions made in the course of administering arbitration and
9 fall squarely within the type of conduct protected by arbitral immunity. Stasz v. Schwab,
10 121 Cal. App. 4th 420, 430 (2004) (noting that arbitrators are entitled to immunity “for
11 their activities in arriving at their award”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
12 Plaintiff’s theory of collusion between AAA and Wells Fargo does not alter this
13 conclusion. The conduct underlying that theory – AAA’s decision to appoint a process
14 arbitrator and the subsequent dismissal of numerous claims – likewise concern actions
15 taken as part of the arbitral process. ECF No. 60 at 9. Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations
16 as true, they challenge functions that are “integrally related to the arbitral process,” and are
17 therefore covered by arbitral immunity. Thiele v. RML Realty Partners, 14 Cal. App. 4th
18 1526, 1530 (1993) (citation omitted).
19 Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s claims arise from conduct undertaken in the course
20 of administering and resolving arbitration proceedings, they fall within the scope of arbitral
21 immunity. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim against AAA. motion to dismiss
22 filed by AAA is GRANTED.
23 B. Motion to Compel Arbitration
24 “In determining the existence and validity of an agreement to arbitrate, a court
25 applies a standard similar to the summary judgment standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.” Lomeli
26 v. Midland Funding, LLC, 2019 WL 4695279 at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2019) (quotations
27 omitted). Accordingly, a court may compel arbitration only “when there is no genuine
28 issue of material fact concerning the formation of an arbitration agreement.” Concat LP v.
1 Unilever, PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 796, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The party seeking to compel
2 arbitration bears “the burden of demonstrating the existence of a valid arbitration
3 agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.” Norcia v. Samsung Telecomm. Am., 845
4 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017). Once that burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the
5 opposing party to establish a generally applicable contract defense rendering the agreement
6 unenforceable. Lim v. TForce Logistics, LLC, 8 F.4th 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2021). One such
7 defense is fraudulent inducement. Filet Menu v. C.C.L. & G.,inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 852,
8 861 (2000).
9 When a party raises a fraudulent-inducement defense, the Court must distinguish
10 between challenges directed at the arbitration agreement itself and challenges to the
11 contract as a whole. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006).
12 If the alleged fraud concerns the arbitration agreement itself, the court may decide that
13 issue before compelling arbitration. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
14 U.S. 395, 403–04 (1967). However, claims that the contract as a whole was fraudulently
15 induced must be decided by the arbitrator. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445–46. Under California
16 law, “the elements of fraud ... are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment,
17 or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or ‘scienter’); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to
18 induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” Lazar v. Superior
19 Court, 12 Cal.4th 631, 638 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Fraud
20 in the inducement is a subset of the tort of fraud,” and therefore shares the same elements.
21 Dhital v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 84 Cal. App. 5th 828, 839 (2022).
22 Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants fraudulently induced her to agree to the
23 Arbitration Provision itself. Because her challenge is directed at the validity of the
24 Arbitration Provision, and not the broader contract (the Account Agreement), the Court
25 may determine whether the Arbitration Provision is enforceable before compelling
26 arbitration. Accordingly, the Court turns to the plaintiff’s fraudulent-inducement
27 argument.
28 Plaintiff argues that Wells Fargo made specific misrepresentations regarding the
1 efficiency and cost-effectiveness of arbitration. According to Plaintiff, the Arbitration
2 Provision stated that the process was “more streamlined” and “cost-effective” than a typical
3 court case, ECF No. 24 at 51, and that disputes would be resolved “as quickly and as easily
4 as possible.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that these statements were false and misleading because
5 Wells Fargo “colluded” with AAA to subject claimants to a prolonged and burdensome
6 arbitration process, which was delayed for over a year. Id.
7 Defendants dispute these allegations. They contend Plaintiff was not “funneled” into
8 arbitration but rather Plaintiff’s counsel voluntarily filed 4,000 claims with AAA and
9 agreed to the application of AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Multiple Case Filings. ECF
10 No. 63 at 5. Defendants further argue that delays in the proceedings were attributable to
11 MLG’s repeated attempts to circumvent orders issued by the Process Arbitrator, not to any
12 conduct by Wells Fargo. Id. at 5. In support, Defendants cite a decision of the Ninth
13 Circuit stating that claimants had refused to comply with information requests and sought
14 to bypass the Process Arbitrator’s directives. See Mosley Appellate Order, 2024 WL
15 977674, at *1.
16 1. Misrepresentation
Defendant’s statements that arbitration would be efficient and cost-effective are not
17
actionable misrepresentations for two reasons. First, under California law, statements that
18
merely express opinions or predictions about future events are generally not actionable.
19
See Brakke v. Economic Concepts, Inc., 213 Cal. App. 4th 761, 769 (2013); see also Nibbi
20
Brothers, Inc. v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Assn., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1415, 1423 (Ct.
21
App. 1988). Here, Defendant’s descriptions of arbitration as “streamlined” and “cost-
22
effective” are general predictions about the common and expected benefits of arbitration,
23
not guarantees that every arbitration will proceed without procedural complications.
24
Second, to the extent the arbitration process became lengthy or burdensome, the delays
25
were attributable in large part to Plaintiff’s own conduct and that of her counsel. See
26
Mosley Appellate Order, 2024 WL 977674, at *1 (“Claimants have refused to comply with
27
information requests from Wells Fargo after months of arbitration and a PA Order and now
28
1 seek to circumvent the PA Order.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant did not
2 misrepresent the nature of the arbitration process.
