Munerlyn

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

ABILENE DIVISION

ANTRAIL MUNERLYN, §

Institutional ID No. 02399387, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 1:23-CV-00202-BU

§

EMMANUEL HAKIZIMANA, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

§

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Antrail Munerlyn, an inmate incarcerated by the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice (TDCJ), brings this action against Correctional Officer Emmanuel

Hakizimana, maintenance worker FNU Lukomba, and nurse FNU Mayfield (collectively,

“the Defendants”), alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. See Dkt. No. 1 at 3.

Munerlyn’s claims are subject to judicial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A

because Munerlyn has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, Dkt. No. 9, and he

sues government officials, see Dkt. No. 1.

In complying with this Court’s Order, Dkt. No. 20, Munerlyn updated the Court with

his current address, Dkt. No. 21. Accordingly, the undersigned ORDERS that the above-

styled and numbered cause be REOPENED and THE STAY LIFTED.

After careful consideration of the claims in Munerlyn’s Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, and

the supplementation of those claims through his response to the Court’s questionnaire, see

Dkt. No. 17, the undersigned recommends that Munerlyn’s claims should be DISMISSED.

I. JURISDICTION

Munerlyn brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, providing the Court with

subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3). Venue is proper in the

Northern District of Texas, Abilene Division, because Munerlyn’s claims arise from his

incarceration at the Robertson Unit located in Jones County, Texas. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b)(2). The undersigned has the authority to enter these Findings, Conclusions, and

Recommendations after United States District Court Judge James Wesley Hendrix

transferred Munerlyn’s case to the undersigned for preliminary screening. Dkt. No. 10; 28

U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For purposes of screening a plaintiff’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

or 1915A, a court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them

in a way that most favor the plaintiff. Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d

415, 419 (5th Cir. 2017). A court may look to the plaintiff’s allegations in their complaint,

responses to a questionnaire, authenticated prison or jail records, and testimony provided

at a Spears hearing. See Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999); see also

Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts may consider

authenticated medical and prison records).

On February 2, 2023, Munerlyn alleges that maintenance employee Lukomba

exposed him to hazardous fumes by placing a heater in his section at the Robertson Unit,

which immediately began emitting white smoke. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Munerlyn states that the

substance in the smoke was later identified as “colesen.” Id. According to Munerlyn, the

heater was placed in the section because the building lacked heat and outside temperatures

were cold. Dkt. No. 17 at 2.

Munerlyn alleges that the heater emitted smoke for approximately five hours—from

3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. Dkt. No. 1 at 6. During that time, he experienced heavy coughing,

chest pain, and lightheadedness. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6; 17 at 3. Correctional Officer Hakizimana

eventually unplugged the heater, and Nurse Mayfield arrived after the smoke had cleared

to “check on inmates.” Dkt. No. 1 at 6. Munerlyn alleges that Nurse Mayfield evaluated

inmates at random and, for unknown reasons, did not examine him despite him wanting

medical attention. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6; 17 at 4.

After medical staff left, Hakizimana plugged the heater back in. Dkt. No. 1 at 6.

Munerlyn alleges that the heater remained on for several additional hours, although he

cannot recall how long it emitted smoke during this second period. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 6; 17 at

2. He further asserts that Hakizimana acted intentionally to harm inmates by restoring

power to the heater. Dkt. No. 17 at 4. Eventually, a maintenance employee, possibly

Lukomba, unplugged the malfunctioning heater. Dkt. No. 1 at 6.

Munerlyn brings claims against Lukomba and Hakizimana for “knowingly exposing

[him] to hazardous and toxic fumes” in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

on unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Dkt. Nos. 1 at 3; 17 at 5 (cleaned up). He

also asserts a claim against Nurse Mayfield for deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs based on her alleged refusal to evaluate him following the exposure. Id. Munerlyn

seeks $100,000 in damages for pain and suffering. Dkt. No. 1 at 4.

III. THE PARTIES

Munerlyn names three defendants: (1) CO Hakizimana, (2) maintenance worker

Lukomba, and (3) Nurse Mayfield.1 Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state

actors. “[T]he under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely

private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (internal quotations omitted). For purposes of screening,

the Court presumes that Nurse Mayfield was employed directly by TDCJ, a state agency,

and therefore qualifies as a state actor. Even if she were a private actor who was contracted

by TDCJ to provide medical services to state prison inmates, she would still qualify as a

state actor under the public function test. See Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545,

549–50 (5th Cir. 2005); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988).

