Goodman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

LARRY C. GOODMAN,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-614-TJC-SJH

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Larry C. Goodman, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ

of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 1. Petitioner challenges a state court (Duval County,

Florida) judgment of conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon, attempted

armed robbery, aggravated assault, driving with an expired license, and leaving

the scene of an accident. Petitioner is serving a fifteen-year prison sentence.

Respondent filed a Response with exhibits. Doc. 8.1 Petitioner filed a Reply. Doc.

1 The Court will cite exhibits by document and page number as assigned by the Court’s

electronic case management system.

11. This case is ripe for review.2

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard Under § 2254

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. Ledford v. Warden,

Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016)

(explaining AEDPA deference), abrogation in part on other grounds recognized

by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023).

“The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a

guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and

not as a means of error correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34,

38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. Marshall

v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court

2 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need

for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318

(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th

Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must

consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s

factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the

record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,

a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that

“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s decision

to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,

100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied

by an explanation,

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that

does provide a relevant rationale. It should then

presume that the unexplained decision adopted the

same reasoning. But the State may rebut the

presumption by showing that the unexplained

affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as

alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or

argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the

record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125-26 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted

“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for

evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears

repeating that even a strong case for relief does not

mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly

instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable

application of law requires more than mere error or

even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S.

12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of

clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts

by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal

law is different from an incorrect application of federal

law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (parallel

citations omitted).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)

(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a person must

show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of reasonable,

professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the

challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient performance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

The two-part Strickland test applies to challenges to the validity of guilty

pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

58 (1985). The petitioner must still show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. See id. at 56-59; Lynch v. Sec’y Fla. Dept. of Corr., 776 F.3d 1209,

1218 (11th Cir. 2015). To establish prejudice, however, the petitioner “must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill,

474 U.S. at 59 (footnote omitted); Lynch, 776 F.3d at 1218.

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the

Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.

2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to

show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance

prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id.

(citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in

Strickland, “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should

be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.

Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state

court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether

that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-

court decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. Thus, “[s]urmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s

representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is

combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling

on counsel’s performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105).

III. Factual Background and Procedural History

Around 3:00 p.m. on April 5, 2015, Petitioner rear-ended a vehicle at a

red light in Jacksonville, Florida. Doc. 8-1 at 18. Petitioner tried to flee, but one

of the occupants of the vehicle got out and “blocked” Petitioner’s car. Id.

Petitioner brandished a handgun and said, “I got a kilo of cocaine. I got to get

out of here. I don’t need no police.” Id. He then drove away. Id.

Approximately thirty minutes later, Petitioner accosted a bus driver

outside a gas station store. Doc. 8-2 at 18. Petitioner asked for $5, but the driver

said he “did not have any money on him.” Id. In response, Petitioner pointed a

gun at the driver and said, “You know what I can do with this. I can take this

store if I wanted.” Id. The driver said he would use the ATM inside the store to

“get [Petitioner] some cash.” Id. The driver entered the store and told the clerk

to “lock the front doors . . . and call the police.” Id. Petitioner drove away before

officers arrived. Id.

A “be on the lookout” was issued for Petitioner and his vehicle. Doc. 8-1

at 19; Doc. 8-2 at 18. Soon after, law enforcement found Petitioner “standing in

front of [his] vehicle with the hood raised.” Doc. 8-2 at 18. A “silver and black

handgun” was “in plain view” on the front passenger seat. Id. Petitioner was

arrested without incident. Id. The victims of the hit and run and the attempted

robbery were taken to the scene of the arrest. Doc. 8-1 at 19; Doc. 8-2 at 18.

Each identified Petitioner as the culprit. Id. Law enforcement discovered that

Petitioner was a convicted felon whose driver’s license had expired in December

2002. Doc. 8-1 at 19.

For the hit and run, Petitioner was charged with possession of a firearm

by a felon, aggravated assault, driving with an expired license, and leaving the

scene of an accident. Id. at 25. For the attempted robbery, he was charged with

possession of a firearm by a felon and attempted armed robbery. Doc. 8-2 at 25.