3 2. Knowledge of Falsity
4
The Arbitration Provision states that “an impartial third party will hear the dispute.”
5
ECF No. 24-3 at 36. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant knew this statement to be false
6
because Wells Fargo had a “collusive relationship” with AAA. ECF No. 61 at 15. Plaintiff
7
highlights the involvement of Mayer Brown, a law firm that has represented Wells Fargo.
8
Specifically, Plaintiff notes that an attorney from Mayer Brown serves on AAA’s Council,
9
id. at 17, which allowed the firm to influence AAA’s policies and procedures in ways that
10
favor corporate defendants. Id.
11
Plaintiff cites two examples to support this claim. First, Plaintiff notes that Mayer
12
Brown has represented corporate clients in cases seeking enforcement of arbitration clauses
13
that preclude class actions. ECF No. 24 at 16-17. Second, Plaintiff notes that several
14
Mayer Brown attorneys authored a publication for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce
15
Institute for Legal Reform that discussed arbitration-related issues. Id. Plaintiff argues
16
that these activities demonstrate a broader effort by corporate defense firms to shape
17
arbitration practices. Id.
18
Plaintiff also highlights the procedures used in the mass arbitration filings against
19
Wells Fargo. According to Plaintiff, AAA assigned a “Process Arbitrator” to review a large
20
group of arbitration demands filed against Wells Fargo. ECF No. 61 at 17. The Process
21
Arbitrator subsequently ordered claimants to submit additional information, including
22
proof of their claims and relevant account numbers, before their cases could proceed. Id.
23
Plaintiff alleges that many claimants were unable to provide the requested information, and
24
the Process Arbitrator ultimately dismissed numerous cases for failure to satisfy these
25
requirements. Id. Thus, Plaintiff believes the Process Arbitrator favors corporate
26
defendants, such as Defendant Wells Fargo. Id.
27
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has submitted no evidence showing how the alleged
28
1 relationship between AAA and Mayer Brown is relevant to her individual arbitration. ECF
2 No. 63 at 7. Defendant emphasizes that (1) the Mayer Brown attorney on AAA’s Council,
3 did not draft a policy paper on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, (2) Mayer Brown
4 is not involved in this case, and (3) the attorneys representing the parties here are not on
5 AAA’s Council. Id. at 7-8. Defendant also notes that the Chamber’s publication was
6 published in February 2023, after AAA appointed the Process Arbitrator in July 2022. Id.
7 Defendant further contends that Plaintiff’s allegations speak to disagreements with
8 procedural decisions made by the Process Arbitrator rather than establishing knowledge of
9 falsity. Id.
10 The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant knowingly
11 made a false statement. First, Defendant has debunked Plaintiff’s theory that Wells Fargo’s
12 attorneys were colluding with AAA with its persuasive arguments mentioned above.
13 Second, because Defendant’s attorneys were not involved with AAA, the decision to
14 appoint a Process Arbitrator was made solely by AAA. The appointment of a Process
15 Arbitrator constitutes a procedural decision within the discretion of the arbitration provider,
16 and courts do not have jurisdiction to review such procedural decisions. See Kyocera Corp.
17 v. Prudential-Bache T Servs., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that procedural
18 decisions in arbitration are not subject to judicial review). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot
19 prove that Defendant knew its statements regarding arbitration were false, and the Court
20 finds that this element of fraudulent inducement is not satisfied.
21 3. Intent to Defraud
Plaintiff asserts that Wells Fargo’s primary objective in describing arbitration as
22
“streamlined” and “cost-effective” was to induce her reliance on the Arbitration Provision
23
in exchange for waiving her right to sue. ECF No. 24 at 41. The Court is not persuaded.
24
Simply claiming that Wells Fargo did not deliver on a “streamlined” or “cost-effective”
25
process is insufficient to establish that Wells Fargo intended to defraud Plaintiff. See
26
Tenzer v. Superscope, 39 Cal. 3d 18 (1985) (holding that “something more than
27
nonperformance is required to prove the defendant's intent not to perform his promise”).
28
1 || Without evidence demonstrating Defendant’s intent to mislead, Plaintiff cannot show
2 || fraudulent inducement.
3 Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim for fraudulent inducement because she cannot
4 demonstrate that Defendant (1) made a misrepresentation, (2) had knowledge of the falsity
5 || of any statement, or (3) intended to defraud Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff cannot establish all
6 |;elements of fraudulent inducement, the Court need not reach the remaining elements,
7 justifiable reliance and resulting damages. See Kincaid v. Kincaid, 197 Cal. App. 4th 75,
8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). Based on the record before it, the Court finds that Plaintiff was
9 ||not fraudulently induced into the Arbitration Provision. Accordingly, the Court grants
10 || Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.
11 IV. CONCLUSION
12 For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that AAA 1s entitled to arbitral
13 immunity, and Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against it. AAA’s motion to dismiss 1s
therefore GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint within 30 days of
15 this order.
16 Additionally, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was
M7 fraudulently induced into the Arbitration Provision. Accordingly, Wells Fargo’s motion to
18 compel arbitration is GRANTED. The parties are directed to proceed under the terms of
19 the Arbitration Provision, and the matter is STAYED pending the completion of
20 arbitration. The parties are ORDERED to notify the Court within 14 days of the resolution
7! of arbitration.
22 Dated: March 30, 2026
23
24
25
27 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks
28 United States District Judge
14
25-cv-824-BJC-SBC