Sievers

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

MARK D. SIEVERS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-58-MMH-LLL

DR. VERONA, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Mark D. Sievers, an inmate of the Florida Department of

Corrections (FDC), initiated this case by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). The Court granted his request to proceed as a

pauper (Doc. 4) and directed him to file an amended complaint (Doc. 5),

explaining in part as follows:

[Sievers] does not describe how each defendant violated his

constitutional rights, but rather he seeks to hold all defendants

jointly liable for the alleged “prolonged denial of the medically

necessary, life affirming prescribed treatment for sleep apnea”;

and it appears he seeks to proceed against some defendants solely

on a theory of vicarious liability without alleging a causal

connection between any individual supervisor’s actions and an

alleged constitutional violation (i.e., the CEO of Centurion, the

Chief Health Officer, Directors, Administrators, the Warden, and

the Secretary of the FDC).

See Order (Doc. 5) at 4–5.

Before the Court for screening is Sievers’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 6;

Amended Complaint). In his Amended Complaint, Sievers names eight

Defendants: (1) Ricky Dixon, Secretary of the FDC; (2) Barry Reddish, Warden

of Union Correctional Institution (UCI); (3) K. Tomlinson, Assistant Warden

and ADA coordinator at UCI; (4) Dr. Verona, Regional Medical Director (RMD)

for Centurion; (5) Dr. Asbelti Llorens, Chief Health Officer and site Medical

Director for Centurion; (6) Jessica Putney, Nurse Practitioner for Centurion;

(7) Stephanie Alvarez, Health Services Administrator for Centurion; and (8)

Eve Gilbert, Director of Nursing for Centurion. See Amended Complaint at 3–

5.

Sievers alleges all Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

exhibiting deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Id. at 5, 21–22.

He explains that he was admitted to UCI in 2020 with a VPAP machine, which

he was prescribed to treat his diagnosed sleep apnea. Id. at 9. Between 2020

and 2023, the UCI medical department provided Sievers the equipment needed

to operate and maintain his VPAP machine, including replacement tubing,

water, and a mask. Id. However, in September 2023, his machine stopped

working. Id. After submitting multiple requests for a new one, Sievers received

a replacement machine on January 31, 2024, but it came without a new mask.

Id. For nearly one year, he submitted sick-call requests and grievances for a

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mask.1 Id. When he finally received a mask on January 14, 2025, the mask was

too big, so it “would not seal.” Id. He did not receive a proper-fitting mask until

July 23, 2025. Id. Sievers asserts that the “prolonged denial of the medically

necessary, life affirming prescribed treatment for sleep apnea” negatively

impacted his health in numerous ways. Id. at 20–21.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

1 In a grievance Sievers provides with his Amended Complaint, he

acknowledges that he had a mask to use, but it was two years old and “worn out.” See

Doc. 6-1 at 13.

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‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”

the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Further, the plaintiff

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must

allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

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federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Amended Complaint, the Court must read Sievers’s pro

se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,

while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “this leniency does not

give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

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401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must

provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must

‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s

conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “[T]he deliberate-indifference standard sets

an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. For decades, the Eleventh

Circuit described that “high bar” inconsistently as a “more than mere

negligence” or “more than gross negligence standard.” See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate

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indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and

(3) acted with more than gross negligence.” (internal quotations omitted)); see

also Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). However, in 2024,

the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards conflicted with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit

should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard as used in the criminal

law. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has

instructed that to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate

indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered a

deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” [Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with “subjective

recklessness as used in the criminal law,” id. at 839, and to do so

he must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware

that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to

the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant

“actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he

“cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).3

3 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to

the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

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The law is well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the

negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.

344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process

Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of

due care by prison officials.”). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently

emphasized that the subjective recklessness standard requires a plaintiff to

show a prison official had “more than a generalized or abstract knowledge” of

a risk. See McClinton v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL

1002166, at *5 (11th Cir. Apr. 14, 2026). “Put simply, a constitutional violation

occurs only when prison officials act ‘consciously’ such that their acts or

omissions knowingly have the effect of inflicting a punishment.” Id. at *5, 7

(holding that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because, even

though some were aware of a “risk in the abstract,” the plaintiffs’ arguments

“invoke[d] a negligence standard, premised on a violation of a duty owed to

[their son],” who was killed by a known gang member).

