Richards

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUBBOCK DIVISION

JAMES RICHARDS, §

Institutional ID No. 02346971, §

Plaintiff, §

§

§ No. 5:25-CV-00075-H-BV

§

MARSHA MCLANE, §

TCCO Executive Director, ef al, §

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se Plaintiff James Richards, a sexually violent predator (SVP) confined at the

Texas Civil Commitment Center (TCCC), filed this civil-rights action against Defendants

Marsha McLane, who serves as Executive Director of the Texas Civil Commitment

Office (TCCO), and Management & Training Corporation (MTC), the private company

that operates the TCCC. United States District Judge James Wesley Hendrix referred this

case for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), and the undersigned

magistrate judge submits these findings, conclusions, and recommendation in accordance

with the referral order. For the reasons explained below, the recommendation is that

Defendants’ motions to dismiss be GRANTED, with Richards’s official-capacity claims

against McLane for retrospective relief being dismissed without prejudice and all other

claims being dismissed with prejudice.

1. Richards, a civilly confined SVP, alleges violations of his civil rights by

personnel associated with his confinement.

Richards was civilly adjudged to be an SVP as defined by Texas Health & Safety

Code § 841.003. After Richards completed his criminal sentence, Texas transferred him

to the TCCC in Littlefield, where he remains confined for inpatient treatment in

accordance with the provisions of Texas Health & Safety Code § 841.081. Richards’s

claims are set out in his first amended complaint, and they flow from aspects of his civil

commitment. See Dkt. No. 10.

Richards purports to bring his claims as a class representative of TCCC residents.

Id. at 1; see also Dkt. No. 22 (motion to certify class). He claims that Defendants

routinely violate residents’ due process rights by creating and enforcing an

“unconstitutional . .. treatment scheme that is punitive in effect” and “fail[s}] provide

appropriate treatment” for SVPs. Dkt. No. 10 at 4. He further claims that the TCCO

“neriodically places panels on hold to purposely delay [his] progression in the treatment

program.” Jd. at 5. He asserts that TCCC staff lack adequate training, education, and

experience in sex-offender treatment, and he expresses general dissatisfaction with the

treatment curriculum. /d. at 6, 9, 32.

Richards alleges that McLane has interfered with his treatment and that she

created and enforces unconstitutional policies. /d. at 3. He specifically alleges that she is

responsible for “continual amendment of the treatment curriculum over the years, which

substantially delays movement from one tier to the next.” /d. at 6. He accuses McLane

of making “arbitrary administrative decisions” that often “supersede and override MTC’s

professional decisions or opinions by the licensed sex offender treatment providers, or

other treatment professionals.” /d. at 22. He asserts that “written policies . . . arbitrarily

punish without due process.” /d. at 15-17.

Richards also complains about the conditions of the TCCC facility, describing it as

a “maximum security prison” rather than a treatment facility, 7d. at 10-11. In particular,

he criticizes MTC’s use of a secured management unit (SMU) which “is MTC’s version

of the barbaric and outlawed solitary confinement.” Jd. at il.

Richards seeks many forms of relief including: (1) declaratory judgment

proclaiming several of Defendants’ alleged actions unconstitutional and unlawful,

(2) permanent injunctive relief regarding the TCCO policies and procedures he complains

of; (3) the appointment of “independent expert panel(s),” which would oversee the

movement of residents between tiers; and (4) appointment of a “special master” to

“oversee the implementation of’ the Court’s order. /d. at 41-44.

McLane moves to dismiss the claims against her under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b), asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under subsection (b)(1)

and failure to state a claiin under subsection (b)(6). Dkt. No. 26. MTC also moves to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)\(6). Dkt. No. 28.

2. The Court must dismiss claims that fail to meet certain pleading standards,

A. —_ Rule 12(b)(1) standards

Rule 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. When a

Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed with other Rule 12 motions, a court should consider the

jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. Hitt v. City of Pasadena,

561 F.2d 606, 608 (Sth Cir. 1977), “Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is properly dismissed

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional

power to adjudicate the claim.” In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab, Litig.

