Cavaness

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

DWIGHT HENRY CAVANESS, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:25-cv-3197-E-BN

§

160TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT §

COURT, ET AL., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Dwight Henry Cavaness, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit on

November 20, 2025 against six defendants. See Dkt. No. 3.

On February 17, 2026, Defendants Darren Bender and Zwicker & Associates,

P.C., (collectively, “Zwicker”) moved to dismiss the claims against them for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 17.

On February 20, 2026, Defendant 160th Judicial District Court moved to

dismiss the claims against it. See Dkt. No. 20.

And, on March 4, 2026, Defendants Robert Jenkins and Jenkins Court

Receiver (collectively, “Jenkins”) moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See

Dkt. No. 22. And they joined Zwicker’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction [Dkt. No. 17]. See Dkt. No. 31.

The Court ordered briefing on the motions. See Dkt. Nos. 18 & 23.

Cavaness responded. See Dkt. No. 24. Zwicker and Jenkins replied. See Dkt.

Nos. 25 & 32.

The Court then dismissed the claims against Defendants Capital One NA and

Discover Bank without prejudice. See Dkt. No. 34.

For the reasons set out below, the undersigned enters these findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should grant the motions to

dismiss [Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, & 22] and dismiss the claims against the remaining

Defendants for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Background

On or about November 6, 2023, Discover Bank, represented by Zwicker, filed a

petition in state court against Cavaness, for breach of contract arising out of

Cavaness’s alleged failure to repay credit services rendered by Discover Bank. See

Dkt. No. 3 at 10-12.

The 160th Judicial District Court entered judgment against Cavaness on

March 10, 2025 and ordered that Discover Bank was entitled to recover damages,

costs, and post-judgment interest from Cavaness in the amount of $5,248.61. See id.

at 18-19, 24. And it appointed a court receiver to take possession of Cavaness’s

nonexempt property to satisfy the judgment. See id. at 24. Capital One became a

successor by merger to Discover Bank. See id.

On October 6, 2025, Wells Fargo informed Cavaness that it “was served a

garnishment order” from the receiver, Jenkins, “to freeze or remove money” in

Cavaness’s Wells Fargo account, at a maximum amount of $7,300.96. Id. at 20, 25.

Wells Fargo informed Cavaness that the funds in that account were exempt from

garnishment, see id. at 21, but that it had frozen $5,025.39 from his account ending

in 2802 for garnishment and charged him a $125 legal process fee, see id. at 31.

And, on October 10, 2025, Wells Fargo informed Cavaness that it had deducted

another $25 from his account ending in 2802. See id. at 26.

On November 20, 2025, Cavaness filed this lawsuit against the 160th Judicial

District Court, Jenkins, and Zwicker. See id. at 2. His complaint is based on the

following allegations:

The judge and the defendant knowingly proceeded without the debt

validation of an agreement with signature and without the full history

of debt requested of both.

The judge and the defendant knowingly proceeded without the identity

of the type of debt being pursued by the defendant: unsecured or

secured.

The type of debt being pursued by defendant is a[n] unsecured credit

card debt.

The judge and the defendant proceeded with the omission of evidences.

The judge ordered the garnishment of my bank account which had my

funds frozen causing damages and pain and suffering, depression,

stressfulness. I am asking $120,000, for damages.

Id. at 7.

Based on these allegations, Cavaness appears to bring claims under the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §

1692g (“FDCPA”). Id. at 8.

Legal Standards

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction

conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Stockman v. Fed. Election

Comm’n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). The Court “must presume that a suit lies

outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction

rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d

912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-

matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).

The Court must dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction

“when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the

case.” Home Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th

Cir. 1998) (cleaned up). The Court will not assume it has jurisdiction. Rather, “the

basis upon which jurisdiction depends must be alleged affirmatively and distinctly

and cannot be established argumentatively or by mere inference.” Getty Oil Corp. v.

Ins. Co. of N.A., 841 F.2d 1254, 1259 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co. v.

Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1983)).

“The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party

asserting jurisdiction. Accordingly, the plaintiff constantly bears the burden of proof

that jurisdiction does in fact exist” in any case originally filed in federal court.

Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (citations

omitted). The plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim and form of relief

sought. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Duno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (noting that

“our standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim

he seeks to press” and that “[w]e have insisted ... that a plaintiff must demonstrate

standing separately for each form of relief sought” (cleaned up)).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognizes a

distinction between a “facial” attack to subject-matter jurisdiction, which is based

only on the pleadings, and a “factual” attack to jurisdiction, which is based on

affidavits, testimony, and other evidentiary material. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644

F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981); accord Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 (“Lack of subject

matter jurisdiction may be found in any one of three instances: (1) the complaint

alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record;

or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of

disputed facts.”). Regardless of the nature of the attack, the plaintiff seeking a federal

forum “constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact

exist.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.

Where, as here, a defendant files a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, the attack

is presumptively facial, and the Court need look only to the sufficiency of the

allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, or on the complaint as supplemented by

undisputed facts, all of which are presumed to be true. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645

F.2d 404, 412 (5th Cir. 1989); Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523.

But, on a factual attack, the Court “is empowered to consider matters of fact

which may be in dispute,” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161, and, to oppose the Rule 12(b)(1)

motion, “a plaintiff is also required to submit facts through some evidentiary method

and has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court

does have subject matter jurisdiction,” Paterson, 644 F.2d at 523. “When considering

a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the district

court must give the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard, particularly when disputed

factual issues are important to the motion’s outcome. In some cases, an oral hearing

may be indispensable due to the complicated factual disputes underlying the case.” In

re Eckstein Marine Serv. L.L.C., 672 F.3d 310, 319 (5th Cir. 2012) (footnotes omitted).

