N.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

N.N., INDIVIDUALLY AND ON

BEHALF OF C.M.U (A MINOR

CHILD),

Civil No. 23-1280 (RMB-EAP)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.

NORTH BURLINGTON COUNTY

REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et

al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES

JOHN H. UYAMADU, LLC

John H. Uyamadu, Esq.

2 Ridgedale Avenue, Suite 335

Cedar Knolls, New Jersey 07927

Attorney for Plaintiff

POSTERNOCK APELL, PC

Daniel Posternock, Esq.

Diana R. Sever, Esq.

302 Harper Drive, Suite 103

Moorestown, New Jersey 08057

Attorneys for Defendants

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge

Plaintiff N.N. (“Plaintiff” or “N.N.”) brought suit on behalf of her minor child

C.M.U. (“C.M.U.”) against Defendants Northern Burlington County Regional

School District (“District”), School Superintendent Andrew Zuckerman

(“Zuckerman”), Principal Dr. Sally Lopez (“Lopez”), Teacher David Simpson

(“Simpson”), Northern Burlington County Regional Board of Education (“Board of

Education”), and Assistant Principal Brandon Bennett (“Bennett”), claiming that they

violated federal and state discrimination laws for suspending C.M.U. for bringing an

alcohol bottle to school as part of a history project. [Defs.’ Statement of Material Facts

in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ¶ 1 (DSOMF) (Docket No. 106-2).] After a series of

amended complaints and substitution of counsel, the operative complaint in this

matter is the Fourth Amended Complaint. See Compl. (Docket No. 73.). Defendants

District, Simpson, Lopez, Bennett, and Zuckerman (collectively “School District

Defendants”), now move for summary judgment, contending Plaintiff’s claims fail

because, among other reasons, School District Defendants acted pursuant to statutory

and Board Policy mandate. [Defs.’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

at 2 (Defs.’ SJ Br.) (Docket No. 106-1).]

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds Plaintiff has not shown a dispute

of material fact to resist summary judgment, and therefore, the Court GRANTS

School District Defendants’ summary judgment motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As an initial matter, Plaintiff fails to adequately respond to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56 and Local Civil Rule 56.1(a). The Third Circuit has upheld district courts’

decisions deeming as admitted factual assertions where the party opposing summary

judgment failed to properly respond to a factual assertion. See, e.g., Rau v. Allstate Fire

& Cas. Ins. Co., 793 F. App'x 84, 87 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding district court properly

deemed as admitted factual assertions where plaintiff denied assertions in defendant's

statement of material facts and “then wrote answers that did not actually reject the

paragraphs it responded to”). This Court will deem as admitted any factual assertion

that Plaintiff has failed to properly respond to as required by Rule 56.1(a) unless the

assertion is contradicted by record evidence. See Fantastic Sams Franchise Corp. v.

Weekes, 2023 WL 2696595, at *1 n.3 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2023) (presuming movant's

facts undisputed “unless demonstrated by the parties’ record evidentiary

submissions” where non-movant's statements in responsive statement of facts were

nonresponsive). Nonetheless, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s Opposition [Docket

No. 112], in full. With these principles, the record is as follows.

A. The Disciplinary Incident

In October 2022, Plaintiff C.M.U., who is Black, was an eleventh-grade student

at Northern Burlington Regional High School. [DSOMF ¶¶ 1, 5.] As a student in Mr.

Simpson’s United States Advanced Placement History class (“APUSH”), C.M.U.

took part in a group assignment to create a presentation on a selected historical topic

(“Project”). [Id. ¶¶ 2, 6.] C.M.U. and his groupmates selected the topic of

“Temperance,” which C.M.U. understood to mean the banning and/or prohibition of

alcohol. [Id. ¶ 7.]

As part of the Project, students were tasked to present “artifacts” that would

properly describe the group’s selected topic. [Id. ¶ 9.] The Project Rubric encouraged

groups to “attract people to come view your booth” by “getting creative[,]” and

presenting items that “represent your cause” either “symbolic or literal.” [Id. ¶ 10.]

On October 21, 2022, C.M.U. brought a bottle of Fireball whiskey to school as an

artifact for his group’s presentation. [DSOMF ¶ 11.] C.M.U. admitted the bottle,

which he transported from home to school in his backpack and on the school bus, was

partially full and was given to him by his mother to bring in for the Project. [Id. ¶¶ 12–

14.] Lopez, who was principal of the school at the time, testified that she knew about

the Project and knew that C.M.U. was working on alcohol prohibition but was

unaware “the reason for the students to bring in artifact[s].” [Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Pl.’s Opp’n) Docket No. 112 ¶ 15.]

After observing C.M.U. remove the Fireball bottle from his backpack, teacher

Simpson confiscated the bottle, identified it as alcohol, and took both C.M.U. and the

Fireball bottle to the main office. [Id. ¶¶ 16–17.] C.M.U. acknowledged Simpson had

no further involvement in the matter after escorting him to the main office. [Id. ¶¶ 21–

22.] Lopez was not present at school on the day of the incident. [Id. ¶¶ 62–63.]

The incident was reported to Assistant Principal Brandon Bennett, who

confiscated the bottle, interviewed C.M.U., and had him write a statement. [Id. ¶¶ 44–

45.] Bennett contacted C.M.U.’s parents and provided C.M.U.’s father with a “Form

Letter and copy of District Policy and Regulation 5530, Substance Abuse, and referred

CMU out for a mandatory 10-panel urine screen.” [Id. ¶ 52.] Zuckerman testified to

only seeing paperwork for alcohol screening but was notified by Lopez that additional

tests were conducted without their request. [Pl.’s Opp’n ¶¶ 1–2; Defs.’ Reply ¶¶ 1–2.]

Lopez claims it was typically school practice to send a child in possession of alcohol

in for both alcohol and drug screening. [Id. ¶ 3.] In the Parent Acknowledgement to

Screen Form, completed by C.M.U.’s parent, only the box consenting to alcohol

screening was checked off, but the box consenting to drug screening was not. [Id. ¶¶

4–5; Defs.’ Reply ¶¶ 4–5.] C.M.U.’s father agreed to take C.M.U. to the School

District’s medical facility for testing, where C.M.U. was tested for both drugs and

alcohol and all his results came back negative. [DSOMF ¶ 56.]

Bennett referred C.M.U. for discipline, and C.M.U. received a three-day in-

school suspension. [Id. ¶¶ 57–60.] C.M.U. served a three day in-school suspension

from October 24, 2022 to October 26, 2022. [Id. ¶ 61.] Lopez testified that she did not

know, because she was not there, whether C.M.U. was left on his own without

supervision or schoolwork on the first day of his in-school suspension. [Pl.’s Opp’n ¶

14; Defs.’ Reply ¶ 14 (Docket No. 113).] During depositions, Lopez was presented

with an email sent from N.N. on the night of the first day of the suspension

complaining and claiming C.M.U. was abandoned in room, but Lopez does not recall

receiving the email or what she did in response to it. [Id.] C.M.U. was not present for

the oral part of his presentation, so Simpson gave him a zero for the oral aspect of his

Project. [DSOMF ¶¶ 69–70.] However, after C.M.U.’s suspension, he was permitted

to make up the oral part of his project and earned 100%. [Id. ¶ 73.] C.M.U. later

graduated from Northern Burlington High School on time. [Id. ¶ 74.]

B. New Jersey Law and School District Policies

Under New Jersey law, each board of education is instructed to adopt policies

and procedures for discipline of pupils involved in incidents of possession or use of

substances on school property. [Id. ¶¶ 23–24 (citing N.J.S.A. 18A:40A-11; N.J.A.C.

6A:16-4, et seq.).] New Jersey code requires educational staff to immediately report

alcohol suspicion to the principal, or the school nurse in the principal’s absence. [Id.

¶ 26 (citing N.J.A.C. 6A:16-4.3(a)(1)).] Educational staff is also directed to seize and

turn over to the principal or designee, the alcohol or other item. [Id. ¶ 33 (citing

N.J.A.C. 6A:16-6.] The principal is then directed to notify the parent for immediate

medical examination. [Id. ¶ 27 (citing N.J.A.C. 6A:16-4.3(a)(2)).] New Jersey code

directs school districts to establish minimum requirements for medical examination.

[Id. ¶ 28 (citing N.J.A.C. 6A:16-4.3(a)(4)).] Failure of students to comply with such

procedures is treated as a policy violation. [Id. ¶ 29 (citing N.J.A.C. 6A:16-4.3(e)).]

Burlington County School District policy and the Student Handbook for 2022-

2023 prohibit the possession of alcohol on school grounds, and District Policy instructs

educational staff to comply with New Jersey Code. [Id. ¶¶ 30–33, 42.] According to

school district regulations, when there is reasonable suspicion a student is in possession

of alcohol the administration must exclude the student from school pending formal

hearing. [Id. ¶ 36.] Moreover, the administration must “arrange immediately for a

medical ten (10) part urine drug screen and possibility of an alcohol breathalyzer test.”

