The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION
LILIA BELKOVA RUSSO,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 5:26-cv-26-WWB-PRL
JUDGE JACOB A. BROWN, GLENN
KELLEY, JUDGE SARAH L.
SULMAN, CLERK OF COURT OF
PALM BEACH COUNTY, CLERK OF
4 DCA OF FLORIDA, FORTH
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF
FLORIDA, PALM BEACH COUNTY
SHERIFF’S OFFICE, J. LEVEY, and J.
SNIETKA,
Defendants.
ORDER
Plaintiff Lilia Belkova Russo, proceeding pro se, filed this suit in federal court pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state court, clerks of court in state courts, state court judges, a
bankruptcy judge, a sheriff’s office, and law enforcement officers, alleging violations of her
constitutional rights stemming from legal proceedings in state court and bankruptcy court.
(Doc. 1). Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). For the reasons explained
below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is taken under advisement, and in an
abundance of caution, Plaintiff will be permitted to amend her complaint and the motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who resides in Morriston, Florida,1 sues the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s
Office (“PBSO”); the Clerk of Court of Palm Beach County; the Fourth District Court of
Appeal of Florida, located in West Palm Beach, Florida; the Clerk of the Fourth District
Court of Appeal of Florida; Judge Glenn Kelley (“Judge Kelley”) in the Circuit Court of the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (“Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit”); Judge Sarah L. Shullman (“Judge Shullman”) of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit;2 J.
Snietka (“Snietka”), a law enforcement officer in the PBSO; J. Levey (“Levey”), a law
enforcement officer in the PBSO; and Judge Jacob Brown (“Bankruptcy Judge Brown”), a
United States Bankruptcy Judge in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District
of Florida in the Jacksonville Division (collectively, the “Defendants”). (See Doc. 1).3 In the
jurisdiction section of her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]his action arises under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for which this Court has jurisdiction.” (See id. at p. 2).4 Simultaneously with the filing
of the complaint, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 2).
The allegations levied by Plaintiff in this case center around real property located in
Palm Beach County, Florida (the “Property”), which she claims constitutes her “homestead”
1 Plaintiff indicates that Morriston is located in Marion County, Florida (see Doc. 1 at p. 2);
however, Morriston is located in Levy County, Florida.
2 Plaintiff names “Judge Sarah L. Sulman” as a defendant in this action. (Doc. 1 at p. 1);
however, it appears that Plaintiff misspelled her last name, as it is listed as “Shullman” on the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit’s website (https://www.15thcircuit.com/judges/shullman-sarah).
3 Plaintiff also names Judge Danielle Sherriff (“Judge Sherriff”) of the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit as a defendant. (See Doc. 1 at p. 3).
4 Although Plaintiff’s jurisdictional statement does not identify a federal question, construing
the complaint liberally, it appears Plaintiff has invoked the jurisdiction of the Court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 based upon her § 1983 claims. Because Plaintiff does not allege the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, and it appears from the complaint that the Plaintiff and Defendants are citizens of
Florida, Plaintiff fails to establish diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
and in which she asserts an ownership interest. (See Doc. 1 at pp. 3, 8, 10). As best can be
discerned from the allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff’s claims arise out of her
dissatisfaction with legal proceedings in state court in Palm Beach County, Florida, and the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida in Jacksonville, Florida,
related to the Property. (See generally Doc. 1). Plaintiff asserts § 1983 claims against
Defendants for alleged violations of her constitutional rights (Counts I and II), and a state law
claim for a “[v]iolation of the homestead property protection” under the Florida Constitution
(Count III). (See id. at pp. 9-12).
The basis for Plaintiff’s claims is not entirely clear, nor is the involvement of each of
the Defendants. Plaintiff alleges as follows:
The Defendants deprived [her] of her [P]roperty and [r]ights while acting under
‘color of state law[.]’ The Defendants did not provide [her] with an adequate
process for ejectment or for taking of her homestead [P]roperty and proceeds
from sale of her homestead real property, for taking her personal property and
the business assets of her mother[,] Anissa Nazarova (joint owner of the farm
at the time), of which [Plaintiff] and Nazarova had possession and joint control
as they were in possession of this farm at the time of these violations of her
substantive rights, and conducting together with her mother family farm
business on that farm as well as on other rural properties in Florida.
