The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 THE ESTATE OF ABDUL KAMARA, Case No.: 25-cv-0226-AJB-VET
et al.,
12 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS
13
Plaintiffs,
14 (Doc. No. 22)
v.
15
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,
16
Defendants.
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18 Defendants County of San Diego (the “County”), Christopher Aberle, Alejandro
19 Aguilera, Carlos Heard, Derrick Jones, Travis Kaapke, and Tyler Phillips (“Individual
20 Defendants”) (collectively, the “County Defendants”) move to partially dismiss Plaintiffs’
21 First Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
22 Procedure. (Doc. No. 22.) The County Defendants also move to dismiss DOES 21–50. (Id.)
23 Plaintiffs oppose the Motion. (Doc. No. 25.) The County Defendants filed a reply in
24 support of the Motion. (Doc. No. 26.) Based on the reasoning below, the Court DENIES
25 the Motion.
26 I. BACKGROUND
27 On January 30, 2025, Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit against Defendants for various
28 civil rights violations in connection with the death of Decedent Abdul Kamara
1 (“Decedent”). (See Doc. No. 1.) Plaintiffs filed the operative First Amended Complaint
2 (“FAC”) on April 29, 2025. (Doc. No. 3.)
3 Plaintiffs allege the following facts in the FAC, which the Court accepts as true for
4 purposes of the subject Motion. See, e.g., Schueneman v. Arena Pharms., Inc., 840 F.3d
5 698, 704 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court
6 accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most
7 favorable to the plaintiff). On March 2, 2024, at approximately 9:18 p.m., Carlsbad
8 paramedics responded to a call from a concerned individual regarding a medical emergency
9 at a Carl’s Jr. restaurant. (Doc. No. 3 ¶ 38.) Paramedics found Decedent wandering in the
10 parking lot of a nearby Jack in the Box. (Id.) When paramedics arrived, Decedent stated he
11 had been “playing a game with his friends tonight” and expressed paranoia about lights
12 and movement. (Id.) Paramedics noted that Decedent was “slightly tachycardic and
13 hypertensive with a heart rate of 112 and a blood pressure reading of 181/116.” (Id.)
14 Decedent requested to go to the hospital for evaluation. (Id.) Paramedics transported
15 Decedent to the emergency department at Scripps Memorial Hospital in Encinitas
16 (“Scripps Encinitas”). (Id.)
17 Decedent arrived at Scripps Encinitas shortly after 10:00 p.m. (Id. ¶ 39.) A nurse
18 wrote that, according to paramedics, Decedent “believed the lights being shined into his
19 eyes and the pulse oximeter were ‘lasers trying to give him a heart attack.’” (Id.) The
20 emergency room doctor noted Decedent’s “affect was blunt, his speech was tangential, and
21 his thought content was paranoid and delusional.” (Id.) The doctor noted Decedent was
22 cooperative and that he did not express homicidal or suicidal ideation. (Id.) The doctor
23 wrote that Decedent had an “incoherent and non-linear thought process,” and the doctor
24 intended to “initiate [a] broad workup to include [a] CT scan of [Decedent’s] head to
25 evaluate for any organic cause of his presentation.” (Id.)
26 While medical personnel were getting ready to draw blood for lab work, Decedent
27 ran out of the emergency department without a shirt or shoes. (Id. ¶ 40.) At 10:56 p.m., the
28 hospital called 911 and requested police assistance. (Id. ¶ 41.) The hospital staff member
1 who called 911 informed dispatch that Decedent was at the hospital for “mental help” and
2 that he was paranoid, “incompetent,” and “unable to care for himself.” (Id.)
3 Sheriff’s deputies, Defendants Aguilera and Phillips, responded to the 911 call. (Id.
4 ¶ 42.) At approximately 11:13 p.m., Defendants Aguilera and Phillips spoke to a nurse and
5 the emergency room physician at Scripps Memorial. (Id.) The doctor indicated that
6 Decedent could not care for his own safety, and Defendants Aguilera and Phillips were
7 instructed to locate and return Decedent to the hospital for a medical hold. (Id.)
8 At 11:45 p.m., the Sheriff’s Department received a 911 call from a gas station
9 employee. (Id. ¶ 43.) The caller reported that a man (Decedent) was “crawling around the
10 parking lot without a shirt and only wearing hospital socks.” (Id.) The caller noted that
11 Decedent had a hospital wristband on his arm. (Id.) A deputy arrived at the gas station and
12 found Decedent lying on his stomach with his hands behind his back.1 (Id. ¶ 44.) Decedent
13 was “having involuntary muscle spasms and making comments about being tased even
14 though no one was near him.” (Id.) According to the deputy, Decedent was cooperative
15 and compliant. (Id.)