[Id. ¶ 37.]

C. Proposed Comparator

Plaintiff contends that a similarly situated white classmate was not subject to

the same discipline as C.M.U. for bringing a Nerf gun to school for the Project. [Id. ¶

80.] C.M.U. argues in his deposition that this student’s actions should have been

treated the same as his own. [Id. ¶ 81.] Simpson did not report the white student to

administration but instead placed the Nerf gun in the back office of the media center.

[Id. ¶¶ 86–87.]

There is a dispute as to the policy and guidelines around Nerf guns on school

premises. Zuckerman testified that there is no school policy on Nerf guns, but that

students are typically not allowed to bring Nerf guns to school, and the administrator

may confiscate and later return the Nerf gun dependent on the situation. [Pl.’s Opp’n

¶¶ 6–8, 9; Defs.’ Reply ¶¶ 6–8, 9.] The administration then may decide whether it is

necessary for the principal to take other actions. [Pl.’s Opp’n ¶ 10; Defs.’ Reply ¶ 10.]

Lopez testified that teachers may tell high school students to put away a Nerf gun or

may confiscate them depending on if the student is acting inappropriately with the

Nerf gun, but notes there is no School District policy on Nerf guns. [Pl.’s Opp’n ¶¶

11, 13; Defs.’ Reply ¶¶ 11, 13.] School District policy defines weapon as “anything

readily capable of lethal use or of inflicting serious bodily injury.” [DSOMF ¶ 85.]

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pro se on March 7, 2023. [Docket No. 1.] Plaintiff

retained counsel, who entered a notice of appearance on April 10, 2023. [Docket No.

8.] As alluded to above, Plaintiff was permitted to file four amended complaints,

[Docket Nos. 12, 31, 43, 73.] Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on January

23, 2025. [Compl. ] The Fourth Amended Complaint asserted the following claims

against the Defendants.

Count I: Title VI Discrimination on the Basis of Race [id. ¶¶ 43–46.]

Count II: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) Claim for Violation of

C.M.U.’s Right to Privacy and Rights Under the Fourth Amendment to

Be Free From Unreasonable Search and Seizure [id. ¶¶ 47–50.]

Count IV: Section 1983 Claim for Violation of C.M.U.’s Fourteenth

Amendment Substantive Due Process Right By Imposing a Three-Day

In-School Suspension [id. ¶¶ 51–53.]

Count V: 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”) Equal Benefit and Like

Punishment Clauses Claim for Discrimination on Account of C.M.U.’s

Race [id. ¶¶ 54–56.]

Count VI: Section 1983 State Created Danger Claim against Simpson [id.

¶¶ 57–61.]

Count VII: Section 1983 State Created Danger Claim against

Zuckerman, Lopez, and Bennett [id. ¶¶ 62–64.]

Count VIII: NJCRA Claim for Violation of C.M.U.’s Right to Privacy

and Rights Under N.J. Const. Art. 1 Par. 7 to Be Free From

Unreasonable Search and Seizure [id. ¶¶ 65–66.]

Count IX: NJLAD Place of Public Accommodation and Aiding and

Abetting Claims for Discrimination on Account of C.M.U.’s Race [id. ¶¶

67–69.]

Count X: NJCRA Claim for Creation of a State Created Danger against

Simpson [id. ¶¶ 70–71.]

Count XI: NJCRA Claim for Creation of a State Created Danger against

Zuckerman, Lopez, and Bennett, as supervisors [id. ¶¶ 72–73.]

Count XII: Section 1983 Selective Enforcement Denial of Equal

Protection against Simpson [id. ¶¶ 74–77.]

Count XIII: Section 1983 Class-Of-One Denial of Equal Protection

Claim against Simpson [id. ¶¶ 78–82.]

Count XIV: NJCRA Selective Enforcement Denial of Equal Protection

Claim against Simpson [id. ¶¶ 83–84.]

Count XV: NJCRA Class-Of-One Denial of Equal Protection Claim

against Simpson [id. ¶¶ 85–86.]

Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery. On November 7, 2025, School

District Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed in

Opposition [Pl.’s Opp’n], and School District Defendants replied. [Defs.’ Reply.] The

Motion is now ripe for determination.2

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Courts must grant summary judgment if “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might impact the

“outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Gonzalez v. Sec'y of Dep't of Homeland

Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 2012). A dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would

allow a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. Id. To prevail on a summary

judgment motion, the moving party must show the nonmovant cannot establish one

or more essential elements of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

And if the nonmoving party “‘fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear the burden of

proof at trial,’ then summary judgment is appropriate for the moving party.”

2 Unfortunately, Plaintiff’s briefing in this matter is woefully deficient and the task before the Court has been

an onerous one. Although Plaintiff asserted fourteen claims, Plaintiff’s Opposition Brief, which is missing a

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts pursuant to Local Rule 56, is a mere five pages with no analysis of

each of his claims.

SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 204 (3d Cir. 2022) (alterations in

original) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count I: Title VI

Plaintiff claims the School District violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act when

it treated C.M.U. adversely while favoring a white student. [Compl. ¶¶ 43–46.] School

District Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VI claims,

because there is no record evidence upon which a reasonable juror could find the

School District Defendants intentionally discriminated against C.M.U. [Defs.’ SJ Br.

at 5–7.] The Court agrees.

Plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish a claim under Title

VI of the Civil Rights Act. Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination based on race

in any program that receives federal funding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To state a racial

discrimination claim under Title VI in the educational setting, Plaintiff must allege: (1)

C.M.U. is a member of a protected class; (2) C.M.U. was “qualified to continue in

pursuit of [his] education;” (3) C.M.U. “suffered an adverse action;” and (4) that

“action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”

Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 2d 749, 758 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Sarullo

v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003)), aff'd, 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014).

Title VI applies only to “intentional discrimination[,]” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.

275, 280 (2001), which “[p]laintiffs can prove … by pointing to ‘comparator’

evidence.” Burns v. SeaWorld Parks & Ent., Inc., 2024 WL 1660514, at *10 (E.D. Pa.

Apr. 17, 2024). Indeed, “[e]vidence that a similarly-situated student outside the

protected class was treated differently may raise an inference of discrimination.” Blunt,

826 F. Supp. 2d at 758 (citing Manning v. Temple Univ., No. 03-4012, 2004 WL

3019230, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2004) (internal citations omitted)).

For the purposes of this Motion, the Court assumes that Plaintiff satisfies the

first three elements. Plaintiff’s claim nevertheless fails because the record contains

insufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that School District

Defendants’ actions were motivated by race. Plaintiff’s allegations about another

student are just that, allegations. There is no evidence to support an inference of racial

discrimination. Plaintiff fails to point to any similarly situated student who was treated

differently because of his race. Rather, Plaintiff contends that a white classmate was

not subject to the same discipline for bringing a Nerf gun to school. [DSOMF ¶ 80

(citing Compl.).] The record fails to demonstrate that the students engaged in

comparable conduct. Instead, the record reflects that the alleged comparator possessed

a Nerf gun as part of the Project and C.M.U. possessed a bottle of Fireball as part of

the Project.

Plaintiff points to alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of school officials

concerning the permissibility of Nerf guns on school property. This is not the proper

focus. Even assuming such inconsistencies exist, it is not evidence that Defendants,

and the school’s policy regarding the same, treated the students differently because of

C.M.U.’s race. Bringing alcohol to school as a minor, which is illegal, is not the same

as bringing to school what some may consider a potentially dangerous toy, which is

not illegal. The School District’s policies reflect that distinction. Under the most

generous reading of the record, this evidence amounts to mere speculation that the

disciplinary outcome would have been different had C.M.U. been of a different race.

Speculation is insufficient to survive summary judgment. Orsatti v. New Jersey State

Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 1995); accord Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 227 (3d

Cir. 2010) (“[S]peculation and conjecture may not defeat a motion for summary

judgment.” (citing Acumed LLC. v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 228 (3d

Cir. 2009))). Accordingly, the record fails to raise an inference of racial discrimination.

Nor does the remainder of the record suggest School District Defendants

directly discriminated against C.M.U., like making discriminatory comments to or

about him, or implementing discriminatory policies. Because Plaintiff has failed to

produce any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find intentional

discrimination, the Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted as to this claim.

B. Counts II and VIII: Fourth Amendment and NJCRA Claim for

Violation of Privacy and Right to be Free From Unreasonable Search

and Seizure.

Plaintiff alleges that School District Defendants violated C.M.U.’s Fourth

Amendment rights, as well as rights under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA)

and the New Jersey Constitution, by subjecting him to an unreasonable search in the

form of a urine screen. [Compl. ¶¶ 47–50, 65–66.] School District Defendants move

for summary judgment on these claims. [Defs.’ SJ Br. at 7–17, 24.]

i. School District and Mr. Bennett

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

See U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[A] search ‘occurs when an expectation of privacy that

society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed[.]’” Heard v. City of Plainfield,

No. 24-10293, 2025 WL 3017902, at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2025), reconsideration denied,

No. 24-10293, 2026 WL 508102 (D.N.J. Feb. 24, 2026) (quoting United States v.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (1984)). To demonstrate that a deprivation

of this right occurred, Plaintiff must show both that: (1) a search occurred; and (2) that

it was unreasonable. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-06 (2012) (first

determining whether government conduct constituted a search within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment before considering its reasonableness). “Fourth Amendment

reasonableness ‘is predominantly an objective inquiry.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.

731, 736 (2011) (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000)).

In determining that a reasonableness standard applies in cases applying the

Fourth Amendment to the public school setting, the Supreme Court of the United

States noted “the role public schools play in furthering ‘publicly mandated educational

and disciplinary policies.’” Wallace by Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010,

1012 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985)). It also

recognized that “the preservation of order and a proper educational environment

requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against

conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.” T.L.O., 469

U.S. at 339. “Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes

require immediate, effective action.” Id. (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580

(1975)). “[A] student search is reasonable if it is (1) “justified at its inception” and (2)

“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in

the first place.” Heard, 2025 WL 3017902, at *6 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341)

(internal citations omitted)).

Here, a search occurred when C.M.U. underwent a urine screening following

the discovery of his possession of alcohol on school grounds. The question becomes,

then, whether the search was reasonable, and Plaintiff has introduced no evidence to

conclude otherwise. The Court finds that the search was reasonable. Upon learning

that C.M.U. had brought an open bottle of Fireball onto school property, Bennett

interviewed C.M.U., obtained a written statement, contacted his parents, and arranged

for medical screening in accordance with the School District’s procedures governing

alcohol-related incidents. Clearly, Bennett had an objective basis to suspect C.M.U.

had violated school rules prohibiting possession of alcohol on school grounds. T.L.O.,

469 U.S. at 341–42 (finding a search will be ‘“justified at its inception when there are

reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student

had violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school.”)

The search was also reasonable in scope. Bennett was confronted with a student

who admittedly possessed alcohol at school. Given the School District’s obligation to

maintain a safe educational environment, referral for urine screen “was reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first

place[.]” Id. at 339. New Jersey law and School District policy instruct administrators

to do so. Although Plaintiff points to evidence that C.M.U.’s parent consented only

to alcohol screening, Plaintiff’s focus on parental consent is misplaced. School officials

have substantial authority to investigate alcohol and drug related misconduct. See

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665–66 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536

U.S. 822, 838 (2002). Indeed, this District has upheld a school district’s drug testing

policy which, based upon individualized suspicion did not require a parent’s consent

before conducting a drug test. See Gutin v. Washington Twp. Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp.

2d 414, 423 (D.N.J. 2006), on reconsideration, No. 04-1947, 2007 WL 2139376 (D.N.J.

July 23, 2007). In any event, the record is undisputed that the school requested only

alcohol screening, and Plaintiff has no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the

Court grants summary judgment in favor of Bennett on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

claim.

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish an underlying constitutional violation,

any Fourth Amendment claim against the School District fails as well. See City of Los

Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (finding a municipality cannot be held liable

“when in fact the jury has concluded that the officer inflicted no constitutional

harm.”); Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989)

(finding a municipality “cannot be vicariously liable under Monell unless one of [the

municipality’s] employees is primarily liable under section 1983 itself.”) Even

assuming Plaintiff could identify a municipal policy or custom, of which the record is

devoid of any such evidence, municipal liability cannot attach in the absence of a

constitutional deprivation. See Heller, 475 U.S. at 799. Accordingly, the Court grants

summary judgment in favor of Bennett and the School District on Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claim.

ii. Mr. Simpson

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against Simpson fails at the outset. “A

defendant in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs[.]” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). As the record

contains no evidence that Simpson participated in the decision to require C.M.U. to

undergo a urine screen, summary judgment will be granted for Simpson as to Count

II. See Harvey v. Czplinski, No. CV 16-8181 (RMB), 2016 WL 7436052, at *2 (D.N.J.

Dec. 22, 2016) (dismissing Section 1983 claims where complaint did not “in any way

disclose” how defendants were personally involved).

iii. Dr. Zuckerman and Dr. Lopez

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against Zuckerman and Lopez fare no

better. “[L]iability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.”

Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207 (citations omitted). Accord Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d

1286, 1293–96 (3d Cir. 1997); Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (3d Cir.

1995). As the record shows, neither Lopez nor Zuckerman had any personal

involvement in the urine screening, summary judgment will be granted as to

Zuckerman and Lopez for Count II.3

iv. NJCRA and New Jersey Constitution Claims

3 Fourth Amendment claims may also be dismissed as duplicative against Zuckerman, Lopez, and Bennett to

the extent they are brought against the School District directly.

Likewise, School District Defendants will also be granted summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s NJCRA claim for privacy, and New Jersey Constitution claim to be free

from unreasonable search and seizure. “This district has repeatedly interpreted

NJCRA analogously to § 1983.” Pettit v. New Jersey, No. 09-3735, 2011 WL 1325614,

at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011) (collecting cases); see also Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E.

Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 164 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2008). Although the New Jersey

Constitution, in certain circumstances, affords greater protections than the Fourth

Amendment, State v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 584 (2013), Plaintiff provides no authority

suggesting that a different standard governs school searches conducted in response to

suspected alcohol violations. Nor does the Court discern any basis for applying a

different standard here. Because the Court finds no Fourth Amendment violation,

Plaintiff’s parallel NJCRA claim fails as well.

C. Count IV: Substantive Due Process

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants violated C.M.U.’s

substantive due process right to receive education at his school by “lock[ing] him away

in another room without any assignments or teachers for three excruciating days of

uncertainty in an in-school suspension.” [Compl. ¶¶ 52–53.] School District

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims,

arguing that none of their actions “shocked the conscience.” [Defs.’ SJ Br. at 17–19.]

The applicable legal standard to prove a substantive due process claim is quite

high. See Vurimindi v. City of Philadelphia, 521 F. App'x 62, 65 (3d Cir. 2013)

(explaining that “[t]o state a substantive due process claim, [the plaintiff] must show

that the [c]ity [d]efendants deprived him of a protected property interest and that such

deprivation ‘shocks the conscience’”) (citations omitted). What constitutes conduct

that shocks the conscience “varies depending on the factual context,” United Artists

Theatre Cir., Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392, 400 (3d Cir. 2003), but “only

the most egregious official conduct” can be characterized as “arbitrary, or conscience

shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847

(1998) (cleaned up).

Before addressing whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendants’

conduct shocks the conscience, the Court must consider whether “the particular

interest at issue is protected by the substantive due process clause.” Lear v. Zanic, 524

F. App'x 797, 801 (3d Cir. 2013). “[B]oth Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent

have held that the “right” to public education is not a fundamental right. Sabbah v.

Springfield Sch. Dist., No. 19-5564, 2021 WL 2138792, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2021)

(quoting Jarmon v. Batory, No. 94-0284, 1994 WL 313063, at *10 (E.D. Pa. June 29,

1994; citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220–21 (1982)); Astacio v. E. Brunswick High

Sch., No. CV16938MASLHG, 2019 WL 3843090, at *13 (D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2019)).

“Certainly then, there is no right to a discipline-free public education.” Sabbah, 2021

WL 2138792, at *10.

Nonetheless, the Court turns to whether School District Defendants’ conduct

“shocks the conscience.” C.M.U. possessed a bottle of alcohol while at school.

Bennett investigated the incident, notified Plaintiff’s parent, arranged for appropriate

follow-up, and imposed a three-day in-school suspension pursuant to School District

policies governing student possession of alcohol. While it is disputed what occurred

during the first day of Plaintiff’s suspension, he later made up the oral component of

his APUSH project for full credit and graduated on time. The record bears no

resemblance to the type of conduct courts have found sufficiently egregious to

implicate substantive due process. See Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch.

Dist., 272 F. 3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2001) (reserving substantive due process for “brutal

and inhumane abuse of official power”); Metzger By & Through Metzger v. Osbeck, 841

F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A decision to discipline a student, if accomplished

through excessive force and appreciable physical pain, may constitute… a violation of

substantive due process[.]”).

Plaintiff cannot satisfy either prerequisite of a substantive due process claim.

Thus, the Court will grant School District Defendants’ summary judgment motion as

to Count IV of the Complaint.

D. Count V: 42 U.S.C. Section 1981

Plaintiff’s 1981 claim fails for substantively the same reasons as his Title VI

claims. Section 1981 “prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement

of contracts[.]” Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 796 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). To prevail on a § 1981 claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) that he

“belongs to a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate on the basis of race by

[Defendants]; and (3) discrimination concerning one or more of the activities

enumerated in § 1981[,]” like making and enforcing contracts. Est. of Oliva ex rel.

McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 797 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate

Athletic Ass'n., 288 F.3d 548, 569 (3d Cir. 2002)). “The standard for establishing an

‘intent to discriminate on the basis of race” is identical in the Title VI and § 1981

contexts.” Pryor, 288 F.3d at 569.

As discussed supra, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence from which a

reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants acted with discriminatory intent. The

Court has already determined that the alleged Nerf gun comparator does not support

a reasonable inference of racial discrimination, and Plaintiff identifies no other

evidence suggesting that race motivated Defendants’ actions.4

Accordingly, the Court grants School District Defendants’ summary judgment

motion as to Count V of the Complaint.

E. Counts VI, VII, X, and XI: State Created Danger

Counts VI, VII, X, and XI allege state-created danger claims. Counts VI and

X are brought against Simpson for federal and NJCRA state-created danger claims.

[Compl. ¶¶ 57–61; 70–71.] Counts VII and XI are brought against Zuckerman,

Lopez, and Bennett, under federal and state law, for their participation in, and

acquiescence to the state-created danger posed by Simpson, as well as their role as

supervisors for Simpson. [Id. ¶¶ 62–64, 72–73.] As previously stated, the Court will

interpret the NJCRA analogously to § 1983.” Pettit, 2011 WL 1325614, at *3

(collecting cases); see also Borden, 523 F.3d at 164 n. 5.

4 The Court need not determine whether Plaintiff has identified a contractual relationship cognizable under §

1981 because the claim independently fails for lack of evidence of intentional racial discrimination.

As a general matter, “a state-created danger claim is one exception to the

general rule that “the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative obligation

on the state to protect its citizens.” Philips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d

Cir. 2008). To plead a state-created danger claim, a plaintiff must allege:

1. the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct;

2. a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience;

3. a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the

plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a

discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the

state's actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general; and

4. a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a

danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger

than had the state not acted at all.

L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 F.3d 235, 242 (3d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (citing

Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2006)).

i. Counts VI and X: Simpson

Defendants focus on the last prong of the test. They argue that Plaintiff has

failed to allege any affirmative action that Simpson used his authority in a way that

made C.M.U. more vulnerable to danger than had he not acted at all. [Defs.’ SJ Br.

at 22.] The Court agrees. Confiscating the bottle of Fireball from C.M.U., taking him

to administration, and initially giving him a bad grade do not amount to making him

more vulnerable to danger; if anything Simpson’s confiscation of the bottle of Fireball

made C.M.U. safer. See Morrow, 719 F.3d at 178 (dismissing a state-created danger

claim where school allegedly failed to enforce a disciplinary policy).

Alternatively, the record is also devoid of any evidence that Simpson’s conduct

shocked the conscience as discussed supra. Accordingly, the Court grants School

District Defendants’ summary judgment motion as to Count VI and X of the

Complaint.

ii. Counts VII and XI: Zuckerman, Lopez, and Bennett

As the Court has found there is no evidence to support a state-created danger

claim against Simpson, The Court similarly grants School District Defendants’

summary judgment on Counts VII, and XI, and dismisses the state-created danger

claims against Zuckerman, Lopez, and Bennett as administrators.

F. Count IX: Aiding and Abetting Racial Discrimination in a Place of

Public Accommodation

Plaintiff brings a New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) claim

against School District Defendants for aiding and abetting racial discrimination in a

place of public accommodation. [Compl. ¶¶ 67–69.] School District Defendants move

for summary judgment on the grounds that no reasonable juror could find C.M.U. was

discriminated against based on race when he was disciplined for possessing alcohol on

school grounds. [Defs.’ SJ Br. at 24–26.]

The NJLAD makes it unlawful “[f]or any person, whether an employer or an

employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts

forbidden under [the NJLAD], or to attempt to do so.” Thange v. Oxford Glob. Res.,

LLC, No. 195979, 2022 WL 2046938, at *10 (D.N.J. June 7, 2022) (citing N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 10:5-12(e)). As race discrimination under NJLAD is governed by substantially

the same standard as Section 1981, the Court agrees with School District Defendants,

finding no sufficient evidence of racial discrimination to sustain the NJLAD claim. Id.

at *10 n. 8 (citing Deans v. Kennedy House, Inc., 587 F. App'x 731, 734 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014);

Murphy v. Housing Auth. and Urban Redevelopment Agency, 32 F. Supp. 2d 753, 763

(D.N.J. 1999)).

Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment for School District

Defendants on Count IX.

G. Counts XII, XIII, XIV, XV: 42 USC Section 1983

In Counts XII and XIV, Plaintiff brings a selective enforcement denial of equal

protection claim, under both federal and New Jersey state law against Simpson for

exposing C.M.U. to discipline, thereby treating him differently from other similarly

situated individuals on account of his race. [Compl. ¶¶ 74–77, 83–84.] Plaintiff asserts

in Counts XIII and XV class-of-one denial of equal protection claims, under federal

and New Jersey state law, against Simpson on a similar basis. [Id. ¶¶ 78–82; 85–86.]

As previously stated, the Court will interpret the NJCRA analogously to § 1983. Pettit,

2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (collecting cases); see also Borden, 523 F.3d at 164 n. 5.

Section 1983 imposes liability on individuals who deprive a person of a federal

constitutional or statutory right “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage” of a state. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983’s “under color of law”

requirement is the “equivalent of state action.” Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d

Cir. 2005); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 73 L.Ed.2d

418 (1982) (“The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit

under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth

Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal rights ‘fairly attributable to the

State?’” (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73

L.Ed.2d 482 (1982))).

The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall ... deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const amend.

XIV, § 1. In essence, it requires that individuals who are similarly situated be treated

the same. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249,

87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Plaintiff pursues Equal Protection claims under two distinct

theories: the selective enforcement approach and the class-of-one theory.

i. Counts XII and XIV: Selective Enforcement Claims Against

Simpson

To prevail on a selective enforcement claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) “that

[C.M.U.] was treated differently from other similarly situated individuals, and (2) that

this selective treatment was based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race, or

religion, or some other arbitrary factor ... or to prevent the exercise of a fundamental

right.” Suber v. Wright, 574 F. App'x 207, 211 (3d Cir. 2014) (omission in original)

(quoting Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 184 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010)). Under the

Equal Protection Clause, “persons are similarly situated ‘when they are alike in all

relevant aspects.’” Lasche v. New Jersey, No. 20-2325, 2022 WL 604025, at *6 (3d Cir.

Mar. 1, 2022) (quoting Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 203 (3d Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiff cannot rely on “mere unequal treatment or adverse effect” to support his

selective enforcement claim, but “must provide evidence of discriminatory purpose.”

Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 521 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Jewish Home of E. Pa. v.

Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicate Servs., 693 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2012)).

Here, as the Court has already found that Plaintiff’s proposed comparator is not

similarly situated, the selective enforcement claim can be disposed of on those grounds

alone. The record also fails to find discriminatory purpose on the part of Simpson.

Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment for School District Defendants on

Counts XII and XIV.

ii. Counts XIII and XV: Class-Of-One Denial of Equal Protection

Under the class-of-one theory, a plaintiff need not belong to a protected class to

assert an equal protection claim. Rather, he must establish that the defendants

intentionally subjected him to differential treatment, compared with similarly situated

individuals, in a manner that was irrational. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528

U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006). To

succeed in a class-of-one claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he was treated

differently from others who were similarly situated; (2) the disparate treatment was

intentional; and (3) no rational basis justified the difference. Hill, 455 F.3d at 239.

Here, the record does not support any of the elements to satisfy a class-of-one

claim. The white comparator who brought the Nerf gun to school was not similarly

situated, there is no evidence that any “disparate treatment” on the part of Simpson

was intentional, and any difference in Simpson’s treatment of C.M.U. and the other

student could be considered rational given the difference in bringing an open bottle of

alcohol and a Nerf gun to school. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment

for School District Defendants on Counts XII and XV.

H. Qualified Immunity

Because the Court grants summary judgment for School District Defendants on

each individual claim, the Court need not determine whether the School District

Defendants are qualifiedly immune from suit.

I. Punitive Damages

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages on all Counts. [Compl. ¶ 87.] Because the

Court grants summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s substantive claims, this claim is

dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, School District Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED. An accompanying Order shall issue separately on this date.

FED. R. CIV. P. 58(a).

/s/Renée Marie Bumb

RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge

DATED: June 26, 2026