Aaron

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

KAMEON SUPREME AARON PLAINTIFF

ADC #129521

v. No: 4:24-cv-00838-BSM-PSH

GETRY SMITH DEFENDANT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The following Recommendation has been sent to United States District Judge

Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part of this

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the

factual and/or legal basis for your objection, and (2) be received by the Clerk of this

Court within fourteen (14) days of this Recommendation. By not objecting, you

may waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

DISPOSITION

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Kameon Supreme Aaron, an inmate at the Arkansas Division of

Correction’s Grimes Unit, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on

October 2, 2024 (Doc. No. 2). Aaron subsequently filed an amended complaint

(Doc. No. 4). In the Amended Complaint, Aaron alleged that on June 20, 2024,

defendant Sergeant Getry Smith sprayed him with mace while he was attempting to

hang himself and then wrote him a false disciplinary. Doc. No. 4 at 4-7. Aaron

claimed that the use of the chemical spray was excessive and that Smith acted with

a retaliatory motive because Aaron had previously informed ADC officials of a

criminal enterprise at the Cummins Unit between inmates and staff. Id. Aaron seeks

both injunctive and monetary relief against Smith in his official and personal

capacities. Id. at 3 & 10. Aaron’s excessive force and retaliation claims against

Smith are the only claims remaining in this case. See Doc. Nos. 6 & 10.

Before the Court is Smith’s motion for summary judgment, supporting brief,

statement of undisputed material facts, and several exhibits (Doc. Nos. 37-43).

Although Aaron was notified of his opportunity to file a response, he did not do so.

See Doc. No. 45. He also failed to file a statement setting forth disputed facts he

believes must be decided at trial as required by Local Rule 56.1. Because Aaron

failed to controvert the facts set forth in Smith’s statement of facts, Doc. No. 42,

those facts are deemed admitted. See Local Rule 56.1(c). Smith’s statement of facts,

and the other pleadings and exhibits in the record, establish that the material facts

are not in dispute, and Smith is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

II. Legal Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is

proper if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir.

2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials, but instead must

demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann

v. Yarnell, 497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations

must be supported by sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in

his favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations

omitted). An assertion that a fact cannot be disputed or is genuinely disputed must

be supported by materials in the record such as “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including

those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or

other materials . . .”. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). A party may also show that a fact

is disputed or undisputed by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the

absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce

admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). A dispute is

genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict

for either party; a fact is material if its resolution affects the outcome of the case.

Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes

that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will not preclude

summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th

Cir. 2010).

III. Facts1

June 20, 2024 Use of Force

In his deposition, Aaron testified that he had attempted suicide on multiple

occasions, with his most recent attempt three days prior to June 20. Aaron

Deposition at 32:7-33:17, 47:1-8, 48:25-49:6, 58:6-8. He was placed on treatment

precaution2 as a result. Id. at 48:21-24. On June 20, Aaron tore the paper gown he

was wearing into strips, twisted the strips, and then braided them together. Id. at

57:10-11. He explained that he “would braid it real tight, real tough, real tight where

it might not hold your weight but you could strangle somebody with it.” Id. at 57:21-

23. After braiding the gown, Aaron stood up on the concrete bed in his cell and

looped the gown around the bars at the top of the cell. Id. at 59:4-13, 60:1-7. He

1 These facts were taken from Smith’s statement of undisputed material facts (Doc.

No. 42) and the evidence provided in support, including video recordings of the incident

(Doc. No. 43) and Aaron’s deposition testimony (the “Aaron Deposition”) (Doc. No. 37-

11). Opinions, legal conclusions, and immaterial facts are omitted.

2 In his declaration, Smith explained that the south wing of the Cummins Unit

houses inmates that are in restrictive housing or are on treatment precaution. Doc. No.

37-1, Declaration of Getry Smith (“Smith Declaration”), at ¶ 5. He further explained

that inmates are placed on treatment precaution by mental health staff when they are

deemed to be at risk of harm to themselves or others. Id. at ¶ 7.

then placed the makeshift noose around his neck and started spinning around to

tighten the noose. Id. at 60:8-13.

