The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BRANDON GROSSINGER, :
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 26-CV-2039
:
GOOGLE LLC, et al., :
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM
BEETLESTONE, C. J. JUNE 9, 2026
Brandon Grossinger, a repeat pro se litigant in this Court, filed this case asserting claims
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) against Google LLC and Stephen D. Watson
in his official capacity as Bucks County Court Administrator. He also asserts a breach of
contract claim against Google under Pennsylvania law. Grossinger also names IBM Corporation
in the caption of the Complaint and list of defendants, but makes no specific claim against it.
Grossinger also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis and has filed six motions for temporary
restraining orders.1 The Court will grant Grossinger leave to proceed without paying the fee for
1 Grossinger opened this case on March 29, 2026 by filing an Emergency Supplemental
Declaration (ECF No. 1), followed on April 1, 2026 by an Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order (ECF No. 2). In an Order filed on April 2, 2026 (ECF No. 5), the Court
directed Grossinger to file an actual complaint and pay the filing fee for the case or seek leave to
proceed in forma pauperis if he sought to proceed with this case. He filed his Complaint (ECF
No. 9) and an in forma pauperis motion (ECF No. 7) on April 29, 2026, but the financial
information he provided was incomplete. On May 4, 2026, the Court denied his in forma
pauperis motion because it did not contain sufficient financial information, directing him to
resubmit the application or pay the filing fee so that this case could proceed. Even though he
filed numerous other emergency motions and notices, Grossinger did not refile his in forma
pauperis request until June 3, 2026 (ECF No. 19).
Because Grossinger included Bucks County in the caption of his first submission, the
Clerk of Court recorded it as a named Defendant. Grossinger did not, however, name Bucks
County in his Complaint so it will be terminated as a named defendant.
this case. Because his claims are not plausible, the Complaint will be dismissed and his motions
for injunctive relief will be denied since he cannot show the likelihood of success on the merits
of his claims.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2
Grossinger asserts he has “documented disability-related needs” who “relies on written
and digital tools to manage records, communications, and legal deadlines.” (Compl. ¶ 4.) He
does not, however, describe his disability in his Complaint. He seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief, preservation of data and logs, “restoration of functional access where appropriate,” “non-
destructive exports where restoration is not immediately possible,” and an account reconciliation.
(Id. ¶ 3.) He asserts that he uses Goggle products, including Workspace, Gmail, Drive, and
others for email, records, account administration, “disability-related documentation,” and
2 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from the Complaint
(ECF No. 9). The Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned to all pleadings by the
CM/ECF docketing system.
Grossinger included allegations of fact in numerous pre- and post-Complaint pleadings.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, do not contemplate piecemeal pleadings or the
amalgamation of pleadings, even in the context of a pro se litigant. See Bryant v. Raddad, No.
21-1116, 2021 WL 2577061, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2021) (“Allowing a plaintiff to file partial
amendments or fragmented supplements to the operative pleading, ‘presents an undue risk of
piecemeal litigation that precludes orderly resolution of cognizable claims.’” (quoting Uribe v.
Taylor, No. 10-2615, 2011 WL 1670233, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2011)); Brooks-Ngwenya v.
Bart Peterson’s the Mind Tr., No. 16-193, 2017 WL 65310, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 6, 2017)
(“Piecemeal pleadings cause confusion and unnecessarily complicate interpretation of a
movant’s allegations and intent[] . . . .”). Where noted, additional factual information may be
cited from other pro se pleadings filed by Grossinger in connection with the requests for
emergency relief so that the true nature of the claims may be understood. Swofford v. Mandrell,
969 F.2d 547, 549 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that, when evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court
may look to “allegations contained in the other court filings of a pro se plaintiff” to clarify
statements made in the complaint (citing, inter alia, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980))); cf.
Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 485 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]hile this case involves a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Supreme Court . . . confirmed that we may use appellants’
brief ‘to clarify allegations in the complaint whose meaning is unclear.’” (quoting Pegram v.
Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 230 n.10 (2000))).
“litigation-preservation workflows.” (Id. ¶ 5.) He uses IBM cloud, account and support services
for research, records, and mitigation and, although he asserts no specific claims against IBM, he
has named it as a Defendant “narrowly for preservation, account-state reconciliation, access, and
billing/resource issues.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Defendant Watson, in his official capacity as Bucks County
Court Administrator, is allegedly responsible for “state-court administrative access barriers
affecting [Grossinger’s] individual ability to obtain accessible court procedures and meaningful
participation in state proceedings.” (Id. ¶ 7.)
