Brown

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ARTHUR BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:25-cv-1462-WWB-LLL

TESLA, INC.,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration

(Doc. 13), Plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. 19), and Defendant’s Reply (Doc. 24).1 For the

reasons set forth below, Defendant’s Motion will be granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Arthur Brown purchased a Powerwall 2 from Defendant Tesla, Inc.

(“Tesla”) to charge his Tesla vehicles, save on energy bills, and sell stored energy back

to his power grid. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 42–43, 45). The Powerwall was backed by an express

Limited Warranty (Doc. 1-4), which included an agreement to arbitrate “any dispute

arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between [Brown and

Tesla] . . . on an individual basis.” (Id. at 3).

1 Plaintiff’s Opposition fails to comply with this Court’s January 13, 2021 Standing

Order. In the interests of justice, the Court will consider the filing because this matter is

fully briefed and ripe for resolution on the merits, but the parties are cautioned that future

failures to comply with all applicable rules and orders of this Court may result in the

striking or denial of filings without notice or leave to refile. The Court notes that its April

2, 2026 Standing Order was issued subsequent to the instant filings but applies

prospectively to all filings in this action.

Brown alleges “that a significant population of Powerwall 2 systems contained

[defective] lithium-ion battery cells” that could “overheat, stop functioning, emit smoke, or

catch fire under normal operating conditions.” (Doc. 1, ¶ 21). Tesla issued a recall on

the affected units, including Brown’s. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 29). Pursuant to the recall, Tesla will

inspect and eventually replace affected Powerwalls. (Id. ¶ 27). But because the recall

process has been “slow” and “burdensome,” Tesla has, in the interim, remotely

disengaged the affected Powerwalls on an intermittent basis to prevent overheating. (Id.;

see also id. ¶¶ 26, 29, 46–48). Accordingly, Brown initiated a putative class action against

Tesla on behalf of Powerwall purchasers across the United States and Florida, bringing

claims for breach of express and implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and violations of

the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. (See generally id.). Tesla moves

to compel arbitration pursuant to the relevant clause in its Limited Warranty. (See

generally Doc. 13).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In general, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., governs the

enforceability of arbitration provisions in contracts involving transactions in interstate

commerce. Hill v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 398 F.3d 1286, 1288 (11th Cir. 2005). “A written

provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by

arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid,

irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the

revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. “The FAA embodies a ‘liberal federal policy

favoring arbitration agreements.’” Hill, 398 F.3d at 1288 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l

Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). However, it is well-settled that

“arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration

any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.” AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns

Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (quotation omitted).

“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate

under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district

court . . . for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in

such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. In determining whether to compel arbitration, courts do

not weigh the merits of the parties’ claims. AT & T Techs., 475 U.S. at 649. Rather,

courts must limit their review to three factors: “(1) whether a valid written agreement to

arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitrate

was waived.” Senti v. Sanger Works Factory, Inc., No. 6:06-cv-1903-Orl, 2007 WL

1174076, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2007). “[W]hile doubts concerning the scope of an

arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitration, the presumption does not

apply to disputes concerning whether an agreement to arbitrate has been made.”

Bazemore v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation

omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Tesla argues that Brown entered into a valid arbitration agreement and that any

further questions of arbitrability have been delegated to the arbitrator. The Court agrees.

“[S]tate law governs whether an enforceable contract or agreement to arbitrate exists.”

Exceen v. Ramirez, No. 8:24-cv-880, 2024 WL 3327509, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 13, 2024)

(quotation omitted). And under Florida law “[o]ne cannot both take advantage of contract

provisions to seek to impose liability on [a business] and at the same time avoid another

contract term or provision for which it has no use.” Giller v. Cafeteria of S. Beach Ltd.,

967 So. 2d 240, 242 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (collecting cases). Here, Brown attempts to do

just that. He does not dispute that he entered into an agreement with Tesla, that the

agreement was governed by a Limited Warranty, or that the Limited Warranty contained

an arbitration clause—in fact, Brown alleges all three points and seeks relief under the

terms of the Limited Warranty. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 17–20, 80–86). Thus, he cannot avoid the

Limited Warranty’s arbitration provision.