(Miss. Plaintiffs), 668 F.3d 281, 286 (Sth Cir, 2012) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

In evaluating its jurisdiction, a court may consider: “(1) the complaint alone;

(2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the

complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed

facts.” Kling v. Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 284 (Sth Cir. 2023) (quoting Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (Sth Cir. 2001)). The district court has substantial authority to

“weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.”

Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (Sth Cir. May 1981) (citation omitted). A court

should only grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction when it is

convinced that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that would entitle him to relief.

Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (Sth Cir.

1998). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction. See

Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) standards

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts “to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl, Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

570 (2007); see Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd., 647 F.3d 248, 252 (Sth Cir.

2011). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Under this standard, a court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, while the plaintiff must allege facts supporting

each element of the cause of action. Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F 4th 270, 279 (Sth Cir.

2021) (quoting Jqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Factual allegations must go beyond mere

speculation, and the court does not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]” /qbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Any ambiguities in controlling substantive law must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.

See Walker vy. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (Sth Cir. 2019) (quoting

Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 357 (Sth Cir. 2001)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally examines the complaint and any attachments

thereto. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (Sth Cir. 2000).

3. Richards’s claims should be dismissed.

A. Richards may not bring class claims.

Richards attempts to bring claims against Defendants on behalf of himself and a

class of civilly committed individuals at the TCCC. But Richards is proceeding pro se,

and “courts have generally held” that such plaintiffs “may not serve as class counsel

because they are ill-suited to protect the interests of the class.” Armour v. Davis, No.

6:18-CV-535, 2020 WL 2850140, at *22 (E.D. Tex. June 1, 2020) (citing McGrew v, Tex.

Bad. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

Indeed, under Fifth Circuit precedent, “those not licensed to practice law may not

represent the legal interests of others.” Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dep't, 819

F.3d 205, 210 (Sth Cir. 2016),

Richards does not claim that he is licensed to practice law. While he can represent

himself under 28 U.S.C. § 165, he cannot represent others and “should be limited to

seeking relief for the damages that he alleges he personally suffered[.]” May v. Bell, No.

5:24-CV-14-BR, 2025 WL 2844784, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2025), R. & R. adopted by

2025 WL 2841985 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2025) (dismissing class-action claims brought by

pro se plaintiff).

The undersigned recommends that Richards’s pending motion to certify a class be

denied, Dkt. No. 22, and that all class claims be dismissed without prejudice.

B. The Court lacks jurisdiction over claims seeking retrospective

injunctive relief.

Richards’s pleadings state that he is suing McLane in her official capacity. Dkt.

No. 10 at 3, 41-44. As the filings make clear, Richards seeks both retrospective and

prospective injunctive relief. See id.

“Official capacity suits generally represent another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Burge v. Par. of St. Tammany,

187 F.3d 452, 466 (5th Cir, 1999), “A suit against Defendant McLane in her official

capacity is simply another way of stating a claim against the TCCC or TCCO, and

therefore the State of Texas.” May v. McLane, No. 5:21-CV-271-BQ, 2022 WL

4353562, at *3 (ND. Tex. Aug. 8, 2022). “The Eleventh Amendment bars an individual

from suing a state in federal court unless the state consents to suit or Congress has clearly

and validly abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity.” Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv.

Ctr., 307 F.3d 318, 326 (Sth Cir. 2002).

However, under Ex parte Young, a plaintiff may sue a state official in her official

capacity if the suit seeks prospective injunctive relief to redress an ongoing violation of

federal law. 209 U.S. at 167-68. “To determine whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young

avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a ‘straightforward

inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and

seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Newton v. Joseph, No. 1:13-CV-

510, 2015 WL 1321491, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2015) (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v.

Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ma., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).

Here, Richards alleges that McLane implemented and continues to enforce

unconstitutional policies and practices. McLane argues that Richards lacks standing to

assert his claims because he fails to (1) allege any injury-in-fact and (2) demonstrate that

he permissibly requested retroactive relief that will redress his claimed injuries. See Dkt.