Grossinger asserts that he “used admin@bunnyflowers.org3 as his primary Google
Workspace administrator and Super Admin identity connected to email, records, account
recovery, Google Admin, Drive, Vault, and disability-access documentation workflows.”4 (Id. ¶
11.) A Google product called “Google Workspace for Nonprofits” was allegedly represented to
him as “including nonprofit email/admin controls and a 100 TB shared storage allocation.” (Id. ¶
12.) In January 2026, he documented concerns that the expected storage and account
entitlements had become “unavailable, reduced, displaced, or inconsistent following Enterprise
or account-plan activity.” (Id. ¶ 14.) He “also documented disability-related accommodation
3 In one of his prior lawsuits, Grossinger v. Lichty, Civ. A. No. 25-2510 (E.D. Pa.),
Grossinger attempted to bring claims on behalf of an entity called Bunny’s Flowers but was
instructed that, as a pro se litigant he could not represent an entity in federal court and had to
retain counsel for the entity. When he failed to do so, the entity was dismissed from the case
without prejudice. In this case, Grossinger states that “he does not bring this action on behalf of
Bunny’s Flowers as an entity” but only references its “related systems” because he “personally
used and administered those systems, depended on them for disability-access workflows, and
needs access to records and account tools to protect his own rights and comply with court
obligations.” (Compl. ¶ 2.) It is unclear from the documents Grossinger has submitted whether
he or the entity is the owner of the web domain, email address, and associated electronic services
he describes.
4 Grossinger uses the term “disability-related workflows throughout his pleadings but
does not state the meaning of the term.
needs and reliance on written/digital tools to communicate, manage records, and meet legal and
administrative deadlines.” (Id. ¶ 15.) He created “Google Vault litigation holds intended to
preserve emails, files, metadata, and account records.” (Id. ¶ 16.) He also “preserved
screenshots and records showing Google’s legal/compliance screens” because he believed the
account contained health-related and disability-related records requiring preservation. (Id. ¶ 17.)
On April 28, 2026, after recognizing Grossinger’s identity, Google displayed a message
stating that the Workspace account had been suspended due to payment failure and that users
would be unable to use Workspace services such as Gmail. (Id. ¶ 19.) He disputed the billing
“characterization” because the account was associated with “nonprofit Workspace entitlements”
and active preservation concerns and disability-related workflows. (Id. ¶ 20.) The suspension
blocked his access to Gmail and the other services and his Super Admin identity itself was
blocked, meaning he could not use ordinary administrative tools to verify preservation status,
export records, cure or dispute billing, confirm license status, or determine whether Vault holds
remained effective. (Id. ¶ 22.) Grossinger has observed IBM account suspension or access
barriers during the same period, including an “inability to access dashboard information needed
to verify active resources, billing exposure, credits, support status, and any data-preservation
risk.” (Id. ¶ 25.)
With regard to Defendant Watson, Grossinger asserts that he requested “disability-related
accommodations” in Bucks County court-related proceedings, including written or email-based
communications, accessible filing/service procedures, and procedures that would preserve
legible records and exhibits. (Id. ¶ 27.) He claims that “state-court administrative processes
forced or attempted to force paper/mail procedures, degraded visual exhibits, created unclear
cure requirements, and impaired [his] meaningful access to the court as a disabled pro se
litigant.” (Id. ¶ 28.) Watson participated in or oversaw the appeal, denial, or administration of
these accommodation and access issues. (Id. ¶ 29.)
Based on these allegations, Grossinger asserts a claim under ADA Title III and a breach
of contract claim against Google (Counts I and II), seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against
Google and IBM to preserve all relevant data, logs, support notes, billing/license records, and
related digital data (Counts III), and asserts access to courts claims under ADA Title II and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Watson (Count IV). He seeks declaratory and injunctive relief from
Google, including the preservation and restoration of all account data and administrative access;
preservation-related declaratory and injunctive relief from IBM, and prospective declaratory and
injunctive relief from Watson requiring accessible digital/written communications, clear
procedures, and preservation of readable records and exhibits.
In his first motion seeking a temporary restraining order, Grossinger asserted that he had
uncovered evidence of medical records tampering involving his CPAP machine. (ECF No. 2 at
3.) He claims the “Defendants commenced a coordinated campaign to dismantle [the Google
and IBM] infrastructure and purge all associated data.” (Id.) He claimed there was “active
deletion” by Google and “imminent deletion” by IBM of data. (Id. at 4.) In his second motion,
Grossinger asserted he documented “rapid account-state changes” and other problems “affecting
accounts associated with [himself] and Bunny’s Flowers.” (ECF No. 6 at 2.) The “affected
assets” are associated with himself Bunny’s Flowers, bunnysflowers.org,
admin@bunnysflowers.org, bunnysflowersus@gmail.com, and other Google accounts
“associated with [himself] and/or Bunny’s Flowers. (Id. at 2-3, 5.)
