The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 WESTERN DIVISION
11
12 ROSA I. C., No. 2:25-cv-02847-BFM
13 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION
14 v. A ND ORDER
15 FRANK J. BISIGNANO,1
Commissioner of Social Security,
16
Defendant.
17
18 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
19 In March 2022, Plaintiff Rosa I. C.2 applied for Disability Insurance
20 Benefits and Supplemental Security Income; she alleged that she had been
21 disabled since June 11, 2020, based on right shoulder stiffness and pain, pain in
22 both hands and in her left shoulder, right knee pain, high blood pressure, and
23 diabetes. (ECF 9 (Administrative Record (“AR”)) at 280-99, 345.) Plaintiff’s
24
25
1 Frank J. Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 6,
26 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he is
hereby substituted for Kilolo Kijakazi as the defendant in this suit.
27
2 In the interest of privacy, this Memorandum Opinion and Order uses only
28
the first name and last initial of the non-governmental party in this case.
1 applications were denied at the initial level of review and on reconsideration, so
2 she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 71-154, 177.)
3 On April 11, 2024, an ALJ held a hearing and heard from Plaintiff and a
4 vocational expert. (AR 43-70.) After considering the evidence, the ALJ issued a
5 partially favorable decision, finding Plaintiff became disabled as of April 1,
6 2024—two months before Plaintiff’s 55th birthday—based on her age,
7 education, work experience, and residual functional capacity (“RFC”).3 (AR 22-
8 34.) The ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled for the period between June 11, 2020,
9 and March 31, 2024. (AR 27, 31-33.)
10 With respect to that period, the ALJ found at step two of the disability
11 analysis4 that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: lumbar
12 and cervical degenerative disc disease, right shoulder full-thickness tear with
13 tendinopathy (status post arthroscopy), left shoulder overuse syndrome,
14 bilateral thumb osteoarthritis, hand degenerative joint disease, diabetes,
15 hypertension, and obesity. (AR 25-26.) The ALJ found Plaintiff retained a RFC
16 for light work limited to: (1) occasionally climbing ramps and stairs, balancing,
17 stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling, and reaching overhead with the right
18 upper extremity; (2) frequently reaching overhead with the left upper extremity,
19 and handling and fingering with the bilateral upper extremities; and (3) never
20 climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (AR 27.) At step four, the ALJ found
21 Plaintiff would be unable to perform her past relevant work. (AR 31.) At step
22 five, the ALJ found that, as to the period before April 1, 2024, a person with
23
24
25
3 An RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and
26 nonexertional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1).
27 4 A five-step evaluation process governs whether a claimant is disabled. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g)(1), 416.920(a)-(g)(1). Only the steps relevant to the
28
issues raised are discussed herein.
1 Plaintiff’s RFC would be capable of performing work that exists in significant
2 numbers in the national economy. (AR 31-33.)
3 For the period beginning on April 1, 2024, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
4 moved into the age category for individuals of advanced age, and that after that
5 date, the Medical Vocational guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2 (“the
6 Grids”), directed a finding that Plaintiff was disabled. (AR 31-33 (citing Grid
7 Rule 202.06).)
8 On February 12, 2025, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to
9 review the ALJ’s decision, making the ALJ’s decision final. (AR 1-3, 277-79.)
10 Dissatisfied with the Agency’s resolution of her claim, Plaintiff filed a Complaint
11 in this Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court determines that the
12 ALJ’s decision should be reversed and this matter should be remanded for
13 further administrative proceedings.
14 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
15 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision
16 to deny benefits to determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported
17 by substantial evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards.
18 See Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008);
19 Brewes v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
20 “Substantial evidence. . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ It means—and means
21 only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
22 support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citations
23 omitted); Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th Cir. 2014).
24 To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing
25 court “must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the
26 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s
27 conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “If the
28
1 evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing,” the Court may
2 not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21.
3 III. DISCUSSION
4 In this Court, Plaintiff makes two arguments concerning the ALJ’s denial
5 of her claim for benefits: (1) the ALJ failed to evaluate properly the medical
6 opinions offered by Dr. Tomas Saucedo and Dr. Matthew Longacre; and (2) the
7 ALJ impermissibly rejected Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her impairments
8 and symptoms. (ECF 14 (“Pl. Br.”) at 3-11.) As set forth below, the
9 Court reverses the ALJ’s decision based on the second issue and thus declines
10 to reach the first one.
11 A. The ALJ’s Reasoning for Discounting Plaintiff’s Subjective
12 Complaints is Inadequate
13 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ inadequately explained his reasons for
14 discounting her subjective complaints. (Pl.’s Br. at 8-11.)
15 1. Legal Framework
16 Where a claimant testifies about subjective medical symptoms, an ALJ
17 must evaluate such testimony in two steps. First, the ALJ must determine
18 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying
19 impairment that could “reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
20 symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)
21 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
22 Second, if the claimant meets that first standard and there is no evidence
23 of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony only by offering
24 “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation and internal
25 quotation marks omitted). An ALJ “is not required to believe every allegation of
26 disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a
27 result plainly contrary to the Social Security Act.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th
28 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At the
1 same time, when an ALJ rejects a claimant’s testimony, he must “specify which
2 testimony [he] finds not credible, and then provide clear and convincing reasons,
3 supported by evidence in the record,” to support that determination. Brown-
4 Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). General or implicit
5 findings of credibility will not suffice; the ALJ must show his work. Smartt, 53
6 F.4th at 499; see also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090,
7 1102 (9th Cir. 2014).
8 The sufficiency of an ALJ’s explanation should be judged in light of its
9 purpose—ensuring that this Court’s review is “meaningful.” Brown-Hunter, 806
10 F.3d at 489. That is, the explanation must be “‘sufficiently specific to allow a
11 reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on
12 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony[.]’”
13 Id. at 493 (citation omitted).
14 Judged by that standard, the ALJ’s reasons and explanation for
15 discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were inadequate.
16 2. Factual Background
17 Plaintiff testified that she has “lots of pain everywhere”—in her neck,
18 shoulders, hands, lower back, “everywhere.” (AR 57-59.) She continues to suffer
19 right shoulder pain even after her shoulder surgery (AR 57) and has neck pain
20 that goes down her shoulder and to her lower back (AR 56). Plaintiff developed
21 symptoms in her left shoulder because she relied on that arm more after the
22 surgery. (AR 58.) She was taking pain medication (Naproxen) at least twice a
23 day, used Diclofenac cream, and took Tramadol “maybe” two times a week,
24 which helps “a little.” (AR 55-56, 59.)
25 Plaintiff explained that reaching above her shoulder with her left arm was
26 painful. (AR 54.) She required her family’s help with retrieving things in
27 cabinets above her shoulders and with lifting. (AR 54.) For the first six months
28 after her surgery, she could not lift even a cup. (AR 58.) By the time of the
1 hearing, she could lift a gallon of milk using both hands, but it was difficult. (AR
2 58.) Plaintiff stated that she drives “very little” and cannot sit for long periods
3 because of her pain. (AR 55.)
4 In a December 2022 Function Report form, Plaintiff said that she had
5 constant pain in her shoulder, hands, and right elbow. (AR 387.) She said she
6 could not do any household chores due to pain and weakness in her hands, and
7 that she needed help with routine tasks like showering, drying herself, dressing,
8 and brushing her hair. (AR 387-89.) She had difficulty standing for more than
9 20 minutes, walking for more than 30 minutes, and could not lift or reach due
10 to shoulder pain. (AR 392.)
11 The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and her written
12 statements. (AR 27-28.) After reciting that testimony, he concluded that while
13 Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
14 symptoms,” her statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
15 effects of those symptoms were not fully supported “for the reasons explained in
16 this decision.” (AR 28.)
17 The ALJ then proceeded to consider the medical evidence in the record.
18 (AR 28-29.) The balance of his analysis does not discuss Plaintiff’s testimony.
19 3. Analysis
20 The ALJ’s reasoning in this case is inadequate. An ALJ is required to
21 “identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what
22 evidence undermines the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195,
23 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). Here, however, the ALJ merely
24 summarized Plaintiff’s testimony, summarized the medical records, and then
25 concluded that the record did not support Plaintiff’s allegations. In doing so, the
26 ALJ here nearly replicated the error identified in Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at
27 494. There, the ALJ summarized the claimant’s testimony, found that her
28 statements were “not credible to the extent they [were] inconsistent with [his
1 RFC] assessment,” summarized the claimant’s medical records, and then
2 concluded that the claimant’s functional limitations were “less serious than she
3 [had] alleged” and “did not prevent her from engaging in all work related
4 activities.” Id. at 491. This was error, the Ninth Circuit held, because the ALJ
5 did not identify with specificity what testimony was not credible and what
6 evidence undermined that particular testimony. Id. at 493 (citing Reddick v.
7 Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102-
8 03 (finding reversible error where ALJ’s statement—that claimant’s statements
9 were not credible to the extent they were inconsistent with the RFC statement—
10 failed to provide “sufficiently specific reasons” supported by evidence in the case
11 record). Just as in Brown-Hunter, the ALJ’s failure to “link [the claimant’s]
12 testimony to the particular parts of the record supporting her non-credibility
13 determination [is] legal error.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494.
