Price

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

CHERION PRICE, on behalf of her §

minor son, J.C., §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-1387-L

§

IESAH WHITE; ANTONIO BRITTON; §

GUADALUPE FRIAS; and MARK §

SHARROCK, §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On December 13, 2024, the Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United

States Magistrate Judge (“Report”) (Doc. 17) was entered, recommending that the court deny

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Original Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. 6),

filed July 8, 2024, in which Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s excessive force and unlawful

detention claims based on qualified immunity. For the reasons herein explained, the court has

concerns regarding the objections raised by Defendants to the Report and recommits this matter

and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss to the magistrate judge for further consideration and issuance

of amended or supplemental findings, conclusions, and recommendations in light of the legal

authority that issued after the Report and the court’s observations in this order.

In support of his recommendation, the magistrate judge determined that the incident report

should not be considered in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss because, although some portions of

the incident report are referenced in Plaintiff’s pleadings, the incident report is not necessary to

prove Plaintiff’s claims, and Plaintiff’s pleadings dispute the statements in the incident report

regarding J.C.’s possession of a gun, which is a material issue. The magistrate judge further

determined that Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s unlawful detention claim

based on qualified immunity because Plaintiff alleges that there was no justification for J.C.’s

further detention (Terry stop)1 after he told Defendants he did not possess a gun and Defendants

confirmed this, and J.C.’s continued detention was unreasonable and violated his Fourth

Amendment rights, as there was no additional reasonable suspicion to justify prolonging his

detention. In addition, the magistrate recommends that the court deny the Motion to Dismiss based

on qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim because:

Considering the allegations of the complaint, set out above, and these established

standards, the undersigned finds that [Plaintiff] has “plead[ed] specific facts that

both allow” for “the reasonable inference that,” by tasing or drive stunning J.C.

almost immediately after he was tackled to the ground and held there, with his

hands visible, where he was neither threatening [Defendants] nor attempting to flee,

[Defendants] Frias and Sharrock violated the Fourth Amendment “and that

defeat[ed] [their associated] qualified immunity defense with equal specificity.”

Report 37 (quoting Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 744 (5th Cir. 2023)).2 Defendants filed objections

to the Report (Doc. 11), to which Plaintiff filed a response. Thereafter, Defendants filed a reply

(Doc. 13).3

In their objections (Doc. 11), Defendants contend that: (1) the magistrate judge erred in not

considering the incident report in ruling on their Motion to Dismiss; (2) Plaintiff has not

sufficiently pleaded facts that, if proved, would show that the Terry stop of J.C. lasted longer than

necessary; and (3) Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to allege more than a de minimus injury occurred as a

1 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).

2 In reaching this conclusion, the magistrate judge also considered other Fifth Circuit cases involving tasers. See Report

35-38.

3 Defendants’ reply (Doc. 13) was filed in violation of Local Civil Rule 72.2, the court’s Order (Doc. 8), and Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), which do not permit a party to file a reply to another party’s response to objections.

Defendants also filed their reply without first seeking and obtaining leave of court as required by this district’s Local

Civil Rules and the undersigned’s Order of Reference (Doc. 8). Id.

result of Defendant Sharrock’s tasing. In addition, they disagree with the magistrate judge’s

determination that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the tasing and “drive stunning” of J.C. was

excessive. Doc. 11 at 8. They contend, based in part on the incident report, that their conduct was

objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and that “the law is not clearly established whether

J.C.’s resistance, as pleaded, constituted active resistance” justifying their conduct.

The court questions the correctness of these objections by Defendants for essentially the

reasons set forth in the Report, and it elaborates on one of these objections. Regarding the length

of the Terry stop, the magistrate judge focused on Plaintiff’s allegation that “it was unreasonable

to detain J.C. once it was dispelled that he was not in possession of the gun and whe[n] no

additional reasonable suspicion justified an extension of [his] detention.” Report 30. In their

objections, Defendants assert that J.C.’s continued detention was justified, even after confirming

that he was not currently in possession of the gun, because: (1) they had reasonable suspicion that

he previously possessed the gun before his brother4 was seen leaving the pool with it; and (2) they

also had reasonable suspicion that he knew where the gun was located and, therefore, extended

their investigation and J.C.’s detention to take him home to discover the location of the gun and/or

his brother who had been seen with the gun:

Defendants Britton and White had reasonable suspicion that J.C., a juvenile, had

possessed a handgun at the neighborhood pool. They also had reasonable suspicion

that J.C. knew the whereabouts of the gun since his “brother” had possibly left the

pool with the gun.

. . . .

Defendants Britton and White had additional articulable, reasonable suspicion.

They were intending to extend the investigation for the brief purpose of taking J.C.

home to discover the whereabouts of the gun that J.C.’s “brother” had left the pool

with. Doc. 6-1, at 7. Defendants Britton and White informed J.C. “he was being

4 In the Complaint, Plaintiff explains that, although he used the term “brother” when responding to Defendants’

questions, he used this term to mean that this was a “close friend.” Pl.’s Compl. 2, ¶ 42 & n.2. It is apparent from

Plaintiff’s pleadings, though, that Defendants took this to mean that the young man who left the scene was J.C.’s

actual brother and an immediate family member. See id. ¶¶ 28-30, 61, 66, 68, 114.

detained and request[ed] that he place his hands behind his back.” Doc. 1, at ¶73.

This is reasonably related to the scope of the circumstances which justified the

interference in the first place.

Defs.’ Obj. 4-5 (Doc. 11).

Defendants, however, acknowledge that the first part of this argument directly conflicts

with Plaintiff’s allegation that “J.C. never had a gun.” Defs.’ Obj. 2. As correctly noted by the

magistrate judge, the court must construe this allegation in Plaintiff’s Complaint and other

allegations, including the allegation—that “J.C. informed [security guard Shana] Cowen he did

not have a gun, showed Cowen his belongings, and after checking them and confirming he did

not have a gun Cowen told him he was good to go”—true and in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff. Report 11 (quoting Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 10) (emphasis added); see also Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 68-69

(“[D]espite having information that J.C. had not committed any crimes as he did not have a gun

and was not described by witnesses as being the person with a gun, Defendant Frias instructed

Defendants Britton and White to detain J.C.”).

Defendants nevertheless argue that the magistrate judge erred in not considering the

incident report. According to Defendants, this report allegedly supports their argument that they

had reasonable suspicion to believe that J.C. possessed the gun at issue before they arrived at the

scene based on what the security guard allegedly told them:

Plaintiff omits from the incident report that when “Deputies made contact with

[Shana Cowen] the pool security guard . . . [the security guard had] confirmed

with the male, later identified as [J.C.] that he did have a gun and advised [J.C.]

that no guns were allowed at the property.” Doc. 6-1, at 4. Thus, “as to these

material facts, there is a genuine conflict between the allegations and what the

incident report states.” Doc. 10, at 17. What the security guard told officers is

central to Plaintiff’s claim. It establishes that the Defendants had reasonable

suspicion to continue the detention of J.C. The Recommendation’s conclusion that

a video of an officer speaking with the pool’s security guard should be admitted,

but the after-the-fact incident report should not be admitted is incorrect. Plaintiff

has incorporated the incident report into her pleadings and, therefore, the whole

incident report should be admitted. Defendants object to the recommendation to

disregard the parts of the incident report not referenced in Plaintiff’s complaint.

Defs.’ Obj. 2-3 (emphasis added).

Although Plaintiff references the incident report in the Complaint, the court agrees with

the magistrate judge that the incident report is not central to Plaintiff’s claims. Instead, the incident

report is much more central to Defendants’ defenses. See Scanlan v. Texas A&M Univ., 343 F.3d

533, 636-37 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496,

498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). In Scanlan, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in

considering a report referenced in the plaintiffs’ pleadings because the plaintiffs did not accept the

report that was created by the defendants, and, while insightful, the report was not central to the

plaintiffs’ claims; rather, it was “much more central” to the defendant’s defenses.

Likewise, the incident report here was created by one of the Defendants, specifically

Defendant White, and Plaintiff disputes the portion(s) of the incident report relied on by

Defendants. See Scanlan, 343 F.3d at 537 (noting that the report relied on by the defendants in

support of their motion to dismiss was “essentially a defendant-created report,” the contents of

which were not accepted as true by the plaintiffs). The magistrate judge, therefore, correctly

determined that, at the pleadings stage, the court applies a different standard to the contents of an

after-the-fact police incident report that are rejected by the plaintiff’s pleadings than it would to

evidence such as a video that captured the incident at the time. Report 20 (quoting Peña v. City of

Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 622 & n.9 (5th Cir. 2018) (Peña’s “characterization”—“that she

was not suspected of any crime when she fled”—“is belied by the police reports [incorporated into

her complaint], but on a motion to dismiss, Peña’s well-pleaded factual allegations enjoy a

presumption of truth” where the “complaint expressly rejects those elements of the police report

that conflict with her account. Hence, for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), we presume only that the

officers made the assertions contained in the report, not that those assertions are in fact truthful.”)

(citations omitted).

Thus, although Defendants attached the incident report to their Motion to Dismiss,

consideration of the report is not appropriate here in resolving their Motion to Dismiss under Rule

12(b)(6) because it is not the equivalent of a video, and the court must construe the factual

allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true and in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See id.; see

also Scanlan, 343 F.3d at 537 (“[T]he district court’s first error was going outside the plaintiffs’

complaints and considering the Final Report. Even if the Final Report fell under the Collins

exception, the district court failed to construe the plaintiffs’ factual allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiffs.”). The court also notes that a majority of the cases relied on by

Defendants involved summary judgment motions, not motions to dismiss, and are, therefore,

distinguishable because a different standard applies at the summary judgment stage of litigation.