The prosecution filed a notice of intent to classify Petitioner as a habitual felony

offender (HFO). Doc. 8-1 at 57; Doc. 8-2 at 62. Because he qualified as an HFO,

Petitioner faced a maximum sentence of (1) thirty years’ imprisonment for

possession of a firearm by a felon and (2) thirty years’ imprisonment for

attempted armed robbery. Id.; see also Munden v. State, 426 So. 3d 498, 501

(Fla. 4th DCA 2025); Betty v. State, 7 So. 3d 586, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).

Petitioner ultimately pleaded guilty to each offense, stipulating that he

qualified as an HFO. Doc. 8-1 at 44-45; Doc. 8-2 at 41-42, 151. In exchange, he

received a total sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment. Doc. 8-1 at 59; Doc. 8-

2 at 64. Petitioner was forty-two years old at the time of sentencing. Doc. 8-1 at

16, 59; Doc. 8-2 at 64.

Petitioner appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal (First DCA)

affirmed his convictions. Doc. 8-10. Petitioner then filed a motion for

postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Doc. 8-12

at 22. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief.

Id. at 130-43. The First DCA affirmed in an unexplained decision. Doc. 8-15.

This federal habeas petition followed. Doc. 1.

IV. Analysis

Petitioner raises two grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id.

at 5-7.

A. Ground One

Petitioner argues that trial counsel was deficient for stipulating that he

qualified as an HFO. Doc. 1 at 5. The “HFO provision allows courts to sentence

a defendant who qualifies as an HFO to an extended term of imprisonment.”

Foulks v. State, 306 So. 3d 1178, 1185-86 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020). A defendant

qualifies as an HFO if (1) he has been convicted of two or more felonies and (2)

he committed the present offense within five years of the date of conviction of

the last felony. Fla. Stat. § 775.084(1)(a). Here, the prosecution relied on two

prior convictions for HFO sentencing: an April 2000 Florida conviction for sale

of cocaine, and a September 2010 North Carolina conviction for felony larceny.

Doc. 8-1 at 57; Doc. 8-2 at 62. As part of the guilty plea, Petitioner and his

counsel stipulated that Petitioner qualified as an HFO. Doc. 8-1 at 44, 151; Doc.

8-2 at 41. The trial court determined that Petitioner met “the criteria to be

classified as an” HFO and sentenced him to a total of fifteen years’

imprisonment. Doc. 8-1 at 152, 160-61.

According to Petitioner, counsel should not have stipulated to HFO

sentencing because the felony larceny conviction “wasn’t his.” Doc. 1 at 5. The

postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim. Before the guilty

plea, counsel asked a colleague at the Public Defender’s Office—Tricia Rover—

to visit Petitioner at the county jail and discuss the matter of HFO sentencing.

Doc. 8-12 at 223-24. Rover testified that she showed Petitioner the judgments

for the sale-of-cocaine and felony-larceny convictions. Id. at 224. According to

Rover, Petitioner confirmed that he “remembered” both convictions. Id. With

respect to the North Carolina conviction, Rover explained: “The judgment and

sentence that [he] and I reviewed is a felony larceny from the State of North

Carolina. I asked [him] if [he] remembered it. [He] said, yes. I asked if it was

[him] and [he] said, yes.” Id. at 230. Counsel testified that Rover told her about

the jailhouse conversation with Petitioner. Id. at 238-39.

Petitioner offered a different version of events. He admitted that Rover

met him at the jail but denied that she showed him any judgments. Id. at 249.

According to Petitioner, Rover merely told him that the prosecution was “using

a felony out of . . . Florida and something out of North Carolina.” Id. Rover then

asked if he had “ever been to prison in North Carolina before and [he] said yes.”

Id. Petitioner testified that he did not “have” a 2010 North Carolina conviction

for felony larceny. Id. at 250. Instead, he claimed that his “last conviction in

North Carolina was in 2008 . . . for possession of cocaine.” Id. At the hearing,

however, Petitioner was confronted with a copy of the North Carolina judgment

for felony larceny. Id. at 260-61. He acknowledged that, although it lacked

fingerprints, the judgment contained his name, date of birth, and Social

Security number.3 Id. at 261.

After the hearing, the postconviction court held that Petitioner’s

ineffective-assistance claim was “without merit.” Id. at 141. The court found

that counsel and Rover were “more credible than” Petitioner based on their

“demeanors.” Id. According to the court, Petitioner “was presented with the

North Carolina judgment [at the jail and] confirmed it was his conviction.” Id.

Thus, “there was no reason for counsel to question that it was not [him].” Id.

The court acknowledged that the judgment lacked a “fingerprint card.” Id. But

it noted that the judgment contained Petitioner’s “full name, date of birth, and

Social Security number, which [was] sufficient identifying information for a

judgment to be used to prove a qualifying offense.” Id. at 141-42. Given “the

totality of the circumstances,” the court held that counsel was not deficient for

“conclud[ing] and advis[ing] [Petitioner] that he met the qualifications for an

HFO designation.” Id. at 142.

This ruling was reasonable. Strickland requires courts to “indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.” 466 U.S. at 689. “Even if counsel’s decision

appears to have been unwise in retrospect, the decision will be held to have been

3 The record includes a copy of the North Carolina judgment. Doc. 8-2 at 59-61. It

contains Petitioner’s name, date of birth, and Social Security number. Id.

ineffective assistance only if it was so patently unreasonable that no competent

attorney would have chosen it.” Dingle v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092,

1099 (11th Cir. 2007). Moreover, because the postconviction court rejected

Petitioner’s claim on the merits, he cannot prevail unless he shows that “no

reasonable jurist could find that his counsel’s performance fell within the wide

range of reasonable professional conduct.” Franks v. GDCP Warden, 975 F.3d

1165, 1176 (11th Cir. 2020).

Petitioner cannot overcome the “doubly deferential” standard of review

required by Strickland and AEDPA. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 190

(2011). His claim turned on a credibility determination. At the evidentiary

hearing, Petitioner testified that Rover never confirmed the North Carolina

conviction was his. Doc. 8-12 at 249. But the postconviction court declined to

credit this testimony. Instead, it deemed “credible” Rover’s testimony that

Petitioner “was presented with the North Carolina judgment” and “confirmed

it was his conviction.” Id. at 141. “Determining the credibility of witnesses is

the province and function of the state courts, not a federal court engaging in

habeas review.” Consalvo v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 664 F.3d 842, 845 (11th Cir.

2011). Petitioner has not shown by “clear and convincing evidence” that the

court’s credibility determination was erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Thus,

he cannot overcome the “presumption of correctness” afforded that

determination. Consalvo, 664 F.3d at 845.

Based on the postconviction court’s reasonable determination of the facts,

counsel’s performance was not deficient. Because Petitioner confirmed that the

North Carolina conviction was his—and because the judgment contained

Petitioner’s name, date of birth, and Social Security number—counsel had no

reason to doubt that the conviction belonged to Petitioner. Therefore, the

postconviction court reasonably concluded that counsel was not ineffective for

stipulating to HFO sentencing. See Franks, 975 F.3d at 1176 (to prevail on

Strickland claim under AEDPA, petitioner must show that “no reasonable jurist

could find that his counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of

reasonable professional conduct”).

B. Ground Two

Petitioner was charged with—and convicted of—two counts of possession

of a firearm by a felon. Doc. 8-1 at 25, 59; Doc. 8-2 at 25, 64. The first count

related to the hit and run, and the second concerned the attempted armed

robbery. Doc. 8-1 at 25; Doc. 8-2 at 25. According to Petitioner, counsel should

have informed him that double jeopardy barred his dual convictions for

possession of a firearm by a felon. Doc. 1 at 7. Petitioner argues that double

jeopardy applied because he continuously possessed the firearm “on the same

day,” and the two incidents occurred “only minutes apart.” Id. Had Petitioner

known that his dual convictions were “legally invalid,” he allegedly would not

have pleaded guilty. Doc. 8-12 at 28.

Even under de novo review, this claim fails for lack of prejudice. To show

prejudice in the plea context, a petitioner must establish “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and

would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The “strong societal

interest in finality has special force with respect to convictions based on guilty

pleas.” Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 368-69 (2017). Thus, “[c]ourts should

not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from [the petitioner] about

how he would have pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” Id. at 369.

Instead, the petitioner must “convince the court that a decision to reject [a] plea

[] would have been rational under the circumstances.” Diveroli v. United States,

803 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2015).

Even assuming counsel was deficient for failing to raise the double-

jeopardy issue, Petitioner cannot show prejudice.4 A successful double-jeopardy

challenge would have resulted in the dismissal of one felon-in-possession count.

But Petitioner still would have faced a statutory maximum of thirty years’

imprisonment for the other felon-in-possession count, along with a separate

4 Some Florida appellate decisions hold that “felonious possession of a firearm is a

continuing crime,” and thus “each period of uninterrupted possession of the same

firearm, regardless of length, is punishable only once.” Rogers v. State, 113 So. 3d 960,

961 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013); see also Syder v. State, 921 So. 2d 871, 873 (Fla. 4th DCA

2006) (same). Under this line of authority, Petitioner’s dual convictions for possession

of a firearm by a felon would likely violate double jeopardy. But even if the double-

jeopardy argument had merit, Petitioner cannot show prejudice for the reasons

explained below.

statutory maximum of thirty years’ imprisonment for attempted armed robbery.

Doc. 8-1 at 57; Doc. 8-2 at 62; see also Munden, 426 So. 3d at 501; Betty, 7 So.

3d at 587. Thus, Petitioner—who was forty-two years old at the time of

sentencing—could have received a total sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment

had he gone to trial and lost. Instead, he pleaded guilty and received an agreed-

upon sentence of fifteen years’ imprisonment. Doc. 8-1 at 44-45, 59; Doc. 8-2 at

41-42, 64, 151. Given the significant reduction in sentencing exposure,

Petitioner cannot show that a “rational person would have rejected [the] plea

bargain.” United States v. Miranda-Alfaro, 462 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir.

2012) (finding no Strickland prejudice where “plea bargain lowered

[defendant’s] sentence of imprisonment by eight years”).

Moreover, Petitioner offers no viable defense to any of the charges. Doc.

1; Doc. 11. One way “to evaluate whether there is a reasonable probability a

petitioner would have insisted on going to trial is to determine whether

petitioner had available a defense that would likely have borne fruit at trial.”

Singleton v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:07-cv-1419-VMC-MAP, 2009 WL 975783,

at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2009). Because Petitioner offers no defense to the

charges—and because his guilty plea allowed him to avoid the possibility of

spending the rest of his life in prison—Petitioner fails to show a “reasonable

probability” that he “would have insisted on going to trial” had counsel raised a

double-jeopardy challenge. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Sierra v. Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 657 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that, because petitioner

had “no valid defenses, it would not have been rational . . . to have rejected the

plea agreement and proceeded to trial”).

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED

with prejudice.

2. If Petitioner appeals, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.

Because the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not

warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any

motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such

termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.5

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

5 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To

make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration of

the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 22nd day of April,

2026.

& Cimtheg Corrig nv

Wy. TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

Senior United States District Judge

TpaP-2

C:

Larry C. Goodman, #801071

Counsel of Record

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