The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 WESTERN STATES REGIONAL Case No.: 3:25-cv-02544-GPC-JLB
COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS, an
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Unincorporated Association, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
13 DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
Plaintiff,
MOTION TO DISMISS
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v.
15 [ECF Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17]
VICTORIA STARR, an individual
16 formerly known as Victoria Velasquez,
also known as Victoria S; ATRIA LTD, a
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California Corporation; MAVERICK
18 STARR PRODUCTIONS, LLC, a
California Limited Liability Corporation;
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ADAMS & ASSOCIATES, an
20 Unincorporated Association,
21 Defendants.
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23 On December 5, 2025, Defendants filed several Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 14,
24 15, 16, 17. On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed its opposition to the motions. ECF Nos.
25 19, 20, 21, 22. On January 16, 2026, Defendants filed their reply. ECF Nos. 23, 24, 25,
26 26. On February 27, 2026, the Court held a hearing on this matter. ECF No. 27. For the
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1 reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant’s motions to
2 dismiss.
3 FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4 Western States Regional Council of Carpenters (“Plaintiff”) is an unincorporated
5 association and nonprofit labor organization that represents union carpenters in twelve
6 western states. ECF No. 12 (“FAC”) ¶ 16. Plaintiff employed Defendant Victoria
7 Velasquez (“Velasquez”) from August 2019 to August 2024 as Human Relations (“HR”)
8 Director, which Plaintiff considered a high-level executive position. Id. ¶ 22. As HR
9 Director, Velaquez was head of Plaintiff’s HR department, covering hundreds of
10 employees throughout all of the twelve states the organization represented. Id. ¶ 23. The
11 role also included access to confidential union personnel records, internal financial
12 records, employee protected health information, and other sensitive employee and union
13 member information. Id. ¶ 29. Upon employment, Plaintiff provided Velasquez with a
14 company-issued laptop and access credentials to its computer systems, containing the
15 confidential union information. Id. ¶ 30.
16 As part of her employment, Velasquez joined the Union and “was a member
17 governed and bound by the Union’s Bylaws, Resolutions and the Constitution of the
18 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (“UBC”).” Id. ¶ 25. Under the
19 UBC Constitution, members are prohibited from disobeying authority, failing to return
20 Union property, misappropriating Union funds, and defrauding the Union. Id. ¶ 28.
21 Velaquez also acknowledged and signed the employee handbook. Id. ¶ 32. The
22 handbook included the declaration that the employee “must return the electronic
23 device(s), includ[ing] case, accessories, and peripherals, upon employment termination,
24 transfer, or retirement in accordance with the Council’s exit procedures.” Id. It also stated
25 that “[a]ccess to the Internet, Web sites and other types of Council-paid computer access
26 are to be used for Council related business only.” Id. ¶ 33. Additionally, it listed the
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1 Plaintiff’s conflict-of-interest policy, which prohibits employees “from using their
2 positions for personal gain or conducting activities that interfere with the performance of
3 their responsibilities for the Union and further requires employees to disclose any actual
4 or potential conflicts arising under the policy.” Id. ¶ 48.
5 In August 2022, Velasquez moved from Los Angeles to San Diego and requested
6 to work from Plaintiff’s San Diego office. Id. ¶ 63. Her request was granted, but she was
7 required to report in-person to the office every day. Id. ¶ 64.
8 Throughout her employment, Velaquez allegedly engaged in competing work
9 activities without Plaintiff’s knowledge. Id. ¶ 36. For example, Velaquez used her work
10 time, resources, and property to aid her husband’s film production company, including
11 working on a script, and to complete HR consulting work for eight different companies.
12 Id. ¶¶ 37, 51-52.
13 In 2022, Velazquez started and worked for Defendant Atria LTD, which Plaintiff
14 alleges is a competing HR business. Id. ¶ 56. Velasquez is the sole officer, director, and
15 registered agent as listed on the California Secretary of State’s website registry. Id. ¶ 57.
16 Around this time, Plaintiff was given paid leave based on a pregnancy disability during
17 her employment. Id. ¶ 6. However, during her pregnancy, Velaquez participated in a
18 filmed podcast, where she stated that she continued to work on her competing career and
19 “picked up a really big client.” Id. ¶¶ 42-44.
20 In 2023, while still working full-time for Plaintiff, Velasquez started advertising
21 her HR services on her family’s tax and accounting firm, Adams & Associates. Id. ¶ 61.
22 Velasquez also attended multiple HR-related events at the expense of Plaintiff
23 without valid authorization, disclosure, or permission. Id. ¶ 71. This included over
24 $12,000 spent on 5-star hotels that violated Plaintiff’s travel accommodation policies. Id.
25 ¶¶ 71-72. She also enrolled in several courses and obtained credentials with Plaintiff’s
26 funds that were not required or related to her position. Id. ¶¶ 73-78. Those credentials,
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1 instead, would benefit her businesses Defendants Adam & Associates and Atria LTD. Id.
2 ¶ 73. These unauthorized expenses totaled in excess of $30,000. Id. ¶ 70.
3 In July or August 2024, Plaintiff discovered that Velasquez was not reporting into
4 the San Diego office; instead, she had worked remotely without authorization over the
5 course of two years. Id. ¶ 66. When requested to report to Plaintiff’s headquarters to
6 discuss the issue, Velasquez demanded time off and refused to meet with upper
7 management. Id. ¶ 68, 69. Velasquez was, thus, terminated on August 29, 2024. Around
8 that time, Plaintiff also discovered that Velasquez had misused Plaintiff’s funds.
9 Upon termination, Velasquez was ordered to return all Plaintiff’s property,
10 including her laptop and files. Id. ¶ 31. Velasquez failed to do so. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff’s IT
11 Department, instead, detected unauthorized attempts to access Plaintiff’s protected
12 computer systems and databases, originating from Velasquez’s unreturned laptop. Id. ¶
13 83. Because of Velasquez’s refusal to return Plaintiff’s property and unauthorized access
14 to Plaintiff’s computer systems, Plaintiff diverted substantial resources to monitor for
15 additional access attempts, identify compromised credentials, assess potential data
16 exposure, reconfigure its systems, and enhance security protocols. Id. ¶ 89. These
17 measures allegedly exceeded $5,000 to complete.
