Opinion

Townsend

Court
District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed
May 11, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.3%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

TAMERLA TOWNSEND, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:26-cv-01340-B-BN

§

MUSK, ET §

AL., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Tamerla Townsend filed a complaint pro se purporting to assert civil

rights and constitutional claims against various defendants based on allegations of

technological implantation, surveillance, and psychological manipulation. See Dkt.

No. 3. Senior United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred the complaint to the

undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

recommendation that the Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice as

frivolous.

Discussion

A district court is required to screen a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis

(that is, without payment of the filing fee) and may summarily dismiss that complaint

(or any portion of it) if the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per

curiam).

And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on

its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969,

at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th

Cir. 2006)), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff’d, 763 F.

App’x 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019).

A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint

on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.’” Gaffney v. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co., 294 F. App’x 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll,

470 F.3d at 1177; citation omitted).

“[F]airness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention to

dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano

v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also Carver v.

Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court

may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.’

More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court’s intention

and an opportunity to respond’ before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.”

(citations omitted)).

And these findings, conclusions, and recommendations provide notice, while

the period for filing objections affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett,

2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).

A district court’s authority to dismiss an action that “fails to ‘state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face’” extends to dismissal of “claims that are ‘clearly

baseless,’ including ‘claims describing fantastic or delusional scenarios.’” Starrett, 763

F. App’x at 383-84 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, then Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989); citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)

(concluding that dismissal “is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of

the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable

facts available to contradict them”)).

A review of Townsend’s filing reflects that she purports to assert constitutional

and civil rights claims arising from allegations that various individuals and entities

implanted technology in her through a “Neuralink,” that caused her to hear “voices,”

subjected her to “extortion,” and manipulated her mental health. Dkt. No. 3 at 4. She

further alleges she has been subjected to “cyberdata breaches” and can “see” chips

implanted through her eyes. Id. But the claims describe fantastic or delusional

scenarios and lack any arguable basis in fact. So, the complaint qualifies as clearly

baseless, irrational, or wholly incredible, requiring dismissal with prejudice.

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint

before dismissal, but leave is not required when he has already pled her “best case.”

Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). Townsend has failed to state

or suggest a cognizable claim or any facts from which a cognizable claim can be

inferred. Based on the most deferential review of her complaint, it is highly unlikely

that, given the opportunity, Townsend could allege cogent and viable legal claims.

Thus, the undersigned concludes that granting leave to amend under these

circumstances would be futile and cause needless delay.

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice as frivolous.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. □□□□

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 11, 2026 pelos

DAVIDL.HORAN ————

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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