(Id. at p. 10). Plaintiff further alleges that:
The ‘taking’ of the property and the sales proceeds from [her] homestead
without due process to her also violated the homestead property protections
that the Florida Constitution provides. [Plaintiff,] as the co-owner of the
property and member of the HOA[,] was denied the right to pay the . . . post-
petition assessments on the [P]roperty as provided by her Confirmed Chapter
12 Bankruptcy plan. The HOA governing documents did not allow [the]
Association’s attorneys[’] fees to become a lien that can be foreclosed on the
property. Attorneys’ fees could only be a money judgment, which cannot be
foreclosed on [a] homestead. Additionally[,] [Plaintiff] in her individual
capacity was not sued for any damages and attorneys[’] fees. Nor was she sued
to foreclose her property rights or for ejectment. County Court does not have
jurisdiction for an action of ejectment.
(Id. at p. 12). For relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court (1) “[i]ssue a declaratory judgment .
. . that “Defendants deprived [Plaintiff] of property without due process of law”; (2) “a
prospective injunction against further violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights”; and (3) “a
judgment for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants’ violation of Plaintiff’s civil
rights, in an amount to be determined at trial.” (See id. at pp. 12-13)
On January 27, 2026, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause directing Plaintiff to
show cause why the case should not be transferred to the West Palm Beach Division of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. (Doc. 5). In the Order to
Show Cause, the Court noted that the Southern District of Florida appeared to be the proper
venue for this action because eight of the nine Defendants were located in the Southern
District of Florida (with only Bankruptcy Judge Brown located in the Middle District of
Florida in Jacksonville), and most, if not all, of the alleged events giving rise to the action
occurred in Palm Beach County, which is located in the Southern District of Florida. (Id. at
p. 3). Plaintiff responded to the Court’s Order to Show Cause, indicating that she filed suit in
the Middle District of Florida because she resides in Morriston, Florida, which is “near
Ocala,” she is allegedly disabled, and she has “no funds and no income to be able to afford
litigation in South Florida.” (Doc. 8 at p. 6).5
Notably, shortly before filing this action, Plaintiff filed a separate action in this district
against the Palm Beach County Clerk of Court, asserting substantially similar allegations and
5 West Palm Beach is located in Palm Beach County, Florida. Palm Beach County is located
in the Southern District of Florida. See 29 U.S.C. § 89(c). Morriston is located in Levy County, Florida.
Levy County is located in the Northern District of Florida. See id. Jacksonville is located in Duval
County, Florida. Duval County is located in the Middle District of Florida. See id.; M.D. Fla. Local
Rule 1.04. Thus, Plaintiff resides in the Northern District of Florida, Bankruptcy Judge Brown resides
in the Middle District of Florida, and the remaining eight defendants reside in the Southern District
of Florida.
claims to those in the instant action. See Russo v. Palm Beach County Clerk of Court, No. 5:26-cv-
15-SPC-PRL, at doc. 9 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026) (dismissing case without prejudice after
Plaintiff filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, which was self-executing).6
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
An individual may be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis if she declares in an
affidavit that he is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
However, before a plaintiff is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court is obligated
to review the complaint to determine whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See id. § 1915(e)(2). If the complaint is deficient, the Court is
required to dismiss the suit sua sponte. See id.
In evaluating a complaint under § 1915, courts must liberally construe pro se filings and
hold them to less stringent standards than papers drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But courts cannot act as counsel for plaintiffs or rewrite pleadings. See
United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058, 1068 n.11 (11th Cir. 2021). Pro se litigants must still
comply with the procedural rules applicable to ordinary civil litigation. See McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Nevertheless, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
6 In the prior action, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on January 12, 2026, directing
Plaintiff to show cause why the action should not be transferred to the West Palm Beach Division of
the United States District Court for Southern District of Florida, as the Palm Beach County Clerk of
Court resided in Palm Beach County, Florida, which is located in the Southern District of Florida,
and the alleged events giving rise to that action occurred in Palm Beach County. See id. at doc. 5 (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 12, 2026).
544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
While this pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” See id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” and must provide “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Although a court must accept as true well-pleaded
allegations, it is not bound to accept a legal conclusion stated as a “factual allegation” in the
complaint. See id.; Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (citations omitted); Franklin v. Curry, 738
F.3d 1246, 1248 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (stating that the court “afford[s] no
presumption of truth to legal conclusion and recitations of the basic elements of a cause of
action”) (citations omitted).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue in any case pending in the United States
District Court. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, which are “‘empowered to
hear only those cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article III
of the Constitution,’ and which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional grant
authorized by Congress.” See Univ. of So. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.
1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994)). “[A] court must
zealously [e]nsure that jurisdiction exists over a case, and should itself raise the question of
subject matter jurisdiction at any point in the litigation where a doubt about jurisdiction
arises.” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001); see Fitzgerald v. Seaboard Sys.
R.R., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1985) (“A federal court not only has the power but also
the obligation at any time to inquire into jurisdiction whenever the possibility that jurisdiction
does not exist arises.”). This inquiry should be done at the earliest stage in the proceedings
and sua sponte whenever subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking. See Univ. of So. Ala., 168
F.3d at 410; Fitzgerald, 760 F.2d at 1251. If a court “determines at any time that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Morrison
v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce a court determines that
there has been no [jurisdictional] grant that covers a particular case, the court's sole remaining
act is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Failure to Comply with the Pleading Requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure
As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with the pleading
requirements set forth in Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8
requires that, among other things, the complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the
claim” demonstrating an entitlement to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Each allegation in
the complaint must be “simple, concise, and direct.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 10
requires that a party “state its claims . . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as
practicable to a single set of circumstances” and that each claim be stated in separate counts
“[i]f doing so would promote clarity.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
In this instance, Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that she is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2), nor does it set forth
each allegation in separate, numbered paragraphs as required by Rule 10(b). See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2), 10(b). Although Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, she is “still required to conform to
procedural rules, and the court is not required to rewrite a deficient pleading.” See Washington
v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 256 F. App’x 326, 327 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
Given that Plaintiff’s complaint violates both Rules 8 and 10, it is an impermissible
shotgun pleading. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir.
2015) (defining a “shotgun pleading” as a pleading that “violate[s] either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule
10(b), or both”). The Eleventh Circuit has identified four basic categories of shotgun
pleadings: (1) a complaint “containing multiple counts where each count adopts the
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that came before
and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint”; (2) a complaint “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of
action”; (3) a complaint that fails to separate “each cause of action or claim for relief” into a
different count; and (4) a complaint that “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or
which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” See id. at 1321-23. Each of these types
of pleadings fail “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.” See id. at 1323. The Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly
condemned the use of shotgun pleadings. See Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th
Cir. 2021); Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Indeed,
shotgun pleadings “exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket,” among other things.
See Cramer v. Florida, 117 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s complaint falls under the second and fourth categories of shotgun pleadings.
First, Plaintiff’s complaint contains conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously
connected to a particular count. See Johnson v. Georgia, 661 F. App’x 578, 581 (11th Cir. 2016)
(holding that a complaint “composed of long, rambling paragraphs and conclusory statements
unsupported by factual allegations” was a shotgun pleading); Giles v. Wal-Mart Distrib. Ctr.,
359 F. App’x 91, 93 (11th Cir. 2009) (determining that a complaint “consist[ing] of a lengthy
series of unnumbered paragraphs containing what amounts to a personal narrative suggesting,
but not clearly and simply stating, a myriad of potential claims” was a “classic” shotgun
pleading). Second, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to connect each cause of action with any
particular defendant. Specifically, in Counts I, II, and III of the complaint, Plaintiff does not
identify which defendant is responsible for which acts or omissions. As a result, Plaintiff’s
complaint makes it virtually impossible for the Court to discern what claims Plaintiff asserts
against each defendant and what role, if any, each defendant played in the alleged violations.
See Veltmann v. Walpole Pharmacy, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 1996). Because
Plaintiff’s complaint constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading, it fails to give the
Defendants adequate notice of the claims asserted against them and the grounds upon which
each claim rests. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323.
B. Improper Party to the Action
While Plaintiff names the PBSO as a defendant in the complaint (see Doc. 1 at p. 2),
the PBSO is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983. Significantly, sheriff’s departments
are not a proper defendant because they are not a legal entity subject to suit. See Dean v. Barber,
951 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that certain subdivisions of local or county
governments, such as sheriff’s departments and police departments, generally are not
considered legal entities subject to suit) (citations omitted); Faulkner v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff’s
Dep’t, 523 F. App’x 696, 700-01 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of a civil
rights action against the Monroe County Sheriff’s Office and relying on Florida law to hold
that a sheriff’s office is not a legal entity subject to suit because “Florida law has not
established Sheriff’s offices as separate legal entities with the capacity to be sued”); Spry v.
Turner, No. 8:11-cv-531-T-33TGW, 2011 WL 940343, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2011)
(finding that Polk County Sheriff’s Department was not a suable entity since “no provision is
made constitutionally or statutorily for a ‘Sheriff’s Department’ as a separate legal entity, as
an agency of the county, or as a corporate entity, nor is a Sheriff’s Department given authority
to be sued in such a name”) (collecting cases); Acker v. City of Jacksonville, No. 3:10-cv-984-J-
34TEM, 2010 WL 4259356, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2010) (“The Jacksonville Sheriff’s
Office is not a proper party to the lawsuit because, under Florida law, the Sheriff’s department
is not a legal entity that can be sued.”) (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against the
PBSO in this action are improper.
C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Next, and perhaps most importantly, it appears that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Although Plaintiff attempts to plead artfully, it is obvious
that she is simply unhappy with the state court rulings, orders, and/or judgments entered
against her. While the procedural posture of the state court actions referenced in Plaintiff’s
complaint is unclear, to the extent that the state court proceedings have concluded, this Court
would not be an available avenue to seek review because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes federal courts (other than the United States Supreme Court) from reviewing and
rejecting final state court judgments or orders. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (explaining the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Rooker v. Fid. Tr.
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). “It is
well-settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a
final state court decision.” Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(citations omitted). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284; Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1214 (11th
Cir. 2021) (stating that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “applies only when litigants try to appeal
state court losses in the lower federal courts”). This jurisdictional bar “extends not only to
constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are
‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment” such that the federal court litigant is
seeking to “effectively nullify” the state court judgment (directly or indirectly) or if it
“succeeds[,] only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” See Incorvaia
v. Incorvaia, 154 F. App’x 127, 128 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Goodman ex rel.
Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001)); Coreno v. One W. Bank FSB, 617 F.
App’x 928, 930 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260
(11th Cir. 2009)); see also Castro v. Lewis, 777 F. App’x 401, 406 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
Simply stated, “federal courts are not a forum for appealing state court decisions.” See Staley
v. Ledbetter, 837 F.2d 1016, 1018 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at
482-86).
Plaintiff’s complaint takes issue with several state court rulings, orders, and/or
judgments relating to the Property. In essence, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to be nothing
more than an effort to have this Court nullify certain state court orders so that she can re-
acquire the Property. (See Doc. 1 at pp. 12-13). To that end, Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants
violated her constitutional rights stemming from the state proceedings appear “inextricably
intertwined” with any state court rulings, orders, and /or judgments, at least as Plaintiff
describes them. As such, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forecloses Plaintiff’s efforts to use this
action as a mechanism to review, reverse, or invalidate the state court’s final decisions. See
Arthur v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA, 569 F. App’x 669, 677 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Insofar as the
[plaintiffs] seek to have their [foreclosure] judgment declared null and void by the district
court . . ., such claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”); AboyadeCole Bey v. BankAtl.,
No. 6:09-cv-1572-ORL-31GJK, 2010 WL 3069102, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2010) (finding
that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
because the case was, “at its core,” an attempt by plaintiff to appeal the state court’s decision
permitting defendant to foreclose on her home). Indeed, this is the very sort of situation that
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was designed to eliminate. See Bedasee v. Fremont Inv. & Loan Co.,
741 F. App’x 642, 644 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Plaintiffs lost in state court and they
now seek a do-over in federal court with the goal of having the district ‘review and reject[ ]’
the state court foreclosure judgment: an action that is exactly what the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine prohibits.”) (citation omitted). In short, Plaintiff is a “state-court loser[] complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” See Exxon
Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. Because Plaintiff essentially seeks to appeal her state court losses
with this Court, Plaintiff’s claims are therefore likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
to the extent that any of the state court proceedings referenced in Plaintiff’s complaint have
concluded.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court to intervene in any ongoing state
court proceedings, the Court would abstain from doing so under the Younger abstention
doctrine. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431-37 (1982) (explaining the application of the Younger
abstention doctrine in the civil context). “Younger and its progeny reflect the longstanding
national public policy, based on principles of comity and federalism, of allowing state courts
to try cases—already pending in state court—free from federal court interference.” Butler v.
Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
Under the Younger abstention doctrine, “federal courts ordinarily must refrain from
deciding the merits of a case when (1) there is a pending state judicial proceeding; (2) the
proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) the parties have an adequate
opportunity to raise any constitutional claims in the state proceeding.” See Newsome v. Broward
Cnty. Pub. Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432); Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013)
(explaining that under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts will not interfere with
certain state civil proceedings, including “civil proceedings involving certain orders that are
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions”) (citation
omitted).
Upon consideration of these factors, the Court finds that abstention would be
warranted to the extent that any of the state court proceedings referenced in Plaintiff’s
complaint remain active and pending. See McKinnon v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 6:10-cv-
325-ORL-28DAB, 2010 WL 731801, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2010) (finding Younger
abstention elements satisfied where ongoing state foreclosure proceedings “implicate
important state interests” and “provide the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to litigate federal
claims”) (citation omitted); Dixon v. Haworth, No. 8:09-cv-1017-T-30EAJ, 2009 WL 4730546,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 4, 2009) (explaining that plaintiffs “have the opportunity to raise their
constitutional and evidentiary claims in the foreclosure actions, and appeal any rulings
deemed improper”); 31 Foster Child. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that
a plaintiff has “the burden of establishing that the state proceedings do not provide an
adequate remedy for their federal claims” and “[a] federal court ‘should assume that state
procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the
contrary’”) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987)); see also Old Republic Union
Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that Younger
abstention applies to injunctions and declaratory judgments that would effectively enjoin state
court proceedings).
D. Immunity
Defendants Bankruptcy Judge Brown, Judge Kelley, Judge Shullman, the Clerk of
Court of Palm Beach County, and the Clerk of the Fourth District Court of Appeal are
immune from suit.
Judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity when they act in their judicial capacity as
long as they do not act in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d
1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
This immunity is absolute—it applies even if the judge acts in error, with malice, or in excess
of their jurisdiction. See id. (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978)); McCullough
v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that judicial immunity extends to
all “judicial acts regardless of whether [the judge] made a mistake, acted maliciously [or
corruptly], or exceeded his authority”) (citation omitted). Whether a judge’s actions were
made while acting in their judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act was a normal
judicial function; (2) the act occurred in chambers or open court; (3) the controversy involved
a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose out of a visit to the judge in
their judicial capacity. See Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Importantly, “[l]ike other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an
immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” See Mireles v. Waco, 502
U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). To that end, judicial
immunity also generally extends to demands for injunctive and declaratory relief. See Bolin,
225 F.3d at 1242; Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1073-74; Tarver v. Reynolds, 808 F. App’x 752, 754 (11th
Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Alongside judicial immunity from damages, judges also receive
protection from declaratory and injunctive relief.”). For injunctive relief to be available, the
court must determine whether the defendant violated a declaratory decree or whether
declaratory relief was unavailable to the plaintiff. See Tavares v. Schreiber, No. 6:19-cv-1394-
ORL-41EJK, 2019 WL 6683154, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2019); Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242; see
also Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1073-74. To receive declaratory relief, the plaintiff “must establish that
there was a violation, that there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if the relief is
not granted, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law.” See Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1073
(quoting Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1242); Tavares, 2019 WL 6683154, at *4.