18 On August 12, 2025, Velasquez filed a state court complaint against Plaintiff and
19 other parties, alleging discrimination, harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination, and
20 negligent supervision and retention. ECF No. 15-1 at 8-9.1 This case is still pending.
21 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
22 On September 26, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint. ECF No. 1. On November 21,
23 2025, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint. ECF No. 12. The FAC alleges (1)
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26 1 Throughout the order, the pagination for docketed documents is derived from the
numbering generated by the ECF system.
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1 violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, (2) breach of
2 fiduciary duty, 29 U.S.C. 501, (3) violation of the Labor Management Relations Act §
3 301, (4) violation of California Penal Code § 502, (5) aiding and abetting a breach of
4 fiduciary duty, (6) civil conspiracy, (7) conversion, (8) breach of loyalty under California
5 common law, (9) unjust enrichment, and (10) fraud and deceit, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709-
6 1710. Id. ¶¶ 108-177. Counts 5, 6, and 9 were brought against all Defendants. The
7 remaining causes of action were brought only against Defendant Velasquez.
8 On December 5, 2025, Defendants each filed a separate motion to dismiss for
9 failing to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 14, 15,
10 16, 17. On December 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed its opposition to the motions. ECF Nos. 19,
11 20, 21, 22. On January 16, 2026, Defendants filed their reply. ECF Nos. 23, 24, 25, 26.
12 LEGAL STANDARD
13 Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim
14 upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule
15 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient
16 facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Election Integrity Project Cal., Inc. v. Weber,
17 113 F.4th 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th
18 Cir. 2001)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain a “short and
19 plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
20 backed by sufficient facts that make the claim “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
21 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
22 (2007)). Plausibility requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
23 unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, it requires enough factual content for the
24 court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
25 alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing the plausibility of a
26 complaint, courts must “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe
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1 them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Dent v. Nat'l Football
2 League, 968 F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2020). But courts do not accept as true allegations
3 that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.
4 Coronavirus Rep. v. Apple, Inc., 85 F.4th 948, 954 (9th Cir. 2023). Ultimately, the court
5 must be able to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
6 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
7 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless
8 the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
9 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
10 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
11 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).
12 DISCUSSION
13 The Defendants present several arguments in their motions to dismiss. As to
14 counts alleged against Velasquez alone, Velasquez maintains that (1) the First Count does
15 not plausibly allege hacking or reasonable damages, (2) the Second Count fails based on
16 a lack of a private right of action, Velasquez’s non-fiduciary status, and speculation, (3)
17 the Third Count fails given its time-barred status and because Velasquez is not an
18 employer or labor organization, (4) supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 4, 7, 8, and 10
19 should not be exercised, (5) Count 4 alternatively does not plausibly allege access or
20 hacking, and (6) Count 10 alternatively does not sufficiently plead willful deceit or intent
21 to induce Plaintiff to alter its position. See ECF No. 14-1 (“Vel. Mot.”) at 14-33.
22 Velasquez also challenges the remaining Counts, and her arguments are
23 substantively identical to the arguments of Defendants Atria LTD, Maverick Starr
24 Productions, LLC, and Adams & Associates (collectively, “Entity Defendants”). In their
25 motions, all Defendants contend that (1) supplemental jurisdiction should not be
26 exercised over Counts 5, 6, and 9, (2) in the alternative, Plaintiff does not sufficiently
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1 plead a breach of fiduciary duty for Count 5, (3) Count 6 fails because Velasquez is not a
2 fiduciary and a wrongful act was not sufficiently pled, and (4) the Ninth Count does not
3 sufficiently plead a benefit to the Defendants. See id.; ECF Nos. 15-1, 16-1, 17-1 at 7-20.
4 Plaintiff opposes all of Defendants’ arguments. See ECF No. 19 (“Opp.”).
5 I. Count 1: Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)
6 “[T]o bring an action successfully under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) based on a violation
7 of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), [a plaintiff] must show that [the defendant]: (1) intentionally
8 accessed a computer, (2) without authorization or exceeding authorized access, and that
9 he (3) thereby obtained information (4) from any protected computer (if the conduct
10 involved an interstate or foreign communication), and that (5) there was loss to one or
11 more persons during any one-year period aggregating at least $5,000 in value.” LVRC
12 Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009).
13 Defendant Velasquez argues that Count 1 fails because it does not plausibly allege
14 the second and fifth prongs. Namely, in her view, Velasquez’s actions are not without
15 authorization and reasonable damages of $5,000 are not alleged.
16 A. Unauthorized Access
17 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) is violated where a person “intentionally accesses a
18 computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains…
19 information from any protected computer.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
20 Velasquez contends 1) that her use of the computer was not without authorization
21 and 2) that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged access.
22 1. Without Authorization
23 One is without authorization when she “has no rights, limited or otherwise, to
24 access the computer in question.” Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133. In the context of
25 employment, “it is the employer's decision to allow or to terminate an employee's
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1 authorization to access a computer that determines whether the employee is with or
2 without authorization.” Id.
3 Velasquez maintains that Plaintiff provided her initial access to the alleged “stolen
4 laptop” and, therefore Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege that she accessed the laptop
5 “without authorization.” Vel. Mot. at 14-15. However, just as authorization can be
6 granted, it can also be revoked. See United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir.
7 2016) (“Implicit in the definition of authorization is the notion that someone, including an
8 entity, can grant or revoke that permission.”). Thus, even if an employer initially granted
9 permission to access a computer to an employee, the employer has the discretion to
10 rescind permission, making further use of that computer “without authorization” under §
11 1030(a)(2). Id. at 1034. This revocation of authorization can be indicated by a termination
12 of employment. See Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1136 (“There is no dispute that if Brekka
13 accessed LVRC's information on the [traffic monitoring] website after he left the
14 company ..., Brekka would have accessed a protected computer ‘without authorization’
15 for purposes of the CFAA.”).
16 Here, Plaintiff terminated Velasquez’s employment. FAC ¶ 69. The employee
17 handbook, which Velasquez acknowledged and signed, outlined that computer access
18 would be limited to Plaintiff’s business and that all devices must be returned to Plaintiff
19 upon termination. Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Finally, Plaintiff expressly ordered Velasquez to return all
20 of Plaintiff’s property, which included laptops and files, upon her termination. Id. ¶ 31.
21 Considering all these facts in combination, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that it had
22 revoked Velasquez’s prior authorization. Thus, any subsequent use of the laptop by
23 Velasquez after her termination was without authorization.
24 2. Access
25 Velasquez argues that the FAC does not adequately allege that “Velasquez entered
26 or accessed any of Plaintiff’s password-protected websites or databases, after her
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1 termination or altered any information on those websites or databases.” ECF No. 23 at 1-
2 2; see Vel. Mot. at 16. Essentially, Velasquez maintains that the claim fails because the
3 FAC does not specifically “allege a misuse of a company password or login, access of
4 any particular database, alteration of any information or when the attempts occurred.”
5 Vel. Mot. at 16.
6 However, this level of specificity is not required under the statute. As used in the
7 statute, a person must access the protected computer and obtain information from that
8 protected computer. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
9 Here, Plaintiff alleged that Velasquez was given a laptop and access credentials to
10 its protected computer systems, containing confidential information. FAC ¶ 30. Once she
11 was terminated, Plaintiff ordered Velasquez to return the laptop, but Velasquez refused to
12 do so. Id. ¶ 31, 34. Instead, Velasquez allegedly continues to possess and use the
13 protected computer. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiff supports this allegation by stating that its IT
14 department detected unauthorized attempts to access its protected computer systems from
15 Velasquez’s computer and a screenshot of Velasquez accessing the computer without
16 authorization. Id. ¶ 83. Taking these factual allegations as true, the Court has enough
17 factual content to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
18 misconduct alleged,” namely accessing and obtaining information from a protected
19 computer. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
20 556). Accordingly, Plaintiff has adequately alleged unauthorized access under the
21 CFAA.
22 B. Reasonable Damages
23 When a plaintiff “suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of [the statute],”
24 the plaintiff has a private right of action “against the violator to obtain compensatory
25 damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief” if they meet one of five possible
26 categories Id. § 1030(g). As relevant to this case, one of these categories is triggered if
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1 the offense caused “loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period…aggregating at
2 least $5,000 in value.” Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
3 The statute defines both “damage” and “loss.” “Damage” is defined as “any
4 impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information.”
5 Id. § 1030(e)(8). Physical manipulation or deletions of data, programs, or systems are not
6 required for damage to occur. Instead, “[i]t is sufficient to show that there has been an
7 impairment to the integrity of data, as when an intruder retrieves password information
8 from a computer and the rightful computer owner must take corrective measures ‘to
9 prevent the infiltration and gathering of confidential information.’” Multiven, Inc. v.
10 Cisco Sys., Inc., 725 F.Supp.2d 887, 894–95 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citations omitted); see
11 Cline v. Reetz-Laiolo, 329 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Therapeutic Rsch.
12 Fac. v. NBTY, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 991, 966 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (“The alleged
13 unauthorized access to the Publication and the disclosure of its information may
14 constitute an impairment to the integrity of data or information even though ‘no data was
15 physically changed or erased.’”).
16 The CFAA defines “loss” as “any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost
17 of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data,
18 program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue
19 lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of
20 service.” Id. § 1030(e)(11). In this context, loss accounts for “the types of costs ... related
21 to fixing a computer.” Nowak v. Xapo, Inc., No. 5:20-CV-03643-BLF, 2020 WL
22 6822888, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2020) (quoting Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc.,
23 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff'd, 166 F. Appx. 559 (2d Cir. 2006). This
24 includes “[t]he cost of investigating unauthorized access and securing a computer
25 network.” Cline, 329 F. Supp. 3d at 1049.
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1 First, Velasquez contends that the FAC contains no plausible allegations of
2 damage to the integrity of data. Specifically, in Velasquez’s view, Plaintiff only claims
3 the taking of information and does not allege facts indicating that the data’s
4 completeness, useability, or availability was impaired.
5 However, the FAC alleges that Velasquez continues to possess and use the
6 protected computer without authorization, giving her access to confidential information.
7 FAC. ¶ 34. This allegation indicates unauthorized access to a protected system and
8 disclosure of confidential information, which falls under the “damage definition.” See
9 Therapeutic Rsch. Fac., 488 F. Supp. 2d at 966. Physical changes affecting the use or
10 availability of data are not required.
11 Based upon that damage, Plaintiff allegedly incurred costs exceeding $5,000 when
12 it dedicated “resources to monitor for additional access attempts, identify compromised
13 credentials, and assess potential data exposure.” FAC ¶¶ 85, 89. As these costs are for
14 investigating unauthorized access and securing Plaintiff’s computer systems, Plaintiff has
15 also adequately met the “loss” definition.
16 At the same time, Plaintiff also alleged that its efforts “revealed vulnerabilities and
17 necessitated system reconfiguration and enhanced security protocols.” Id. ¶ 89. However,
18 the language of this allegation indicates that those vulnerabilities preexisted and were not
19 a result of Velasquez’s actions. Thus, because the allegation does not link Velasquez’s
20 actions to those computer issues, the vulnerabilities and subsequent remedial measures
21 would not be part of the “loss” calculation.
22 Second, Velasquez maintains that the FAC only ambiguously refers to the damages
23 associated securing Plaintiff’s system and does not clearly outline how the damages
24 amounted to $5,000. Vel. Mot. at 18. However, Plaintiff has alleged that it “has incurred
25 costs exceeding $5,000 within one year, including forensic review, system security
26 measures, and related expenses, because of [Velasquez’s] refusal to return [Plaintiff’s]
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1 property.” FAC ¶ 85. No further specificity is needed at this stage. See Biden v. Ziegler,
2 737 F. Supp. 3d 958, 974 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (“Plaintiff has specifically alleged this,
3 asserting that he suffered ‘direct costs, incurred during any one-year period, of
4 investigating and responding to Defendants violations of the CFAA in excess of $5,000
5 in value.’ [ ] That is enough for pleading purposes.”).
6 In sum, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged reasonable damages under the CFAA.
7 II. Count 2: LMRDA § 501
8 Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not have a private right of action under
9 Section 501 of the LMRDA because the statute as a whole provides a right of action only
10 to a union member, not a union itself. Vel. Mot. at 19. Plaintiff, in contrast, maintains that
11 only Section 501(b) has that limitation, while unions are permitted to “enforce its rights
12 under Section 501(a).” ECF No. 19 at 12.
13 These arguments reflect a split between federal district courts in this circuit and
14 throughout the country. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S.
15 365, 375 n.16 (1990) (“Courts have reached inconsistent positions on the question
16 whether a union may bring suit under § 501.”); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of
17 Am. v. Shapiro, No. 2:22-CV-01099-JHC, 2023 WL 2161701, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
18 22, 2023) (collecting cases).
19 In relevant part, Section 501 of the LMRDA provides:
20 “(a) Duties of officers; exculpatory provisions and resolutions void
21 The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor
22 organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its
23 members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person, taking into
24 account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its
25 money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members
26 and to manage, invest, and expend the same in accordance with its constitution
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1 and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies adopted thereunder, to
2 refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party or in behalf of
3 an adverse party in any matter connected with his duties and from holding or
4 acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with the interests
5 of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received
6 by him in whatever capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him
7 or under his direction on behalf of the organization. A general exculpatory
8 provision in the constitution and bylaws of such a labor organization or a
9 general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve any
10 such person of liability for breach of the duties declared by this section shall be
11 void as against public policy.
12 (b) Violation of duties; action by member after refusal or failure by labor
13 organization to commence proceedings; jurisdiction; leave of court; counsel fees
14 and expenses
15 When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor
16 organization is alleged to have violated the duties declared in subsection (a)
17 and the labor organization or its governing board or officers refuse or fail to
18 sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief
19 within a reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the
20 labor organization, such member may sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or
21 representative in any district court of the United States or in any State court of
22 competent jurisdiction to recover damages or secure an accounting or other
23 appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization. No such proceeding
24 shall be brought except upon leave of the court obtained upon verified
25 application and for good cause shown, which application may be made ex
26 parte. The trial judge may allot a reasonable part of the recovery in any action
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1 under this subsection to pay the fees of counsel prosecuting the suit at the
2 instance of the member of the labor organization and to compensate such
3 member for any expenses necessarily paid or incurred by him in connection
4 with the litigation.”
5 29 U.S.C. § 501 (emphasis added).
6 In essence, Section 501(a) establishes that “officers, agents, shop stewards, and other
7 representatives of a labor organization” occupy positions of trust in relation to such
8 organization and its members as a group and establishes a set of specific fiduciary duties
9 owed to the labor organization. Section 501(b) then explicitly confers jurisdiction upon
10 individual union members to file a derivative suit on behalf of the union.
11 What is disputed here is whether §§ 501(a) and (b), read together, provides a union
12 an implied right to sue under 501 and whether Traweek has decided this issue.
13 A. Traweek
14 In arriving at its decision, the Traweek court spoke definitively on § 501(b) but did
15 not specifically analyze a union’s right of action under § 501(a). The court began its
16 analysis by noting that it was required to narrowly construe § 501(b) because of the
17 federal policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of unions and because § 501(b)
18 extends federal court jurisdiction. See Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 828 (9th
19 Cir.1968) (“[S]tatutes extending federal jurisdiction, such as Section 501(b), are narrowly
20 construed so as not to reach beyond the limits intended by Congress.”). The Phillips court
21 held that narrow construction of such a statute is especially appropriate when it generally
22 concerns rights subject to full and satisfactory vindication in state courts. Id. As it relates
23 to unions, Traweek observed that it was uncontested that the union may sue its officers
24 either in state court or under other federal statutory authority. See Bldg. Material & Dump
25 Truck Drivers, Loc. 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500, 506 (9th Cir. 1989).
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1 As for § 501(b), Traweek found “[t]he literal language of the statute [to be]
2 clear—it authorizes an individual union member to bring suit if a union refuses or fails to
3 sue.” See Traweek, 867 F.2d at 506. Further, Section 501(b), by its terms, does not
4 establish a private right of action for a union itself. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat.
5 Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 374 n.16 (1990). This point is uncontested.
6 In terms of § 501(a), a number of district courts in the Ninth Circuit have found
7 that because Traweek “did not consider whether Section 501(a) implies a right of action
8 by unions” that it did not foreclose a possibility of a union maintaining a cause of action
9 under 501(a). Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Roselli, No. 09-CV-00404-WHA, 2009 WL
10 1382259, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2009) (“The actual holding of Traweek expressly
11 pertained only to Section 501(b) and not to Section 501(a).”); Hawaii Reg'l Council of
12 Carpenters v. Yoshimura, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1035-36 (D. Haw. 2017) (“Court agrees
13 with Roselli that Traweek did not foreclose the possibility of a union maintaining a cause
14 of action under § 501(a) and agrees with Roselli's determination that an implied cause of
15 action exists for unions to sue under § 501(a)”); Carpenters Loc. Union 721 v. Limon,
16 No. 18-CV-8470 DSF (MRWX), 2020 WL 3124222, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2020)
17 (finding § 501(a) is not limited to actions by a union member).
18 Meanwhile, other district courts have found that Traweek and Phillips are
19 dispositive in finding that there is no implied cause of action for unions. Commc'ns
20 Workers of Am., Loc. 9423 v. Alvarado, 629 F. Supp. 3d 988, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 2022)
21 (Traweek squarely addressed “whether a union standing alone can bring a § 501 suit as an
22 initial matter.”); Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Rosselli, No. 08-CV-2777-JFW PLAX, 2008
23 WL 3342721, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 22, 2008) (rejecting argument that Traweek “only
24 precluded a union suit under section 501(b), and not under section 501(a)”);
25 United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Sanchez, No. 3:22-CV-05416-JHC, 2023
26 WL 2161697, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 2023) (applying Philips, narrow construction
27
1 of § 501 does not support implied cause of action); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners
2 of Am. v. Shapiro, No. 2:22-CV-01099-JHC, 2023 WL 2161701, *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb.
3 22, 2023) (same).
4 Here, Plaintiff avoids contending with the effect of Traweek by relying on Servs.
5 Emps. Int’l Union v Nat’l Union of Healthcare Workers, 718 F. 3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2013)
6 (hereinafter “SEIU I”) as supporting its standing claim. Plaintiff argues that by affirming
7 the union’s recovery of damages against individual members of a union, the SEIU I court
8 confirmed that the labor organization itself possesses the right to enforce these duties.