In his third emergency motion, filed simultaneously with the Complaint, Grossinger
repeats his factual allegations and again asks for preservation and restoration of records. (ECF
No. 8.) In a “Supplemental Notice” he filed on May 2, 2026, Grossinger asserted that his
“treating medical provider documented disability-related limitations requiring additional time,
clear written communication, and administrative accommodations” due to limitations affecting
his “ability to navigate complex account systems, medical-device records, digital records,
support portals, billing disputes, and court filings.” (ECF No. 10 at 1.) He stated that “[w]ithin
the last several hours, [he] located a large volume of Google Drive/Docs materials that [he]
previously believed were deleted . . . contain[ing] substantial prior legal filings, work product,
organizational records, and related metadata.” (Id.) His access to admin@bunnysflowers.org,
however, remained inconsistent or nonfunctional. (Id. at 2.) In another notice filed on May 10,
2026, he asserts that Google informed him his “Cloud Identity Free account for bunnsflowers.org
had been placed in a ‘read-only’ state and was scheduled for suspension and cancellation on June
6, 2026.” (ECF No. 12 at 1.) He adds that on April 23, 2026, a collection agency transmitted a
collection letter to Bunny’s Flowers referencing a delinquent balance of $71.24 owed to Google
Workspace for the bunnysflowers.org account. (Id.) On May 2, 2026, Google sent notice that
his AI Ultra Access subscription had been suspended and would be canceled even though he had
“previously identified [the service] as a disability accommodation tool.” (Id. at 2.) The notice
was apparently sent to Grossinger’s backup email account, admin@monumentalglass.com. (Id.)
Grossinger asserts the suspension of this service during the time he “had active ADA
accommodation requests pending with Google support – is material to [his] ADA and
accessibility claims.” (Id.) In a notice filed on May 14, 2026, Grossinger attached screen shots
of subscription suspension and deletion warnings and alleged “active litigation hold and
preservation configurations within Google Vault.” (ECF No. 13 at 1.)
In his fourth emergency motion filed on May 27, he states that Google Support opened a
case in response to his complaints but he received only a “formally drafted, legally precise
communication” acknowledging his “active litigation hold” and ADA accommodation request
for email-only communications. (ECF No. 14 at 1.) He claims the legalistic response he
received “is inconsistent with routine automated customer support and indicates coordinated
legal review prior to response.” (Id.) When he attempted to respond to Google support via his
admin@monumentalglass.com domain, “all outbound communications were blocked” making
the “support system” unreachable from his Google-administered domain. (Id.) His “nonprofit
domain admin@bunnysflowers.org returned error 550 5.1.1. – ‘account does not exist.’” (Id. at
2.)
Two days later, in a fifth emergency motion in which Grossinger included GODADDY
LLC in the caption even though it is not a party to this case, he asserted that the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted him an extension of time to seek reconsideration
of affirmance of this Court’s decision in Grossinger v. Lichty, No. 25-2510 (E.D. Pa.). (ECF No.
15 at 2, 11 (screenshot of order entered in Grossinger v. Lichty, No. 25-2477 (3d Cir.).)5
Nonetheless, counsel for the defendants in that case “issued a written threat to permanently
destroy all of Bunny’s Flowers charitable assets, federal grant documentation, and evidence”
located at the property involved in that lawsuit. (Id. at 2.) He claimed his dispute with Google
involves an active litigation hold concerning that lawsuit. (Id. at 3.) He also mentions a
“Christmas Shutdown Following ADA Request” involving GoDaddy, specifically that he
submitted a formal ADA accommodation request to GoDaddy “due to chronic neurological and
5 The docket of the Third Circuit case indicates that Grossinger’s pending motions were
denied on June 4, 2026. Grossinger v. Lichty, No. 25-2477 (3d Cir. (ECF Nos. 33, 34).)
pulmonary disabilities.” (Id. at 2-3.) It eventually restored data from a December 22, 2025
backup, but he lost data between that date and January 2, 2026. (Id. at 4.) In that same fifth
emergency motion, Grossinger asserted that Defendant Watson denied him access to the courts
and “retaliated against [his] ADA requests” by imposing a “paper-only filing requirement on a
disabled pro se litigant whose disabilities preclude physical paper handling,” converting his
“digital evidence into paper format with ink-bleed redactions that rendered the evidence
unreadable and destroyed its digital integrity.” (Id. at 4.) Watson stated that the Bucks County
Court of Common Pleas ‘“cannot make further ADA accommodations’ effectively barring [him]
from filing necessary IFP documentation,” and denying his IFP motion. (Id.) Attached to the
motion are screenshots of documents from the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas returning
Grossinger’s submission to him, telling him not to fax or email documents, and directing him to
return corrected documents to the court “either in person or via mail.” (Id. at 29-30.) Another
screenshot shows an apparent poor-quality copy of a document involving a dispute with Lichty.