16 Defendants Aguilera and Phillips arrived at the gas station at 11:55 p.m. (Id. ¶ 45.)
17 Upon arriving at the gas station, Defendants Aguilera and Phillips determined that
18 Decedent was the same individual from Scripps Encinitas. (Id.) Defendant Phillips
19 handcuffed Decedent without issue and walked Decedent to the patrol car. (Id. ¶ 46.) At
20 midnight, Defendants Aguilera and Phillips informed police dispatch that they were taking
21 Decedent back to Scripps Encinitas. (Id.) At 12:22 a.m., Defendants Aguilera and Phillips
22 changed course and told police dispatch that they would be transporting Decedent to the
23 Vista Detention Facility and not to Scripps Encinitas. (Id. ¶ 48.)
24 Upon arriving at the Vista Detention Facility, Defendants Aguilera and Phillips
25 exited the patrol car and Decedent began exhibiting bizarre behavior. (Id. ¶ 49.) Decedent
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1 appeared paranoid and agitated and began bouncing around in the back seat of the patrol
2 car. (Id.) Decedent hit his head on the patrol car’s plexiglass divider causing Decedent to
3 cut his head. (Id.) Eventually, Decedent calmed down and Defendant Aguilera moved
4 Decedent from the patrol car to a bench. (Id. ¶ 50.) Defendant Aguilera walked away to
5 speak with detention facility deputies while Defendant Phillips waited at the bench with
6 Decedent. (Id.)
7 At approximately 12:49 a.m., Decedent began to stand up from the bench. (Id. ¶ 51.)
8 However, Decedent soon ended up on the ground—either by falling or by being taken to
9 the ground by Defendant Phillips. (Id.) At this point, Defendants Deputy Sheriff Kaapke,
10 Deputy Sheriff Jones, and California Highway Patrol Officer Liekkio approached the
11 scene. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21, 51.) Defendants Kaapke, Jones, Liekkio, Aguilera, and Phillips laid
12 on top of Decedent, restraining his arms, legs, and neck, and placed a WRAP restraining
13 device around Decedent.2 (Id. ¶ 51.) While Defendants were restraining Decedent, he hit
14 his head on the ground. (Id.) Defendants completed placing the WRAP device on Decedent
15 at around 12:56 a.m., at which point he was placed face down in a prone position. (Id.
16 ¶¶ 51, 52.) Once Decedent was restrained, Defendants called paramedics, who arrived at
17 approximately 1:13 a.m. (Id. ¶ 53.) The FAC alleges that “Deputies who are properly
18 trained on the use of hobbling restraints know that restrained individuals should be placed
19 sitting upright or standing to facilitate breathing and monitoring.” (Id. ¶ 52.) However,
20 Defendants did not do this and instead left Decedent in the prone position. (Id.)
21 About five minutes after the paramedics arrived, while still prone and restrained by
22 the WRAP, Decedent stopped breathing and became unresponsive. (Id. ¶ 53.) At 1:28 a.m.,
23 paramedics documented that Decedent had no pulse and began administering
24 cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”). (Id.) Decedent was transported to Tri-City
25 Medical Center where he passed away on the morning of March 3, 2024. (Id.)
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1 Based on these facts, Decedent—by and through his successor in interest, his mother
2 Fredrika Nabbie—asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) deliberate indifference to
3 serious medical needs in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) excessive
4 and unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) deprivation of right of
5 association under the Fourteenth Amendment; (4) municipal liability (Monell) against the
6 County; (5) and violation of California’s Bane Act. (Id. ¶¶ 82–127.) The FAC also alleges
7 survival claims for (6) battery and (7) negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 128–141.) Fredrika Nabbie brings
8 the eighth claim for wrongful death. (Id. ¶¶ 142–145.)
9 The County Defendants move to dismiss the fourth claim for Monell liability arguing
10 Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to state a claim under either a policy, ratification, or
11 failure to train theory. (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11.3) The County Defendants seek dismissal of
12 the fifth claim under the Bane Act arguing the FAC lacks any facts to establish the
13 necessary “specific intent” of the County Defendants to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional
14 rights. (Id. at 16.) Finally, the County Defendants contend the allegations against Does
15 21–50 should be dismissed because Plaintiffs do not allege specific facts showing how
16 each particular Doe Defendant violated Plaintiffs’ rights. (Id.)