The same reasoning applies to Defendant Lukomba. Whether employed directly by

TDCJ or contracted to provide maintenance services within the prison, Lukomba’s alleged

conduct arises from functions traditionally within the exclusive province of the state,

rendering him a state actor for § 1983 purposes. Defendant Hakizimana, as a correctional

officer employed by TDCJ, is likewise a state actor.

Munerlyn does not specify whether he sues Defendants in their official or individual

capacities. See Dkt. No. 1. But courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold

them to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). And because the Eleventh Amendment bars claims for

1 Neither the Court nor Munerlyn were able to identify the full names of the maintenance worker or the

nurse.

money damages against state officials in their official capacities, the undersigned construes

Munerlyn’s claims as personal capacity claims. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).2

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS

A court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis or by a prisoner against a

government entity or employee if the court determines the claims are frivolous or

malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A(b).

A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable basis, either in fact or in law, for the wrong

alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis

in fact if it rests upon clearly baseless factual contentions and it lacks an arguable basis in

law if it contains indisputably meritless legal theories. See id. at 327; Geiger v. Jowers, 404

F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim “turns on the sufficiency of the ‘factual

allegations’ in the complaint.” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 F. App’x 830, 833 (5th Cir.

2015) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12

(2014) (per curiam)). This means a plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her

2 The Fifth Circuit has expressly applied Eleventh Amendment immunity to TDCJ officers and officials

acting in their official capacities. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (Eleventh

Amendment bars prisoner’s suit for money damages against prison officials in their official capacities).

Thus, to the extent Munerlyn seeks monetary damages from Defendants in their official capacities, those

claims are barred. Furthermore, the exception to sovereign immunity under Ex parte Young does not apply

here because Munerlyn does not allege an ongoing violation of federal law and does not seek prospective

relief. See Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2021).

claim has substantive plausibility” by “stat[ing] “simply, concisely, and directly events”

that entitle them to relief. Johnson, 574 U.S. at 11–12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3),

(d)(1), (e)).

“Substantive plausibility” means enough facts to permit the court “to infer more

than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634

F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)).

The facts do not need to be detailed, but they must be “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint should be dismissed if it contains

only “naked assertions” of a wrong “without some further factual enhancement[,]” or

“threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements[.]” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663, 678 (internal

citations omitted). Rather, a plaintiff must plead facts to plausibly support each element of

a claim. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Chhim

v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016).

These standards reflect the guiding principle that pro se claims rise or fall at the

pleading stage based on the facts alleged, not on whether the plaintiff has invoked the

proper legal theory. Johnson, 574 U.S. at 11–12 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)–(3), (d)(1),

(e)). To this end, courts liberally construe pro se pleadings, holding them to “less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106

(1976). But even pro se plaintiffs must plead facts that raise the right to relief above mere

speculation. Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469 (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376,

378 (5th Cir. 2002)). “[L]iberal construction does not require that the Court . . . create

causes of action where there are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-

B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013). “To demand otherwise would

require the ‘courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff’” and

would “‘transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role

of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a

party.’” Jones v. Mangrum, No. 3:16-cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb.

23, 2017) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).

Additionally, when assessing a complaint’s factual sufficiency, courts must “accept

all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In

re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205–06 (5th Cir. 2007); Chhim, 836 F.3d

at 469. Courts must also draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Elsensohn

v. St. Tammany Par. Sheriff's Off., 530 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2008). But the Court “will

not strain to find inferences favorable to the plaintiff.” Tempur-Pedic Int'l Inc. v. Angel

Beds LLC, 902 F. Supp.2d 958, 964 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (quoting Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities,

Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). Ultimately, “‘[d]etermining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief’ is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.

v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

During preliminary screening, the Court must consider not only the operative

complaint, but also any supplement to the complaint through documents attached to or

referenced in the complaint, the prisoner’s questionnaire responses, and the prisoner’s

Spears hearing testimony, if any. Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (1983) (“[T]he court

was required to look beyond the inmates’ formal complaint and to consider . . . materials

subsequently filed”); Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 603 (1996) (Spears hearing testimony

remained part of the pleadings even after prisoner amended complaint); See Berry v. Brady,

192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (responses to a questionnaire are incorporated into the

plaintiff’s pleadings). The Court may also consider other reliable evidence such as the

authenticated prison records. See Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1995)

(“Medical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an

inmate's allegations of deliberate indifference.”).

V. ANALYSIS

As discussed above, Munerlyn asserts claims under the Eighth Amendment. He

alleges that Defendants Lukomba and Hakizimana violated the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that Defendant

Mayfield was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, also in violation of the

Eighth Amendment.

A. Eighth Amendment Claim for Unconstitutional Conditions-of-Confinement

The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. Const.

amend. VIII, and “[t]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under

which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Gates v. Cook,

376 F.3d 323, 332 (5th Cir. 2004). While the Constitution does not mandate comfortable

prisons, it does not permit inhumane ones. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981);

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). An Eighth Amendment violation occurs

when prison conditions pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to a prisoner’s

health—an objective test—and prison officials act with deliberate indifference to the risk

posed—a subjective test. Garrett v. Lumpkin, 96 F.4th 896, 900 (5th Cir. 2024).

The objective component also requires showing that the conditions were objectively

“sufficiently serious” or “extreme.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citation omitted) (first

quote); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (second quote). The deprivation must

involve a basic human need—such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary

living conditions—and must deny the inmate of the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities. Hope v. Harris, 861 F. App’x 571, 582 (5th Cir. 2021); Chapman, 452 U.S. at

347–49. The conditions are measured against the standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society. Chapman, 452 U.S. at 346–48.

The subjective component requires proof that the prison official acted with

deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (to violate

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently

culpable state of mind). The standard is not met merely from a negligent or even a grossly

negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm. Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374,

381 (5th Cir. 2020). Rather, the inmate must show that prison officials were: (1) “aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists”; (2) “subjectively drew the inference that the risk existed”; and (3) “disregarded the

risk.” Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837)

(alterations omitted). More simply, the prison officials must know of, and disregard, an

excessive risk to a prisoner’s health or safety. See id. (citation omitted). Under exceptional

circumstances, a prison official’s knowledge of a substantial risk of harm may be inferred

by the obviousness of a substantial risk. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir.

1998).

i. Conditions-of-Confinement: Lukomba

As to the objective prong of Munerlyn’s conditions-of-confinement claim, he

alleges that he was exposed to smoke from a malfunctioning heater for several hours, which

caused coughing, chest pain, and lightheadedness. He further asserts that the smoke

contained a substance he identifies as “colesen,” though he provides no additional detail or

clarification as to the nature of that substance or how he knows the smoke contained it.

While exposure to toxic fumes may, in some circumstances, rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, Munerlyn’s allegations are limited to a single incident of several

hours’ duration. He does not allege that he suffered any lasting injury,3 required follow-up

care, or was diagnosed with any condition as a result of the exposure. Under these

circumstances, the alleged condition, while far from ideal and undoubtedly unpleasant,

falls short of plausibly establishing that he was exposed to a substantial risk of serious

harm.

This conclusion is reinforced by Munerlyn’s failure to develop the factual basis of

his claim when given the opportunity to do so. The undersigned specifically directed him

to provide additional details regarding the severity of the smoke—such as its thickness, the

presence of ventilation, and any remedial actions taken by staff—but he declined to

3 See Dkt. No. 17 at 3 (Question No. 5: You claim that you suffered heavy coughing, chest pains, and light

headedness. Are these the extent of your injuries from the smoke? If not, please describe. Answer: Yes,

these are the extent of my injuries.).

respond. See Dkt. No. 17 at 3 (Question No. 6: Provide more facts regarding the severity

of the smoke. For instance, how thick was the smoke? Was there any ventilation or fans in

the area? Did staff do anything to try and lessen the smoke or otherwise improve the

situation? Was it burnt kerosene causing the smoke?4 Answer: [blank].). As a result, the

record contains no factual allegations from which the Court can reasonably infer that the

conditions were sufficiently extreme.