9 ECF No. 19 at 11-12. Further, Plaintiff points to district courts that have relied on SEIU I
10 to support the conclusion that unions possess an implied right of action against individual
11 members. Id. This argument fails to persuade because the individual union members in
12 SEIU I did not challenge the Union’s standing to sue under § 501 and, instead, questioned
13 any duty to the union under § 501. As a result, the Ninth Circuit had no occasion to apply
14 or consider Traweek. Though SEIU found in favor of a union under § 501(a), the opinion
15 “contains no discussion of whether a cause of action may be implied, and it does not cite
16 Traweek.” Alvarado, 629 F.Supp.3d at 995.
17 As a threshold matter then, the Court must gauge to what extent the analysis in
18 Phillips and Traweek applies here. First, the union in Traweek did not rely on § 501(a) to
19 support an implied cause of action and the court’s analysis did not specifically address
20 whether §§ 501(a) and (b) created such a cause of action. Traweek only interpreted the
21 language in § 501(b) and relied upon Phillips which itself was limited to analyzing §
22 501(b). Further, Phillips also did not involve a union seeking to sue an individual
23 member. Instead, it involved a former union member who had withdrawn from the union
24 that he sought to sue under § 501(b). Given the facts and focus of the case, the analysis in
25 Phillips and Traweek supports a narrow construction of § 501 in general but, otherwise,
26 has little application to the case here. Cf. Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers
27
1 Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183 (1979) (quoting Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925))
2 (“Questions which ‘merely lurk in the record’ are not resolved, and no resolution of them
3 may be inferred.”). The Court concludes neither Traweek nor Phillips are dispositive and
4 therefore proceeds to analyze § 501 to determine whether it creates an implied cause of
5 action for a union to sue an individual union representative.
6 B. Implied Right to Sue under § 501
7 Ultimately, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by
8 Congress. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979) (remedies
9 available are those “that Congress enacted into law”). Courts must therefore be
10 “reluctant” to “provide a private cause of action where the statute does not supply one
11 expressly.” Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004). The judicial task is to
12 interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to
13 create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Transamerica Mortgage
14 Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15 (1979). Statutory intent on this latter point is
15 determinative. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102
16 (1991).
17 In interpreting § 501(b), the Traweek court found evidence of Congress's intent to
18 grant the remedy solely to the union members in § 501(b)'s requirement that union
19 members request leave of the court before suing. Traweek, 867 F.2d at 506; see
20 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). However, as discussed above,
21 Traweek did not have occasion to examine whether Congress had expressed the intent to
22 create an implied cause of action under §§ 501(a) and (b) in favor of the unions.2
23
24
25 2 It is notable, however, that § 501(b) provides an express remedy to union members but
not unions, as it is “an ‘elemental canon’ of statutory construction that where a statute
26 expressly provides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional
27 remedies.” Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263, 489
1 Other circuit courts have examined § 501 to determine whether Congress
2 expressed an intent to provide a union standing to sue individual members. The results
3 are mixed.
4 In Int'l Union, Sec., Police & Fire Pros. of Am. v. Faye, 828 F.3d 969, 977 (D.C.
5 Cir. 2016), the D.C Circuit Court found that Weaver v. United Mineworkers of America,
6 492 F. 2d 580, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1973) was dipositive in providing a union an implied cause
7 of action under § 501. But the court disagreed as to whether Congress had expressed the
8 intent to do so. One concurring opinion noted that “[b]y creating federal rights and an
9 express derivative federal cause of action for union members to bring ‘for the benefit’ of
10 the union—if the union does not itself ‘commence proceedings’—section 501 reveals
11 Congress's intent that the union be able to enforce the duties its agents owe it in federal
12 court.” Id. at 977. However, another concurring opinion expressed doubts that such intent
13 was revealed stating that “if we were writing on a clean slate, the relevant indicia of
14 statutory intent would, in my view and as well explained by the dissenting opinion, weigh
15 heavily against implying a right of action for unions to prosecute lawsuits under Section
16 501.” Id. at 982. The dissenting opinion authored by Judge Kavanaugh3 explained that in
17 enacting § 501 “Congress chose to create a cause of action, but only for union members
18
19
20
21 U.S. 527, 533 (1989) (citation omitted); see also Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
(TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1979). After all, “express provision of one method
22
of enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”
23 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001). However, even settled rules of
statutory construction could yield to persuasive evidence of a contrary legislative intent.
24
Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 419 (1975).
25
3 Because this case involves a dissenting opinion before Justice Kavanaugh’s appointment
26 to the Supreme Court, for clarity the Court will refer to Justice Kavanaugh as Judge
Kavanaugh in this opinion.
27
1 and not for unions. That decision strongly suggests that Congress intended to allow union
2 members—and only union members—to sue under Section 501.” Id. at 985.
3 Unlike the majority in the Faye case, the Traweek court rejected the Union’s
4 argument that Weaver v. United Mineworkers of America supported an implied cause of
5 action. Bldg. Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Loc. 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500, 506
6 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the analysis in Weaver in
7 reading subsections (a) and (b) of § 501 together and concluding that the statute as a
8 whole created an implied federal cause of action for labor organizations. Int'l Union of
9 Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416,
10 1421 (11th Cir. 1996) (“By giving the union the right of first refusal to the cause of
11 action, section 501(b) shows Congress preferred that the union, rather than individual
12 members, sue on its own behalf.”). The Seventh Circuit in Int'l Union of Operating
13 Eng'rs, Loc. 150, AFL-CIO v. Ward then approvingly cited Statham and stated, “we agree
14 with the Eleventh Circuit that the text and remedial structure of § 501(a) and (b), read
15 together, imply both federal rights and a federal remedy for labor organizations against
16 union officers who violate their statutory duties.” 563 F.3d 276, 288 (7th Cir. 2009).
17 In determining whether Congress has created an implied cause of action, the Court
18 focuses on Congress’s intent and looks for explicit or implicit evidence from the text and
19 legislative history that supports the creation of a right. Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v.
20 Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1103 (1991).
21 A review of the text discloses that § 501(a) does three things (1) establishes a
22 fiduciary duty owed by individual representatives of the union to the union and its
23 members; (2) identifies specific obligations owed to the union and individual members;
24 (3) declares void any general exculpatory provision which relieves any covered
25 individual for breach of the duties that are specifically identified. Section 501(b)
26 explicitly establishes a union member’s derivative right to sue the union when the union
27
1 fails to take steps to protect the union from corruption and permits the individual to sue in
2 state or federal court. There is no question that Congress intended to impose enforceable
3 fiduciary obligations under § 501(a). But whether Congress intended additionally that a
4 statute would be enforced through private litigation is a different question. See
5 Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. (TAMA) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979).
6 With respect to the legislative intent, Congress enacted the LMRDA in 1959 in
7 response to various union corruption scandals and an associated congressional
8 investigation. Int'l Union, Sec., Police & Fire Pros. of Am. v. Faye, 828 F.3d 969, 972
9 977 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (explaining that Congress had found “a
10 number of instances of breach of trust, corruption, disregard of the rights of individual
11 employees, and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical
12 conduct”). At the time § 501 was enacted, states permitted unions to sue individual
13 members in state court for fiduciary claims but did not recognize an individual member’s
14 standing to sue corrupt union officers. See S. Rep. No. 86–187, at 72 (1959) (minority
15 views); Statham, 97 F.3d at 1420. In addition, Congress knew that unions already had
16 state-law causes of action available to them. Faye, 828 F.3d at 977 (Tatel, J., concurring),
17 see also H.R. Rep. No. 86–741, at 81 (1959) (supplementary views). While unions could
18 sue their officers under state law, the unions were sometimes choosing not to do so for
19 corrupt reasons. See Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 828–29, 831–32 (9th Cir. 1968).
20 Section 501, thus, aimed to protect unions against corrupt practices by union
21 representatives by enabling individual members to sue on behalf of the union where the
22 union failed to utilize state law to do so. Because state law varied, the method devised by
23 Congress was to establish specific fiduciary duties owed to the union and its membership
24 and then permit individual members of unions to exercise the corresponding rights in
25
26
27
1 federal or state courts when a union failed to enforce them.4 The regime further required
2 a court to find good cause for the individual to sue on behalf of the union. Under this
3 structure, federal courts were forums of last resort in limited circumstances.
4 Based on the above history, Judge Tatel, in his concurring opinion in Faye, found
5 that Congress chose to address the corruption problem by declaring federal duties the
6 union agents owed the union and creating a federal remedial scheme that includes a
7 derivative-like suit. Faye, 828 F. 3d at 977 (Tatel, J. concurring). By doing so, “[s]uch a
8 scheme obviously depends for its coherence on the ability of the union to control the suit
9 that, after all, ultimately belongs to it.” Id. The additional remedy “consists merely of
10 allowing the ultimate owner of a derivative claim to bring suit in its own name.” Id.
11 However, Judge Kavanaugh replied, “Congress did not need to allow unions to sue
12 under federal law because unions, unlike union members, already could bring suit against
13 union officers under state law. And so Congress did not need to—and did not—create a
14 new federal cause of action for unions.” Faye, 828 F.3d at 986 (Kavanaugh, J.,
15 dissenting); see Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., Loc. 20 v. Leu,
16 No. 76-CV-221, 1976 WL 1685, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 1976) (“The statutory
17 language confers upon the union as a unit no right to sue its officers. Unions are left to
18 the state law jurisdiction they have always had.”). 5
19 In Statham, the court also found that the enforcement regime in § 501 suggests that
20 Congress intended to supplement the remedies available to unions by creating new
21
22
23 4 Congress was aware of state fiduciary duty but nonetheless “considered it important to
write the fiduciary principle explicitly into Federal labor legislation.” H.R. Rep. 86-741
24
(1959).
25
5 In this case, the Union has sued Defendant for federal claims under the LRMA and
26 CFAA, and state claims for breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, conversion, unjust
enrichment and fraud. ECF No. 12 at 20-27.
27
1 federal protections. Int'l Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers,
2 AFL-CIO v. Statham, 97 F.3d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1996). As a result, in that court’s
3 view, it would make no sense to impose federal duties and simultaneously deny the
4 unions the right to enforce those duties. Id. In contrast, the Traweek court observed that
5 unions still “may sue its former officers either in state court or under other federal
6 statutory authority.” Bldg. Material & Dump Truck Drivers, Loc. 420 v. Traweek, 867
7 F.2d 500, 506 (9th Cir. 1989).
8 To the extent that § 501(a) establishes new federally recognized duties and rights,
9 they can be enforced in state court along with the other state causes of action available to
10 the Plaintiff. But see Faye, 828 F. 3d at 986 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[N]othing in
11 Subsection (b) suggests that Congress intended to allow unions to bring suit under federal
12 law rather than state law.”). Plaintiff is not denied the right to enforce the federal duties,
13 only the right to sue in federal court and an implied cause of action would not
14 substantially further the purpose of § 501. While permitting unions to enforce the duties
15 provided under § 501(a) could be viewed as compatible with the remedial scheme created
16 in support of a derivative lawsuit, it merely provides cumulative remedies for unions and
17 is not coupled with persuasive evidence on Congress’s intent to create an implied cause
18 of action. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001) (without evidence of
19 intent, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how
20 desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute”).
21 More problematic for the Plaintiff’s position is the legislative history reveals that
22 one Senate bill expressly provided for suits by unions, S. 748, 86th Cong.§ 301 (1959),
23
24
25
26
27
1 and that bill's provisions were not adopted.6 Crosley v. Katz, 131 L.R.R.M. 2175, 2176–
2 77 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1988). The fact that an explicit cause of action was created for
3 individual members but then rejected for unions reveals that not only did Congress know
4 how to create an explicit cause of action, but it also expressly chose not to do so in the
5 case of unions suing individual union representatives. Statutory intent on this latter point
6 is determinative. See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1102
7 (1991).
8 In sum, the Court finds that a union does not possess the right to prosecute an
9 implied § 501 cause of action in federal court where (1) Congress explicitly created one
10 for individual members but not unions, (2) unions already have the ability to sue
11 individual members in state court, (3) Congress considered an explicit cause of action but
12 rejected the amendment, and (4) an implied cause of action does not substantially
13 advance the purpose of § 501. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to
14 demonstrate that Congress intended to create an implied cause of action for unions to sue
15 individual union representatives for breaches of a fiduciary duty in federal court.
16 III. Count 3: LMRA § 301
17 Count 3 presents a claim under §301(a) of the LMRA. It alleges defendant
18 Velasquez violated the union constitution by misappropriating funds to enrich her
19 personal business, defrauding the Union with her lavish travels and educational
20 endeavors and her unauthorized access and continued use of Union property.” FAC ¶
21 111. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring Defendant to return Union property and
22 prohibiting Defendant from further misuse of the property. Id. ¶ 112.
23
24
25
6 S. 748, § 301 was introduced by Senator Goldwater who represented the
26 Administration's views and succeeded in having fiduciary proposals in § 501(a) added to
the Senate bill on the floor.
27
1 Section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185, confers federal jurisdiction over “suits
2 for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ... or between
3 any such labor organizations.” Given this language, Defendant contends that this action
4 fails because Velasquez is not an employer or a labor organization. Vel. Mot. at 26.
5 Relying on Woodell and SEIU II, Plaintiff, in turn, argues Velasquez’s violation of the
6 Union Constitution is enough to provide jurisdiction under Section 301. ECF No. 19 at
7 13.
8 As expressed by the Supreme Court, the primary purpose of the LMRA is “to
9 promote the achievement of industrial peace through encouragement and refinement of
10 the collective bargaining process.” Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,
11 509 (1962). Because “such an effort would be purposeless unless both parties to a
12 collective bargaining agreement could have reasonable assurance that the contract they
13 had negotiated would be honored…Section 301(a) reflects congressional recognition of
14 the vital importance of assuring the enforceability of such agreements.” Id.
15 In discussing these purposes, “the Supreme Court focused on the accountability of
16 union organizations and employers, not union members.” Bldg. Material & Dump Truck
17 Drivers, Loc. 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500, 507 (9th Cir. 1989). In particular, the
18 Supreme Court found that Congress was “concerned that unions be made legally
19 accountable for agreements into which they entered among themselves.” United Ass'n of
20 Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of United States & Canada,
21 AFL-CIO v. Loc. 334, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing &
22 Pipefitting Indus. of United States & Canada, 452 U.S. 615, 624 (1981). Accordingly, §
23 301(a) allows a suit to be brought by:
24 (1) A union against an employer,
25 (2) An employer against a union,
26 (3) A union against another union,
27
1 (4) Individual union members against their union, and
2 (5) Individual union members against their employer.
3 See, e.g., Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of Am. (UAW),
4 AFL-CIO v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 698 (1966); Carbon Fuel Co. v.
5 United Mine Workers of Am., 444 U.S. 212, 214-15 (1979); Kinney v. International
6 Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 669 F.2d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir.1981); Journeymen,
7 452 U.S. at 620; Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976).
8 Whether a union can bring an action under § 301 against an individual union
9 member is not clear cut and requires a nuanced analysis. Specifically, while union
10 constitutions are understood to be contracts between labor organizations, Journeymen,
11 452 U.S. at 623, this does not necessarily mean any failure to comply with by-laws or the
12 constitution necessarily falls within the purview of § 301, Bldg. Material & Dump Truck
13 Drivers, Loc. 420 v. Traweek, 867 F.2d 500, 508 (9th Cir. 1989).
14 In Traweek, for example, a union had sued two former officers for misuse of union
15 funds and other violations of union rules, resulting in an order for the former officers to
16 repay the union. 867 F.2d at 503-05. On appeal, the officers challenged the district
17 court’s jurisdiction under § 301(a). Id. at 507-08. In its analysis, the Ninth Circuit
18 emphasized that the purpose of § 301(a) was centered on accountability of unions over
19 union members. Id. at 507. It also held that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Complete
20 Auto Transit, Inc. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981) primarily focused “on Congress' intent to
21 immunize individual members from a § 185 suit.” Id. at 508. With that, the Ninth Circuit
22 held in the officers’ favor, stating that federal courts should not provide a forum for
23 unions “to demand payment or to settle internal squabbles” every time “a union member
24 failed to pay dues or committed a minor infraction of union rules.” Id.
25 Traweek aligns closely with the facts of this case. Velasquez is a former officer of
26 Plaintiff. Plaintiff has alleged that Velasquez violated § 301 and the UBC Constitution
27
1 when she misappropriated funds, defrauded the Union with lavish travel and educational
2 endeavors, and continued to use Union property without authorization. FAC ¶ 111. These
3 allegations are akin to the violation of union rules which Traweek found did not warrant
4 subject-matter jurisdiction under § 301.
5 Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Traweek by relying on SEIU II. ECF No. 19 at 13.
6 In that case, an international labor organization sued three former leaders of one of its
7 affiliated local unions and a new union the three former officers had formed to compete
8 against their former employer. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union v. Nat'l Union of Healthcare
9 Workers (“SEIU II”), 598 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2010). Before being relieved of
10 their duties, the former officers “commenced a strategy to vigorously resist the
11 trusteeship, disrupt union operations, and undermine the ability of any trustee to govern.”
12 Id. Given Traweek, the former officers argued that § 301(a) jurisdiction was foreclosed.
13 The Ninth Circuit, however, held the facts of the case to be distinguishable from
14 Traweek and found § 301(a) jurisdiction. “Traweek concerned individual wrongs and
15 individual liability,” which created “good reason to deny jurisdiction.” Id. at 1071-72. In
16 contrast, SEIU II concerned not only “the personal liability of one or two former officers,
17 but a contest between two unions competing for the hearts and minds of the rank and
18 file.” Id. at 1072. Traweek also concerned financial liability rather than a request for
19 injunctive relief. Id. Based on those differences, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
20 jurisdiction was not completely foreclosed by Traweek.
21 Plaintiff submits the Court should similarly hold that § 301 provides “jurisdiction
22 over an action by a union against former officers to return union property because
23 enforcing the constitution promote[s] stability in labor relations.” ECF No. 19 at 13.
24 Here, the instant case does involve a request for injunctive relief under § 301,
25 meaning that Traweek does not immediately dispose of this claim. See FAC ¶ 112.
26 Nonetheless, unlike SEIU II, the FAC focuses on Velasquez’s individual wrongs and
27
1 individual liability rather than wrongs which threaten wider labor relations. Thus, there is
2 “good reason to deny jurisdiction,” given that the allegations are more like the “internal
3 squabbles” and union rule violations that both Traweek and SEIU II wanted to avoid
4 flooding the courts with. SEIU II, 598 F.3d at 1072. Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks subject-
5 matter jurisdiction to bring a § 301 claim in this case.
6 IV. Counts 4-10: Supplemental Jurisdiction
7 In an action over which a district court possesses original jurisdiction, the court
8 “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in
9 the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
10 controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The
11 supplemental jurisdiction statute “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether
12 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, a federal court should consider and weigh in each
13 case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience,
14 fairness, and comity.” City of Chi. v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)
15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
16 District courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if:
17 (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
18 (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the
19 district court has original jurisdiction,
20 (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,
21 or
22 (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
23 jurisdiction.
24 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
25 Defendants contend that this Court should decline to exercise supplemental
26 jurisdiction over the FAC’s state law claims, Counts 4-10. Vel. Mot. at 27-28; ECF No.
27
1 15-1 at 14-15. Specifically, Defendants maintain there is no supplemental jurisdiction (1)
2 if the Court dismissed all federal claims or (2) because the state claims predominate. Id.
3 First, since the Court has not dismissed Plaintiff’s first federal claim, Count 1, the
4 Court will not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for that reason.
5 As for the second contention, district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
6 jurisdiction over a claim if “the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
7 over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2). Declining
8 supplemental jurisdiction would be appropriate where “it appears that the state issues
9 substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or
10 of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.” United Mine Workers of America v.
11 Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
12 Here, the FAC alleges three federal claims and seven state claims. FAC ¶¶ 86-177.
13 As discussed above, only one federal claim remains, specifically the CFAA claim. The
14 seven state claims include a violation of the California Computer Data Access and Fraud
15 Act (Count 4), aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty (Count 5), civil conspiracy
16 (Count 6), conversion (Count 7), a breach of the duty of loyalty (Count 8), unjust
17 enrichment (Count 9), and a violation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1709-10 (Count 10).
18 The Court will maintain supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 4 and 7. However,
19 the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Counts 5, 6, 8, 9, and 10.
20 Counts 4 & 7. Counts 4 and 7 are within the scope of the remaining federal claim.
21 Like the CFAA claim, these two counts rely on the same factual background:
22 Velasquez’s wrongful and continued possession of union property and her unauthorized
23 access to the Union’s computer system and files. The three claims also require similar
24 proof. Thus, these two claims do not substantially predominate over the remaining federal
25 claim.
26
27
1 Counts 5-6, & 8-10. In contrast, the fifth, sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth claims are
2 unrelated to the narrow CFAA claim and would predominate over this claim.
3 As described by Plaintiff, these state law claims are all factually related to “her
4 federal fiduciary duties under the LMRDA.” ECF No. 19 at 15. Counts 5, 8, and 10 focus
5 explicitly on Velasquez’s breached duties, and “Velasquez’s liability for conspiracy and
6 unjust enrichment depends entirely on proving that primary federal breach.” Id. However,
7 the LMRDA is dismissed as Plaintiff lacks a private right of action.
8 The remaining five state law claims also significantly differ from the sole
9 remaining federal claim. While Count 1 focuses on Velasquez’s actions after her
10 employment and relates to unauthorized possession and use of Plaintiff’s property, the
11 five state law claims center on her alleged wrongful actions during her employment. For
12 the same reasons, the state law claims will require a different set of evidence and
13 witnesses compared to the federal claim. Thus, judicial economy, convenience, and
14 fairness weigh in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726
15 (“It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion,
16 not of plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in consideration of judicial economy,
17 convenience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should
18 hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even though bound to apply state law to
19 them. Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to
20 promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of
21 applicable law.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). Here, none of the salient
22 considerations support exercising jurisdiction over the state claims. Accordingly, these
23 five state law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
24 / / /
25 / / /
26 / / /
27
1 V. Count 4: California Computer Data Access and Fraud Act
2 Velasquez contends that Count 4 fails because “access” under § 502 refers to
3 “hacking.” As the FAC does not plausibly allege Velasquez hacked the computer, this
4 claim fails in Velasquez’s view. However, this argument is unavailing.
5 A person is found to be in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 502 if the person
6 “[k]nowingly accesses and without permission alters, damages, deletes, destroys, or
7 otherwise uses any data, computer, computer system, or computer network in order to
8 either (A) devise or execute any scheme or artifice to defraud, deceive, or extort, or (B)
9 wrongfully control or obtain money, property, or data.” Cal. Penal Code § 502(c)(1).
10 Under the statute, “access” is defined as “to gain entry to, instruct, cause input to, cause
11 output from, cause data processing with, or communicate with, the logical, arithmetical,
12 or memory function resources of a computer, computer system, or computer network.”
13 Cal. Penal Code § 502(b)(1).
14 While the statute is reminiscent of the CFAA, the Ninth Circuit has found this
15 California statute to be distinct. See United States v. Christensen, 828 F.3d 763, 789 (9th
16 Cir. 2015). Unlike the CFAA, “the California statute does not require unauthorized
17 access. It merely requires knowing access.” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, Section
18 502(c)’s “focus is on unauthorized taking or use of information” rather than just access.
19 Id. Access can include “includes logging into a database with a valid password and
20 subsequently taking, copying, or using the information in the database improperly.” Id. It
21 can also encapsulate accessing, taking, copying, and making use of computer data that
22 one formerly—but no longer—had authorization to access. Facebook, Inc. v. Power
23 Ventures, Inc., 844 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2016) (once defendant was told to cease
24 and desist it “knew that it no longer had permission to access [plaintiff's] computers at
25 all” and continuing to access and use the data violated § 502); see also Erhart v. BofI
26 Holding, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1057-58 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (finding allegations that
27
1 || the defendant exceeded the scope of employment by accessing the plaintiff's computer
2 ||system was sufficient at the motion to dismiss stage); Biden v. Ziegler, 737 F. Supp. 3d
3 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (“Plaintiffs sufficiently contend and allege that they used his
4 || passwords to access password-protected files and ignored prelitigation demands to cease
5 || and desists.”’).
6 As established in the discussion for Count 1, Plaintiff terminated Velasquez’s
7 |}employment and ordered her to return the laptop. FAC {ff 31, 34. These alleged actions
8 demonstrate that Plaintiff knew she no longer had permission to access Plaintiff's
9 computer system and data. The FAC, then, alleges that Velasquez “continues to possess
10 use the Union laptop and other Union property for personal use” and “downloaded
11 saved filed from protected Union computer systems locally to her Union provided
12 || laptop.” Id. J§ 34-35. These facts are sufficient to allege a violation of Section 502 at the
13 motion to dismiss stage.
14 CONCLUSION
15 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the first,
16 || fourth, and seventh claims and GRANTS the motion to dismiss the second, third, fifth,
17 || sixth, eighth, ninth, and tenth cause of action without leave to amend.
18 IT IS SO ORDERED.
19 Dated: March 17, 2026 <=
21 United States District Judge
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27 31
28 3:25-cv-02544-GPC-JLB