17 II. LEGAL STANDARD
18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to
19 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6)
20 requires the Court to dismiss claims that fail to establish a cognizable legal theory or do
21 not allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Mendiondo v. Centinela
22 Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Under Rule
23 8(a)(2) a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
24 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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3 Citations to the record refer to the CM/ECF system page number at the top of each page rather than the
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1 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
2 accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
3 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
4 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
5 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
6 alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
7 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to
8 dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content,
9 must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret
10 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted).
11 To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint does not need detailed
12 factual allegations, but it must provide allegations that raise a right to relief above the
13 speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While the plausibility standard is not a
14 probability test, it does require more than a mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully.
15 Id. at 556. “When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must accept all
16 material allegations in the complaint as true, and construe them in the light most favorable
17 to the non-moving party.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946,
18 956 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
19 III. JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
20 As a preliminary matter, the County Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice
21 of the Computer Aided Dispatch Log Dated March 2, 2024 (the “CAD Log”). (Doc. No.
22 22-2.) County Defendants contend the CAD Log “is subject to judicial notice because it
23 is quoted in paragraph 41 of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint and is therefore
24 incorporated by reference.” (Doc. No. 22-2 at 2.) Plaintiffs oppose the request. (Doc. No.
25 25 at 29.)
26 Judicial notice and incorporation by reference are separate and distinct. See Khoja
27 v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting that judicial
28 notice and incorporation by reference both “permit district courts to consider materials
1 outside a complaint, but each does so for different reasons and in different ways”); see also
2 United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Judicial notice under Federal
3 Rule of Evidence 201(b) allows a court to “judicially notice a fact that is not subject to
4 reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
5 jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
6 cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts may take judicial notice at
7 any stage of a proceeding. Fed. R. Evid. 201(d). However, judicial notice is uncommon
8 during the pleading phase, as “district courts may not consider material outside the
9 pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint” under Federal Rule of Civil
10 Procedure 12(b)(6). Khoja, 899 F.3d at 998 (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d
11 668, 288 (9th Cir. 2001)). Considering information outside the pleading typically converts
12 the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim into a Rule 56 motion for
13 summary judgment, but judicial notice can serve as an exception. Id. at 998; Ritchie, 342
14 F.3d at 908.
15 Incorporation by reference, on the other hand, is a “judicially created doctrine that
16 treats certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.” Khoja, 899 F.3d
17 at 1002. This doctrine allows the court to incorporate documents and other instruments into
18 a complaint “if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the
19 basis of the plaintiff’s claim.” Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908. Merely mentioning a document
20 does not constitute extensive reference. Id. at 908–09. Incorporation by reference does not
21 convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment. Id.
22 The CAD Log is not subject to judicial notice or incorporation by reference. The
23 Court may not take judicial notice of the CAD Log because it cannot be “accurately and
24 readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” See
25 Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). And the single mention of the CAD Log in the FAC (see Doc. No. 3
26 ¶ 41) is far from meeting the standard for incorporation by reference. See Ritchie, 342 F.3d
27 at 908–09. Thus, the County Defendants’ request for judicial notice is DENIED and the
28 Court finds the CAD Log has not been incorporated by reference.
1 IV. DISCUSSION
2 A. Monell Claim
3 The County moves to dismiss the fourth cause of action contending the FAC fails to
4 state facts sufficient to support a Monell claim. (Doc. No. 22-1.) The County argues that
5 “the language of the Complaint makes it difficult to decipher exactly what theories
6 Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed on.” (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11.) The County further argues
7 that even if one could decipher Plaintiffs’ theories of liability, the “allegations fall below
8 the threshold standards of Monell liability.” (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11.) The Court disagrees.
9 As the County recognizes, “Plaintiff[s] allege that part of the custom and practice is
10 arresting individuals in need of urgent medical intervention and booking such arrestees into
11 jail rather than first sending them to a hospital for medical treatment and stabilization.”
12 (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11 (citing Doc. No. 3 ¶ 114)). And “Plaintiffs also claim that the Sheriff’s
13 Office did not train deputies to try to minimize the amount of weight applied to someone’s
14 chest or back while in a prone position or the physiology of a struggle.” (Id. (citing Doc.