Brown’s counterarguments are unpersuasive. Brown first argues that Tesla has

failed to meet its burden to show that an agreement to arbitrate exists because the parties

have submitted different versions of Tesla’s Limited Warranty—Brown’s submission

being effective April 19, 2017, and Tesla’s being effective April 13, 2021. (Doc. 1-4 at 2;

Doc. 14-1 at 1). While the Complaint does not allege the exact date on which Plaintiff

purchased a Firewall, both parties’ submissions include an arbitration agreement.

Brown’s April 2017 Limited Warranty provides:

Agreement to Arbitrate. Please read this provision carefully.

In the event of a concern or dispute between us, please send Tesla written

Notice to energyresolutions@tesla.com describing the nature of the dispute

and the relief sought.

If it is not resolved within 60 days, Tesla and you agree that any dispute

arising out of or relating to any aspect of the relationship between us will not

be decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an

arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA).

This includes claims arising before this Agreement, including claims related

to statements about our products. Alternatively, you may opt out of

arbitration as described below.

The AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules will apply. We will pay all AAA fees

for any arbitration. The arbitration will be held in a location most convenient

to your residence. To learn more about the Rules and how to begin an

arbitration, you may call any AAA office or go to www.adr.org.

The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and Tesla on an

individual basis. The arbitrator cannot award relief for anyone who is not a

party and may not consolidate claims. In other words, you and Tesla may

bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity and not

as a plaintiff or class member in any class or representative action. If a court

or arbitrator decides that any of this section’s limitations cannot be enforced

as to a particular claim for relief, then that claim (and only that claim) must

be severed from the arbitration and may be brought in court.

If you prefer, you may instead take your individual dispute to small claims

court.

You may opt out within 30 days after accepting the terms of this Limited

Warranty by sending a letter to P.O. Box 15430, Fremont, CA 94539-7970,

stating your name and intent to opt out of the arbitration provision.

(Doc. 1-4 at 3). Tesla’s April 2021 Limited Warranty provides substantially identical terms:

Agreement to Arbitrate. Please carefully read this provision, which applies

to any dispute between you and Tesla, Inc. and its affiliates (together

“Tesla”).

If you have a concern or dispute, please send a written notice describing it

and your desired resolution to resolutions@tesla.com.

If not resolved within 60 days, you agree that any dispute arising out of or

relating to any aspect of the relationship between you and Tesla will not be

decided by a judge or jury but instead by a single arbitrator in an arbitration

administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) under its

Consumer Arbitration Rules. This includes claims arising before this

Agreement, such as claims related to statements about our products.

We will pay all AAA fees for any arbitration, which will be held in the city or

county of your residence. To learn more about the Rules and how to begin

an arbitration, you may call any AAA office or go to http://www.adr.org.

The arbitrator may only resolve disputes between you and Tesla and may

not consolidate claims without the consent of all parties. The arbitrator

cannot hear class or representative claims or requests for relief on behalf

of others purchasing or leasing Tesla products. In other words, you and

Tesla may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual

capacity and not as a plaintiff or class member in any class or representative

action. If a court or arbitrator decides that any part of this agreement to

arbitrate cannot be enforced as to a particular claim for relief or remedy

(such as injunctive or declaratory relief), then that claim or remedy (and only

that claim or remedy) shall be severed and must be brought in court and

any other claims must be arbitrated.

If you prefer, you may instead take an individual dispute to small claims

court.

You may opt out of arbitration within 30 days after signing this Agreement

by sending a letter to: Tesla, Inc.; P.O. Box 15430; Fremont, CA 94539-

7970, stating your name, product, and intent to opt out of the arbitration

provision. If you do not opt out, this agreement to arbitrate overrides any

different arbitration agreement between us, including any arbitration

agreement in a lease or finance contract.

(Doc. 14-1 at 2–3). Therefore, no version of facts presents a material dispute over the

existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Cf. Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1333 (stating that “a

summary judgment-like standard is appropriate” for evaluating the formation of an

arbitration agreement).