14 Nor can the Court find the error harmless. Precedent requires “cautio[n]
15 about when harmless error should be found” in this context. Brown-Hunter, 806
16 F.3d at 492 (citing Marsh v. Colvin, 792 F.3d 1172, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015)). The
17 Court cannot find harmless error simply because it can infer from the whole of
18 the decision why the ALJ decided not to credit Plaintiff’s testimony. Id. That’s
19 because the federal court is “constrained to review the reasons the ALJ asserts.”
20 Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). If the ALJ fails to specify
21 his reasons for finding claimant testimony not credible, a reviewing court will
22 be unable to review those reasons meaningfully without “substitut[ing] [its]
23 conclusions for the ALJ’s, or speculat[ing] as to the grounds for the ALJ’s
24 conclusions.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at
25 1103). Because courts “cannot engage in such substitution or speculation,” error
26 of this sort “will usually not be harmless.” Id.
27 Here, the error is decidedly not harmless. Simply stating that Plaintiff’s
28 testimony is fatally undermined for reasons explained elsewhere in the decision
1 does not provide the Court enough information to “discern” the “agency’s path.”
2 Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1099; Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (declining to find
3 error harmless where court “cannot discern the agency’s path because the ALJ
4 made only a general credibility finding without providing any reviewable
5 reasons why she found [the claimant’s] testimony to be not credible”).
6 Defendant points to evidence that might have provided an appropriate
7 basis for the ALJ to disregard Plaintiff’s testimony concerning her pain and the
8 limitations. (ECF 16 (“Def. Br.”) at 14-19.) But Brown-Hunter makes clear that
9 courts err when they usurp the ALJ’s duty to try to link particular testimony to
10 specific evidence that the ALJ might have found to undermine it. 806 F.3d at
11 494 (ALJ’s “error could not be corrected by the district court’s statement of links
12 between claimant testimony and certain medical evidence.”); Bray v. Comm’r of
13 Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Long-standing principles
14 of administrative law require us to review the ALJ’s decision based on the
15 reasoning and factual findings offered by the ALJ—not post hoc rationalizations
16 that attempt to intuit what the adjudicator may have been thinking.”). Put
17 another way, the Court is constrained to review the reasons given by the ALJ,
18 not post hoc rationalizations provided by government counsel. Connett v.
19 Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003).
20 Here, while Defendant points to portions of the ALJ’s decision that might
21 rationally undermine Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ never offered those as
22 reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s complaints. Reversal is therefore required,
23 because an ALJ’s failure to “link [a claimant’s] testimony to the particular parts
24 of the record supporting her non-credibility determination [is] legal error.”
25 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494.
26 Defendant also points to the sentence where the ALJ concludes his
27 analysis by saying that “the objective medical evidence does not warrant any
28 additional limitations beyond those established in the residual functional
1 capacity herein.” (Def. Br. at 19 (quoting AR 31).) To the extent that sentence
2 was meant to refer back to Plaintiff’s testimony—which is a stretch—it still does
3 not link any particular portion of the record to Plaintiff’s subjective symptom
4 testimony and thus would still flunk Brown-Hunter’s test.
5 B. Remedy
6 Remand (as opposed to an outright grant of benefits) is appropriate as the
7 circumstances of this case suggest that further administrative proceedings
8 could remedy the ALJ’s errors. See Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th
9 Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative
10 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction
11 to provide benefits.”); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101, n.5 (remand for further
12 administrative proceedings is the proper remedy “in all but the rarest cases”);
13 Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2000) (remand for further
14 proceedings rather than for the immediate payment of benefits is appropriate
15 where there are “sufficient unanswered questions in the record”).
16 Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address
17 Plaintiff’s remaining argument regarding the ALJ’s consideration of the medical
18 opinion evidence. Whether the ALJ adequately considered the medical opinions
19 in this case can be addressed, as necessary, on remand. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687
20 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we remand the case to the ALJ for the
21 reasons stated, we decline to reach [plaintiff’s] alternative ground for remand.”);
22 see also Augustine ex rel. Ramirez v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D.
23 Cal. 2008) (“[The] Court need not address the other claims plaintiff raises, none
24 of which would provide plaintiff with any further relief than granted, and all of
25 which can be addressed on remand.”).
26
27
28
1 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
2 For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that: (1) the decision of the
3 || Commissioner is reversed, and this matter is remanded pursuant to sentence
4 || four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with
5 || this Opinion and Order; and (2) Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff.
6
7 || DATED: February 238, 2026 Ein
8
9 BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
10