But “an oral hearing is not always necessary if the parties receive an adequate

opportunity to conduct discovery and otherwise present their arguments and

evidence to the court.” Id. at 319-20 (footnote omitted).

“When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12

motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before

addressing any attack on the merits.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. “This requirement

prevents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with

prejudice. The court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s case because the plaintiff lacks subject

matter jurisdiction is not a determination of the merits and does not prevent the

plaintiff from pursuing a claim in a court that does have proper jurisdiction.” Id.

(citations omitted).

“The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is determined at the time of

removal.” In re Bissonnet Inv. LLC, 320 F.3d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2023). To make this

determination, the Court considers the claims in the state court petition as they

existed at the time of removal. See Juanopulos v. Salus Claims Mgmt. LLC, 518 F.

Supp. 3d 973, 975 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (citing Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.,

276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Analysis

I. The Court should dismiss the claims against the 160th Judicial

District Court because it is immune from this lawsuit.

“Absent waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not fully

expressed in, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski v.

Lawley, 44 F.4th 318, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

F.3d 268, 274, 276 (5th Cir. 2020)).

That is, “‘[f]ederal courts are without jurisdiction over suits against a state, a

state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has waived its

sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.’ Texas has not consented

by statute, and [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” for example, “does not abrogate state sovereign

immunity.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (5th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Moore v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th

Cir. 2014), then citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 340 (1979)). Courts in this

circuit have also “decline[d] to hold that the FDCPA abrogates state immunity under

the Eleventh Amendment.” Webb v. Tex. Higher Educ. Coordinating Bd., No. EP-14-

cv-345-FM, 2014 WL 12594193, at *10 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014).

And “the State of Texas has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims

‘based on an act or omission of a court of this state or any member of a court of this

state acting in his official capacity.’” Avdeef v. Royal Bank of Scotland, P.L.C., 616 F.

App’x 665, 674 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.053);

accord Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 228 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Texas judges

are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for claims asserted against them in

their official capacities as state actors.” (citing Warnock v. Pecos Cnty., Tex., 88 F.3d

341, 343 (5th Cir. 1996))).

There is a “narrow exception ... that allows certain private parties to seek

judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive officials from enforcing

state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 595

U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)). But this

exception does not permit injunctions against state courts or their employees because

“’an injunction against a state court’ or its ‘machinery’ ‘would be a violation of the

whole scheme of our Government.’” Id. (quoting Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 163).

And, so, Cavaness’s constitutional and statutory claims against the 160th

Judicial District Court – a court of the State of Texas – are barred by sovereign

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.

And, insofar as Cavaness attempts to sue the presiding state judge in the 160th

Judicial District of Dallas County in her individual capacity, “a judge generally has

absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis, 565 F.3d at 221 (citing Mireles v.

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)).

“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment

of damages.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing, in turn, Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))).

There are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity may

be overcome. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial

actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles,

502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). “Second, a judge is not immune for

actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Allegations of bad faith or malice

are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id.

Id.; see also Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Court [employees] ‘have

absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically

required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.’” (quoting Tarter v. Hury,

646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981))); Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229,

230-31 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he judge’s law clerk, when assisting the judge in carrying

out the former’s judicial functions, is likewise entitled to absolute immunity.”

(citations omitted)).

Cavaness alleges no facts that could overcome judicial immunity for the

judicial defendant.

And, so, his claims against the 160th Judicial District Court should be

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

II. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Defendants also move to dismiss Cavaness’s claims under Rule 12(b)(1)

because his claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. See Dkt. No. 17 at 2;

Dkt. No. 31.

Only insofar as a state judicial proceeding has concluded, such that no appeal

was pending when Cavaness filed this lawsuit, this federal district court lacks

jurisdiction “to modify or reverse” a state proceeding under the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (“‘Reduced

to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not

have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments’ except when authorized

by Congress.” (quoting Union Planters Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Salih, 369 F.3d 457, 462

(5th Cir. 2004))); accord Liedtke v. State Bar of Tex., 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1994);

see also Jordaan v. Hall, 275 F. Supp. 2d 778, 789 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the

doctrine prevents “thinly veiled attempt[s] to circumvent the state appellate process

and to collaterally attack – in the guise of a federal civil rights action – the validity

of a state court [judgment] and other related orders”); but see Miller v. Dunn, 35 F.4th

1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 2022) (“Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable where a state appeal is

pending when the federal suit is filed.”).

Cavaness challenges Zwicker’s state court lawsuit on behalf of its clients

Discover Bank and Capital One. See Dkt. No. 3 at 7. He challenges the 160th Judicial

District Court’s entry of judgment against him and the manner in which that court

reached its decision. See id. He appears to challenge Jenkins’ role in the procurement

of his funds to satisfy the judgment. See id. And he seeks relief from the judgment by

asking this Court to unfreeze his funds and for damages resulting from the

garnishment of his bank account in satisfaction of the judgment. See id.

And, so, Cavaness’s lawsuit amounts to nothing more than a collateral attack

on a prior state judgment in violation of Rooker-Feldman. That he frames his claims

under federal laws – such as the FDCPA and the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments – does not allow Cavaness to sidestep this jurisdictional bar. See Turner

v. Cade, 354 F. App’x 108, 111 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“A plaintiff cannot

‘circumvent this jurisdictional limitation by asserting claims not raised in the state

court proceedings or claims framed as original claims for relief,’ if these claims are

‘inextricably intertwined with a state judgment.’”) (quoting United States v.

Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 924 (5th Cir. 1994); citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

And, so, the Court should dismiss this lawsuit for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

Recommendation

The Court should grant Defendants’ motions to dismiss [Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, &

22] and dismiss this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. Civ.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: May 138, 2026

DAVIDL.HORAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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