15 No. 3 ¶¶ 66, 67)). It is unpersuasive for the County to contend that the FAC is so
16 unintelligible that Plaintiffs’ theories of liability cannot be discerned, while simultaneously
17 devoting substantial portions of the Motion to addressing those very theories. Accordingly,
18 the Court turns to whether Plaintiffs have adequately alleged Monell liability for a
19 constitutional injury resulting from a policy, custom, practice, or a failure to train.
20 In the motion to dismiss context, the Ninth Circuit has made clear claims of Monell
21 liability must comply with the basic principles set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. AE v. Cnty.
22 of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., Alter v. Cnty. of San Diego, 635 F.
23 Supp. 3d 1048, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 2022). First, a complaint “may not simply recite the
24 elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to
25 give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE, 666 F.3d
26 at 637. Second, “the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an
27 entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected
28 to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Id.
1 1. Policy, Custom, or Practice
2 Cities, counties and other local government entities are subject to claims under
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658. While
4 municipalities, their agencies, and their supervisory personnel cannot be held liable under
5 § 1983 on any theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, they can, however, be
6 held liable for deprivations of constitutional rights resulting from their formal policies or
7 customs. Id. at 691–93. Liability only attaches where the municipality itself causes the
8 constitutional violation through “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether
9 made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
10 official policy.” Id. at 694.
11 To prevail, a plaintiff must allege “(1) [the plaintiff] had a constitutional right of
12 which he was deprived; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounts to
13 deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) ‘the policy is the moving force
14 behind the constitutional violation.’” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir.
15 2021) (citing Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011)). As to a
16 municipality’s policy, a “plaintiff must allege either that (1) a particular municipal action
17 itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so; or (2) the municipality, through
18 inaction, failed to implement adequate policies or procedures to safeguard its community
19 members’ federally protected rights.” Hyun Ju Park v. City and Cnty. of Honolulu, 952
20 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Absent
21 a formal governmental policy, [a plaintiff] must show a ‘longstanding practice or custom
22 which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.’”
23 Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d
24 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992)). “The custom must be so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it
25 constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled city policy.’” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
26 691).
27 Plaintiffs must allege the County acted with deliberate indifference which is “a
28 stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a [municipality] disregarded a known or
1 obvious consequence of [its] action.” Bd. of the Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v.
2 Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997) (“Claims not involving an allegation that the municipal
3 action itself violated federal law, or directed or authorized the deprivation of federal rights,
4 present much more difficult problems of proof.”) (citations omitted); see also Hyun Ju
5 Park, 952 F.3d at 1141 (“When, as here, a plaintiff pursues liability based on a failure to
6 act, she must allege that the municipality exhibited deliberate indifference to the violation
7 of her federally protected rights.”) (citing Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143
8 (9th Cir. 2012)).
9 A plaintiff alleging deliberate indifference can survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge
10 if he or she alleges the municipality has engaged in a pattern of prior, similar violations
11 of federally protected rights of which it had actual or constructive notice. See Connick
12 v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (“A pattern of similar constitutional violations
13 by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate
14 indifference . . . .”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing
15 dismissal where plaintiff “specifically allege[s] numerous incidents” of prior, similar
16 incidents of excessive force and the defendant was provided notice of all these incidents);
17 Bagos v. Vallejo, No. 2:20-cv-00185-KJM-AC, 2020 WL 6043949, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Oct.
18 13, 2020) (“[p]rior incidents involving lawsuits alone, even those which do not result in a
19 finding or admission of wrongdoing, can be sufficient for Monell liability purposes in the
20 face of a motion to dismiss.”); Villa v. Cnty. of San Diego, Case No.: 20-cv-537-CAB-
21 NLS, 2020 WL 5535384, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020) (denying motion to dismiss
22 Monell claim of policy and custom and failure to train claim as the plaintiff referenced
23 federal investigations, citizen complaints, and lawsuits against the County that include
24 similar allegations of misconduct).
25 Here, the FAC provides factual support that frames the existence of a specific custom
26 or practice that was the moving force behind Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries. The FAC alleges
27 the Sheriff’s Department has a longstanding custom of arresting and booking intoxicated
28 or mentally ill individuals rather than diverting them to hospitals for medical care. (Doc.