No. 26 at 8-10. “This is a challenge to the existence ofa cause of action in each of

[Richards’s] Section 1983 claims” and is “properly considered as an attack on the merits”

of his claims. Richards v. Taylor, No. CIV.A. H-13-1394, 2015 WL 5310853, at *7

(S.D. Tex. Sep. 11, 2015) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (Sth Cir,

May 1981)).

The undersigned agrees that since Richards asks the Court to declare past acts

unlawful, he secks retrospective injunctive relief for which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

But to the extent that Richards seeks prospective injunctive relief, the Court has subject-

matter jurisdiction over his claims and addresses the objection to standing as a direct

attack on the merits. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 415 (stating that “[w]here the

defendant’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction ts also a challenge to the existence of a

federal cause of action, the proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that

jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the

plaintiff's case”); Williams v. McLane, No. 5:24-CV-00248-H, 2025 WL 2773806, at *3

(N.D. Tex. Sep. 26, 2025) (acknowledging defendant’s argument that SVP lacked

standing because he failed to allege a constitutional injury but addressing the merits).

For these reasons, the district judge should grant-in-part McLane’s motion under

Rule 12(b)(1) and dismiss the claims for retrospective relief.

C. Richards fails to state a viable due process claim based on the alleged

delay in progression through the treatment program.

Many of Richards’s allegations concern his delayed progress through the tiered

treatment program, He claims he completed Tier 3 of the program on May 6, 2024, and

has been waiting ten months to appear before a panel for advancement to Tier 4. Dkt. No.

10 at 5. He argues that the delay constitutes a denial ofa “seamless” transition between

programming tiers and treatment progression, as required by Chapter 841. Jd.

Richards also alleges that the treatment program is inadequate. He complains that

MTC administers the treatment program but allows McLane to override treatment

decisions that should be made by qualified sex-offender treatment providers. /d. at 9, 22.

Richards alleges that staffing is inadequate due to high turnover of treatment providers,

requiring residents to repeat treatment. Jd. at 26. He also argues that the disproportionate

ratio of treatment providers to residents and the use of “unqualified” Affiliate Sex

Offender Treatment Providers (ASOTPs) hinder treatment. /d. at 26-28. Finally, he

complains that the curriculum has been amended at times and that residents are

sometimes required to repeat assignments. Jd. at 20, 26, 33-35, 37,

Under certain circumstances, deprivations related to sex-offender treatment can

give rise to a constitutional claim. See, e.g., Brown v, Taylor, 911 F.3d 235, 244 (Sth Cir.

2018) (per curiam) (holding that SVP’s detention in jail where “he received no sex

offender treatment” was not reasonably related to his supervision and treatment and

therefore violated due process); Gomez v. Gonzales, No. 5:23-CV-00148-H, 2025 WL

755226, at *6—-7 (N.D. Tex. Mar, 10, 2025) (finding that SVP stated a plausible due

process claim where he alleged that his case manager and sex-offender treatment provider

demoted his tier before a hearing).

Richards argues that the treatment he receives is “inadequate” under “reasonable

professional judgment, and contemporary treatment standards.” Dkt. No. 10 at 26. This

bare-bones allegation—devoid of factual support——is insufficient to show a due process

violation. Richards concedes that he is receiving treatment, despite his dissatisfaction

with the program’s curriculum, timing, and use of ASOTPs. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 10 at 26—

33 (complaining about the curriculum and use of ASOTPs, which he alleges provide

inferior treatment but without factual support for that allegation); see also Welsh v.

Correct Care Recovery Sols., 845 F, App’x 311, 322 (Sth Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal

of SVP’s claim that defendants denied therapy thereby prolonging his period of civil

commitment, where SVP received some treatment and failed to plead facts “showing that

receiving additional treatment would have expedited his release”); Rogers v. McLane, No.