(Id. at 29.) Grossinger labeled the screen shot “Watson Refusal of Further ADA
Accommodations.” (Id.)
In another notice filed May 31, 2026, Grossinger asserted a “pattern of self-executing
spoliation” by Google due, inter alia, to a cancellation notice for the bunnysflowers.org account
sent to the backup account Grossinger controls, admin@monumentalglass.com. (ECF No. 16 at
1-3.) Another notice also filed on May 31 asserts that “two imminent destruction events” were
about to occur, namely the cancellation notice and a notice from counsel for Bunny’s Flowers
landlord that the entity’s property on the leased premises would be unilaterally removed if not
retrieved by June 14, 2026. (ECF No. 17.) Finally, in a sixth Emergency Supplemental Motion
(ECF No. 21), Grossinger states that on June 4, 2026, “in a new support chat” a Google
employee confirmed that its own support team cannot access the affected account and directed
him back to automated recovery forms that have failed for months. (Id. at 2-3.) He refers to this
as a circular and ineffective recovery process and shows a pattern of targeting his “digital
identity across Google’s ecosystem.” (Id. at 3-4.) He again references his doctor’s
recommendations that he avoid fragmented and stressful communication, which the chat required
him to engage in, that the agent offered a voice callback but his medical conditions are such that
he “can only pick up unpredictably,” he has not been able to establish a single point of contact,
and that Google is violating a litigation hold. (Id. at 4-5.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court grants Grossinger leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Complaint if it fails to state a claim.
Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same
standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999), which requires the Court to
determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quotations omitted); Talley v. Wetzel, 15 F.4th 275, 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). Although this
“plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’” it demands “more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 566 (2007)). At this early stage of the litigation, the Court will accept
the facts alleged in the Complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in the Grossinger’s
favor, and ask only whether the Complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds
recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do
not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Court construes pro se allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir.
2021). However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support
a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)). ).
An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules — they must abide by the same rules
that apply to all other litigants.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245); see also Doe v. Allegheny
Cnty. Hous. Auth., No. 23-1105, 2024 WL 379959, at *3 (3d Cir. Feb. 1, 2024) (per curiam)
(“While a court must liberally construe the allegations and ‘apply the applicable law, irrespective
of whether the pro se litigant mentioned it b[y] name,’ Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d
Cir. 2002), this does not require the court to act as an advocate to identify any possible claim that
the facts alleged could potentially support.”).
Furthermore, the Court must dismiss the Complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also Grp. Against Smog and Pollution, Inc.
v. Shenango, Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that “an objection to subject
matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time [and] a court may raise jurisdictional issues sua
sponte”). A plaintiff commencing an action in federal court bears the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir.
2015) (“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests with the party asserting its
existence.”) (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006)).
“Jurisdictional [issues] . . . may be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them sua
sponte.” Wilkins v. United States, 598 U.S. 152, 157 (2023) (internal quotations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. IBM
Grossinger asserts that he uses IBM Cloud, account, and support services for research,
records, and mitigation. He named IBM as a Defendant but does not assert any claims it. Rather
Grossinger states he named IBM as a Defendant “narrowly for preservation, account-state
reconciliation, access, and billing/resource issues.” (Compl. ¶ 6.) In other words, he appears to
have named IBM as a Defendant because it is a custodian of records via its Cloud that
Grossinger may need in this or some other litigation, such as his already dismissed case seeking
pre-litigation discovery regarding an allegedly defective CPAP machine. See Grossinger v.
Apria Healthcare LLC, Civ. A. No. 26-2601 (E.D. Pa.). Because Grossinger has asserted no
legal claim against IBM, either under the ADA or otherwise, it will be dismissed as a
Defendant.6
B. ADA Claim Against Google
6 Notably, in his first motion seeking a temporary restraining order in this case,
Grossinger asserted that he had uncovered evidence of medical records tampering involving his
CPAP machine. (ECF No. 2 at 3.) He claimed the defendants in that case “commenced a
coordinated campaign to dismantle [the Google and IBM] infrastructure and purge all associated
data.” (Id.) He claimed there was “active deletion” by Google and “imminent deletion” by IBM
of data. (Id. at 4.)