The duration of the alleged exposure further undermines his claim. Although even

short-term exposure to exceptionally egregious conditions may violate the Eighth

Amendment, see Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 52–54 (2020) (filthy cell with massive

amounts of feces, four days; then frigid cell with clogged drain and no clothes, two days),

less severe conditions must typically persist for a longer period to rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1978). Here, Munerlyn

alleges two episodes lasting several hours, without accompanying facts demonstrating that

the conditions were so extreme as to be comparable to those recognized as unconstitutional

in short-duration cases like Taylor.

In sum, absent allegations regarding the nature, concentration, or severity of the

smoke, or any resulting lasting harm, Munerlyn has not plausibly alleged that he was

subjected to an objectively serious deprivation of a safe and healthy environment.

Even if the objective prong were satisfied, Munerlyn fails to allege facts showing

4 The undersigned believes that Munerlyn may have been referring to kerosene rather than the unknown

word “colesen” when referring to the toxicity of the smoke, but because of Munerlyn’s refusal to answer

this question or to describe the severity of the smoke, he has failed to plausibly allege an extreme condition.

that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. As to Defendant Lukomba,

Munerlyn alleges only that he placed the heater in the section because the building lacked

heat and temperatures were cold. These allegations suggest, at most, an attempt to address

cold conditions which resulted in unintended consequences—not that Lukomba was

subjectively aware that the heater posed a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded

that risk. Moreover, Munerlyn fails to allege when Lukomba learned the heater was

producing smoke, how he learned of the smoke, and what he did in response. The Court

cannot reasonably infer simply from the fact that Lukomba placed the heater there that he

also both knew of and disregarded the conditions created when it malfunctioned.

Accordingly, Munerlyn’s claim against Lukomba should be DISMISSED.

ii. Conditions-of-Confinement: Hakizimana

Similarly, Munerlyn’s allegations against Defendant Hakizimana do not plausibly

establish the requisite subjective awareness. Here again, Munerlyn fails to allege when

Hakizimana learned of the smoke, how he learned of the smoke, and what he did in

response. The only allegations in this regard are that Hakazimana unplugged the heater and

he or some other officer summoned the medical staff to evaluate the inmates. It was only

after the nurse evaluated several inmates that Hakazimana plugged the heater back in.

These facts do not plausibly support deliberate indifference, particularly when, as

Munerlyn admits, the officers in the area also would have been exposed to the smoke as

well. Munerlyn speculates that Hakazimana plugged the heater back in with the intent to

harm inmates, but he provides no factual support for that conclusion.5 Conclusory

assertions of intent, without supporting facts, are insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference. At most, the allegations suggest negligence or poor judgment, which does not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Accordingly, Munerlyn’s claim against Hakizimana should be DISMISSED.

B. Eighth Amendment Claim for Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical

Needs

The Eighth Amendment is violated when prison officials or doctors act with

deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, whether by intentionally

denying, delaying, or interfering with medical treatment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104–05 (1976). An Eighth Amendment medical claim has two prongs: objective exposure

to a substantial risk of serious harm, and subjective deliberate indifference on the part of

the defendants. Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).

The objective prong of a medical claim is satisfied when the prisoner faces a

substantial risk of serious harm, which requires the existence of a serious medical need,

such as serious illness or injury. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. “A serious medical need is

one for which treatment has been recommended or for which the need is so apparent that

even laymen would recognize that care is required.” Gobert, 463 F.3d at 345 n. 12; see also

id. at 346 n. 17 (noting that there was no dispute that a head wound, which would become

5 See Dkt. No. 17 at 4 (Question No. 8: If you know, why did C.O. Hakizimana plug the heater back in?

What was the temperature in the Unit while the heater was unplugged? Were the Correctional Officers also

exposed to the smoke? Answer: I believe C.O. Hakizimana was intentionally trying to harm us by plugging

the heater back in. The Correctional Officers were exposed until they left the section while the heater was

still running.).

infected if not treated, posed a substantial health risk).

Even where a substantial risk exists, exposure to that risk does not violate the Eighth

Amendment unless the defendants subjectively had the applicable mental state regarding

that exposure. Satisfying this subjective prong requires the plaintiff to show that the

defendant was: (1) aware of facts permitting inference of risk, (2) subjectively drew that

inference, and (3) disregarded the risk; the defendant’s conduct must amount to wanton

disregard for the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Spikes v. Wheat, 141 F.4th 662, 668 (5th

Cir. 2025) (citing Cleveland v. Bell, 938 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks,

citation, and alterations omitted)).