§:22-CV-130-BQ, 2023 WL 4629044, at *12 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2023) (noting that

“Tplaintiff] does not contend that [dJefendants denied him all therapy; instead he

acknowledges that the TCCC provided him group therapy one time per week and also

assigned tier therapy tasks,” which does not give rise to a substantive due process claim),

R. & R. adopted by 2023 WL 4636894 (N.D. Tex, July 19, 2023),

The Court cannot discern a plausible due process claim based on Defendants’ use

of ASOTPs generally or the purported lack of a psychologist or psychiatrist overseeing

Richards’s treatment. Under the Texas Administrative Code § 810.3, an individual may

provide sex-offender treatment by obtaining a license as an ASOTP, who is then

supervised by a Licensed Sex Offender Treatment Provider (LSOTP). Tex. Admin. Code

§ 810.3(a), (c)(2). And in any case, “whether Defendants have complied with Texas

licensing requirements is not a constitutional matter.” Rogers, 2023 WL 4629044, at *15

(citing Etheridge vy. Miss. Dept of Corr. Votec Schs., 79 F, App’x 47, 48 (Sth Cir. 2003)

and Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 900 (Sth Cir. 1982)). Richards fails to allege facts

showing how treatment by ASOTPs and lack of oversight by a psychologist or

psychiatrist delays his treatment or tier progression. He also fails to show how the

treatment by the ASOTPs is constitutionally inadequate.'! Therefore, his allegations based

! Richards claims that the ASOTPs should be directly supervised by a LSOTP in group therapy, Dkt. No.

10 at 27-28. But state law imposes no such requirement. See Tex. Admin. Code § 810.3(c)(8) (requiring

that “[aln ASOTP shall receive face-to-face supervision at least | hour per 20 hours of assessment and

treatment with a minimum of 2 hours per month” while providing sex offender assessment and

treatment’). And Richards cites no authority showing that the Constitution requires it.

10

on delaying progression or tier treatment should be rejected. See id. (rejecting plaintiff's

arguments that ASOTP was improperly licensed).

To the extent Richards accuses Defendants—primarily McLane-—of “overrul[ing]

critical treatment decisions,” he fails to provide supporting facts. Dkt. No. 10 at 9. He

likewise fails to provide facts to undergird his claim that Defendants amend the

curriculum to delay progress or intentionally make residents complete unnecessary

assignments. See Rogers, 2023 WL 4629044, at *16 n.18 (recommending dismissal of

SVP’s substantive due process claim when he alleged Defendants gave assignments that

were not part of the curriculum and invented rules because he provided “no facts

detailing specific examples of such conduct or how it caused him particularized harm”);

id. at *19 (dismissing plaintiff’s claim when he alleged that defendants were purposely

hindering his tier progression but failed to provide factual detail); see generally DeMarco

v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 386-87 (Sth Cir. 2019) (“We do not accept as true conclusory

allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions” (quoting Gentilello v,

Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir, 2010))).?

Finally, Richards does not specify any harm resulting from the alleged denial of

adequate treatment. His “purported harm—that he might have progressed more quickly

through the tiers with additional [or adequate] . . . therapy—is speculative at best.”

2 Richards admits that other factors, like a high turnover rate, force residents to “repeat their biographies,

sexual histories, and offenses [.]” Dkt. No. 10 at 26. Richards does not say he experienced this, and this

concession undermines the allegations that Defendants intentionally interfere with treatment. See Rogers,

2023 WL 4629044, at *12 n.14 (observing that “[SVP] attributes the alleged reduction in therapy at least

in part to MTC’s inability to retain or hire therapists” and that the “reduction in group therapy sessions

was not intentional and therefore not an actionable constitutional claim” (citations omitted)).

il

Rogers, 2023 WL 4629044, at *12. While he repeatedly alleges that Defendants are

interfering with his “seamless transition” between tiers and thus delaying his eventual

release from his civil commitment, Richards “has not pleaded any facts suggesting when

he might have been released from commitment but for the alleged reduced treatment.”