Additionally, Defendants have not requested that their Motion to Dismiss be converted into one

for summary judgment, and the court would have declined any such request even if it had been

made.

Thus, this leaves only Defendants’ argument that J.C.’s continued detention was justified

for purposes of their conducting an investigation regarding the brother’s possession of a firearm,

using J.C. as a witness to obtain information regarding the whereabouts of the brother and/or the

gun. Even assuming that J.C.’s continued detention was appropriate for this purpose, Defendants

offer no legal authority that would justify J.C.’s continued Terry detention that involved

transporting him (a minor) to another location, whether to his home or anywhere else under the

circumstances, and the court was unable to find any Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court authority that

would warrant J.C.’s continued detention for this purpose absent probable cause that he had

committed a crime.

In Dunaway v. New York, the Supreme Court explained that, because of the limited nature

of the intrusion, brief investigative Terry stops of less than a minute that involve, for example,

random checks for drivers’ licenses or briefly questioning a driver and passengers regarding

suspicious circumstances, fall within Terry’s narrow intrusions that do not demand the probable

cause required for an arrest, but “any further detention or search must be based on consent or

probable cause.” 442 U.S. 200, 211 (1979). Although the Supreme Court has not adopted a time

limitation for a permissible Terry stop, courts have held that investigative detentions involving the

transportation of a suspect to another location require more than reasonable suspicion, that is,

probable cause or consent. See id. at 207 (concluding that Dunaway was “seized” without probable

cause and taken involuntarily to the police station for questioning regarding an informant’s lead

implicating him in a robbery/murder); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1983)

(concluding that the detention of a suspect’s luggage that was seized for ninety minutes and

transported to another location for a dog sniff went beyond the narrow authority possessed by

police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics); United States v. Baker,

203 F.3d 827, 1999 WL 1234383, at *3 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that, although the length of

the detention was unclear, “the facts in the present case are clearer than the facts in Place, as both

Baker and his luggage were detained for transport to another location where a dog sniff could be

conducted.”). Thus, Defendants assertion that they had reasonable suspicion, without more, to

extend their investigation and J.C.’s detention to take him home in an effort to discover the location

of the gun and/or his brother is insufficient.

Defendants cite cases in their Motion to Dismiss, arguing that much longer detentions of

several hours have been upheld, but these cases are distinguishable for the reasons noted in

Plaintiff’s response, and two of the cases are from another circuit. For example, Defendants point

to Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332 (2001), for the conclusion that a “two-hour detention

while officers obtained a search warrant for a trailer [was found to be] reasonable [and upheld

because] . . . the ‘time period was no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with

due diligence, to obtain the warrant.’” Defs.’ Mot. 9-10. As Plaintiff correctly notes, the detention

in this case was upheld because the officers had probable cause to believe that the suspect had

illegal drugs in his home. McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331-32. It is, therefore, distinguishable and does

not support Defendants’ assertion that reasonable suspicion justified their further detention of J.C.

for the investigative purpose identified by them that involved transporting him (a minor) to another

location. Accordingly, accepting the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true and viewing the

facts as pleaded in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court questions the viability of this and

the other objections asserted by Defendants for the reasons explained.

Further, after issuance of the Report, the Supreme Court held that courts must consider the

“totality of the circumstances,” including “all relevant circumstances . . . facts, and events leading

up to the climactic moment” in assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s actions and ruling on

a qualified immunity defense to a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. Baker v. Coborn, 170

F.4th 988, 994 (5th Cir. 2026) (quoting Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025)). The Court in

Baker explained that “the ‘totality of the circumstances’ inquiry into a use of force has no time

limit.” Barnes, 605 U.S. at 80. The Court nevertheless recognized that “the situation at the precise

time of the shooting will often be what matters most; it is, after all, the officer’s choice in that

moment that is under review.” Ramirez v. Granado, 163 F.4th 204, 209 (Sth Cir. 2025) (quoting

Barnes, 605 U.S. at 80).

Accordingly, rather than rule on the magistrate judge’s recommendation and Defendants’

objections to the Report at this time, the court recommits this matter and Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss to the magistrate judge for further consideration and issuance of amended or supplemental

findings, conclusions, and recommendations he deems necessary in light of the legal authority that

issued after the Report, the effect if any of such authority on this case and Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, and the court’s observations in this order.

As the court has had sufficient initial briefing on this matter, it places a ten-page limit

(exclusive of signature and certificate of service pages) on any objections, or responses by any

party, to the amended or supplemental Report of the magistrate judge. Further, any objections filed

by the parties must not rehash previously urged arguments. No reply may be filed by any party

without leave of court. Any reply brief filed without leave of court will be summarily stricken.

It is so ordered this 5th day of June, 2026.

United States District Judge

Memorandum Opinion and Order — Page 9