1 No. 3 ¶¶ 55, 62). The FAC goes on to allege that the San Diego County Sheriff’s
2 Department has a custom and practice of arresting individuals in need of urgent medical
3 intervention and booking such arrestees into jail rather than first sending them to a hospital
4 for medical clearance. (Id. ¶ 62.) Plaintiffs contend that deputies frequently arrest and jail
5 individuals exhibiting medical distress for being “under the influence.” (Id.) And Plaintiffs
6 allege the County was aware of the recurring pattern of preventable deaths caused by
7 failures to obtain emergency medical care. (Id.) As to deliberate indifference, Plaintiffs
8 allege that between 2009 and 2020, Defendants have engaged in a pattern of prior similar
9 violations—indeed, Plaintiffs describe the deaths of twenty individuals that passed away
10 from intoxication or untreated medical crises while in police custody. (Id. ¶ 62(a)–(t).)
11 According to the FAC, these deaths occurred because deputies refused to obtain emergency
12 hospitalization and instead criminalized medical crises. (Id. ¶ 63.) Finally, Plaintiffs allege
13 that County officials failed to take corrective action despite being on notice of the
14 constitutional violations. (Id. ¶ 64.)
15 In its reply, the County argues it can’t be liable for depriving arrestees suspected of
16 intoxication or mental illness of urgently needed medical care because, in this case,
17 Defendants eventually called the paramedics. (Doc. No. 26 at 2–3.) The County contends
18 the custom of depriving arrestees of medical care cannot be the moving force behind the
19 alleged constitutional violation in this case because the FAC indicates Defendants obtained
20 medical care for the decedent. (Id. at 3.) This argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiffs do not
21 allege Defendants never provide arrestees and detainees medical care. Rather, the
22 allegation is that Defendants have a policy and practice of arresting and jailing individuals
23 in need of medical attention instead of addressing their medical needs first. (See Doc. No.
24 3 ¶ 62.) Accordingly, the mere fact that Defendants eventually summoned medical
25 assistance does not negate Plaintiffs’ allegation that the County’s policy of delaying
26 necessary care in favor of arrest was the moving force behind the alleged constitutional
27 violations.
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1 Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the FAC’s
2 allegations support the finding that Defendants engaged in a practice of arresting
3 individuals rather than providing them with necessary medical care—and this practice was
4 widespread, persistent, and known to policymakers. Accordingly, the Court finds that
5 Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show the County has a custom or practice of
6 arresting individuals in need of urgent medical intervention and booking such arrestees into
7 jail rather than sending them to a hospital for medical treatment and stabilization, the
8 County was on notice of this custom, and the custom was the moving force behind
9 Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.
10 2. Failure to train
11 The FAC also includes a Monell claim based on a failure to train theory. The County
12 Defendants argue this theory is also not viable. (Doc. No. 22-1 at 11.) Plaintiffs claim that
13 the Sheriff’s Office did not train deputies to try to minimize the amount of weight applied
14 to someone’s chest or back while in a prone position or the physiology of a struggle. (Doc.
15 No. 3 ¶¶ 66, 67, 116, 117.) Plaintiffs also allege the Sheriff’s Department was aware its
16 deputies were killing individuals by using excessive and unreasonable restraint methods.
17 (Id. ¶68.)
18 “[A]s to a municipality, ‘the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for
19 § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the
20 rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.’” Flores v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,
21 758 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388
22 (1989)). This means Plaintiffs “‘must demonstrate a conscious or deliberate choice on the
23 part of a municipality in order to prevail on a failure to train claim.’” Id. (quoting Price v.
24 Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate
25 indifference requires proof that the municipal entity “disregarded a known or obvious
26 consequence” that a particular omission in its training program would cause city employees
27 to violate citizens’ constitutional rights. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 410. “Thus, when [the
28 municipal entity is] on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their
1 training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, the city
2 may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose[s] to retain that
3 program.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citing Brown, 520 U.S. at 407).
4 In the failure to train context, additional instances of misconduct are usually required to
5 show deliberate indifference, however, a narrow range of possibilities exist where the need
6 for training is so “obvious” as to be satisfied by a single incident. Connick, 563 U.S. at 64.
7 “To allege a failure to train, a plaintiff must include sufficient facts to support a
8 reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a municipal training policy that
9 amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; and (3) that the constitutional
10 injury would not have resulted if the municipality properly trained their employees.”
11 Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing
12 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007)).