The law also is well established that “supervisory officials are not liable

under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352,

1360 (11th Cir. 2003), abrogated in part on other grounds by Randall v. Scott,

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610 F.3d 701 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish individual liability for supervisory

conduct, a plaintiff must show “that the supervisor either directly participated

in the unconstitutional conduct or that a causal connection exists between the

supervisor’s actions and the alleged constitutional violation.” Keith v. DeKalb

Cnty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1047–48 (11th Cir. 2014).

Causation “may be established and supervisory liability

imposed where the supervisor’s improper custom or policy results

in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” Id.[4]

(alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A

plaintiff can also show that the absence of a policy led to a violation

of constitutional rights.” Piazza,[5] 923 F.3d at 957. “Either way,

though, to prove that a policy or its absence caused a constitutional

harm, a plaintiff must point to multiple incidents, or multiple

reports of prior misconduct by a particular employee.” Id. (citation

omitted). And allegations of a single incident of unconstitutional

conduct cannot state a claim for supervisory liability, even when

the conduct involves several subordinates. Id. at 957–58.

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022).

The requisite causal connection is not established merely by filing a

grievance with a supervisory official. See Jones v. Eckloff, No. 2:12-cv-375-

Ftm-29DNF, 2013 WL 6231181, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2013) (citing Gallagher

v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009)) (“[F]iling a grievance with a

supervisory person does not automatically make the supervisor liable for the

4 Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999).

5 Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty., 923 F.3d 947 (11th Cir. 2019).

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allegedly unconstitutional conduct brought to light by the grievance, even

when the grievance is denied.”).

Similarly, where a claim of deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need is brought against a private contractor based on its functional equivalence

to a government entity, liability under § 1983 cannot be based on a theory of

respondeat superior. Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310. Instead, the plaintiff must show

that the entity “had a ‘policy or custom’ of deliberate indifference that led to

the violation of his constitutional right.” Id. (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).

Sievers’s Amended Complaint suffers from the same deficiencies as his

original Complaint and is due to be dismissed for his failure to state a claim

for relief. First, despite the Court previously advising Sievers that he cannot

proceed under § 1983 against supervisory officials on a theory of respondeat

superior, see Order (Doc. 5) at 4, he again seeks to proceed against some

Defendants based solely on such a theory, including Defendants Dixon,

Reddish, and Llorens. As to these Defendants, Sievers explains the basis of his

claims as follows: (1) Defendant Dixon did not approve his grievances, two of

which he submitted near or after the date he received a proper-fitting mask

(July 23, 2025);6 (2) Defendant Reddish, who was responsible for the day-to-

6 It appears Sievers mentions the grievances he submitted after he had already

received a new mask to demonstrate he exhausted his administrative remedies before

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day operations of the prison, received two grievances from Sievers about the

issue, one of which he submitted after July 23, 2025; and (3) Defendant

Llorens, who is responsible for overseeing nurses, denied two of Sievers’s

grievances, one of which he submitted after July 23, 2025. See Doc. 6 at 16, 18.

Even if Sievers had alleged an FDC or Centurion employee had been

deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs—which he does not— the

mere filing of a grievance with these supervisory officials is insufficient to

demonstrate “an affirmative causal connection between [their] acts or

omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” See Zatler, 802 F.2d at

401. Insofar as Sievers alleges that these and other Defendants denied him due

process in the grievance procedure, such allegations fail to state a claim

because inmates have “no constitutionally protected liberty interest in access

to the prison’s grievance procedure.” Moore v. McLaughlin, 569 F. App’x 656,

659 (11th Cir. 2014)7 (citing Bingham, 654 F.3d at 1177; Grayden v. Rhodes,

345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also Charriez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of

bringing this action. The events relevant to whether Sievers states a plausible

deliberate indifference claim are those that occurred before his request for a new

mask was satisfied.

7 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th

Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished

opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive

authority.”).

12

Corr., 596 F. App’x 890, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding the district court did not

err in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim that the defendants “had violated his

constitutional due-process rights by failing to take corrective action during the

appeal of the suspension of his visitation privileges [b]ecause the prison

grievance procedure does not create a protected liberty interest”); Mathews v.

Moss, 506 F. App’x 981, 984 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the plaintiff failed to state

a claim because he merely “alleged that his prison grievances were either

ignored or wrongly decided or that prison officials did not properly follow the

prison’s own grievance procedures”).

As to the remaining Defendants (Tomlinson, Verona, Putney, Alvarez,

and Gilbert), there are two relevant timeframes, each implicating acts or

omissions of different Defendants: between September 20, 2023, and January

31, 2024 (when Sievers was without a functioning VPAP machine); and

between February 1, 2024, and July 23, 2025 (when he was without a proper-

fitting mask, although he had a working machine with a “worn out” mask or

one that would not properly seal).8

As to the first timeframe, Sievers states the basis of his claims as follows:

(1) Defendant Putney, who is responsible for healthcare at UCI, was notified

8 For purposes of this Order, the Court accepts without deciding that Sievers

had an objectively serious medical need when he was without his VPAP machine and

a proper-fitting mask.

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of Sievers’s need for a replacement machine through one grievance and at two

quarterly ADA meetings; (2) Defendant Alvarez received multiple

communications (from Sievers, his family, and his postconviction counsel)

between September 2023 and November 2023 regarding his need for a

replacement machine; and (3) and Defendant Gilbert “had contact with

[Sievers] and his family” in December 2023 regarding his need for a

replacement machine. See Doc. 6 at 18–19.

As to the second timeframe, Sievers states the basis of his claims as

follows: (1) Defendant Tomlinson received two grievances from Sievers, one of

which he submitted after July 23, 2025, and Tomlinson, as the coordinator of

quarterly ADA meetings, was present at a July 16, 2025 meeting at which

Sievers discussed his medical equipment needs; and (2) Defendant Verona,

who was responsible for authorizing medical equipment orders, delayed

approving the request for a new mask. Id. at 16–17.

September 2023–January 2024

Four Defendants knew that Sievers’s VPAP machine stopped working in

September 2023: Putney, Alvarez, Gilbert, and Verona. As to these

Defendants, Sievers’s allegations do not go beyond establishing that they knew

he needed medical supplies. He does not allege facts permitting the reasonable

inference that they subjectively knew their own acts or omissions caused a

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substantial risk of serious harm or acted unreasonably in response to a known

risk.

First, Sievers alleges that Defendant Putney was on notice of his

problem through a sick-call request he submitted on September 20, 2023. Id.

at 18. But Sievers acknowledges that a nurse (who is not a Defendant) told him

on September 20, 2023, his machine “was being ordered and expedited.” Id. at

12. According to Sievers, a different nurse told him on September 23, 2023,

that “there was nothing in the system about [him] needing a [new machine]”

and that Sievers should contact Defendants Putney and Alvarez. Id. at 12–13.

To the extent there was a three-day delay in submitting a request for approval

of a new VPAP machine, Sievers does not allege the delay was attributable to

Defendant Putney (or Defendant Alvarez, whom Sievers was told was ordering

the machine). See id. at 12.

Sievers also asserts that Defendant Putney was on notice of his medical

need because she was present at two ADA meetings—in October 2023 and

January 2024—when he discussed that his VPAP machine had broken, and he

was waiting for a new one. Id. at 18.9 He claims someone asked him at the

9 Sievers mentions in one section of his Amended Complaint that Defendant

Llorens may have been at the October 2023 ADA meeting, see Doc. 6 at 13, but he

does not repeat that allegation in setting forth the factual basis for his claim against

Defendant Llorens, id. at 18. To the extent Defendant Llorens was present at the

October meeting, Sievers’s claim against Llorens fails for the same reason his claim

against Defendant Putney fails.

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October 2023 meeting whether he had received his machine yet, telling him it

had been “approved and ordered.” Id. at 13. Even if Defendant Putney knew—

by virtue of her presence at the meeting—that Sievers had not received a

replacement machine yet, she also would have known or heard that the

machine had been ordered. See id. In other words, Sievers alleges no facts

suggesting Defendant Putney was ignoring or delaying his need for medical

equipment. Sievers further asserts that someone told him at the January 2024

meeting that his replacement VPAP machine had been received on November

2, 2023, but was returned. Id. To the extent the machine was received but

returned in November, Sievers does not allege Defendant Putney was

responsible.

Second, Sievers’s mother emailed Defendant Alvarez on October 1, 2023,

and Sievers’s postconviction counsel contacted Defendant Alvarez by telephone

on November 2, 2023. See Doc. 6-1 at 27, 29. Defendant Alvarez responded

directly to Sievers on October 2, 2023, advising that “the order ha[d] been

submitted to the regional doctor for approval,” and, after speaking with

postconviction counsel, Defendant Alvarez noted in Sievers’s medical chart

that “[the machine] has been ordered [sic] awaiting the arrival.” Doc. 6 at 19;

Doc. 6-1 at 29.

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Third, Sievers’s stepmother emailed Defendant Gilbert on December 5,

2023, explaining that Sievers still had not received a replacement machine.

Doc. 6-1 at 31, 33. Defendant Gilbert responded to her on December 10, 2023,

advising that the RMD (Defendant Verona) had approved the order, and a

Centurion employee had “called about [the order] many times.” Id. at 33.

Defendant Gilbert made a note in Sievers’s medical record about the

communication. Id. at 35.

Sievers received a replacement machine on January 31, 2024. See Doc. 6

at 13. Accepting that a replacement machine was ordered and approved shortly

after Sievers requested one, Defendants Putney, Alvarez, Gilbert, and Verona

cannot be said to have denied him necessary medical supplies. Although his

replacement machine was delayed for a few months, Sievers alleges no facts

indicating Defendants Putney, Alvarez, Gilbert, or Verona caused the delay or,

if so, “consciously” knew that their acts or omissions “ha[d] the effect of

inflicting a punishment.” McClinton, 2026 WL 1002166, at *5. Sievers’s

allegations against these Defendants “invoke[] a negligence standard,” which

is insufficient to state a plausible deliberate indifference claim. See id. at *7.

February 2024–July 2025

Not including those to whom Sievers merely submitted grievances

(Defendants Dixon, Reddish, and Llorens), Sievers attributes the lengthy delay

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in receiving a proper-fitting mask to Defendants Tomlinson and Verona. First,

Sievers asserts Defendant Tomlinson denied his August 2024 medical

grievance in which he complained he had been without a proper-fitting mask

for about six months. See Doc. 6 at 16. Even if Sievers’s grievance put

Defendant Tomlinson on notice that Sievers had a serious medical need,

Defendant Tomlinson investigated the issue and discovered that Sievers’s

“supplies ha[d] been approved and ordered” and would be “issued to [him]”

upon receipt by the medical department. See Doc. 6-1 at 14.10 The denial of the

grievance was not tantamount to Defendant Tomlinson (or Defendant Llorens,

who co-signed the grievance response) ignoring Sievers’s serious medical

needs. Sievers complains that he did not receive his replacement mask for

nearly a year after that grievance response, but he does not allege Defendant

Tomlinson was aware of that delay until Sievers mentioned it at the July 16,

2025 quarterly meeting. See Doc. 6 at 17. Sievers received a new mask shortly

after that meeting, which, if anything, suggests the opposite of deliberate

indifference by Defendant Tomlinson.

Second, Sievers implies Defendant Verona unnecessarily prolonged his

receipt of a proper-fitting mask because he was told in two grievance

responses—in February 2025 and June 2025—that medical was “waiting on

10 Defendant Llorens also signed the grievance response.

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approval from the RMD.” Id. See also Doc. 6-1 at 21, 23. Without more, these

allegations do not permit the reasonable inference that Defendant Verona

consciously delayed the order to inflict punishment. Moreover, according to a

grievance Sievers submitted on July 22, 2025, it appears that the delay was

attributable, at least in part, to a supply chain issue: Sievers noted in his

grievance that someone told him “[V]PAP supplies all over the country [were]

delayed.” See Doc. 6-1 at 6.

The reason for the unfortunately long delay in Sievers receiving a proper-

fitting mask for his VPAP machine is unclear, but the facts he alleges do not

permit the reasonable inference any named Defendant consciously disregarded

a known risk of harm to him. To the extent the problem was attributable to a

supply chain issue, oversight, or lack of due care, Sievers “invokes a negligence

standard.” McClinton, 2026 WL 1002166, at *7. To the extent the delay was

attributable to the process by which Centurion approves medical supplies for

inmates, Sievers does not allege that Centurion “had a ‘policy or custom’ of

deliberate indifference that led to the violation of his constitutional right.” See

Craig, 643 F.3d at 1310.

Therefore, it is now ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

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2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions as moot, and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 24th day of April,

2026.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-6

C:

Mark D. Sievers

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