LUSKI

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SHIMON ASAF LUSKI,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 25-14657 (ZNQ) (TJB)

v.

OPINION

JUDGE MADELIN F. EINBINDER, et al.,

Defendants.

QURAISHI, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon an application to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”) (ECF No. 21) by pro se Plaintiff Shimon Asaf Luski (“Plaintiff”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2), the Court will conduct a sua sponte screening of the Complaint (“Compl.”, ECF No.

1). Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Federal Protection (ECF No. 8), and Emergency

Motion for Federal Intervention (ECF No. 26). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will

GRANT Plaintiff’s IFP Application and DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s Motions will be DENIED AS MOOT.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following facts are derived from Plaintiff’s Complaint.1 As such, the facts asserted

therein are accepted as true only for the purposes of screening the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1915(e)(2). Plaintiff filed a Complaint and an IFP application on August 12, 2025. (ECF No 1.)

1 Attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint are scores of documents, state court orders, police reports, and declarations made

by Plaintiff. (See generally ECF Nos. 1-1 &1-2.) The Court will consider these documents as part of Plaintiff’s

Complaint.

On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Federal Protection. (ECF No. 8.) The Court

denied Plaintiff’s IFP application without prejudice on December 9, 2025. (ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff

filed a second IFP application on December 12, 2025. (ECF No. 21.) On April 22, 2026, Plaintiff

filed an Emergency Motion for Immediate Federal Intervention. (ECF No. 26.)

The Complaint is not a model of clarity. As best the Court can discern and in the briefest

terms, Plaintiff has been the subject of ongoing proceedings before the New Jersey Superior Court,

Ocean County, Family Division. Plaintiff has had multiple temporary and final restraining orders

imposed against him for domestic relations incidents. (ECF No. 1-2 at 12–17, 29, 76–84.) Plaintiff

alleges that these restraining orders have been “weaponized” against him, “and used as [the]

foundation for multiple arrests [and additional] restraining orders.” (Compl. at 3.) For example,

Plaintiff attests that he was arrested on August 25, 2024, spent forty-six days in jail, and upon

conclusion of a trial conducted on January 30, 2025, he was sentenced to time served. (ECF No.

1-1 at 5.)

Plaintiff is additionally on probation with monthly check-ins from probation officers, is in

arrears of his child support payments, and faces ongoing enforcement collection actions to recoup

the amount owed. (Compl. at 3; ECF No. 1-2 at 65–66, 69–70; ECF No. 13 at 1.) Plaintiff avers

that his ongoing court-ordered probation and financial collections have been carried out under

“unsigned or mismatched dockets, despite multiple hearings in which no judicial officer authorized

any term of probation.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 10 at 1.) Plaintiff claims that his requests for signed

court orders and other court documents caused him to experience retaliatory punishment, and that

he was consistently misled by court staff about the implications of his restraining orders and the

status of the proceedings against him. (Compl. at 2.)

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the following Defendants:

(1) Hon. Madelin F. Einbinder, J.S.C. (“Judge Einbinder”), Hon. Vincent J. Grasso, J.S.C. (“Judge

Grasso”), and Hon. Deborah Hanlon-Schron, J.S.C. (“Judge Hanlon-Schron”), (collectively the

“Judges”); (2) Court Clerk “Jeanin” (the “Court Clerk”); (3) Kimberly Knapp, as Manager of

Probation and Child Support, and Nancy Therman, as Manager of the Family Division

(collectively, the “Managers”); (4) Probation Officers Scott and Hart (collectively, the “Probation

Officers”); (5) Sara Litek (“Litek”) and Jessica Desousa (“DeSousa”), as Child Support Agents

(collectively, the “Child Support Agents”); (6) the New Jersey Superior Court, Ocean County,

Family, Child Support, and Probation Divisions (the “New Jersey Superior Court, Ocean

County”); (7) Laura Ben-Ishay2 (“Ben-Ishay”); (8) Assistant Prosecutor Moscato; and

(9) Detective Shadiak.3 (See generally id.4)

Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) violation of the procedural due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against the Judges, the Court Clerk, the Managers, Litek, the

Probation Officers, and the New Jersey Superior Court, Ocean County (“Count One”); (2) double

jeopardy and excessive punishment against Judges Einbinder and Grasso, the Probation Officers,

and the New Jersey Superior Court, Ocean County (“Count Two”); (3) retaliation for protected

speech and access to the courts against all Defendants (“Count Three”); (4) violation of the equal

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against Judges Grasso and Hanlon-Schron, the

Managers, Litek, and Ben-Ishay (“Count Four”); (5) unlawful jail conditions and cruel punishment

against the “Ocean County Jail System” and Judge Einbinder (“Count Five”); and (6) abuse of

state power and color of law against all Defendants (“Count Six”). (See generally id.)

2 Also named in the Complaint as: Laura J. Ben-Ishay, Ben-Ishay, and Laura Luski.

3 Plaintiff does not provide full names for the Court Clerk, Assistant Prosecutor Moscato, or Detective Shadiak.

4 The Court construes the claims against the Judges, the Court Clerk, the Managers, the Probation Officers, Assistant

Prosecutor Moscato, and Detective Shadiak as brought against them in both their individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff seeks damages against the Defendants, in the aggregate of $25,000,000, as well

as: (1) the “full expungement of all criminal, municipal, and probation records” associated with

his case, “including any charges, arrests, restraining orders, or court findings” procured by

unconstitutional or fraudulent means; (2) immediate termination of “all current enforcement

actions based on manipulated hearings or improperly entered restraining orders”; (3) an order

requiring “correction” of state or local databases to remove harmful legal information related to

Plaintiff; and (4) a declaration that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated. (ECF No. 1-1 at

21.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

District courts must review IFP complaints and sua sponte dismiss any action that “(i) is

frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

“Whether a complaint should be dismissed under § 1915 because it fails to state a claim is assessed

under the same standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Rhodes v.

Maryland Judiciary, 546 F. App’x 91, 93 (3d Cir. 2013).

When evaluating the pleadings under a 12(b)(6) standard, “courts accept all factual

allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine

whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.”

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. County of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). Under 12(b)(6), a complaint survives if it contains

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). It is not for courts to decide at this

point whether the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, but “whether the[ plaintiff] should be

afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of [his] claims.” In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props.,

Inc. Sec. Litig., 311 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2002). While “detailed factual allegations” are not

necessary, a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).

Further, federal courts have a constant obligation to satisfy themselves of their

subject-matter jurisdiction and to decide the issue sua sponte. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward

Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 742, 750 (3d Cir. 1995). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3),

a federal court must dismiss an action if it “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction.”

III. DISCUSSION

A. IN FORMA PAUPERIS APPLICATION

Based on the information provided in Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court finds that it is

appropriate to permit him to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s IFP Application will therefore

be GRANTED. Having granted Plaintiff’s IFP Application, the Court will sua sponte screen the

Complaint.

B. SUA SPONTE SCREENING

Upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds that it must be dismissed for several

reasons. The Court discusses those reasons below.

1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over each of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine proscribes federal district courts from

exercising jurisdiction over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by

state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.

Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The principle undergirding Rooker-Feldman is simple: 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331 “is a grant of original jurisdiction[ ] and does not authorize district courts to exercise

appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments[.]” Id., at 292 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub.

Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002)). As the United States Supreme Court recently

stated, the principles of federalism are “best served by continuing to apply Rooker-Feldman to

federal cases in which plaintiffs seek review of state-court judgments, regardless of whether those

judgments are final trial-court judgments or those of a State’s highest court.” T.M. v. Univ. of

Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., Civ. No. 25-197, 608 U.S. ----, 2026 WL 1751823, at *9 (2026).

“The Third Circuit has consistently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits suits

brought in federal court where, as here, Plaintiff challenges the judgments of state family courts.”

Adamo v. Jones, Civ. No. 15-1073, 2016 WL 356031, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2016) (internal

citations omitted). For Rooker-Feldman to apply, the Third Circuit has enumerated four

prerequisites that must be met: “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff

complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were rendered

before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and

reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159,

166 (3d Cir. 2010). All four requirements are present in this matter.

Here, a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) was issued against Plaintiff in the Lakewood

Township Municipal Court on July 28, 2022 for a prima facie act of domestic violence pursuant

to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (“PDVA”), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-17, et seq. (ECF

No. 1-2 at 15.) Another TRO was issued against Plaintiff on December 1, 2022 by Judge Einbinder

pursuant to a prima facie act of domestic violence under the PDVA and a final hearing was

scheduled for December 12, 2022. (Id. at 28.) An amended TRO was granted on January 20,

2023, and the final restraining order (“FRO”) against Plaintiff was imposed pursuant to PDVA and

has been amended several times throughout 2023 and 2024 regarding Plaintiff’s visitation time

with his children. (ECF No. 1-2 at 76.) Under the statutory scheme of the PDVA, violations of

an order issued under the PDVA may result in contempt proceedings before the Family Part of the

New Jersey Superior Court and may be enforced in a civil or criminal action. N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 2C:25-31. A defendant to a contempt violation may be sentenced to probation, id. at -32.3, but

any person convicted of a second domestic contempt offense shall be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment for no less than thirty days. Id. at -31. Plaintiff has appeared to violate the terms of

the FRO and his probation at least three times (see Compl. at 2; ECF 1-2 at 24), subjecting him to

a forty-six-day stint in county jail. (ECF No. 1-1 at 5.)

For each of Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, he alleges that restraining orders imposed

against him have been either fabricated, altered, or manipulated, as part of a campaign to punish

Plaintiff and deprive him of his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments. (See generally Compl.) Plaintiff thus claims that the enforcement of these

restraining orders has subjected him to unconstitutional arrests for false violations of those

restraining orders, as well as an unconstitutional trial and resulting sentence. (Id.) The foregoing

demonstrates that Plaintiff “lost” in state court insofar as the state court has entered an FRO, found

that Plaintiff violated the terms of his probation on three separate occasions, and incarcerated

Plaintiff for such violations. (See generally Compl.; ECF No. 1-1, 1-2.) Additionally, the harm

Plaintiff seeks to remedy emanates from the entry and subsequent enforcement of the restraints

imposed against Plaintiff. (Compl.) By asking this Court to expunge “all criminal, municipal, and

probation records” associated with Plaintiff, “including any charges, arrests, restraining orders, or

court findings” procured by unconstitutional or fraudulent means and to immediately terminate

“all current enforcement actions based on manipulated hearings or improperly entered restraining

orders”, Plaintiff necessarily invites this Court to exercise appellate review over the proceedings

in the state court in an attempt to declare these adverse orders “unconstitutional, unenforceable,

and void ab initio.” T.M., 2026 WL 1751823, at *7 (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s claims thus

implicate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as Plaintiff’s success hinges upon this Court negating the

state court’s judgments against Plaintiff and otherwise preventing the state court from enforcing

its FROs. See Melleady v. Blake, Civ. No. 11-1807, 2011 WL 6303245, at * (D.N.J. Dec. 15,

2011) (dismissing § 1983 suit under Rooker-Feldman because “[i]n order for this Court to grant

any of the relief [the plaintiffs] seek, the Court would be required to review the decision of the

New Jersey Family Court. Such a review would necessitate this Court passing judgment on the

soundness and validity of the Family Court’s actions, reasoning, and resolution of the underlying

. . . proceedings.”).

The Court accordingly lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for inviting

appellate review of the state court’s orders imposing restraints and conditions of probation upon

him. See T.M., 2026 WL 1751823, at *6 (explaining that Rooker-Feldman requires dismissal for

want of subject-matter jurisdiction).

2. Younger Abstention

Even if the Court were to possess subject-matter jurisdiction over the present suit, the Court

finds that abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), is appropriate for Plaintiff’s

ongoing child support enforcement action and term of probation. See Anthony v. Council, 316

F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds by Gok v. United States, Civ. No.

23-2150, 2024 WL 1597690, at *2 n.3 (3d Cir. Apr. 12, 2024) (applying Younger abstention to

action challenging state court orders on child support). In order for a district court to abstain under

Younger, exceptional circumstances must exist, such as: (1) ongoing state criminal prosecutions;

(2) civil enforcement proceedings; and (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely

in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint Commc’ns,

Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). If exceptional

circumstances exist, then three requirements must be met before a court abstains: (1) there must

be ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings must implicate

important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings must provide an adequate opportunity to

raise federal claims.” Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 F. App’x 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Anthony, 316

F.3d at 418). Here, all the prerequisites to abstain are met.

First, Plaintiff indicates that he is subject to ongoing child support enforcement

proceedings. (See generally Compl.; see also ECF No. 19 at 1.) Judicial proceedings concerning

child support orders and obligations remain ongoing as “child support orders and the mechanisms

for monitoring, enforcing and modifying them comprise a unique system in continual operation”

until the obligation is fully satisfied. Anthony, 316 F.3d at 420. Further, “New Jersey has an

overriding interest in ordering, monitoring, enforcing and modifying child support obligations” as

“[t]he Probation Division and the New Jersey courts are conferred with authority to ensure that

payments are made and to remedy any failures to pay.” Id. at 420, 421; N.J. Ct. R. 5:7-5. Plaintiff

can also raise - and appears to have raised in his most recent filing for emergent relief (ECF No.

26) - his constitutional claims in state court given that all “child support matters are heard in the

Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part.” Id. at 422 (citing N.J. Ct. R.

5:1-1).

Second, Plaintiff’s Complaint challenges, in large part, his probation. (See generally

Compl.) Plaintiff’s probation constitutes an ongoing proceeding as a result of Plaintiff’s sentence

for violating the state court’s FROs. See Miller v. Ayres, Civ. No. 09-0056, 2009 WL 1230877, at

*4 (W.D. Pa. May 4, 2009) (explaining that “the criminal proceeding remains ongoing as the

Plaintiff’s criminal sentences included a term of probation.”). Moreover, New Jersey has an

overriding interest in establishing terms of probation and enforcing FROs issued under the PDVA

because the PDVA is intended “to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection

from abuse the law can provide.” See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-18. And because the Superior Court

of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part has exclusive jurisdiction over all actions arising

out of a family-type relationship, Plaintiff can raise his claims before the state court. N.J. Ct. R.

5:102. Finally, to the extent Plaintiff disagrees with the orders imposed against him in state court,

the New Jersey Court Rules provides a mechanism to submit an appeal to the New Jersey Appellate

Division as a right. See N.J. Ct. R. 2:2-3.

In sum, even if this Court were to have jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, the Court finds

it would be obligated to abstain under Younger.

C. DENYING FURTHER LEAVE TO AMEND

District courts dismissing complaints under § 1915 are required to provide plaintiffs with

an opportunity to amend their complaint to cure their deficiencies unless amendment would be

inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002). Based on the

foregoing, the Court finds that further amendment to the Complaint would be futile. The Court

sets forth additional reasons below.

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that:

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other

person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a

violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the alleged

deprivation was committed or caused by a “person” acting under color of state law. Am. Mfrs.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999); Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 166–67 (3d

Cir. 2013). A person acts under color of state law when the individual is “clothed” with the

authority of state law. Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809, 815–16 (3d Cir. 1994).

First, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Ben-Ishay fail because she is not a person acting

under authority of state law. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Pennsylvania Ct. of Common Pleas of

Philadelphia, 462 F. Supp. 3d 532, 536 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (dismissing § 1983 claim against the

mother of the plaintiff’s children because she was not a state actor).

Second, Plaintiff’s claims against the Judges, the Court Clerk and the Probation Officers,

in their official capacity, as well as the New Jersey Superior Court, Ocean County for monetary

relief are barred under the Eleventh Amendment.5 These Defendants are not “persons” amenable

5 In addition to monetary relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the Court Clerk, the Judges,

and the Probation Officers vis-à-vis his pursuit to achieve expungement of his criminal and probation records and the

immediate termination of his civil enforcement action. Where a plaintiff seeks prospective declaratory or injunctive

relief from individual state officers to end ongoing violations of federal law, an exception to the Eleventh Amendment

may lie. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Ex parte Young doctrine is narrow in scope - the inquiry

focuses on whether the complaint: (1) alleges an ongoing violation of federal law; and (2) seeks prospective relief.

Del. River Joint Toll Bridge Comm’n v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 985 F.3d 189, 193–94 (3d Cir. 2021)

(quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). Here, Plaintiff claims that these

Defendants: (1) signed, entered, or enforced temporary or permanent restraining orders emanating from Ben-Ishay’s

abuse of process; (2) “failed to provide clear notice of the consequences of [his] restraining orders”;

(3) “misrepresented court hearing purposes, obstructed access to records, and fabricated scheduling notices”;

(4) ”retaliated against [Plaintiff] for requesting court documents and questioning court procedures”; (5) “obstructed”

Plaintiff’s access to the courts; and (6) “treated [Plaintiff] unequally” and “targeted” him by coordinating child support

and family court hearings “ex parte”; (6) imposed punishments based on a trial that violated due process; and

(7) incarcerated and sentenced Plaintiff based upon violations of restraining orders that were based upon false claims

or amended without notice. (See generally Compl. & ECF Nos. 1-1, 1-2.) As Plaintiff frames these allegations in the

to suit under § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (“States or

governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes”

are not “persons” under section 1983); Dongon v. Banar, 363 F. App’x 153, 156 (3d Cir. 2010)

(“[S]tate courts, its employees, and the judges are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment because they are part of the judicial branch of the state of New Jersey, and therefore

considered ‘arms’ of the state.”); Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 869 F. Supp. 289, 296 (D.N.J.

1994) (holding that the Superior Court of New Jersey is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity); Futterknecht v. Thurber, Civ. No. 14-7395, 2015 WL 4603010, at *7 (D.N.J. July 30,

2015) (holding New Jersey Superior Court, Bergen County, and Bergen County Probation

Division immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment); Clark v. Conahan, 737 F. Supp. 2d

239, 258 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (“The probation department is an arm of the state, and its employees are

state actors, making them subject to sovereign immunity.”).

Third, Plaintiff’s claims against the Judges, the Court Clerk, and Probation Officers, in

their individual capacity, are barred under the doctrine of absolute judicial and quasi-judicial

immunity. Such immunity “is founded upon the premise that a judge, in performing his or her

judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions without threat of suit for damages.”

Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000). The immunity does not extend to:

(1) “nonjudicial acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity”; or (2) judicial actions

“taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–

12 (1991)). Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that the Judges, the Court Clerk, or

past tense, he has not pled an ongoing violation of federal law and, as already discussed, the prospective relief Plaintiff

seeks implicates the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Mosley v. State of New Jersey, Civ. No. 12-18885, 2022 WL

3913739, at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2022) (suggesting Rooker-Feldman precluded the Court from granting plaintiff’s

request to expunge his arrest, violation of probation, and sentence). Accordingly, the Ex parte Young exception to the

Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to the present matter.

Probation Officers acted outside of the scope of their judicial duties by entering and enforcing

court orders or conducting court proceedings. Nor does Plaintiff plead that these offices acted in

the absence of complete jurisdiction since the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division,

Family Part has exclusive and continuous jurisdiction over all actions arising out of a family-type

relationship. N.J. Ct. R. 5:102.

Fourth, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the Child Support Agents, the Managers, Assistant

Prosecutor Moscato6, and Detective Shadiak are deficient because the Complaint does not contain

any factual allegations made against them. See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F. 3d

575, 583–84 (3d Cir. 2003). “[A] defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement

in the alleged wrongs . . . .” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations

omitted); see also Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A] civil rights complaint

is adequate where it states the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible.”). Without such

allegations, the Complaint violates Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because it does

not contain a short and plain statement clearly alleging which of these defendants were responsible

for which alleged wrongs, as required to provide them fair notice of the claims brought against

them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.7

For these many reasons, the Court finds that further leave to amend would be futile. It will

therefore deny leave to amend.

6 Even if Plaintiff had alleged facts against Assistant Prosecutor Moscato, he or she would be entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity for conduct within the scope of his or her duties as a prosecutor. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976) (noting that a prosecutor is immune for all acts that are “intimately associated with the

judicial process.”).

7 This dismissal also applies to the “Ocean County Jail System” to the extent it is named as a separate defendant in

this action. (See Compl. at 3.) An Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim requires a plaintiff to allege

two elements: (1) that the plaintiff experienced an objectively serious deprivation of humane conditions of

confinement; and (2) the prison or its officials acted with deliberate indifference - that is, they acted with subjective

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994). No such allegations are pled here.

D. PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING MOTIONS

Having determined that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Federal Protection (ECF No. 8) and Emergency Motion for Federal Intervention (ECF No. 26) will

be DENIED AS MOOT.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Plaintiff’s IFP Application. It will

also DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint WITHOUT PREJUDICE and without further leave to amend.

Accordingly, the Clerk’s Office will be instructed to mark this matter CLOSED. An appropriate

Order will follow.

Date: June 30, 2026

s/ Zahid N. Quraishi

ZAHID N. QURAISHI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE