Wilson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SHAWN WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:23-cv-1002-JEP-PDB

J.E. MOORE,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, an inmate of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, is proceeding pro

se on a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1)

against an officer with the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, J.E. Moore. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant Moore used excessive force during his September 2, 2021

arrest and denied him medical care for the injuries he sustained when he

crashed his motorcycle while attempting to outrun police. See Doc. 1 at 4–5.

Before the Court is Defendant Moore’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

47) and Plaintiff’s pro se Response in opposition (Doc. 62).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the

nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.

1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th

Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving

party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th

Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on

a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

When the moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party

must point to evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine dispute of

material fact. Id. Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and

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“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is

appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the party opposing [the motion].” Haves v. City of Miami,

52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca

Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that, after he crashed his motorcycle, Defendant Moore

struck him about five to six times and dragged him by his helmet, still strapped

to his head, across the road. Doc. 1 at 4–5, 12. He further implies Defendant

Moore prevented him from receiving medical attention at the scene by telling

EMTs that he was being “combative” and did not need medical attention, and

at the jail, by “over-[riding] medical.” Id. at 5, 12.

IV. Motion & Response

Defendant Moore invokes qualified immunity. See Doc. 47 at 10–11. He

supports his Motion with the following evidence: his own declaration (Doc. 48-

1); the transcript of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony (Doc. 48-2); and video

evidence filed under seal, including footage from his own body worn camera

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(“BWC”), Officer Yates’s BWC, Officer Pingry’s BWC, and the camera from the

sally-port area at the jail (Doc. S-51).1

In his Response, Plaintiff complains that Defendant Moore’s counsel was

“uncooperative and evasive” during the discovery process, and he has been

denied crucial video and medical evidence. See Doc. 62 at 3–4. He also says

that the video evidence Defendant Moore did provide is incomplete in that it

does not show what happened before he was handcuffed, which is when he

claims Defendant Moore punched him and pulled him across the road by his

helmet. Id. at 9. Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Defendant Moore’s

Motion on the ground that he never received or reviewed the videos he

requested. Id. at 10.

Although Plaintiff has not filed a motion seeking affirmative relief, his

request implicates Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

provides in part that a court may deny a Rule 56 motion or allow time for

discovery before ruling on it if the “nonmovant shows by affidavit or

declaration that, for specified reasons, [he] cannot present facts essential to

justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(1), (2). Plaintiff is not entitled to

1 Video footage was provided on a thumb drive. That footage will be cited

according to sealed document number (Doc. S-51), followed by a camera identifier

(i.e., “Moore BWC” for the footage from Defendant Moore’s BWC or “SP” for footage

from the sally-port) and a time stamp.

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relief under Rule 56(d). Importantly, he does not provide an affidavit or

declaration with “specified reasons” he cannot effectively oppose Defendant

Moore’s Rule 56 Motion.2 Regardless, he has had ample time to conduct

discovery. See Case Management & Scheduling Order (Doc. 32). The Court

even granted Plaintiff’s two motions for more time (90 days each) in which to

conduct discovery. See Orders (Docs. 36, 41). During the discovery period,

Defendant Moore made initial disclosures in accordance with Rule 26(a) and

responded to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. See Doc. 62 at 31–33, 45–47, 67.

Plaintiff never filed a motion to compel complaining that Defendant Moore’s

discovery responses were insufficient.

Plaintiff now claims he missed the motion to compel deadline because a

faulty fire sprinkler in his cell destroyed his legal papers and the Court’s

scheduling order. Id. at 35–36. Even if proffered through an affidavit or

declaration, this excuse is unconvincing. Plaintiff had from July 2, 2024 until

April 3, 2025, to conduct discovery. See Orders (Docs. 32, 36, 41). In addition,

2 Plaintiff claims his Response is “a sworn affidavit and declaration,” see Doc.

62 at 3, but it is not. “An affidavit is a sworn statement, meaning it is made under

oath before a notary or other oath-taker and affixed with a notary seal. Levitt v. U.S.