Here, the three judges—Bankruptcy Judge Brown, Judge Kelley, and Judge
Shullman—acted in their judicial capacity. Plaintiff alleges that the judges injured her
through: (1) denying a hearing on a summary judgment motion, a motion for entry of default,
and an “emergency” motion; (2) issuing an order deeming a pleading as an answer; and (3)
denying her “the right to . . . pay post-petition assessments on the [P]roperty as provided by
her Confirmed Chapter 12 Bankruptcy plan.” (See Doc. 1 at pp. 6-8, 12). Plaintiff also states
that the “[c]ourt foreclosed and sold the [P]roperty,” although it is unclear which court
specifically made these rulings. (See id. at p. 8). Nevertheless, these types of actions—ruling
on motions and filings, deciding whether to hold a hearing, and controlling the docket—are
quintessential judicial functions. See Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070; Wilson v. Bush, 196 F. App’x
796, 799 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (finding that “[e]ntering a judgment or order is a
quintessential judicial function and immunity attaches to it”); McCree v Griffin, No. 19-14646-
A, 2020 WL 2632329, at *1-2 (11th Cir. May 20, 2020) (determining that a judge was entitled
to absolute judicial immunity from monetary damages and injunctive relief where plaintiff
alleged that the judge violated his constitutional rights by arbitrarily denying a motion). And
all the alleged actions complained of appear to have been done when the judges were presiding
over cases pending before them. As to Plaintiff’s demand for injunctive relief (see Doc. 1 at p.
13), there is no indication that a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was
unavailable to her. As for her request for declaratory relief (see id. at p. 12), Plaintiff’s
complaint is devoid of any allegations that there was an inadequate remedy at law through
the state appeals process. See Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1074 (determining that the state appellate
process is an adequate remedy at law); see also Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1243 (noting that in addition
to appeals, a plaintiff may seek an extraordinary writ, such as a writ of mandamus). Thus,
Bankruptcy Judge Brown, Judge Kelley, and Judge Shullman are entitled to judicial
immunity.
To the extent that Plaintiff sues the Clerk of Court of Palm Beach County and the
Clerk of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, they would be entitled to absolute quasi-judicial
immunity for the alleged actions taken within the scope of their authority. See Roland v.
Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining that absolute quasi-judicial immunity
extends to nonjudicial officials who perform duties closely related to the judicial process and
only for actions taken within the scope of their authority); Darst v. Scriven, No. 22-10918, 2023
WL 2401331, at *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 8, 2023) (per curiam) (“Clerks of the court have absolute
immunity for a narrow range of acts ‘they are specifically required to do under court order or
at a judge’s direction, and only qualified immunity for all other actions for damages.’”)
(quoting Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. 1981)). For that matter, Plaintiff’s
complaint fails to allege sufficient facts that the Clerk of Court of Palm Beach County or the
Clerk of the Fourth District Court of Appeal acted outside the scope of their authority as a
court clerk in connection with the state court proceedings involving the Property. (See Doc. 1
at pp. 3-4, 8). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff asserts any claims against the Clerk of Court
of Palm Beach County or the Clerk of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Plaintiff’s claims
against them would be barred by absolute immunity. See, e.g., Blough v. Nazaretian, No. 8:16-
cv-2587-MSS-MAP, 2016 WL 9631677, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2016), aff’d, 704 F. App’x
820 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that court clerks were entitled to absolute immunity because they
were acting under the direction of a judge or under the court’s orders); Shelters v. First Judicial
Cir. Ct., No. 3:20-cv-5261-MCR-HTC, 2020 WL 4721836, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 23, 2020),
report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 4700764 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2020) (holding that
a court clerk was entitled to judicial immunity for actions taken as part of the job working for
the judiciary).
