HUNT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

CORNELIO HUNT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:26-cv-94-AW-MJF

JAMES A. ZINGALE and

BLAISE INGOGLIA,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

In this § 1983 action, Plaintiff alleges that the two Defendants

violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when some unspecified

person suspended Plaintiff’s driver license and when “two Sheriff’s units”

arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff also attempts to assert a claim against a

person not named as a Defendant: the clerk of the court for Holmes

County.

Defendants move to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Doc. 14. Plaintiff responded in

opposition. Doc. 17. Because Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims are barred

by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because Plaintiff fails to state any

individual-capacity claims, and because Plaintiff has not named the clerk

of the court of Holmes County as a defendant and failed to serve process

on that person, the District Court should dismiss this civil action.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, is the operative pleading. Doc. 8.

A. Plaintiff Files a Case in Holmes County

On some date that Plaintiff does not specify, some unspecified

person or entity suspended Plaintiff’s commercial driver license and his

passport. Id. at 5. To redress this, on March 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed an

action in Holmes County, Florida: Hunt v. Zingale, No. 30-2026-CA-57

(Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 10, 2026).

B. “Two Sheriff’s Units” Arrest Plaintiff

Also, on March 10, 2026, upon exiting “the courthouse,” “two

Sheriff’s units” conducted a traffic stop and arrested Plaintiff. Doc. 8 at

7.

C. The Two Defendants

Plaintiff sues two Defendants:

• James A. Zingale, the Executive Director of the Florida

Department of Revenue; and

• Blaise Ingoglia, the Chief Financial Officer of the Florida

Department of Financial Services.

Doc. 8 at 3.

D. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff sues Defendants in both their official and individual

capacities and asserts the following claims:

• a Fourth-Amendment claim for “unlawful seizure” against

both Defendants because of Defendants’ alleged “failure to

adhere to procedural mandates” and “reliance on unverified,

automated systems” that “resulted in [Plaintiff’s] unlawful

arrest and a 10-day deprivation of [his] liberty”; and

• a Fourteenth-Amendment due process claim against both

Defendants because Defendants allegedly “deprived

[Plaintiff] of [his] protected property interest and [his] Right

to Travel without due process of law.”

Id. at 9.

Plaintiff also asserts a First-Amendment retaliation claim against

“the clerk of court,” but Plaintiff has not named the clerk of court as a

defendant in this civil action. Id. Plaintiff also has not filed a proof of

service regarding this person.

E. The Relief Plaintiff Requests

As relief, Plaintiff seeks “[a]n immediate order directing the Florida

Department of Revenue to vacate all administrative holds” on his “Class

A CDL credentials.” Id. Plaintiff also seeks $25,000 in compensatory

damages and a declaratory judgment that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

rights. Id. at 10.

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Official-Capacity Claims Are Barred by Sovereign

Immunity

Plaintiff attempts to assert a Fourth-Amendment and a

Fourteenth-Amendment claim for damages against Zingale and Ingoglia

in their official capacities.

Generally, the Eleventh Amendment recognizes that states may

assert sovereign immunity that would bar suits by an individual against

a State, its agencies, and its employees, unless Congress has abrogated

the State’s sovereign immunity or the State has consented to the

lawsuit. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1890); Manders v. Lee,

338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Congress has not

abrogated the States’ sovereign immunity in actions for damages under

section 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67–68

(1989). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking damages from Zingale and

Ingoglia—both of whom are employees of the state of Florida—Plaintiff’s

claims are barred by sovereign immunity.1

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Fourth-Amendment “False Arrest”

Claim

Plaintiff attempts to assert a Fourth-Amendment “false arrest”

claim against Zingale and Ingoglia in their individual capacities. Doc. 8

at 9.

The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that people

have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ,” U.S. CONST. amend.

IV. The arrest of a person constitutes a “seizure.” Payton v. New York,

445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). To comply with the Fourth Amendment, arrests

must be “reasonable.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56

(2018).

1 Plaintiff also seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. Doc. 8 at 9. Under

the Ex parte Young doctrine, a suit challenging the constitutionality of a

state official’s enforcement of state law is not a suit against the state and

thus operates as an exception to sovereign immunity. Schultz v.

Alabama, 42 F.4th 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)). For the reasons discussed in this report and

recommendation, however, Plaintiff fails to state any claim upon which

relief can be granted. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show any

entitlement to declaratory or injunctive relief.

To state a claim for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, plaintiff must allege at least the following elements:

(1) the defendant arrested plaintiff; and

(2) the defendant lacked probable cause to believe that the plaintiff

had committed a crime.

Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267, 1281 (11th Cir. 2023); Richmond v.

Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1180 (11th Cir. 2022).

1. Plaintiff Fails to Allege that Defendants Arrested

Plaintiff or Participated in Plaintiff’s Arrest

To state a claim of false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a

plaintiff must allege that the defendant arrested or participated in the

arrest of the plaintiff. Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 736–37

(11th Cir. 2010). That is, a plaintiff must allege “an affirmative causal

connection” between the defendant and the arrest. Id. at 737; see also

Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321–22 (11th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants arrested Plaintiff or

participated in the arrest of Plaintiff. Indeed, Plaintiff never articulates

the precise roles Defendants played in Plaintiff’s arrest, if any. Rather,

Plaintiff alleges that “two Sheriff’s units” arrested him. Doc. 8 at 7. To

the extent Plaintiff alleges that Defendants played any role in his arrest,

he fails to allege a sufficiently proximate connection between Defendants

and Plaintiff’s arrest.

For this reason alone, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of false

arrest under the Fourth Amendment.

2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege that the “Two Sheriff’s Units”

Who Arrested Plaintiff Lacked Probable Cause

As noted above, a plaintiff seeking to state a claim of false arrest

under the Fourth Amendment must allege that the individuals who

arrested the plaintiff lacked probable cause to believe that Plaintiff

committed a crime. Brooks, 78 F.4th at 1281; Richmond, 47 F.4th at 1180.

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants lacked probable cause to

believe that Plaintiff committed a crime.

For this reason, too, Plaintiff has failed to state a false arrest claim

under the Fourth Amendment.

C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Denial of Due Process Claim

Plaintiff also attempts to assert a claim that Defendants denied

Plaintiff due process of law. Doc. 8 at 9. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants deprived him of a property interest when they allowed “a

computer system to block” Plaintiff’s “Class A CDL credentials and

passport.” Id.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

prohibits deprivations of property “without due process of law.” U.S.

CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Due process requires adequate notice and a

meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,

333, 348–49 (1976). To state a claim for a denial of due

process, a plaintiff must allege:

(1) the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a constitutionally

protected property or liberty interest;

(2) the defendant was acting under color of law or as a state actor;

and

(3) the defendant did not afford the plaintiff constitutionally-

adequate process.

Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994); see Catron v. City

of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011).

1. Plaintiff Fails to Allege that Defendants Themselves

Denied Plaintiff Due Process

Plaintiff fails to allege any actions or omissions by Defendants that

resulted in depriving Plaintiff of his driver license or his passport.

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants allowed “a computer system to

block” Plaintiff’s “Class A CDL credentials and passport,” is insufficient

to state a claim for a denial of due process. Such an allegation fails to

allege that Defendants were sufficiently proximate in the chain of

causation as to have deprived Plaintiff of his driver license or passport.

Indeed, the District Court can take judicial notice that the Florida

Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issues and revokes

driver licenses—not the Florida Department of Revenue or the Florida

Department of Financial Services. See Fla. Stat. §§ 322.01(15); 322.02(2);

322.14; 322.27.

Similarly, the District Court can take judicial notice that only the

United States Secretary of State and his designees may grant, issue, and

verify U.S. passports—not the Florida Department of Revenue or the

Florida Department of Financial Services. See 22 U.S.C. § 211a.

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable based

on their supervisory capacities of Florida government agencies, § 1983

simply does not create such a claim. See Christmas v. Harris Cnty.,

Georgia, 51 F.4th 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2022); Keating v. City of Miami,

599 F.3d 753, 762 (11th Cir. 2010). A supervisor may be held liable for a

violation of law under § 1983 only when he “personally participates in the

alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal connection

between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged

constitutional violation.” Keating, 599 F.3d at 762 (quoting Gonzalez v.

Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff simply has not

alleged that Defendants personally participated in the denial of due

process or that there is a causal connection between Defendants and the

alleged denial of due process.

For this reason alone, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a

denial of due process.

2. Plaintiff Fails to Allege that Defendants Failed to

Afford Plaintiff Adequate Process

A due process violation does not necessarily occur upon the

deprivation of a liberty or property interest; rather it occurs when the

State “fails to provide due process.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236

(2023).

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege what process the Defendants or the

State of Florida afforded him—if any—before depriving Plaintiff of his

driver license and passport. Similarly, Plaintiff fails to allege what

process Defendants or the State of Florida should have afforded him prior

to depriving him of his driver license and passport. Instead, Plaintiff

merely alleges that he was denied due process. “[C]onclusory allegations”

and “legal conclusions masquerading as facts” are insufficient to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Davila v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,

326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation

that Defendants denied him due process, therefore, is insufficient to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007);

Turner v. Williams, 65 F.4th 564, 577 (11th Cir. 2023).

For this reason too, Plaintiff has failed to state a denial of due

process claim.

D. Plaintiff Fails to State a “Right-to-Travel” Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ actions deprived him of his right

to travel in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Doc. 8 at 9.

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the right to travel entails at

least three facets:

(1) “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and leave another

State;”

(2) “the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an

unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State;” and

(3) “for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents,

the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 499 (1999). But incidental “burdens on a

person’s ability to travel from state to state are not necessarily a violation

of their right to travel.” Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1348 (11th Cir.

2005) (citing Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499).

Beyond Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that Defendants deprived

Plaintiff of his right to travel, Plaintiff fails to set forth any allegations

regarding Defendants and Plaintiff’s right to travel. Thus, Plaintiff fails

to articulate the manner in which Defendants denied Plaintiff his right

to travel. As noted above, conclusory allegations that Defendants denied

Plaintiff the right to travel simply are insufficient to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570; Turner, 65 F.4th at 577.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a “right-to-travel” claim upon

which relief can be granted.

E. Plaintiff Fails to Name the Clerk of the Court of Holmes

County as a Defendant and Plaintiff Has Not Demonstrated

that he Served this Person

Plaintiff also attempts to assert a First-Amendment retaliation

claim against “the Clerk of Court” of Holmes County, Florida. Doc. 8 at

9.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the title of a

complaint “shall include the names of all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

10(a). Furthermore, a plaintiff must ensure that a defendant is served

with a summons and a copy of the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Thus,

“to make someone a party the plaintiff must specify him in the caption

and arrange for service of process.” Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551,

551 (7th Cir. 2005). Indeed, service of process is prerequisite to a district

court exercising personal jurisdiction. “Before a federal court may

exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural

requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.” Omni Capital Int’l,

Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987).

A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a defendant was

served properly. Fitzpatrick v. Bank of New York Mellon, 580 F. App’x

690, 693 (11th Cir. 2014); Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll Cnty. Com’rs, 476

F.3d 1277, 1280–81 (11th Cir. 2007); Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc. v. Universal

Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan.

1981). “Unless service is waived, proof of service must be made to the

court. Except for service by a United States marshal or deputy marshal,

proof must be by the server’s affidavit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(l)(1).

Here, Plaintiff did not list the clerk of court of Holmes County as a

defendant in the caption of his third amended complaint. Doc. 8 at 1.

Plaintiff also did not list this person as a defendant in the section of the

complaint form titled “PARTIES TO THIS COMPLAINT.” Id. at 2. There

is no entry on the docket indicating that Plaintiff ever requested a

summons for this person. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not filed any

evidence indicating that he served process on the clerk of court of Holmes

County. The District Court cannot attempt to exercise personal

jurisdiction over a person whom a plaintiff has not named as a defendant

and whom Plaintiff has not served with process.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court:

1. GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Doc. 14; and

2. DIRECT the clerk of the court to enter judgment, terminate

all pending motions, and close the case file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 4th day of June 2026.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to a magistrate

judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive

matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B), (C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to

these proposed findings and recommendations must be

filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and

recommendation. Any different deadline that may

appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s

internal use only and does not control. An objecting

party must serve a copy of the objections on all other

parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate

judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a

report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th

Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636. The parties also are advised

that if they dispute the accuracy of any judicially-

noticed fact, or if they otherwise wish to be heard on

the propriety of the District Court taking judicial

notice of that fact, they must raise this issue in an

objection to this report and recommendation.