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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 HIROSHI M. MORI, Case No.: 25-CV-03074 TWR (KSC)

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

13 v. MOTION TO DISMISS WITH

PREJUDICE

14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

15 Defendant. (ECF No. 3)

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17 Presently before the Court is Defendant United States’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff

18 Hiroshi M. Mori’s Claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1)

19 (“Mot.,” ECF No. 3), Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 6),

20 Defendant’s Reply in Support of (“Reply,” ECF No. 7), and Plaintiff’s Second Response

21 in Opposition to (“Second Opp’n,” ECF No. 9) the Motion. Having carefully reviewed the

22 Parties’ arguments, Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1-2), the record, and the

23 law, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES WITH

24 PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint.

25 BACKGROUND

26 On August 4, 2025, Plaintiff Hiroshi M. Mori, a resident of San Diego County,

27 California, initiated this action by filing a claim in the Small Claims Court of the Superior

28 Court of California, County of San Diego, case number 25SC03573C. (See generally

1 Compl.) Plaintiff named Glenys Rothwell, an employee of the Del Mar branch of the

2 United States Postal Service (“USPS”), as the defendant. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that

3 on June 21, 2025, Glenys Rothwell notified him that the Post Office had issued him a “dog

4 incident letter” because his dog had been off leash and had interfered with mail delivery to

5 his home, but that a mail carrier also told him his dog did not interfere with mail delivery.

6 (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that USPS stopped delivering mail to his home and, of six

7 packages he expected to receive, only one was delivered and the rest were withheld or

8 returned without notice from the USPS. (Id.) Plaintiff claims Glenys Rothwell owes him

9 $500 based on legal fees, medical expenses, loss of work, and time spent on this matter.

10 (Id. at 3–4.) Plaintiff also seeks filing and service costs of $456 and pre-judgment interest

11 of $8.49. (Id. at 4.)

12 On November 10, 2025, pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 15.4, the United States Attorney for

13 the Southern District of California certified that Glenys Rothwell acted within the scope of

14 her employment with USPS at the time of the events alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF

15 No. 1-5.) Also on November 10, 2025, Glenys Rothwell removed this matter to this Court

16 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). (ECF No. 1.) The United States then sought to substitute

17 itself as the Defendant pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C.

18 §§ 2671–2680. (ECF No. 2.) The Court subsequently granted the request and substituted

19 the United States as the Defendant in this action. (ECF No. 5.)

20 On November 19, 2025, the Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. (See Mot.)

21 Defendant raises two arguments for dismissal. First, Defendant argues it has not waived

22 its sovereign immunity because the Plaintiff’s claim falls under the postal service exception

23 at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) to the FTCA. (Id. at 4–5.) Second, Defendant argues the Court

24 must dismiss the action because Plaintiff failed to first exhaust his administrative remedies.

25 (Id. at 5–7.) Defendant further contends the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s action with

26 prejudice and without leave to amend. (Id. at 5.)

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1 LEGAL STANDARD

2 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges a

3 court’s subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “[A]

4 court of the United States may not grant relief absent a constitutional or valid statutory

5 grant of jurisdiction.” United States v. Bravo-Diaz, 312 F.3d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 2002). “A

6 federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary

7 affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Rsrv., 873

8 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). “The objection that a federal court lacks subject-matter

9 jurisdiction, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1), may be raised by a party, or by a court on

10 its own initiative, at any stage in the litigation . . . .” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,

11 506 (2006). Further, “subject-matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court’s power to

12 hear a case, can never be forfeited or waived.” United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630

13 (2002). “[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

14 court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514; see also Fed.

15 R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter

16 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).

17 ANALYSIS

18 I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

19 A. Postal Service Exception to Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

20 The Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., “provides that the FTCA

21 ‘shall apply to tort claims arising out of activities of [USPS.]’” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

22 546 U.S. 481, 484 (2006) (citing 39 U.S.C. § 409(c)). “The FTCA, in turn, waives [the

23 United States’] sovereign immunity.” Id. “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields

24 the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475

25 (1994). Notably, the FTCA “qualifies its waiver of sovereign immunity for certain

26 categories of claims.” Dolan, 546 U.S. at 485. “If one of the exceptions applies, the bar

27 of sovereign immunity remains.” Id. One such exception is the postal service exception,

28 which provides that provisions of the FTCA do not apply to “[a]ny claim arising out of the

1 loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter.” 28 U.S.C.

2 § 2680(b). “As a consequence, the United States may be liable if postal employees commit

3 torts under local law, but not for claims defined by [the postal service] exception.” Dolan,

4 546 U.S. at 485.

5 The postal service exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity applies to

6 Plaintiff’s claim. Indeed, “[i]llustrative instances of the exception’s operation . . . would

7 be personal or financial harms arising from nondelivery or late delivery of sensitive

8 materials.” Id. at 489. This is exactly what occurred here. Plaintiff argues he suffered

9 personal and financial harm due to USPS’s failure to deliver five out of six of his packages.

10 (Compl. at 3–4.) Courts have applied the postal exception to similar claims of harm

11 stemming from USPS’s failure to deliver mail. See, e.g., Martinez v. United States, No.

12 1:24-CV-00494-SAB, 2024 WL 3498455, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 22), report and

13 recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3758035 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2024) (finding

14 plaintiff’s claim “clearly falls within the postal matter exception to the FTCA” where he

15 claimed to suffer injury from USPS’s failure to deliver his letters to his sister); Valdez v.

16 United States, 365 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1185 (D.N.M. 2019) (finding plaintiff’s claims “fall[]

17 squarely within” the postal service exception where she claimed to suffer financial loss

18 from USPS’s failure to deliver packages to her address).

19 In his Opposition, Plaintiff asserts that the postal service exception does not apply

20 to his claim. (Opp. at 2–3.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues his claim does not arise from

21 USPS’s failure to deliver his packages, but rather from a series of wrongful acts, including

22 defamation, intentional protocol violations, coercive conduct, and “arbitrary and capricious

23 action.” (Id.) However, when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12, “a

24 court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a

25 memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t

26 of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Because Plaintiff

27 did not include such allegations in his Complaint, the Court cannot properly consider them.

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1 “It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that

2 the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.” United States v. Mitchell, 463

3 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). Given that Defendant has not waived its sovereign immunity, (see

4 Mot. at 4), this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s action. Accordingly,

5 the Court DISMISSES the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

6 B. Administrative Exhaustion

7 Prior to filing an action under the FTCA, a plaintiff must file an administrative claim

8 with the appropriate federal agency. Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir.

9 2000); see 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Generally, the agency must deny the claim before the

10 plaintiff can file their lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). If the agency does not resolve the

11 claim within six months of its filing, however, the claim may be deemed denied. Id.

12 Because “[t]he timely filing of an administrative claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the

13 bringing of a suit under the FTCA,” it “should be affirmatively alleged in the complaint.”

14 Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). “A district court

15 may dismiss a complaint for failure to allege this jurisdictional prerequisite.” Id.

16 Plaintiff does not allege that he filed an administrative claim with the USPS before

17 he filed the present action.1 (See generally Compl.) Because Plaintiff did not fulfill the

18 administrative exhaustion prerequisite, this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and

19 DISMISSES the action.2 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

20 II. Leave to Amend

21 “Ordinarily, a case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be

22 dismissed without prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent

23 court.” Frigard v. United States, 862 F.2d 201, 204 (9th Cir. 1988). If no other court has

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26 1 USPS is the appropriate federal agency because Plaintiff’s claim arises from the alleged negligence

of Glenys Rothwell, an employee of the Del Mar branch of USPS. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).

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2 This finding is independent of the postal service exception discussed above. See supra Section

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1 the power to hear a case, however, and the plaintiff cannot redraft their claims to avoid

2 exceptions to the FTCA, then the bar of sovereign immunity is absolute and dismissal with

3 prejudice is proper. Id.

4 No other court has the power to hear Plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff cannot seek relief

5 in state court because district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil actions against

6 the United States for money damages and loss of property caused by the negligence or

7 omission of any federal employee acting within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C.

8 § 1346(b)(1); see Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The [FTCA]

9 vests the federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising from the

10 negligence of Government employees.”).

11 Additionally, Plaintiff cannot alter his complaint to avoid the postal service

12 exception. No matter how he words it, Plaintiff’s alleged personal and financial harms

13 stem from USPS’s failure to deliver packages to his home. (Compl. at 3–4.) Because

14 “[s]uch harms . . . are the sort primarily identified with the Postal Service’s function of

15 transporting mail throughout the United States,” Dolan, 546 U.S. at 489, Plaintiff cannot

16 redraft his complaint to escape the postal service exception to the FTCA. See Trammelle

17 v. United States, No. 2:21-CV-01826-HL, 2022 WL 658707, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 7), report

18 and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 657408 (D. Or. Mar. 4, 2022) (finding “no

19 amendments could cure” plaintiff’s claims of lost mail from falling under the postal service

20 exception given this exception’s “broad scope”). As such, the bar of sovereign immunity

21 is absolute, and the Court thus DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the action.

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l CONCLUSION

2 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

3 || DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff's Complaint.

4 IT IS SO ORDERED.

5 ||Dated: March 19, 2026 ——

6 | as) (2 D (re

7 Honorable Todd W. Robinson

United States District Judge

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