Id. His “assertion that any deprivation of therapy impeded his release is ‘too attenuated

to invoke further due process protections.’” Welsh, 845 F. App’x at 322 (quoting Senty-

Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 887 (8th Cir. 2006)).

The undersigned therefore recommends that the district judge dismiss Richards’s

substantive due process claim based on delaying sex-offender treatment or tier

progression.

D. Richards fails to state a viable substantive due process claim based on

conditions of confinement.

Richards further complains generally about his conditions of confinement. But for

many of these claims, he fails to allege any personal harm. Among these include his

claims regarding: (1) Defendants’ use of the SMU, (2) imposition of commissary or

delivery restrictions due to failure to complete tests, and (3) name-calling by officials.

Dkt. No. 10 at 11-14, 15-17, 11. Because he fails to allege a personal harm stemming

from these claims and only complains about these issues as generally unfavorable

practices, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss these claims for lack of

standing. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992) (holding that a

plaintiff lacks Article III standing where the alleged injury does not affect the plaintiff “in

a personal and individual way”); Gregory v. McKennon, 430 F. App’x 306, 310 (Sth Cir.

12

2011) (per curiam) (plaintiff “would lack standing to seek § 1983 damages for violations

of other prisoners’ rights); Williams, 2025 WL 2773806, at *9 n.6 (noting that “[p]laintiff

only makes a facial challenge to the policy—-he does not allege .. . personal harm

from... the policy”); May, 2025 WL 2844784, at *3 (recommending dismissal of some

of SVP’s unconstitutional conditions claims for lack of standing because he did not allege

personal harm and “[could not] represent other TCCC residents”).

Construing the remainder of his claims liberally, Richards alleges barely sufficient

facts to infer specific harm. He claims that the physical conditions at TCCC violate his

substantive due process rights by compelling him to live in the equivalent of a “maximum

security prison,” and he objects to double-fences topped with razor wire, security, strictly

controlled movement about the facility, limited recreation time, steel doors, metal bunks

and toilets, the general atmosphere, and more. Dkt. No. 10 at 10-11. He also challenges

policies requiring ankle monitors and testing. /d, at 17-18, 19-21.

Conditions of confinement for SVPs are governed by the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. Miguel v. McLane, No. 22-10517, 2024 WL 747232, at *9

(Sth Cir, Feb, 23, 2024) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982)). Because

he is civilly committed, Richards is entitled to “more considerate treatment and

conditions of confinement” than prison inmates, Youngberg, 475 U.S. at 322, but “his

liberty interests are considerably less than those held by members of free society.”

Senty-Haugen, 462 F.3d at 886. “As a result, civil commitment institutions may create

policies that place some restrictions on an SVP’s due process rights, ‘so long as [the

restrictions] advance the state’s interest in security, order, and rehabilitation.’” San

13

Miguel v. Cochran, No. 5:20-CV-041-C, 2022 WL 774147, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18,

2022) (quoting Bohannan v. Doe, 527 F. App’x 283, 294 (Sth Cir. 2013) (per curiam)),

rev'd in part on other grounds, 2024 WL 747232; see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,

368 n.4 (1997) (noting that “[s]tates enjoy wide latitude in developing treatment regimens

[for SVPs}”); Brown, 911 F.3d at 243 (noting that “the Constitution nevertheless affords a

state wide latitude in crafting a civil commitment scheme”).

For SVPs, “[d]ue process requires only that the conditions and duration of

confinement... bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are

committed.” Miguel, 2024 WL 747232, at *9 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). “Accordingly, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege how the conditions at the

facility lack[] a reasonable relation to Texas’s twin goals of long-term supervision and

treatment of sexually violent predators.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). This Court has previously noted that “[w]here an official’s decision ‘is such a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a

judgment,’ the official may be held liable for a constitutional deprivation.” May, 2022

WL 4353562, at *4 (quoting Youngberg, 475 U.S. at 323). But the Fifth Circuit has

stated that “proximity to prisoners and restrictive conditions alone do not state a due

process claim.” Brown, 911 F.3d at 243.

Based on his allegations, “{Richards] has not sufficiently alleged how the

conditions of his civil commitment lack[] a reasonable relation to Texas’s goals of

‘long-term supervision and treatment’ of SVPs.” Welsh, 845 F. App’x at 322. First,

14

regarding his claims about the physical conditions at TCCC, Richards has not asserted

any facts showing that his living conditions—though uncomfortable and institutional in

nature-—constitute a “substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice

or standards.” May, 2022 WL 4353562, at *4 (citation omitted); see also Brown, 911

F.3d at 243 (holding that “{defendant’s] secure facilities—despite their restrictive rules

and ungraceful living conditions—were reasonably related to the goals of supervision and

treatment”); May, 2025 WL 2844784, at *17 (finding that complaints about conditions of

confinement at TCCC—including those regarding room temperatures, unpleasant smells,

loud noises, and overcrowded areas-—did not state a constitutional violation).

Regarding policies requiring residents to wear GPS ankle monitors and to take

polygraphs and penile plethysmographs, “]the TCCO’s] GPS tracking policies are

reasonably related to the goal of long-term supervision” and “polygraph and PPG

examinations are useful tools to assess treatment progress.” Williams, 2025 WL

2773806, at *9, These requirements “[do] not offend either the Fifth Amendment or the

Fourteenth Amendment.” /d.; see, e.g., Day v. Seiler, 560 F. App’x 316, 319 (Sth Cir.

2014) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of SVP’s due process claim based on GPS

monitoring); Miguel v. Jack, No. 23-CV-697-RP-SH, 2023 WL 6466231, at *8 (W.D.

Tex. Oct. 4, 2023) (finding it “not unreasonable for TCCO/TCCC to impose restrictions

on commissary privileges because [SVP] refuses to take a required [PPG] exam),’

3 While Richards alleges that “it is not an uncommon punishment” for class members to be “arbitrarily

deprived of contact with their family for months at a time” for failing a polygraph, Richards fails to allege

that Ae was deprived of contact with family for any duration of time, nor does he provide any further

details regarding this claim. Dkt. No. 10 at 21.

15

Because Richards fails to allege that the conditions at TCCC bear no reasonable

relationship with the goals of his civil commitment—i.e., supervision and treatment—the

undersigned recommends that the district judge dismiss these claims.

D. Richards lacks standing to bring a procedural due process claim.

Richards claims that Defendants issue write-ups and impose punishments with “no

procedural due process.” Dkt. No. 10 at 16,18. But fails to allege facts showing that he

suffered a specific harm and only complains about the general practice. He thus fails to

demonstrate that he has standing to bring this claim. Even if he had standing, the lack of

supporting facts render this claim deficient on its face. The undersigned recommends the

district judge dismiss this claim.

4, Recommendations

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the United

States District Judge (1) GRANT Defendants McLane and MTC’s motions to dismiss,

Dkt. Nos. 26, 28; (2) DENY his motion to certify class, Dkt. No. 22; (3) DENY his

motion for leave to join party as defendant, Dkt. No. 49;4 (3) and (4) dismiss his official-

capacity claims against McLane for retrospective relief without prejudice and all others

with prejudice. Dkt No. 10.

4 Richards seeks to join Cecile Erwin Young, Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human

Services Commission (HHSC), as a defendant because he claims that Texas Health & Safety Code §

841.0835 “requires HHSC to coordinate with [TCCO] . .. to provide psychiatry and disability services”

for “a committed person with an intellectual or developmental disability, a mental illness, or a physical

disability.” Dkt. No. 49 at 2 (emphasis omitted). But Richards cannot bring this claim on behalf of other

individuals, and he does not claim that he suffers from any kind of disability. Further, he fails to provide

any facts or other evidence supporting these allegations.

16

5. Right To Object

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within

fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2016); Fed. R.

Civ, P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding, conclusion,

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to

file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual

findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.

Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (Sth Cir. 1996).

Dated: May IQ. 2026.

Cina Pwrt~—

AMANDA ‘AMY’ R. BURCH

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17