13 Here, the FAC alleges the Sheriff’s Department did not train deputies to minimize
14 the amount of weight applied to someone’s chest or back while in a prone position; instead,
15 it trained them that they may have to apply additional body weight. (Doc. No. 3 ¶ 66). The
16 Department failed to train on the “physiology of a struggle” or risks of positional asphyxia
17 (Id. ¶ 67). The FAC alleges numerous prior deaths which involved prone restraint
18 and/or the use of hobbling restraints, WRAP devices, spit socks, and carotid holds (Id.
19 ¶ 68(a)–(i)). Plaintiffs allege the Sheriff’s Department refused to correct known training
20 and policy deficiencies despite jury verdicts and public findings. (Id. ¶ 69.) The FAC
21 alleges these prior incidents placed the Sheriff’s Department on notice of unconstitutional
22 training related to restraint practices, yet no remedial action was taken. (Id. ¶¶ 69–70.)
23 These allegations are sufficient to state a claim for failure-to-train.
24 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged Monell liability
25 against the County for a constitutional injury resulting from a custom, practice, policy, or
26 a failure to train. The Motion to Dismiss the Monell claim against the County is DENIED.
27
28
1 B. Bane Act
2 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim arguing “the FAC lacks any
3 facts to establish the necessary ‘specific intent’ of the County Defendants to violate
4 Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.” (Doc. No. 22-1 at 16.) Plaintiffs counter that the FAC
5 plausibly alleges that County Defendants acted with “reckless disregard.” (Doc. No. 25 at
6 22.) According to Plaintiffs, “the deputies’ deadly, compressive force and restraint of
7 [Decedent] was sufficiently coercive and egregious that ‘specific intent’ is not required.”
8 (Doc. No. 25 at 23.) Plaintiffs go on to argue that even if “specific intent” was required,
9 the FAC plausibly supports such a finding. The Court finds Plaintiffs arguments
10 meritorious.
11 The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1987 to address hate crimes. Reese
12 v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2018); see Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.
13 The Bane Act “protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights that are
14 secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by threats,
15 intimidation or coercion.’” Reese, 888 F.3d at 1040 (quoting Venegas v. Cnty. of Los
16 Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230, 1239 (2007)). Violations of federal and California
17 constitutional and statutory rights are all cognizable under the Bane Act. See Cal. Civ. Code
18 § 52.1(b) (a violation occurs when a defendant “interfere[s] . . . with the exercise or
19 enjoyment . . . of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the
20 rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state”). Claims under the Bane Act may
21 be brought against public officials who are alleged to interfere with protected rights, and
22 qualified immunity is not available for those claims. See Venegas, 153 Cal. App. 4th
23 at 1246.
24 The Ninth Circuit has held “the Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, intimidation[,]
25 or coercion’ element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional
26 violation alleged” so long as the claimant shows the defendant had a “specific intent” to
27 commit the constitutional violation. Reeseo, 888 F.3d at 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). The specific
28 intent requirement “is satisfied where the defendant allegedly acted with ‘[r]eckless
1 disregard of the right at issue.’” Estate of Serna v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 20-cv-2096-
2 LAB, 2022 WL 827123, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2022) (quoting Cornell v. City & Cnty.
3 of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 804) (alteration in original); see, e.g., M.H. v. Cnty.
4 of Alameda, 90 F. Supp. 3d 889, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (treating deliberate indifference as
5 intentional conduct); see also Scalia v. Cnty. of Kern, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1084 (treating
6 deliberate indifference as a coercive act).
