Cruz-Joseph

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

AHARON CRUZ-JOSEPH,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 3:25-cv-858-MMH-PDB

SERGEANT CARRALLO, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff, Aharon Cruz-Joseph, an inmate in the Florida penal system,

initiated this action by filing a pro se Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint; Doc. 1) in the Tampa Division of the Middle

District of Florida.1 On July 29, 2025, the Honorable Tom Barber, United

States District Judge, transferred the action to the Jacksonville Division. Doc.

3. The Court identified some deficiencies in his Complaint and ordered him to

file an amended complaint if he wished to proceed with his claims. See Order

(Doc. 7). Specifically, the Court noted that Cruz-Joseph failed to provide factual

allegations specific to each defendant and that, in his amended complaint, he

needed to clearly “explain which defendant he attempts to hold responsible for

1 For all pleadings and documents filed in this case, the Court cites to the

document and page numbers as assigned by the Court’s Electronic Case Filing

System.

which action and which injury.” Id. at 4. The Court further outlined the law on

establishing official capacity claims and noted that Cruz-Joseph failed to state

a claim for relief against any defendant in his or her official capacity. Id.

Before the Court is Cruz-Joseph’s Amended Complaint (Amended

Complaint; Doc. 9). Cruz-Joseph names four Defendants, all employed by the

Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC): (1) Sgt. Carrallo (in individual and

official capacity); (2) Officer Johnson (in individual and official capacity); (3)

“other security staff present” (in official capacity only); and (4) the captain or

lieutenant on shift (in official capacity only). Amended Complaint at 2–3. Cruz-

Joseph states that his claim is based on the Defendants’ “neglig[ence] of

serving me a state meal and insufficient medical emergency response.” Id. at

3. Specifically, he alleges Sgt. Carrallo “chose” not to open his flap to give Cruz-

Joseph breakfast and that he asked Carrallo and “shift Sgts. [and] officers” to

feed him that meal and that they still “neglected” to feed him. Id. at 4–5. He

further states unspecified persons “ignored him when he was clearly bleeding

out,” “neglected to respond to my medical emergency” and instead provided “an

insufficient medical emergency response.” Id. at 3, 5. Cruz-Joseph asserts he

suffered a laceration on the vein inside his left elbow which caused bleeding.

Id. He states the “only treatment” he received was a nurse putting “injury glue

inside the wound” instead of a being “properly registered into a li[]censed

emergency response unit care.” Id. He requests a transfer to a different prison,

“proper food and medical care,” monetary damages, and disciplinary action

against the Defendants. Id.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). Moreover, under

Eleventh Circuit precedent, to prevail in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must show

“an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions and

the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,

401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306

n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”

the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While not required to

include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must allege “more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions[,]”

which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a federal constitutional

deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of

action against the defendant.

In assessing the Amended Complaint, the Court must read Cruz-

Joseph’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519

(1972). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than

pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,”

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this

leniency does not give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party

or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.’”

Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)

(quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir.

1998) (citations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds as recognized in

Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

Liberally read, Cruz-Joseph’s Amended Complaint fails to state a

plausible § 1983 claim for relief against any Defendant in his or her official

capacity. “[W]hen an officer is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official

capacity, the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against the entity

to which an officer is an agent.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772

(11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, a suit

against Defendants in their official capacities is equivalent to suing the FDOC

itself. To proceed on such a claim, a plaintiff must allege that a policy, custom,

or practice of the FDOC was the “moving force” behind any alleged

constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693–

94 (1978) (concluding that municipal liability under § 1983 occurs “when

execution of a government’s policy or custom” is “the moving force” behind the

constitutional violation). Here, Cruz-Joseph fails to allege any policy, custom,

or practice of the FDOC was the moving force behind his alleged constitutional

violations. Accordingly, he has failed to state a claim against Defendants in

their official capacities. As Cruz-Joseph sues the “captain or lieutenant on

shift” and “other security staff present” only in their official capacity, all claims

against those Defendants are due to be dismissed.

While Cruz-Joseph’s claims are most appropriately characterized as

violations of the Eighth Amendment, his allegations fail to state such a claim.

The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide

humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates

receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s

conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834). To state a claim that his conditions of confinement violated

the Eighth Amendment, Cruz-Joseph must allege that prison officials were

deliberately indifferent to conditions that were “sufficiently serious.” Chandler

v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The ‘cruel and unusual

punishments’ standard applies to the conditions of a prisoner’s confinement.”).

Conditions of confinement are sufficiently serious under the Eighth

Amendment only if they are so extreme that they expose the prisoner to

“unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety.” Id. at

1289.

As it relates to the denial of food, Cruz-Joseph alleges Sergeant Carrallo

and “shift Sgts; officers” deprived him of a single meal on a single day. The

deprivation of one meal on one day is not a constitutional violation, “especially

where there is no suggestion that [Cruz-Joseph] suffered any adverse physical

effects or that his health was jeopardized as a result of the single deprivation.”

Solomon v. Dep’t of Fin. Serv., No. 5:11cv208/MCR/CJK, 2012 WL 1700838, at

*2 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2012) (collecting cases), rep. & recommendation adopted

by, 2012 WL 1700710, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 15, 2012)3; see also Hoever v.

3 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they too may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union

Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court

Belleis, 703 F. App’x 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiff did

not state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim because he “did not assert that

missing one meal worsened his health”).4 Indeed, “[u]nder the Eighth

Amendment, a prisoner [is] only [] entitled to reasonably adequate food.”

Hernandez v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing

Hamm v. DeKalb Cnty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985)). “[F]eeding a

prisoner a minimal amount of food for a limited number of days” does not

violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. (citing Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 665,

668 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding no Eighth Amendment violation when a prisoner

in solitary confinement was on a 15-day restrictive diet, consisting of 2 slices

of bread a day, unlimited water, and a full meal every 3 days)).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). For decades, the Eleventh Circuit has

would not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision

would have significant persuasive effects.”).

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th

Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished

opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive

authority.”).

described a “more than mere negligence” or “more than gross negligence

standard” in determining whether an official acted with deliberate indifference

to that serious medical need. See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d

1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff

must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had subjective knowledge of a

risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and (3) acted with more than

gross negligence.”) (internal quotations omitted)); see also Wade v. McDade,

106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). Recently, however, the Eleventh Circuit

determined that those standards conflicted with the Supreme Court’s decision

in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit should apply the “subjective

recklessness” standard as used in criminal law. See Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253.

Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to establish liability on

an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered

a deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently

serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with

“subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law,”

id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause” if

he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).5

“As applied in the prison context, the deliberate-indifference standard

sets an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. Indeed, the law is

well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the negligent acts of

corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in

Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or

substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”). The

Eleventh Circuit has also noted that “[n]othing in our case law would derive a

constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to subordinate his

own professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the contrary, it is well

established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does not constitute

deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892, 897 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Similarly, “the question of whether governmental actors should have employed

additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of

a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis for

grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d

5 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to

the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Here, Cruz-Joseph’s vague and

conclusory allegations that the medical response provided was insufficient does

not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. Indeed, he makes no

allegations that Defendant Carrallo or Johnson6 were the individuals who

“ignored” him and “neglected to respond to his medical emergency.” Even if he

had attributed those actions to a remaining Defendant, he does not make any

factual allegations that show either remaining Defendant was “actually,

subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious

harm” to Cruz-Joseph. Further, Cruz-Joseph fails to make any factual

allegations to demonstrate that either Defendant failed to respond reasonably

to the risk. Cruz-Joseph’s own allegations demonstrate that he was seen by

medical and that medical personnel applied “wound glue” to his cut. See

Amended Complaint at 5. To the extent Cruz-Joseph intends to fault either

remaining Defendant based on the belief that prison officials “should have

employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment,” this is also

insufficient to warrant relief under the Eighth Amendment. See Bismark, 213

F. App’x at 897.

Finally, to the extent Cruz-Joseph requests that the Court order prison

officials to transfer him or enforce disciplinary action against any Defendant,

6 The other Defendants were named only in their official capacity, and Cruz-

Joseph failed to state a claim against them in that capacity as stated above.

he would not be entitled to relief. Courts generally will not interfere with

matters of prison administration. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547-48

(1979) (“[T]he operation of our correctional facilities is peculiarly the province

of the Legislative and Executive Branches . . . not the Judicial.”). Federal courts

also do not have the power to order officials to take certain disciplinary actions

against their employees. See LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1543 (11th

Cir. 1993) (holding that a court’s requirement of a state official to discipline its

correctional officers was an “inappropriate use of the court’s equity powers.”);

see also Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 1977) (“We all

understand, of course, that federal courts have no authority to address state

officials out of office or to fire state employees or to take over the performance

of their functions.”), rev’d in part on other grounds by Alabama v. Pugh, 438

U.S. 781 (1978).

In light of the foregoing, this case will be dismissed without prejudice for

Cruz-Joseph’s failure to state a claim. Cruz-Joseph may refile his claims with

factual allegations sufficient to support a claim for relief if he elects to do so.7

Notably, pro se litigants are subject to the same law and rules of court that

govern other litigants who are represented by counsel. See Moon v. Newsome,

7 The Court notes that the claims Cruz-Joseph seeks to assert stem from

actions occurring on April 12, 2025. As such, at this time, the refiling of his claims

would not be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. However, Cruz-Joseph

is cautioned that timely filing is his own responsibility.

863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). All filings with the Court must be made in

accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s Local

Rules.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20th day of April,

2026.

United States District Judge

JaxP-12

C: Aharon Cruz-Joseph, #P90743

14