To the extent this can be read as an allegation of evidence spoliation, it too would not be
plausible as a “claim” against IBM, and thus no leave to amend it will be provided. Spoliation is
defined as “the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or
reasonably foreseeable litigation.” Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d
332, 335 (D.N.J. 2004). Spoliation is not a claim nor is it an affirmative defense, but rather it is
an evidentiary doctrine. See, e.g., Elias v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 710 A.2d 65 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1998) (stating Pennsylvania does not recognize a tort of negligent spoliation); U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Gerber, 380 F. Supp. 3d 429, 440 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (“[S]poliation is not an affirmative
defense but rather an evidentiary doctrine.” (citing Donohoe v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 155
F.R.D. 515, 520 (M.D. Pa. 1994))). It is an adverse inference that permits a jury to infer that
destroyed evidence might or would have been unfavorable to the position of the offending party.
Mosaid Techs., 348 F. Supp. 2d at 336. Accordingly, IBM’s alleged failure to preserve records
cannot be a basis of a plausible claim based on spoliation.
In Count I of his Complaint Grossinger asserts an ADA claim against Google. The ADA
has four subchapters, covering employment, public services, public accommodations and
services operated by private entities, and “miscellaneous.” See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12203. Since Google is a private entity, any claim under the statute would fall under Title III.
See id. § 12181(6) (defining the term “private entity” to mean “any entity other than a public
entity (as defined in section 12131(1) of this title)” (i.e., a state or local government or Amtrak)).
Private entities are barred from discriminating in Title III on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation. Id. § 12182(a). A “public
accommodation” includes establishments such as hotels, restaurants, theaters, retail stores,
service provider locations such as laundromats and pharmacies, museums, schools, day care or
senior centers, and places of exercise or recreation. Id. § 12181(7). Acts of discrimination
include, for example, imposing eligibility criteria that tend to screen out an individual with a
disability, failing to make reasonable accommodations, failing to take steps to ensure that no
disabled person is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently, and
failing to remove barriers. Id. § 12182(b)(2). To state a claim under Title III of the ADA, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege that: (1) he has a disability; (2) the defendant is a public
accommodation within the meaning of the statue; and (3) he was denied goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations due to discrimination based on his
disability, which can include failure to reasonably accommodate his disability. See Matheis v.
CSL Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2019); Douris v. Dougherty, 192 F. Supp. 2d 358,
368 (E.D. Pa. 2002). A plaintiff is disabled for purposes of the ADA if he (1) has a “physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more” of her “major life activities”; (2) has “a
record of such an impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such an impairment.” Eshleman v.
Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).
The ADA definition of “disability,” applicable to the entire statute, provides that a
disability is “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).” Id. § 12102(1). “Major life activities
include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing,
eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading,
concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A).
A complaint must allege enough facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (explaining that “a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” because
“courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”
(cleaned up and citation omitted)). “A plaintiff cannot survive dismissal just by alleging the
conclusion to an ultimate legal issue.” Martinez v. UPMC Susquehanna, 986 F.3d 261, 266 (3d
Cir. 2021). Grossinger has failed to allege facts to make plausible his ADA Title III claim
against Google (or IBM for that matter) because he has failed to allege in the Complaint that he
has a disability.
Stated simply, Grossinger fails to allege any facts about how or why he is disabled or
how that disability limits a major life activity, rendering all of his ADA claims implausible.
Accord, Atamian v. Burns, 236 F. App’x 753, 755 (3d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (affirming district
court’s dismissal of ADA claim where the plaintiff “failed to allege that he is a disabled person
within the meaning of the ADA”); Morrow v. S. Side Area Sch. Dist., No. 22-1142, 2023 WL
6260107, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts only that she ‘was
diagnosed with ADHD and anxiety in or about 2016.’ . . . Even taking this allegation as true, a
diagnosis standing alone is insufficient to establish a disability under the ADA.”) (collecting
cases); Van Der Poel v. Mannheim Auto Auction, No. 08-5607, 2009 WL 1754598, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. June 18, 2009) (“Even accepting, as the Court must, all the allegations in the Complaint as
true, Plaintiff’s claim under the ADA fail [sic] because Plaintiff has failed to allege that he is a
disabled person within the meaning of the ADA. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to allege anywhere
on the face of his Complaint or attached letter that his cardiomyopathy and high blood pressure
are physical or mental impairments which substantially limit one or more of his major life
activities.”).