Perhaps anticipating this conclusion, Brown next disputes Tesla’s ability to rely on

his own allegations concerning the Limited Warranty, which necessarily establish that

Brown entered into a valid agreement with Tesla. The Court sees no reason to discount

Brown’s allegations, as they constitute “conclusively binding” judicial admissions until the

underlying pleading is amended or withdrawn. Lage v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, 145

F. Supp. 3d 1172, 1191 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (quoting White v. ARCO/Polymers, Inc., 720

F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir. 1983)). And, once again, Florida law “precludes a party from

claiming the benefits of a contract (i.e., suing to enforce a contractual provision) while

simultaneously attempting to avoid the arbitration provision within the contract.” Johnson

v. Westlake Portfolio Mgmt., LLC, No. 8:20-cv-749-T, 2020 WL 5526386, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 15, 2020).

Further inquiries into the arbitrability of Brown’s claims have been delegated to the

arbitrator. “A court’s analysis of an arbitration agreement turns on whether it contains a

delegation agreement, which ‘commits questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator’s review,

including questions about the validity or enforceability of the parties’ primary arbitration

agreement.’” KMF Servs., LLC v. Shift4 Payments, LLC, No. 3:24-cv-633, 2025 WL

3669516, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2025) (quoting Attix v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC,

35 F.4th 1284, 1303 (11th Cir. 2022)). “[W]here an arbitration agreement contains a

delegation provision—committing to the arbitrator the threshold determination of whether

the agreement to arbitrate is enforceable—the courts only retain jurisdiction to review a

challenge to that specific provision.” Id. (quoting Ford of Kendall, LLC v. Lemus, No. 24-

10831, 2024 WL 4449455, at *3 (11th Cir. Oct. 9, 2024)). Here, there is no dispute that

both limited warranties establish that any arbitration will be conducted under the American

Arbitration Association’s Consumer Arbitration Rules, which delegate questions of

arbitrability to the arbitrator. Cf. Attix, 35 F.4th at 1291 (“[B]y incorporating the AAA’s

rules for consumer arbitrations into their agreement, the parties had agreed to ‘delegate’

any disputes about the arbitrability of Attix’s claims to an arbitrator.”); Airbnb, Inc. v. Doe,

336 So. 3d 698, 704 (Fla. 2022) (holding that parties “clearly and unmistakably agreed

that an arbitrator decides questions of arbitrability” because “Airbnb’s Terms of Service

explicitly incorporate[d] by reference the AAA Rules”).

Brown correctly notes that if the Court finds that issues of arbitrability have been

delegated, it maintains jurisdiction to rule on challenges to the delegation agreement

itself. See KMF Servs., 2025 WL 3669516, at *3–4. But from there, Brown reiterates that

Tesla has failed to show formation of a contract. As stated above, this argument is

contrary to both Florida law and “federal policy favoring arbitration.” Exceen, 2024 WL

3327509, at *2 (quoting Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th

Cir. 2005)).

Lastly, Tesla moves for dismissal or a stay pending arbitration, arguing that the

weight of authority supports dismissal. “When a district court finds that a lawsuit involves

an arbitrable dispute, and a party requests a stay pending arbitration, § 3 of the FAA

compels the court to stay the proceeding.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U.S. 472, 478 (2024).

While Brown has not requested a stay under § 3 of the FAA, the Court nonetheless finds

that a stay is more appropriate. See Exceen, 2024 WL 3327509, at *2 (“If a court compels

arbitration, it should stay the arbitrable claims.” (citing Smith, 601 U.S. at 474; Klay v. All

Defs., 389 F.3d 1191, 1203–04 (11th Cir. 2004))).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. 13) is GRANTED in part to

the extent provided herein and DENIED in all other respects. The parties

are directed to submit all claims to arbitration in accordance with the terms

of their agreement.

2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) is DENIED as moot and

Defendant’s Request for Oral Argument (Doc. 17) is DENIED as to the

Motion to Compel Arbitration and DENIED as moot as to the Motion to

Dismiss.

3. This case is STAYED pending arbitration. On or before October 27, 2026,

and every 180 days thereafter, Defendant shall file a report as to the status

of the arbitration proceeding. Additionally, Defendant shall notify this Court

within ten days of the final resolution of the arbitration proceeding or other

resolution of this dispute.

4. The Clerk is directed to administratively close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida on April 30, 2026.

WENDY W.B

UNITED STATES T JUDG

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record