The deliberate indifference standard is not satisfied by allegations of negligence or

medical malpractice, or claims that the defendants made an incorrect diagnosis, failed to

provide additional treatment, or failed to perceive a significant risk. Estelle, 429 U.S. at

105–07; Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001). The

decision to provide further treatment, such as further testing or referral to a specialist, is “a

classic example of a matter for medical judgment” that does not constitute deliberate

indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107. Deliberate indifference is instead shown through

allegations that an official refused to treat the prisoner, purposefully treated him incorrectly,

or otherwise engaged in action showing wanton disregard for serious medical needs.

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–07.

With these principles in mind, the undersigned considers whether Munerlyn has

plausibly alleged that Nurse Mayfield was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs. The undersigned finds that he has not.

As explained above, Munerlyn’s symptoms were relatively minor, short in duration,

and did not develop into any lasting harm. When asked by the Court to describe the smoke,

the ventilation in the area, and the defendants’ efforts to remedy the situation, Munerlyn

declined to do so. Dkt. No. 17 at 3. Even when the Court draws all reasonable inferences

in his favor, Munerlyn’s allegations fall short of plausibly establishing a substantial risk of

serious harm.

Otherwise, Munerlyn’s allegations about Mayfield’s state of mind are thin to non-

existent. When asked in the questionnaire to explain why he did not receive medical care,

Munerlyn stated only that he “wanted” to be assessed by Nurse Mayfield but was “refused”

for unknown reasons. Dkt. No. 17 at 4. This allegation is insufficient. Alleging that he

“wanted” medical attention does not establish that he had a serious medical condition or

specifically needed medical attention, let alone that Mayfield knew he needed medical

attention and ignored him. Munerlyn must demonstrate that Mayfield refused to treat him

despite a medical need, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or

engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for his serious

medical needs. Munerlyn’s mere disagreement with Mayfield over whether he needed an

examination is insufficient to make out an Eighth Amendment violation. See Norton v.

Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997).

Moreover, Munerlyn’s assertion that he was refused care for “unknown reasons”

does not support a finding of deliberate indifference. Deliberate indifference is a high bar

and requires more than negligence or an unexplained failure to provide care; it requires that

the defendant knew of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.

Accordingly, Munerlyn’s claim against Mayfield should be DISMISSED.

VI. LEAVE TO AMEND

Still, there is the issue of whether the Court must give Munerlyn leave to amend his

complaint. Ordinarily, “a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his

complaint before it is dismissed.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767–68 (5th Cir. 2009).

Leave to amend is not required, however, where an amendment would be futile, in other

words, the amended complaint would still fail to state a claim, Marucci Sports, LLC v. Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014), or where a plaintiff has already

received an opportunity to amend his or her claims, Cent. Laborers’ Pension Fund v.

Integrated Elec. Servs. Inc., 497 F.3d 546, 556 (5th Cir. 2007).

Here, Munerlyn has already received an opportunity to amend his claims through

the Court’s questionnaire. See Dkt. No. 17. His responses—or refusal to respond—have

failed to cure the defects within his Complaint. Based on this, the undersigned finds that

further amendment would not produce plausible allegations establishing deliberate

indifference with respect to either Munerlyn’s conditions-of-confinement claims or his

medical-needs claim. Accordingly, granting leave to amend would be futile.

VII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Munerlyn’s claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.

VIH. RIGHT TO OBJECT

A copy of these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these Find-

ings, Conclusions, and Recommendations must file specific written objections within four-

teen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which

the objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the

magistrate judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations where the disputed de-

termination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the

briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objec-

tions will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions

of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417

(Sth Cir. 1996).

IX. TRANSFER OF CASE

Having completed the preliminary screening of Munerlyn’s claims, the undersigned

ORDERS that this case be TRANSFERRED back to the docket of the United States District

Judge and designated as Civil Action No. 1:23-CV-00202-H.

ORDERED this 11th day of May 2026.

SDL

JOHN R. PARKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17