The Title III claim against Google is further rendered implausible because Grossinger has
not alleged that Google, or IBM to the extent it is implicated in an ADA violation, provide a
place of public accommodation. He alleges only that the disability discrimination involves his
use of web-based products like Google Workspace, Gmail, Drive and IBM Cloud services.
Nowhere does Grossinger allege that an event occurred at a physical place of public
accommodation where he suffered disability discrimination. Courts are split on the question of
whether the term “public accommodation” requires a physical place or location. See Peoples v.
Discover Fin. Servs., Inc., 387 F. App’x 179, 183 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing split amongst the
courts of appeals). Some courts apply the ADA to a good or service regardless of whether the
service or privilege is connected to a physical location. See, e.g., Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc.
v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that
establishments of “public accommodation” are not “limited to actual physical structures”).
These courts generally invoke Congress’s intent to ensure that people with disabilities have
access to the same services enjoyed by people who are not disabled. See Morgan v. Joint Admin.
Bd., Ret. Plan of the Pillsbury Co. & Am. Fed’n of Grain Millers, AFL-CIO-CLC, 268 F.3d 456,
459 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The site of the sale is irrelevant to Congress’s goal of granting the disabled
equal access to sellers of goods and services.”).
But the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, among other courts, has
concluded that an actual, physical location is necessary. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145
F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The plain meaning of Title III is that a public accommodation is a
place. . . .”); see also Peoples, 387 F. App’x at 183 (“Our court is among those that have taken
the position that the term [“public accommodation”] is limited to physical accommodations.”);
see also Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) and Weyer v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2000). These courts reason that all
of the entities enumerated as examples of public accommodations in 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7),
hotels, restaurants, theaters, laundromats, and the like, refer to physical places. See Ford, 145
F.3d at 612 (noting that requiring a physical location “is in keeping with the host of examples of
public accommodations provided by the ADA, all of which refer to places”). Even though a
physical place or location is required, the Third Circuit has held that a good or service provided
by a public accommodation can be covered by the ADA as long as there is “some nexus between
the services or privileges denied and the physical place. . . .” Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l
Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1998).
Thus, for example, this Court has interpreted the Third Circuit’s instruction that public
accommodations are limited to physical places (or services with a nexus to a physical location)
to mean that a website, on its own, is not a public accommodation within the meaning of the
ADA. See Mahoney v. Bittrex, Inc., No. 19-3836, 2020 WL 212010, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14,
2020) (“A website, by itself, is not a physical location and therefore does not constitute a place
of public accommodation under Section 12182(a) of the ADA.”); Walker v. Sam’s Oyster House,
LLC, No. 18-193, 2018 WL 4466076, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2018) (“A website is not a
physical location and therefore does not constitute a place of public accommodation under
Section 12182(a) of the ADA.”); Tawam v. APCI Fed. Credit Union, No. 18-122, 2018 WL
3723367, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2018) (citing statutory definition of “public accommodation” in
support of conclusion that the defendant’s physical location, rather than its website, was the
place of public accommodation). Since Grossinger alleges that he interacted with Google
exclusively through web portals or other electronic means and fails to allege any nexus between
the services or privileges denied and a physical place, the public accommodation element has not
been alleged plausibly under the law applicable in this Circuit.
Finally, Grossinger has failed to allege that Google discriminated against him in its
provision of the services of a public accommodation based on his disability. Even if a person is
disabled, that does not mean that any action with negative impact on their lives happened
because they are disabled. See Riboldi v. Warren Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. Div. of Temp.
Assistance & Soc. Servs., 781 F. App’x 44, 46 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (affirming district
court dismissal of ADA claim where plaintiff “failed to allege facts plausibly indicating that he
was denied benefits or services on account of his disability”); Thomas v. Murphy Oil Corp., 777
F. App’x 377, 380 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“Plaintiff’s bare conclusory allegations that
Defendants discriminated against him based on his race or disability is not enough to avoid
dismissal.”); J.A.M. v. Nova Se. Univ., Inc., 646 F. App’x 921, 926 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(“J.A.M. did not allege that he was dismissed because of his mental disability. Rather, he
alleged that he was dismissed because he breached his agreement to abstain from alcohol
consumption. At best, Nova discriminated on the basis of J.A.M.’s alcohol-related behavioral
misconduct, not his disability. As such, J.A.M. failed to allege that Nova discriminated against
him on account of his disability and, therefore, failed to state a claim under Title III.”); Lewis v.