Internal Revenue Serv., No. 2:24-CV-00284-SGC, 2025 WL 1745758, at *2 (N.D. Ala.

June 24, 2025). Plaintiff’s Response is not sworn under oath. He also does not include

a statement, “I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and

correct,” or a substantially similar statement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2) (allowing for

the use of unsworn verifications if the individual declares under penalty of perjury

that his statements are true and correct).

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according to a letter he provides as “proof” that a sprinkler head damaged

property inside his cell, that incident appears to have occurred around July

2025, after the discovery period had closed. See Doc. 62 at 35. Had the sprinkler

head broken before the April 3, 2025 discovery deadline, that incident does not

explain why Plaintiff missed not one, not two, but three different deadlines for

the filing of motions to compel.

Finally, Plaintiff does not explain with any specificity what facts he is

missing and how those facts would assist him in opposing Defendant Moore’s

Motion. See generally id. “To invoke rule 56(d), a party may not simply rely on

vague assertions that additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified

facts, but must specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the

motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant’s

showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact.” Burns v. Town of Palm

Beach, 999 F.3d 1317, 1334 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Plaintiff vaguely complains that the arrest report and the video

evidence “conflict” on “numerous details,” see Doc. 62 at 23, but as discussed

below, the video evidence, which speaks for itself, captures all relevant

interactions between Defendant Moore and Plaintiff. Thus, the Court will rule

on the Motion for Summary Judgment.

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V. Law, Evidence & Conclusions

“In order to receive qualified immunity, [a] public official must first prove

that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the

allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th

Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). There is no dispute that Defendant Moore was

acting within his discretionary duties at the time of the incident. Thus, the

burden shifts to Plaintiff to prove that Defendant “(1) violated a constitutional

right, and (2) this right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th

Cir. 2004). Plaintiff must satisfy both prongs to survive a qualified-immunity

defense. Hinson v. Bias, 927 F.3d 1103, 1116 (11th Cir. 2019).

At the time of the events, it was clearly established that an arresting

officer may not use excessive force, evaluated under an objective standard of

reasonableness “without regard to [the officer’s] underlying intent or

motivation.” See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). It was also

clearly established that an arresting officer violates an arrestee’s

constitutional rights if the officer is deliberately indifferent to the arrestee’s

known serious medical needs. See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1308

(11th Cir. 2009). However, the evidence demonstrates that Defendant Moore

did not violate a clearly established constitutional right when arresting

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Plaintiff. Indeed, the camera footage shows that Defendant Moore did not use

any force against Plaintiff, either at the scene of the incident or during

transport, nor did he deny or prevent Plaintiff from receiving necessary

medical care for the injuries he sustained when he crashed his motorcycle

while fleeing from police.

First, Plaintiff says in his Response that he was struck and dragged by

his helmet “before [he] was handcuffed,” Doc. 62 at 9 (emphasis added), and he

testified at his deposition that Defendant Moore “was the first male officer to

interact with him” and the one who hit him and tried to remove his motorcycle

helmet, Doc. 48-2 at 19. According to BWC footage, Defendant Moore was not

the first male officer to encounter Plaintiff after he crashed. See Doc. S-51,

Moore BWC, 06:39:35–06:39:40. When Defendant Moore arrived, at least one

other officer was already struggling to get Plaintiff into handcuffs, and Plaintiff

was lying on the side of the road in the grass. Id. Defendant Moore and a female

officer (who arrived when Moore did) assisted in handcuffing Plaintiff. Id.; see

also Doc. S-51, Yates BWC, 06:39:43–06:40:09. Defendant Moore did not hit

Plaintiff, nor did he pull on Plaintiff’s helmet.3 Given Defendant Moore did not

3 Another male officer attempted to remove Plaintiff’s helmet after he was

handcuffed. That officer aggressively slapped the face shield of Plaintiff’s helmet to

open it, and he pulled hard on the helmet trying to remove it. See Doc. S-51, Yates

BWC, 06:40:08–06:40:11. Plaintiff can be heard saying that he had the helmet

strapped and his neck was hurting. Id., 06:40:11–06:40:15. When that was occurring,

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arrive on the scene until Plaintiff was nearly fully restrained and lying on a

grassy area on the side of the road, Defendant Moore could not have “drug

[Plaintiff] by [his] strapped helmet across the road,” as Plaintiff alleges in his

Complaint. See Doc. 1 at 5.

Second, Plaintiff testified at his deposition that “it took 40 minutes to get

[to the jail], and [he] was slung around . . . . to the point where [he] was

nauseous.” Doc. 48-2 at 21–22. He claimed Defendant Moore drove so

erratically to the jail that he was forced to wedge himself on the floor and had

to be helped off the floor when they arrived at the jail. Id. at 16–18, 21–22, 31.

In his Response to Defendant Moore’s Motion, Plaintiff cites a Tenth Circuit

decision, which held an arrestee stated a plausible excessive force claim where

he alleged the officer intentionally drove recklessly, knowing the arrestee’s

handcuffs were too tight, “so as to toss [him] around the back seat . . . and place

additional pressure on his wrists.” See Doc. 62 at 13 (citing Kostrzewa v. City

of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 640 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Contrary to Plaintiff’s allegations, the BWC footage shows the ride to

the jail took under twenty minutes, and it was not “erratic.” See Doc. S-51,

Moore BWC, 08:01:55–08:18:00. There were some bumps that caused the car

Defendant Moore was standing up, facing the opposite direction. See Doc. S-51, Moore

BWC, 06:40:07–06:40:12; see also Doc. S-51, Pingry BWC, 06:40:07–06:40:15.

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to shake or jar, but those appear to have been attributable to road conditions,

not Defendant’s driving. The drive appeared calm and quiet, and no complaints

by Plaintiff can be heard on the camera footage. See id. When Defendant Moore

pulled into the sally-port area, he opened the back door for Plaintiff, and

Plaintiff appeared to be in the exact same position Defendant Moore

recommended he sit before they left the scene—with his back against the door

and his legs across the seat. See Doc. S-51, SP, 04:21:00–04:21:23. He was not

“wedged” on the floor of the car. No one helped him out. He slowly scooted out

on his own. See id.4

Finally, Plaintiff alleges he was “denied ambulance” and “hospital” by

orders of Defendant Moore. See Doc. 1 at 4. He implied during his deposition

that Defendant Moore prevented him from being treated or taken to the

4 Curiously, the plaintiff in Kostrzewa also alleged, as does Plaintiff, that he

was knocked against the plastic partition in the car and had “to wedge himself” on

the floor to keep from being tossed around. 247 F.3d at 640. Even if those facts were

enough to state a claim in the Kostrzewa case—a case that is not binding on this

Court—the video evidence belies Plaintiff’s unsupported claim that these things

happened to him.

Plaintiff also testified at his deposition that Defendant Moore drove to the jail

“in a roundabout way” and was not kind or helpful in getting him into the car so that

he would not hurt himself. See Doc. 48-2 at 28. Although not material to Plaintiff’s

claims, the video evidence blatantly contradicts these statements as well. Defendant

Moore took the highway, and he was respectful in his interactions with Plaintiff,

calling him “sir” or “buddy,” or “bubba,” and even readjusted Plaintiff’s handcuffs

when Plaintiff complained they were hurting, advised Plaintiff how to situate himself

on the seat to be most comfortable, and ensured Plaintiff had enough (or not too much)

air. See Doc. S-51, Moore BWC, 07:00:30–07:01:07, 07:21:40–07:23:23, 07:44:15,

07:56:12.

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hospital by EMTs and talked the nurses at the jail out of sending him to the

hospital before being booked. See Doc. 48-2 at 26, 31–32. He also testified that

no officer asked him at the scene if he needed medical attention. Id. at 25.

According to the BWC footage, Defendant Moore requested rescue within a

minute of helping to secure Plaintiff in handcuffs. See Doc. S-51, Moore BWC,

06:40:51. He also asked Plaintiff, “What hurts, buddy, so I can tell rescue?” Id.,

06:41:42–06:41:44. Plaintiff responded by saying he was “fine” and only

“scraped up.” Id., 06:41:44–06:41:50. Defendant Moore told Plaintiff that they

were going to have “rescue come to check [him] out” regardless. Id., 06:42:49.

Plaintiff conceded at his deposition that the paramedics evaluated him

at the scene before he was transported to the jail. See Doc. 48-2 at 23. He said

that the paramedics “could tell by [him] sitting on the side of the road that [he]

didn’t have . . . broken bones or anything and [he] didn’t need medical

attention,” and no paramedic concluded after assessing him that he had to be

transported to the hospital. Id. at 23, 27. The BWC footage shows that

Defendant Moore never spoke directly with the EMTs, did not intervene in or

observe their physical evaluation of Plaintiff, and did not decide (or weigh in

on) whether Plaintiff should be taken to the hospital before the jail. See Doc.

S-51, Moore BWC, 06:46:20–06:52:40. Defendant Moore was engaged in

investigatory matters while EMTs were tending to Plaintiff. See id.

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After EMTs left and Plaintiff had been in the backseat of Defendant

Moore’s patrol car for nearly one hour—while still at the scene—something

Plaintiff said to Defendant Moore prompted Moore to ask Plaintiff if he wanted

rescue to come back. See id., 07:56:17. Plaintiff cannot be heard, but Defendant

Moore responded by saying he was not a doctor, and he would do whatever

Plaintiff wanted him to. Id., 07:56:17–07:56:40. Plaintiff apparently declined

rescue. See id. In the sally-port area at the jail, a nurse evaluated and treated

Plaintiff’s wounds. See Doc. S-51, SP, 04:26:30–04:32:10.

As explained, the video evidence blatantly contradicts Plaintiff’s

deposition testimony and Complaint allegations in most material respects,

such that they are not to be credited. “When opposing parties tell two different

stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the

facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The video evidence indisputably shows

Defendant Moore did not use excessive (or any) force against Plaintiff and did

not deny him medical care.5

5 Given Plaintiff had just suffered a traumatic accident, was admittedly high

on methamphetamine, and conceded at his deposition that he did not know “which

officer arrived first, second, third, or fourth” and the way “he remember[ed events]

might not be exactly the way [they] happened,” Doc. 48-1 at 21, 30–31, 43–44, the

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Even if Plaintiff should have been sent to a hospital for treatment before

being booked, as an officer with no medical expertise, Defendant Moore was

entitled to defer to the judgment of EMTs at the scene and the nurses at the

jail regarding whether Plaintiff needed emergency medical attention. See

Mann, 588 F.3d at 1308 (holding the plaintiff’s argument that arresting

officers were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs “without

merit” where the officers called emergency medical personnel to the scene, and

the “medically trained” professionals concluded the plaintiff was not “in any

immediate medical distress” that would have warranted transport to the

hospital). There is no evidence that Defendant Moore knew Plaintiff required

more treatment than what was provided but actively prevented a medical

professional from rendering or arranging for that treatment. On the contrary,

Defendant Moore is the one who called rescue initially and asked Plaintiff if he

wanted to have rescue called back to the scene when Plaintiff later started

complaining about his injuries.

Defendant Moore carries his burden on summary judgment showing he

is entitled to qualified immunity, and Plaintiff fails to point to evidence in the

record to demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact.

Court gives him the benefit of the doubt regarding his motivations for initiating and

prosecuting this action premised on allegations that are so at odds with reality.

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Accordingly, itis ORDERED:

1. Defendant Moore’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47)

is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of

Defendant Moore, terminate any pending motions as moot,

and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20th day of April

2026.

□ JORDAN E. PRATT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jax-6

Shawn Wilson

Counsel of Record

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