7 Here, the FAC sufficiently alleges a Bane Act claim against the County Defendants.
8 First, the right at issue, “the right to be free from deliberate indifference to one’s serious
9 medical needs, is ‘clearly delineated and plainly applicable’ to the circumstances.” Scalia,
10 308 F. Supp. 3d at 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 803). As is
11 the right to be free from the use of excessive force. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
12 (1989); Brown, 520 U.S. at 414. Second, the FAC alleges that Defendants Aguilera and
13 Phillips acted with reckless disregard for Decedent’s rights and safety because they knew
14 he required medical attention, did not pose a risk or threat to the officers or the public, and
15 ultimately decided to take Decedent to Vista Detention Facility rather than returning him
16 to the hospital. (Doc. No. 3 ¶ 86.) Then, the Individual Defendants restrained Decedent on
17 the ground using bodyweight compression, downward pressure, and a WRAP device,
18 restricting his ability to breathe for approximately seven minutes and constituting deadly
19 force. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 51, 100.) Doe 1, the WRAP safety officer, “did nothing in response to
20 [Decedent’s] complaints of injury and pain.” (Id. ¶ 87.) After the WRAP was applied,
21 Individual Defendants left Decedent unmonitored in a dangerous prone position that
22 restricted his breathing for 20 minutes, contrary to proper training to use a position such as
23 sitting upright that does not restrict breathing and monitoring, and to closely monitor him
24 for signs of distress. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3, 52, 100.) Then, once paramedics arrived, they failed to
25 remove the restraints or properly position Decedent until after he was not breathing,
26 unresponsive, and pulseless. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 53, 88.) The FAC alleges that all Defendants’
27 conduct was in deliberate or reckless disregard of constitutional rights, and with specific
28 intent and purpose to violate those rights. (Id. ¶¶ 92, 103, 125.) Taken together, these
1 allegations plausibly establish that Defendants interfered with Decedent’s clearly
2 established rights through threats, intimidation, or coercion, thereby sufficiently stating a
3 claim under the Bane Act.
4 Accordingly, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs here have failed
5 adequately to allege a violation of the Bane Act. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion
6 to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim.
7 C. DOE DEFENDANTS 21-50
8 Finally, the County Defendants move to dismiss Doe Defendants 21–50. (Doc. No.
9 22-1 at 16–17.) The FAC identifies Doe Defendants 21 to 40 as “individuals, corporations,
10 or other entities in the County of San Diego who had contact with [Decedent] on March 2,
11 2024, or March 3, 2024, and whose actions, or inactions, violated [Decedent’s] state and
12 federally protected rights and whose conduct caused decedent injury or harm.” (Doc. No. 3
13 ¶ 33.) Doe Defendants 41 to 50 are identified as “supervisors, captains, commanders, and
14 other high-ranking officials at the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department, California
15 Highway Patrol, or Vista Fire Department, who were responsible for supervising,
16 disciplining, and training subordinate individual defendants in this case and who were
17 responsible for promulgating and approving all policies and practices in this case.” (Id.
18 ¶ 34.)
19 “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.”
20 Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). However, “where the identity of
21 alleged defendants will not be known prior to the filing of a complaint . . . [a] plaintiff
22 should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants,
23 unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint
24 would be dismissed on other grounds.” Id. Plaintiff must nevertheless still “allege specific
25 facts showing how each particular doe defendant violated his rights.” Keavney v. Cnty. of
26 San Diego, No. 3:19-cv-01947-AJB-BGS, 2020 WL 4192286, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 20,
27 2020).
28
l Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against the Doe Defendants is premature at this point.
2 Court declines to dismiss the claims against the Doe Defendants simply because
3 || Plaintiffs were not aware of their identities at the time they filed the Complaint. See
4 || Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163. Indeed, dismissal would only be warranted
5 ||if (1) discovery would not uncover their identities or (2) dismissal is warranted on other
6 || grounds. See id. (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642); see also Palacios v. Cnty. of San
7 || Diego, No. 20-cv-450-MMA (DEB), 2020 WL 4201686, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2020).
8 Here, Plaintiffs allege the County withheld information in response to public records
9 || requests, including all audio and video of the incident. (Doc. No. 3 9 27-28.) As a result,
10 || Plaintiffs allege they “are genuinely ignorant of the identities of all people whose conduct
11 ||may have violated [Decedent’s] rights and caused his death.” (/d. J] 29, 35.) The Court
12 || finds that discovery could uncover the Doe Defendants’ identities. Assuming the truth of
13 || Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations and construing them in their favor, Chubb Custom, 710
14 || F.3d at 956, the Court finds that is plausible that the Doe Defendants are: (1) individuals,
15 || corporations, or other entities in the County of San Diego who had contact with Decedent
16 (Does 21-40); and (2) supervisors, captains, commanders, and other high-ranking officials
17 || at the San Diego County Sheriff's Department, California Highway Patrol, or Vista Fire
18 || Department, who were responsible for supervising, disciplining, and training subordinate
19 individual defendants in this case (Does 41-50). Accordingly, the County Defendants’
20 || Motion to Dismiss Doe Defendants 21-50 is DENIED.
21 CONCLUSION
22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the County Defendants’ Motion to
23 || Dismiss. The County Defendants must answer the FAC on or before April 1, 2026.
24 IT IS SO ORDERED.
25 ||Dated: March 17, 2026 ©
26 Hon. Anthony J. attaglia
27 United States District Judge
28
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