Adirondack Med. Ctr., No. 24-376, 2024 WL 4448870, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2024)
(“[N]owhere in the complaint does Plaintiff suggest he did not receive Lake Placid Sports
Medicine, PLLC’s services because of a disability or that he was otherwise discriminated against
on this basis”); Chavous v. Hous. Visions Unlimited, Inc., No. 22-811, 2022 WL 9967833, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2022) (“Here, the complaint does not allege facts plausibly suggesting that
Defendants’ actions constituted discrimination under Title III of the ADA or resulted in the
discriminatory provision of services to Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted pursuant to Title III of the ADA.”), report and recommendation
adopted, 2023 WL 1775699 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2023); Brennan v. NCAComp Inc., No. 22-127,
2022 WL 4290660, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2022) (“The Amended Complaint does not allege
facts plausibly suggesting that Defendants’ actions constituted discrimination under Title III of
the ADA or resulted in the discriminatory provision of services to Plaintiff. Although the
Amended Complaint appears to allege that: (1) Defendant NCAComp denied Plaintiff’s claims
in an effort to save money,” it does not “allege that Defendants took these actions for the purpose
of discriminating against Plaintiff because of an alleged disability.”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3097843 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2022); Tasambasis v. Pac.
Aerospace Mach., Inc., No. 14-457, 2014 WL 12603098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2014)
(plaintiff’s failure to allege he was denied access to any place of public accommodation on
account of a disability rendered Title III claim implausible).
Because Grossinger fails to allege that any Defendant acted or refused to act because he
is disabled, whether his claim is based on the provision of a public accommodation, the provision
of a service, or otherwise, the claim is not plausible. Stated simply, Grossinger’s core dispute
with Google over the cancellation of the Bunny’s Flowers accounts – presumably for
nonpayment of fees as suggested by his exhibits – is a dispute that any person might have with a
provider of data services regardless of a disability, and Grossinger does not plausibly allege that
he has been subject to discrimination because of his disability. Accordingly, the Title III claims
are dismissed. Since, even if Grossinger could plausible allege facts that he is a disabled person,
as no Title III Defendant provides a service at a physical location, the dismissal will be with
prejudice.
C. ADA Claim Against Watson
Title II of the ADA, applicable to Watson as a governmental official named in his official
capacity, see Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2002), provides that “no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. To state a plausible
claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2)
with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such
entity; (4) by reason of his disability.” Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 146 (3d Cir. 2025)
(citing Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2018)).
Title II provides a cause of action for disabled individuals claiming that they were denied
access to state courts because of their disabilities. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34
(2004) (recognizing that Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity “as it
applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts”). Title II
includes within its prohibition against discrimination the failure to make “reasonable
accommodations.” See Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2018). When determining
whether an accommodation is reasonable, courts consider “whether it alters the essential nature
of the program or imposes an undue burden or hardship in light of the overall program.” Doe 1
v. Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist., 585 F. Supp. 3d 668, 694-95 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (quoting Helen L. v.
DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir. 1995)). “A public entity need not make ‘fundamental’ or
‘substantial’ alterations to accommodate a disabled individual.” Id. at 695 (citing Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985)).
As the Court has already stated, Grossinger has not alleged in his Complaint that he is a
qualified person with a disability, rendering the Title II claim implausible. The Court will permit
Grossinger to file an amended complaint to develop this claim.
D. Civil Rights Claim Against Watson
Grossinger also asserts a First Amendment access-to-courts claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against Watson. “Section 1983 provides a civil remedy for the ‘deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d
273, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Elmore v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279,
281 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but [rather] a
method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443
U.S. 137, 145 n. 3 (1979))). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate “that the
defendants, acting under color of law, violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory
rights, and thereby caused the complained of injury.” Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 520 (3d
Cir. 2018) (quoting Elmore, 399 F.3d at 281); see also Halsey, 750 F.3d at 290 (“To state a claim
under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that ‘some person has deprived him of a federal
right . . . [and] that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or
territorial law.’” (quoting Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980))).
To be plausible, an access-to-the-courts claim must include as an element that the “denial
of access caused actual injury.” Jackson v. Whalen, 568 F. App’x 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2014) (per
curiam) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)). This is because the right of access
to the courts “rest[s] on the recognition that the right is ancillary to the underlying claim, without
which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court.” Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). In other words, a person claiming that he was denied access
to the courts must allege an injury traceable to the conditions of which he complains. Diaz v.
Holder, 532 F. App’x 61, 63 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of denial of access
claims where plaintiff failed to tie alleged deficiencies in library to harm in underlying action).
In general, an actual injury occurs when a plaintiff identifies a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable”
claim or defense was lost because of the denial of access to the courts. Christopher, 536 U.S. at
415. “[T]he underlying cause of action, . . . is an element that must be described in the
complaint.” Id.
There are two types of access-to-courts claims, backward and forward looking.