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff sues the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Plaintiff’s
claims against the Fourth District Court of Appeal are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against a state brought by a citizen of that state. See Bd.
of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). “The [Eleventh] [A]mendment
applies even when a state is not named as a party of record, if for all practical purposes the
action is against the state.” Schopler v. Bliss, 903 F.2d 1373, 1378 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
(citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1984)). This immunity
from suit extends to “arms of the state,” including state courts. See Kaimowitz v. Florida Bar,
996 F.2d 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (quoting Schopler, 903 F.2d at 1378); see
Jallali v. Florida, 404 F. App’x 455, 456 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that the Fourth
District Court of Appeal is protected by sovereign immunity); see also Zabriskie v. Court Admin.,
172 F. App’x 906, 908 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[U]nder Florida law, the judicial branch
is a state agency. And the state court system—including employees of the circuit courts—is
part of the judicial branch.”). While it is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff sues the Fourth
District Court of Appeal as a defendant in this action, as the Fourth District Court of Appeal
is listed in the case caption but not under the “Parties” section in the complaint (see Doc. 1 at
pp. 1-3), the Fourth District Court of Appeal is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit because it is an arm of the State of Florida.
E. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The sole legal basis for Plaintiff’s complaint filed in federal court is 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(See Doc. 1). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate
violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the
United States.” See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for
vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)
(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (internal quotations omitted)).
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived
him of a right secured under the Constitution or federal law; and (2) that such a deprivation
occurred under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Arrington v.
Cobb Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also Knight v. Jacobson,
300 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Section 1983 does not create a remedy for every wrong
committed under the color of state law, but only for those that deprive a plaintiff of a federal
right.”) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 698-99 (1976)). In addition, for liability under §
1983, a plaintiff must allege “an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or
omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” See Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,
401 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citation omitted); Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988,
999 (11th Cir. 1995). “More than conclusory and vague allegations are required to state a case
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hannah v. Union Corr. Inst., No. 3:12-cv-436-J-20JBT, 2012
WL 1413163, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2012) (citations omitted); see Fullman v. Graddick, 739
F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984). “[I]n the absence of a federal constitutional deprivation or
violation of a federal right, [a] [p]laintiff cannot sustain a cause of action against the
[d]efendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hannah, 2012 WL 1413163, at *1.
Here, as pleaded, Plaintiff has failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a plausible
claim for relief against Defendants (namely Levey and Snietka) under § 1983. Even if the
Court were to presume Plaintiff sufficiently alleged violations of a federal right (which she has
not), she has proffered no factual allegations directly connecting Levey and Snietka to the
alleged violations. For that matter, it is not clear how Levey and Snietka were involved in this
matter. Thus, even construing her allegations liberally, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a
claim under § 1983.
F. Venue
Venue for actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), which
provides that venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any defendant
resides, if all defendants reside in the same state in which the district is located; (2) in a district
in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) in a district
in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise
be brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
However, “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought . . . .” See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La
Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 992 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982) (explaining that § 1404(a) “governs
actions brought in an inconvenient venue”); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964)
(“[T]he purpose of [§ 1404(a)] is to prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect
litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is
filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest
of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”).
Under § 1404(a), “[a] district court may sua sponte transfer a civil action to any other district
where it might have been brought if doing so will be convenient for the parties and witnesses
and serve the interest of justice.” See Nalls v. Coleman Low Fed. Inst., 440 F. App’x 704, 706
(11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir.
2011)); see also Tazoe, 631 F.3d at 1336 (“Before transferring sua sponte under section 1404(a),
the [court] should . . . issue an order to show cause why the case should not be transferred,
and thereby afford the parties an opportunity to state their reasons.”) (citation omitted);
Lipofsky v. New York State Workers Comp. Bd., 861 F.2d 1257, 1258 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that
a district court may raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte, but “the court may not dismiss
[the action] without first giving the parties an opportunity to present their views on the issue”)
(citation omitted).
District courts have broad discretion in determining whether to transfer a case to
another district for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and in the interests of justice
under § 1404(a). See England v. ITT Thompson Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted); Am. Aircraft Sales Int’l, Inc. v. Airwarsaw, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1351
(M.D. Fla. 1999) (stating that the standard for transfer under § 1404(a) gives broad discretion
to the trial court) (citation omitted); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc., 689 F.2d at 985
(indicating that the decision to transfer an action is left to the “sound discretion of the district
court”) (citations omitted); see also Vivant Pharms., LLC v. Clinical Formula, LLC, No. 10-21537-
CIV, 2011 WL 1303218, at *6-7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2011) (discussing the two-step analysis
under § 1404(a) to determine the propriety of transfer to another district).