According to Aaron, he had wrapped a sleeping bag around himself before he

began to spin with the noose on his neck. Aaron Deposition at 60:15-24. He

acknowledged that even though he had the sleeping bag held up high, his neck and

head were exposed. Id. at 61:7-19. Aaron stated that he was never unconscious

during the suicide attempt but began to feel lightheaded as if he was going to pass

out, which was his goal. Id. at 63:3-9. He said that before Smith arrived, he heard

Jessica Allen and Corporal Anderson in the hallway, and heard Allen say, “Don’t

just stand there, stop him.” Id. at 63:10-23. Smith then sprayed him with mace. Id.

at 64:24-65:4. Aaron explained that his back was covered up with the sleeping bag,

and his back was facing Smith when he was sprayed. Aaron Deposition at 61:23-

62:17. He admitted that he was not sprayed directly in his face and acknowledged

that he received no physical injury apart from the side effects of chemical spray. Id.

at 62:24-63:2, 76:8-14, 95:20-96:7. Aaron claimed he received no order or

instruction to come down from the bed and was not warned before Smith sprayed

him. Id. at 51:3-10, 81:5-15. Aaron acknowledged that Smith’s use of the spray

startled him and stopped him from harming himself. Id. at 66:1-4, 70:10-12. Once

sprayed, he stepped off the concrete slab and the noose broke. Id. at 65:9-10.

According to Smith’s declaration, he was conducting a security round on the

south wing of the Cummins Unit at approximately 4:40 p.m. on June 20, 2024. Smith

Declaration at ¶ 4. When Smith approached south wing cell S-11, he observed

Aaron standing on his bed trying to hang himself inside the cell. Id. at ¶ 9. Aaron’s

paper gown was braided and tied around his neck. Id. Smith explained that Aaron’s

back was facing him and he was wrapped in a sleeping bag which partially blocked

his view and acted as a barrier between him and the cell. Id. at ¶¶ 10 & 12.

According to Smith, he contacted his supervisor, Lieutenant Corey Haynie, on the

radio, and instructed Aaron to get down from his bed, but Aaron did not do so. Id.

at ¶ 11. Smith then deployed a short burst of OC spray into the cell, and Aaron

quickly came down from his bed. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. When Haynie arrived, he directed

Smith to obtain the key to Aaron’s cell from the control booth; once Smith returned

with the key, Haynie cut the braided paper gown from Aaron’s neck, and Smith and

Haynie escorted Aaron to the south wing shower for decontamination.3 Id. at ¶¶ 15-

16. After decontamination, Aaron was taken to the infirmary in a restraint chair

because he had been combative with staff, and was then escorted to his cell. Id. at

3 It is undisputed that Aaron was allowed to decontaminate in the shower and

taken to the infirmary. See Doc. No. 42, Statement of Undisputed Facts, at ¶¶ 18, 20 &

32; Aaron Deposition at 17:24-25-18:1-6, 74:14-25-75:1-24. Aaron testified that he

attempted suicide again in the shower (id. at 72:15-73:1-9), but he did not bring any

claims relating to that attempt, the decontamination process, or the medical treatment he

received. See Doc. No. 4 at 4-9.

¶¶ 18-21. Medical staff recorded no physical injuries or health complaints. Doc.

No. 37-2, Incident Report, at 5.

The incident is captured in video footage from June 20, 2024. Doc. No. 37-7,

Video Footage Filed Under Seal (flash drive docketed at Doc. No. 43). In the

footage, Aaron can be seen standing on the bed in his cell wrapped in a sleeping bag.

Cell S-11 Footage at 4:44:43 - 4:45:03. Smith is seen walking in front of the cell

before he quickly administers a short burst of OC spray into the cell. Id. at 4:44:43-

4:45:02. The burst of spray is so brief that the footage offers no visual confirmation

that any spray was dispersed. Id. at 4:45:02. When he was sprayed, Aaron’s back

was facing Smith and he was still covered up with the sleeping bag. Id. at 4:45:01.

It is clear from the footage that while Smith sprayed into the cell, he did not spray

Aaron directly. Id. at 4:44:43-4:45:05. Aaron quickly came down from the bed after

the burst of spray was administered. Id. at 4:45:03 - 4:45:06. Hallway footage shows

Aaron being escorted down the hall minutes later. Hallway Cam One Footage at

4:48:12 – 4:48:36.

According to the ADC’s Use of Force Policy, non-deadly force may be used,

when necessary, in order to restrain, maintain or regain control of an inmate. Doc.

No. 37-9, Administrative Directive 17-06; Doc. No. 37-8, Administrative Regulation

409 (“AR 409”). Non-deadly force is also authorized for use to compel compliance

with orders and to protect individuals. Id. AR 409 authorizes the use of chemical

agents when the use of non-deadly force is necessary. AR 409 at 2. Whenever force

is used, internal affairs is notified, and an investigation is conducted. Doc. No. 37-

4, Declaration of Jimmy Coleman IV (“Coleman Declaration”), at ¶ 29; Doc. No.

37-10, Internal Affairs Documentation (filed under seal at Doc. No. 43 on flash

drive). Internal Affairs was informed of the use of force involving Aaron on June

20, 2024, and determined that the use of force was appropriate and according to

policy. Coleman Declaration at ¶ 29; Doc. No. 37-6, Declaration of Thomas

Rowland, at ¶¶ 26-27; Internal Affairs Documentation.

June 20, 2024 Disciplinary

After returning Aaron to his cell, Smith wrote Aaron a disciplinary for the

following code violations: 2-15, Tampering w/Or Blocking Lock; 12-3, Failure to

Obey Order of Staff; 7-1, Unauthorized Use of State Property; and 8-4, Destruction

of Property. Smith Declaration at ¶ 22; Doc. No. 37-3, Disciplinary. Beyond

preparing the disciplinary documentation, Smith had no further involvement in the

disciplinary process. Smith Declaration at ¶ 23. On June 25, 2024, Aaron was

notified of the disciplinary charges, and he was also transferred to another facility

for unrelated reasons. Doc. No. 37-3, Disciplinary, at 3; Coleman Declaration at ¶

34.

On July 3, 2024, Major Jimmy Coleman dismissed the disciplinary because

the time for a hearing had expired. Coleman Declaration at ¶ 35. According to

ADC policy, a disciplinary hearing must take place no more than seven business

days after a disciplinary is written, unless an authorized extension is requested. Id.

at ¶ 36. Coleman does not know why an extension was not requested. Id. at ¶ 37.

Coleman and Deputy Warden Robert Pierce both acknowledged that the disciplinary

charges were appropriate, credible, and supported by evidence. Id. at ¶ 39; Doc. No.

37-5, Declaration of Robert Pierce, at ¶ 29.

According to Smith, he was unaware that Aaron had allegedly informed

prison officials of a criminal enterprise involving inmates and staff at the Cummins

Unit prior to Aaron filing this lawsuit. Smith Declaration at ¶ 24. He stated that his

use of the chemical spray and the subsequent disciplinary were both a result of

Aaron’s actions on June 20, 2024. Id. at ¶ 25. Aaron claims he spoke with ADC

officials regarding the criminal enterprise on April 10, 2024, two months before the

use of force incident.4 Doc. No. 4 at 4; Aaron Deposition at 39:9-19. Aaron testified

in his deposition that after he informed ADC officials of a criminal enterprise at the

Cummins Unit, he was threatened by officers and inmates for snitching. Aaron

Deposition at 39:20-40:12, 41:5-42:14. He admitted that Smith never threatened

him. Id. at 42:15-19. When asked whether Smith was aware of his alleged

disclosure in his deposition, Aaron responded: “Yes, he was aware. He was on the

4 Deputy Warden Pierce has no recollection of Aaron ever informing him or any

other ADC official of any criminal enterprise occurring at the Cummins Unit. Pierce

Declaration at ¶ 30.

shift. He was aware that I was on treatment precaution . . . when you got an inmate

like me, they gotta know what’s going on, they gotta know. . . . ” Aaron Deposition

at 42:20-43:3. Aaron testified he never personally informed Smith about any

criminal enterprise at the Cummins Unit. Id. at 38:1-4. He also testified that prior

to the use of force on June 20, 2024, Aaron had never had a bad interaction with

Smith. Id. at 43:21-44:4. Finally, Aaron acknowledged that using his sleeping bag

to block the cell door was a rule violation that warranted a disciplinary. Id. at 84:23-

25.

IV. Analysis

A. Sovereign Immunity

Smith argues that Aaron’s monetary claims against him in his official capacity

are barred by sovereign immunity. Doc. No. 38 at 5-6. A suit against a state

employee in his or her official capacity is in essence a suit against the State of

Arkansas, and any official capacity claim for monetary damages against that

defendant is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Will v. Michigan

Department of State Police, et al., 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d

429, 431-432 (8th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, Aaron’s official capacity claims for

money damages should be dismissed with prejudice.

Aaron also seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring all

correctional officers to wear body cameras on their person while working in all ADC

prison units. Doc. No. 4 at 10. However, while the doctrine of sovereign immunity

does not apply to a request for injunctive relief, see Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d

936, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2005), Aaron’s request for injunctive relief is moot. 5 He is no

longer incarcerated at the Cummins Unit where defendant Smith works. See

generally Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985) (“[A] prisoner’s

claim for injunctive relief to improve prison conditions is moot if he or she is no

longer subject to those conditions.”).

B. Qualified Immunity

Smith asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Aaron’s

individual capacity claims. Doc. No. 38 at 6-21. To determine whether defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must determine: (1) “whether the facts

alleged or shown, construed in the light most favorable to [plaintiff], establish the

5 Aaron’s request is also overly broad in that he requests all officers to wear body

cameras. The PLRA requires that injunctions with respect to prison conditions be narrowly

tailored. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1). The PLRA states:

Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall

extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of any Federal right

of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any

prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn,

extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,

and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the

federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact

on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the

relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (emphasis added).

violation of a constitutional or statutory right,” and (2) “whether that constitutional

right was clearly established as of [the time of the relevant conduct], such that a

reasonable official would have known that [his or her] actions were unlawful.” Scott

v. Benson, 742 F.3d 335, 339 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Krout v. Goemner, 583 F.3d

557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009); see also Wright v. United States, 813 F.3d 689, 695 (8th

Cir. 2015). Courts may exercise “their sound discretion in deciding which of the

two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of

the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.

223, 236 (2009).

1. Excessive Force Claim

Aaron argues that Smith used excessive force when he sprayed him on June

20, 2024. Doc. No. 4 at 9. The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates

the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. “Whenever

prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the

Eighth Amendment, the ‘core judicial inquiry’ is whether the force was applied in a

good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.” Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 495 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7). See also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986)

(holding that, in an excessive force case, there must be “a reliable inference of

wantonness,” and not “a mere dispute over the reasonableness of particular use of

force or the existence of arguably superior alternatives”). Factors which inform this

inquiry include the need for the application of physical force; the relationship

between the need for physical force and the amount of force applied; and the extent

of injury suffered by the inmate.6 Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d at 495. Unless “‘it

appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, will

support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain . . . the case should

not go to the jury.’” Johnson v. Bi-State Justice Ctr./Arkansas Dep’t of Corr., 12

F.3d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). The Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals has further held:

[W]hen an official’s intent is an element of the § 1983 claim, as it is in

Eighth Amendment excessive force claims, and if the official has made

a properly supported motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity, the plaintiff “must identify affirmative evidence from which

a jury could find that the plaintiff has carried his or her burden of

proving the pertinent motive.”

6 A plaintiff need not allege significant injuries to state an excessive force claim.

See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) (abrogating the de minimis injury

rule in excessive force cases, and clarifying that the extent of the injury is only one factor

to be considered when resolving the “core judicial injury” of “whether force was applied

in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm”); Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007, 1012 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that “the

extent of any resulting injury, while material to the question of damages and informative

as to the likely degree of the force applied, is not in and of itself a threshold requirement

for proving” an excessive force claim). However, the extent of a plaintiff’s injuries may

constitute evidence of the amount and type of force used, and a greater than de minimis use

of force is required. “Even where the force is unjustified, ‘not every push or shove violates

the Constitution, but any use of force greater than de minimis, or any use of force that is

‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind,’ does.” Burt v. Nurse R.N., No. 4:19-CV-00040-

SMR-CFB, 2019 WL 8752341, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Mar. 27, 2019) (citing Irving v. Dormire,

519 F.3d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 2008)).

Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Crawford-El v.

Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998)).

The question in this case is whether Smith acted maliciously and sadistically

when he sprayed Aaron with chemical spray on June 20, 2024. The Court has

carefully reviewed the video recordings of the June 20 incident, and the video clearly

shows that Smith administered a very short burst of chemical spray, causing Aaron

to get off his bed at which point the noose broke. See Cell S-11 Footage at 4:45:02

- 4:45:06. Aaron admits that Smith’s use of spray stopped him from harming

himself. See Aaron Deposition at 66:1-4, 70:10-12.

Smith’s use of spray was reasonable under the circumstances. Most

importantly, he interrupted Aaron’s suicide attempt. There is no indication Smith

had any other reason to spray Aaron. Aaron’s back was facing Smith, he was mostly

covered in a sleeping bag, and Smith did not have a key to the cell. Spraying Aaron

worked to interrupt him while he was twisting the noose around his neck, resulting

in him stepping off the bed and breaking the noose.

Additionally, the video clearly shows that Smith released only one short burst

of spray. Aaron acknowledged he was not sprayed directly in the face and did not

suffer any injury beyond discomfort.7 See Aaron Deposition at 76:8-14, 95:20-96:7.

7 It is well settled that a limited use of mace or chemical spray to control a

recalcitrant inmate does not constitute excessive force. Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491,

496 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a limited application of chemical spray a “tempered

And even assuming Smith did not specifically warn Aaron he would use chemical

spray beforehand, as Aaron alleged in his deposition testimony (Aaron Deposition

at 51:3-10, 81:5-15), there are no other factors indicating that Smith used an

excessive amount of force. “[U]nder current case law, a failure to warn that force

will be used, standing alone, will generally not preclude summary judgment in an

officer’s favor. Generally, there must be other conduct.” See Wright v. State of

Arkansas, No. 4:15-CV-452-BSM-BD, 2016 WL 3023845, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Apr.

26, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:15CV00452 BSM, 2016 WL

3024081 (E.D. Ark. May 25, 2016) (citing Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186, 1189

(8th Cir. 2008) (failed to warn coupled with “super-soaker” amount of spray); Treats

v. Morgan, supra (prolonged burst of pepper spray without warning and inmate

denied shower and clean clothes/bedding for three days afterwards); and Lawrence

v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 730, 732 (8th Cir. 2002) (inmates’ faces, bodies, and

cells soaked with pepper spray from a MK-46); Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687,

692 (8th Cir. 2001) (inmate awakened and sprayed with no warning, then sprayed

again after becoming compliant, and not allowed to shower for days)). Likewise, in

Burns, the Eighth Circuit distinguished its cases finding the use of chemical spray

response” to control a recalcitrant inmate who had refused and questioned a direct order

from his supervisor and refused to return to his barracks); Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d

868, 873 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The test is whether the officer’s use of force was reasonable

under the circumstances, or whether it was punitive, arbitrary, or malicious.”).

punitive or arbitrary, stating “the few cases where we denied summary judgment in

Eighth Amendment excessive force claims based on pepper spraying have involved

no warning this force would be used, no apparent purpose other than inflicting pain,

use of unnecessary ‘super-soaker’ quantities of the chemical, refusal to allow the

victim to wash off the painful chemical for days, and/or use of additional physical

force.” 752 F.3d at 1140.

In these circumstances, Smith’s use of chemical spray did not constitute

excessive force but instead constituted a good faith effort to prevent Aaron from

hanging himself. Accordingly, Aaron cannot establish a constitutional violation

occurred, and Smith is entitled to qualified immunity.

2. Retaliation Claims

In his Amended Complaint, Aaron claimed that Smith sprayed him and issued

him a disciplinary on June 20 in retaliation for Aaron’s prior reports of criminal

activity in the prison.8 Doc. No. 4 at 7. To succeed on a § 1983 retaliation claim, a

plaintiff must prove: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that the

government official took adverse action against him that would chill a person of

ordinary firmness from continuing the activity; and (3) that the adverse action was

8 Smith asserts that Aaron may have abandoned his retaliation claim based on the

use of chemical spray because he testified that he was willing to let the spraying incident

go and would not have sued but for the “frivolous disciplinary.” See Aaron Deposition at

77:4-17; Doc. No. 38 at 19.

motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity. Gonzalez v. Bendt,

971 F.3d 742, 745 (8th Cir. 2020); Spencer v. Jackson Cnty., 738 F.3d 907, 911 (8th

Cir. 2013). Speculative and conclusory, or de minimis allegations cannot support a

retaliation claim. See Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996) (per

curiam). A plaintiff must also prove a causal connection between the constitutionally

protected activity and the adverse action. Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876 (8th

Cir. 2004). Temporal proximity between a protected activity and an adverse action

“is relevant but not dispositive.” Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 592 (8th Cir.

2006) (citing Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999)).

To succeed on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must provide affirmative evidence of a

retaliatory motive. See Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152, 1157 (8th Cir. 2009);

see also Wilson, 441 F.3d at 592 (“[Plaintiff’s] belief that [defendant] acted from a

retaliatory motive is insufficient.”).

Aaron’s reports of criminal activity in the prison may constitute protected

activity. However, he acknowledged that he merely believed Smith would know

about these reports – he did not personally inform Smith, and Smith never threatened

him. See Aaron Deposition at 38:1-4, 42:15-19. Accordingly, Aaron has come

forward with no evidence of a motive on Smith’s part to retaliate against him.

Further, Smith had a reason to spray Aaron on June 20 – he stopped Aaron from

hanging himself. And he had a reason to write the disciplinary – Aaron had wrapped

himself in a sleeping bag, blocking the view into the cell — and as he acknowledged,

that was a violation of a prison rule. See Aaron Deposition at 84:23-25. A retaliatory

discipline clam fails if there is some evidence that the inmate violated a prison rule.

See Sanders v. Hobbs, 773 F.3d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 2014). Aaron’s retaliation claims

therefore fail as a matter of law and Smith is entitled to qualified immunity on these

claims.

Vv. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Smith’s motion for summary judgment should

be GRANTED. Aaron’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice.

SO RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of July, 2026.

mom ae