Grossinger appears to attempt to assert a forward-looking claim: official action that “frustrates a
plaintiff . . . in preparing and filing suits at the present time.” Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413. The
object of this type of suit “is to place the plaintiff in a position to pursue a separate claim for
relief once the frustrating condition has been removed.” Id. Backward-looking claims, on the
other hand, involve those allegations that “cannot now be tried . . . no matter what official action
may be in the future.” Id. at 414. Whether the claim is forward or backward looking, the
elements of both claims are the same. A plaintiff raising an access-to-courts claim must plead:
(1) a “nonfrivolous,” “arguable” underlying claim; (2) the official acts obstructing the litigation;
(3) “a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but not otherwise available in some suit that
may yet be brought.” Id. at 415. “The complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim
well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and must describe the ‘lost remedy.’”
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2008). Specifically, the United States Supreme
Court has explained that in the context of alleging the underlying claim that the plaintiff was
prevented from pursuing, “the complaint should state the underlying claim in accordance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), just as if it were being independently pursued [.]”
Christopher, 536 U.S. at 417-18; see also Crisano v. Grimes, No. 19-1612, 2021 WL 120943, at
*12 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2021) (noting in either a forward looking or backward looking access to
courts claim, “the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must
be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe the official acts
frustrating the litigation.”) (emphasis in original).
Grossinger’s constitutional claim is not plausible. While he described actions by Watson
that may have obstructed his filing papers in state court, he does not describe the underlying
cause of action in any way. It is incumbent upon Grossinger to describe the underlying claim or
defense, explain how it is nonfrivolous, and identify a remedy he cannot receive in that
underlying suit. The Court will permit Grossinger to file an amended complaint to develop this
claim as well.
E. State Law Claim
Grossinger also asserts a breach of contract claim against Google. Having dismissed his
federal law claims the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c) over any state law claims. Accordingly, the only independent basis for jurisdiction over
any such claims is 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), which grants a district court jurisdiction over a case in
which “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”
Section 1332(a) requires “‘complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants,’
even though only minimal diversity is constitutionally required. This means that, unless there is
some other basis for jurisdiction, ‘no plaintiff [may] be a citizen of the same state as any
defendant.’” Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. AEI Life, LLC, 800 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89 (2005) and Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood,
592 F.3d 412, 419 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal footnotes omitted)). An individual is a citizen of the
state where he is domiciled, meaning the state where he is physically present and intends to
remain. See Washington v. Hovensa LLC, 652 F.3d 340, 344 (3d Cir. 2011). The citizenship of
an LLC like Google LLC “is determined by the citizenship of its members.” Zambelli Fireworks
Mfg. Co., 592 F.3d at 420. “[W]here an LLC has, as one of its members, another LLC, the
citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced through however many layers of
partners or members there may be to determine the citizenship of the LLC.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not affirmatively allege the
citizenship of an LLC if he alleges, after a reasonable investigation, that the members of the LLC
are not citizens of his state of citizenship. See Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 800 F.3d at 102.
It is the plaintiff’s burden to establish diversity of citizenship, see Gibbs v. Buck, 307
U.S. 66, 72 (1939); Quaker State Dyeing & Finishing Co., Inc. v. ITT Terryphone Corp., 461
F.2d 1140, 1143 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that, in diversity cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate
complete diversity between the parties and that the amount in controversy requirement has been
met); Jackson v. Rosen, No. 20-2842, 2020 WL 3498131, at *8 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2020).
Grossinger does not allege the citizenship of the parties. Rather, he provides only a
Pennsylvania addresses for himself and asserts that Watson is a government official in Bucks
County, which suggests that they are both Pennsylvania citizens defeating complete diversity.
Accordingly, he has not sufficiently alleged that the parties are diverse for purposes of
establishing the Court’s jurisdiction over any state law claims he intends to pursue.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Amended Complaint will be dismissed on statutory screening
because Grossinger’s claims under the ADA and § 1983 are not plausible and there is no
jurisdiction over any state law claim. The Court concludes that any attempt at amendment of the
ADA Title III claims would be futile. Accordingly, those claims will be dismissed with
prejudice. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that
district courts should dismiss complaints on statutory screening with leave to amend “unless
amendment would be inequitable or futile.”). Grossinger will be granted leave to amend his
ADA Title II and § 1983 claim against Watson. An Order with additional information on
amendment will be entered that also denies all pending motions for emergency relief since
Grossinger has failed to show that he is likely to succeed on the merits of any claim. Winter v.
NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
BY THE COURT:
S/ WENDY BEETLESTONE
__________________________________
WENDY BEETLESTONE, C.J.