The Court is indeed mindful of the considerable weight accorded to a plaintiff’s choice
of forum. See Response Reward Sys., L.C. v. Meijer, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (M.D. Fla.
2022) (“In determining the propriety of transfer, the Court must give considerable weight to
[p]laintiff’s choice of forum. . . . Only if the [p]laintiff’s choice is clearly outweighed by
considerations of convenience, cost, judicial economy, and expeditious discovery and trial
process should this Court disregard the choice of forum and transfer the action.”) (citations
omitted); see also In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“[F]ederal
courts traditionally have accorded a plaintiff’s choice of forum considerable deference.”).
Plaintiff’s complaint does not meaningfully involve events and/or omissions that have
taken place in the Middle District of Florida. Most, if not all, of the factual allegations
underpinning Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Palm Beach County, which is located in the
Southern District of Florida. The majority of the acts and occurrences of which Plaintiff
complains appear to have occurred in the Southern District of Florida, where eight of the nine
Defendants are located.7 To substantiate her claims, Plaintiff relies heavily on events that
involve the eight defendants located in the Southern District of Florida (see Doc. 1 at pp. 3-9),
which would make the Southern District of Florida more convenient for those witnesses to
travel to if required to give testimony and appear in court. Although Plaintiff briefly and
vaguely mentions her bankruptcy case in the complaint (see id. at pp. 7, 12), she does not
allege that such events occurred in the Middle District of Florida (or in the Ocala Division),
nor does she allege that any other events and/or omissions occurred in the Middle District of
Florida.
However, in light of all the other deficiencies noted above, transferring this matter to
the Southern District of Florida would serve no useful purpose and constitute a waste of
limited judicial resources. As the interest of justice would therefore not be furthered by transfer
7 It also bears consideration that Judge Danielle Sherriff resides in the Southern District of
Florida.
at this time, the Court will instead take Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis under
advisement, allowing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint and an amended motion to
proceed in forma pauperis (see more below) to address the issues identified herein.
G. Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is deficient and incomplete
because she did not use the proper form. Consequently, the motion lacks the requisite
information and detail to determine if she is indigent, as she did not answer several pertinent
questions or provide an explanation for her inability to do so.
The Court will allow Plaintiff to file an amended motion to proceed in forma pauperis
so that she can provide the Court with sufficient information to determine whether she is
indigent. As such, Plaintiff must complete the “Application to Proceed in District Court
Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form)” from the Court’s website
(https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/fee-waiver-application-forms/application-proceed-
district-court-without-prepaying-fees-or).
H. Amendment
In an abundance of caution, the Court will allow the Plaintiff an opportunity to file an
amended complaint to clarify the basis of her claims and the jurisdiction over them. Plaintiff
must provide the Court with sufficient information and in a coherent manner so that it can
perform the review required under § 1915. The amended complaint must clearly state the legal
theory or theories upon which Plaintiff seeks relief and explain with factual allegations how
each defendant is responsible. Additionally, the amended complaint must clearly state the
basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff should carefully
consider whether she can allege a claim in good faith because pursuing frivolous claims could
lead to the imposition of sanctions.
Plaintiff □□ cautioned that, despite proceeding pro se, she is required to comply with this
Court’s Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Plaintiff may obtain a copy of the Local Rules from the Court’s website
(http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov) or by visiting the Office of the Clerk of Court. Additionally,
resources and information related to proceeding in court without a lawyer, including a
handbook entitled “Guide for Proceeding Without a Lawyer,” can be located on the Court’s
website (http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov/pro_se/default.htm). Plaintiff should also consult
the Middle District of Florida’s Civil Discovery Handbook for a general discussion of this
District’s discovery practices (http://www. □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is TAKEN
UNDER ADVISEMENT. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint and an amended motion
to proceed in forma pauperis on or before May 26, 2026. The amended complaint must
comply with all pleading requirements contained in Rules 8, 9, 10, and 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and those contained in the Local Rules of the Middle District of Florida.
Failure to comply with this Order may result in a recommendation that this action be
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on April 28, 2026.
ZL cae
PHILIP R. LAMMENS
United States Magistrate Judge
-24-
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties