The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 MATTHEW BEAUSCHESNE, an Case No.: 25-CV-69 JLS (DEB)
individual,
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART
Plaintiff,
13 MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
v.
14
(ECF No. 27)
FORD MOTOR COMPANY, and DOES
15
1 through 10, inclusive,
16
Defendants.
17
18 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Matthew Beauschesne’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion
19 for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Expenses (“Mot.,” ECF No. 27). Also before the Court are
20 Defendant Ford Motor Company’s (“Defendant”) Opposition (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 28) and
21 Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of the Motion (“Reply,” ECF No. 30). Having considered the
22 Parties’ arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion and
23 AWARDS Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of $38,073.50 plus costs in the amount
24 of $897.43, for a total reward of $38,970.93.
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1 BACKGROUND
2 On December 17, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a Ford F1-50 (“the Vehicle”) from
3 Defendant, which was manufactured or distributed by Defendant, for a total cost of
4 $54,662.20. Opp’n at 6.1 Plaintiff alleges that, due to various safety defects, the Vehicle
5 was repaired three times from July 2023 to December 2023, and again in August 2024,
6 causing it to be out of service for a total of at least forty-six days. See Opp’n, Ex. B–E;
7 ECF No. 27-1 (“Hunt Decl.”) ¶ 5. On July 17, 2024, Plaintiff contacted Defendant and
8 requested that it repurchase the Vehicle. Hunt Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff again contacted
9 Defendant on July 29, 2024, and was informed Defendant had not yet decided whether to
10 repurchase the Vehicle. Id. On August 5, 2024, Plaintiff again presented the Vehicle for
11 repair, and on August 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit in state court alleging Defendant violated
12 the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act. See ECF No. 1-2 (“Compl.”). Defendant made
13 subsequent offers to repurchase Plaintiff’s Vehicle on August 30, 2024, and September 10,
14 2024, which Plaintiff declined. ECF No. 28-1 (“Richardson Decl.”) ¶¶ 8–9. Defendant
15 filed a Notice of Removal on January 13, 2025, and Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand on
16 March 6, 2025, which Plaintiff later withdrew after accepting Defendant’s Rule 68 Offer
17 of Judgment to repurchase the Vehicle for $31,000.00. See ECF Nos. 1, 6, 26. The Parties
18 agreed that Plaintiff “may apply for a fee award on the ground that [P]laintiff is a prevailing
19 party entitled to attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d).”
20 See Opp’n, Ex. J at 67. Plaintiff filed the present Motion, seeking $38,073.50 in fees and
21 $897.43 in incurred costs related to this matter. See Mot.
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1 Pin citations to the Motion, Opposition, and Reply refer to the CM/ECF page numbers electronically
1 LEGAL STANDARD
2 “District courts follow the forum state’s law for awarding attorney’s fees when
3 exercising their diversity jurisdiction over state-law claims.” Siafarikas v. Mercedes-Benz
4 USA, LLC, No. 20-CV-1784-JAM-AC, 2022 WL 16926265, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 14,
5 2022). Under § 1794(d) of California’s Song-Beverly Act, the prevailing party shall be
6 allowed to recover attorneys’ fees “based on actual time expended, determined by the court
7 to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and
8 prosecution of such action.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). “A prevailing buyer has the burden
9 of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct
10 of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am., 31
11 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To challenge attorneys’
12 fees as excessive, the challenging party must point to the specific items challenged, with a
13 sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.” Nai Hung Li v. FCA US LLC, No. 17-
14 CV-6290-R-JEM, 2019 WL 6317769, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2019) (internal quotation
15 marks omitted). “The California Court of Appeal has expressly held that the lodestar
16 method applies to determining attorneys’ fees under the Song-Beverly Act.” Id. (citing
17 Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1137–39 (2001)). The lodestar method consists of
18 two steps. Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). “First, the court
19 must calculate the ‘lodestar figure’ by taking the number of hours reasonably expended on
20 the litigation and multiplying it by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. (citing Hensley v.
21 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). “Second, the court must decide whether to enhance
22 or reduce the lodestar figure based on an evaluation of the [Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild,
23 Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by, City of Burlington v.
24 Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992),] factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar
25 calculation.” Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 (first citing Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life
26 Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000); and then citing Morales v. City of San Rafael,
27 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir. 1996)).
28 / / /
1 ANALYSIS
2 California Civil Code § 1793.2(d)(2) provides that:
3 If the manufacturer or its representative in this state is unable to
service or repair a new motor vehicle . . . to conform to the
4
applicable express warranties after a reasonable number of
5 attempts, the manufacturer shall either promptly replace the new
motor vehicle . . . or promptly make restitution to the buyer . . . .
6
7 Plaintiff filed suit alleging Defendant did not meet its obligations under
8 § 1793.2(d)(2), and Plaintiff now contends that they are the prevailing party and entitled to
9 attorneys’ fees under California Civil Code § 1794(d). See generally Mot.
10 Plaintiff seeks to recover a total of $38,970.93, comprised of $38,073.50 for 98.3
11 total billed hours and $897.43 in costs, with a 0.1 multiplier. Id. at 25–26. Defendant
12 challenges Plaintiff’s fee submission on the grounds that Plaintiff is not a “prevailing party”
13 under § 1794(d). Opp’n at 6. Defendant requests that if fees are awarded, they only be
14 awarded for fees Plaintiff incurred before August 30, 2024. Id. Defendant also contends
15 Plaintiff’s billing rate should be reduced and that no multiplier should be applied. Id.
16 I. Attorneys’ Fees
17 A. Prevailing Party
18 Plaintiff is only entitled to attorneys’ fees should he be considered the prevailing
19 party. The allocation of attorneys’ fees “is governed by the fee-shifting statute itself, rather
20 than a rigid adherence to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1032.” Wohlgemuth v.
21 Caterpillar Inc., 207 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1264 (2012). When a fee-shifting statute does
22 not define prevailing party, the Court takes a “pragmatic approach” and considers “which
23 party succeeded on a practical level, by considering the extent to which each party realized
24 its litigation objectives.” Id. (first citing Kim v. Euromotors W./The Auto Gallery, 149 Cal.
25 App. 4th 170, 178–81 (2007); then citing Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal.
26 App. 4th 140, 149–51 (2006); and then citing Castro v. Superior Ct., 116 Cal. App. 4th
27 1010, 1018–20 (2004)). Under § 1794(d), obtaining a “net monetary recovery in the action
28 [does] not necessarily render [a party] the prevailing party.” MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz
1 USA, LLC, 233 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1047 (2015). Rather, the Court is guided by “equitable
2 considerations” and considers “substance rather than form.” Rangel v. Ford Motor Co.,
3 No. CV 20-11440-GW-ASx, 2021 WL 9059844, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021) (citing
4 Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal. 4th 863, 877 (1995)). The Song-Beverly Act “is manifestly a
5 remedial measure, intended for the protection of the consumer; [and] it should be given a
6 construction calculated to bring its benefits into action.” Murillo v. Fleetwood Enters.,
7 Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 985, 990 (1998) (citing Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 23 Cal.
8 App. 4th 174, 184 (1994)).
9 Plaintiff bears the burden of proving he presented the Vehicle to the manufacturer
10 for repair, and that the manufacturer did not correct the issue after a reasonable number of
11 repair attempts. Oregel v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 90 Cal. App. 4th 1094, 1101 (2001).
12 “The reasonableness of the number of repair attempts is a question of fact to be determined
13 in light of the circumstances, but at a minimum there must be more than one opportunity
14 to fix the nonconformity.” Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of California, Inc., 144
15 Cal. App. 4th 785, 798–99 (2006). Manufacturers have “an affirmative duty to replace a
16 vehicle or make restitution to the buyer if the manufacturer is unable to repair the new
17 vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts . . . .” Krotin v. Porsche Cars N. Am.,
18 Inc., 38 Cal. App. 4th 294, 303 (1995). California Civil Code § 1793(d)(2) does not define
19 what qualifies as “promptly” replacing a vehicle, but courts have found reasonably prompt
20 repurchase offers to occur forty to fifty days after the manufacturer’s obligation arises.
21 Carver v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 107 Cal. App. 5th 864, 879–80 (2024); Dominguez
22 v. Am. Suzuki Motor Corp., 160 Cal. App. 4th 53, 59 (2008) (finding a repurchase offer
23 within six weeks of a repurchase request to be reasonably prompt); De Leon v. Ford Motor
24 Co., No. CV 18-7975 PSG (FFMx), 2019 WL 7195325, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2019)
25 (stating “[c]ourts have generally found that a manufacturer makes a prompt offer when it
26 is made within fifty days”); Medrano v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 12-CV-2198-
27 SVW-MAN, 2012 WL 12882428, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 6, 2012) (holding forty-five days
28 between a repurchase request and offer would be prompt).
1 Here, Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees on the grounds he obtained a judgment in his
2 favor and reached his objective of forcing Defendant to repurchase the Vehicle. Mot. at 17.
3 Defendant contends Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees because he filed suit
4 prematurely and deprived Defendant of a chance to make a reasonably prompt repurchase
5 offer. Opp’n at 12–13. Additionally, Defendant argues Plaintiff “achieved nothing” by
6 filing suit. Id. at 6.
7 It is not disputed that Plaintiff presented the Vehicle for repair on multiple occasions
8 during the warranty period. See Mot. at 8. The dispositive question in this matter is when
9 Defendant’s duty to repurchase Plaintiff’s Vehicle arose under § 1793(d)(2).
10 According to the records presented, Plaintiff presented the Vehicle for repair on July
11 18, 2023, September 18, 2023, December 1, 2023, and August 5, 2024. See Opp’n, Ex. B–
12 E. Plaintiff contends Defendant had affirmative repurchase obligations as of August 17,
13 2023, September 18, 2023, August 5, 2024, and July 17, 2024, under § 1793.2(b),
14 § 1793.22(b)(1), § 1793.22(b)(2), and § 1793.2(d)(2). See Mot. 8–9. Defendant asserts its
15 repurchase obligation did not arise until Plaintiff’s repurchase request on July 17, 2024,
16 and claims Plaintiff prematurely filed suit and prevented them from making a reasonably
17 prompt repurchase offer. Opp’n at 14. The Court finds that Defendant’s repurchase
18 obligation derives solely from § 1793.2(d)(2) and examines the present matter through this
19 Section and its pertinent case law.
20 Plaintiff relies on Krotin v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc. to support his position.
21 Krotin stands for the proposition that manufacturers have an “affirmative duty” to replace
22 a vehicle they are unable to repair after a reasonable number of attempts. Krotin, 38 Cal.
23 App. 4th at 303. The court in Krotin held that the Song-Beverly Act “does not require
24 consumers to take any affirmative steps to secure relief . . . other than, of course, permitting
25 the manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle.” Id. at 302–03. The court
26 explicitly stated, “the consumer’s request is not mandated by any provision in the act.” Id.
27 at 303. Simultaneously, the court noted that a manufacturer “seldom on its own initiative
28 offers [to repurchase the vehicle],” meaning a consumer’s replacement request is “often
1 prompted by the manufacturer’s unforthright approach and stonewalling of fundamental
2 warranty problems.” Id. A key aspect of the court’s reasoning was that manufacturers can
3 determine when a vehicle is defective by examining its dealers’ service records. Id.
4 Defendant contends Plaintiff “over-reads” the Krotin holding, and argues the case
5 merely reflects that there is a “rare set of facts” in which a manufacturer is on notice that a
6 repurchase is necessary without the consumer making a repurchase request. Opp’n at 10.
7 Defendant’s position is supported by multiple District Courts. See Islas v. Ford Motor Co.,
8 No. 18-CV-2221-GW(SPx), 2019 WL 10855294, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2019)
9 (holding Krotin did not create an affirmative repurchase obligation on the part of the
10 manufacturer prior to a repurchase request); Gonzalez v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., No. 22-
11 CV-6058-JLS-JC, 2024 WL 5371341, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2024) (stating that
12 interpreting Krotin to create an affirmative repurchase duty prior to a repurchase request
13 “is at odds with how the Song-Beverly Act is typically understood”); Silva v. Ford Motor
14 Co., No. 24-CV-3674-DJC-SJR, 2025 WL 2879624, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2025)
15 (declining to interpret Krotin as placing an affirmative repurchase duty on manufacturers
16 before a repurchase request).
17 Defendant primarily relies on Carver v. Volkswagen and Rangel v. Ford Motor Co.
18 to argue Plaintiff prematurely filed suit and cannot be deemed the prevailing party. See
19 Opp’n 11–16; Carver, 107 Cal. App. 5th 864; Rangel, 2021 WL 9059844.
20 The court in Carver ruled that the defendant acted promptly in offering to repurchase
21 the vehicle twenty days after plaintiff’s repurchase request. Carver, 107 Cal. App. 5th
22 at 880. The court discussed whether the manufacturer’s repurchase duty arose prior to
23 plaintiff’s repurchase request, but it did not decide the matter because regardless of when
24 the duty arose, defendant’s repurchase offer would have been within the fifty-day timeline.
25 Id. at 880. The court also contended Krotin did not support the plaintiff’s argument because
26 defendant did not engage in any “stonewalling” or unforthright behavior, as they made
27 repair efforts and consistently communicated with plaintiff while they reviewed his
28 repurchase request. Id. at 880–81.
1 Although the court in Carver expressed a narrow view of Krotin, it did not
2 affirmatively state that a manufacturer’s repurchase duty did not arise until a consumer’s
3 repurchase request. Id. at 880. Additionally, the vehicle in Carver was only presented for
4 repair on one occasion, and the court lauded the manufacturer’s consistent communication
5 and transparency with the consumer. Id. at 880–81. Here, at the time of his repurchase
6 request, Plaintiff had already presented his Vehicle for repair on three occasions. See Mot.
7 at 9. Additionally, Plaintiff did not hear from Defendant before contacting it twelve days
8 after his repurchase request, by which time Defendant still had not made a repurchase
9 decision. See id. Plaintiff again presented his Vehicle for repair six days later and waited
10 an additional eleven days before filing suit. Id. By the time Plaintiff filed suit, his Vehicle
11 had been presented for repair on four occasions and had still not been conformed to
12 warranty. Id. Additionally, he had not received an update from Defendant since making
13 his repurchase request thirty days prior. Id. It was not until after Plaintiff filed suit that
14 Defendant informed him of its decision to repurchase the Vehicle. Id. Defendant cannot
15 be said to have acted with the same urgency as the manufacturer in Carver, and the Court
16 is unable to say with certainty that there is no evidence of an unforthright approach.
17 Therefore, Carver is distinguishable from this case.
18 In Rangel, the plaintiff requested that the defendant repurchase his vehicle, and
19 defendant notified plaintiff five days later his request was under review. Rangel, 2021 WL
20 9059844, at *1. The plaintiff filed suit two days later, before defendant made its repurchase
21 offer four days later. Id. About six weeks into litigation, the plaintiff accepted a Rule 68
22 Offer of Judgment in which the defendant repurchased the vehicle. Id. Because there was
23 no evidence that the defendant failed to act promptly, and it was “impossible” to determine
24 how much of the plaintiff’s recovery was attributable to the lawsuit, the court did not
25 consider the plaintiff the prevailing party and did not award him attorneys’ fees. Id. at *3.
26 While Rangel stands for the proposition that a premature filing of suit can preclude
27 a plaintiff from being the prevailing party, it is clearly distinguishable from this case. Id.
28 As outlined above, the record reveals that Plaintiff did not rush to file suit, and his behavior
1 here is therefore not comparable to the overzealous plaintiff in Rangel that waited only a
2 week before filing suit. The Court does not view Carver or Rangel as instructive cases in
3 deciding this matter.
4 The Court applies Krotin to find Defendant’s affirmative duty arose long before
5 Plaintiff’s repurchase request. In doing so, the Court is guided by recent precedent and the
6 “remedial purpose” of the Song-Beverly Act. See Murillo, 17 Cal. 4th at 990. A recent
7 district court decision held that Krotin places an affirmative duty on manufacturers to
8 replace a vehicle after failing to repair it after a reasonable number of attempts. Rivas v.
9 Ford Motor Co., No. 25-CV-4821-SPG-JPR, 2026 WL 127775, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15,
10 2026). There, the court followed Krotin and stated that a plain reading of § 1793.2(d) does
11 not indicate the consumer must request a repurchase to initiate the manufacturer’s
12 repurchase duty. Id. The Court stated that policy arguments in favor of requiring a
13 consumer’s request “are better directed to the California Legislature.” Id. Other district
14 courts have also adopted this interpretation of Krotin. See Anderson v. BMW of N. Am.,
15 LLC, No. 18-CV-57-WVG, 2018 WL 2011006, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018) (stating
16 that under Krotin, manufacturers have a duty to replace vehicles prior to a consumer’s
17 repurchase request); Robinson v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., No. 10-CV-3187-MCE-GGH, 2011
18 WL 1459016, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2011) (stating that “in light of Krotin, [d]efendant
19 is expected to review its dealers’ service records, and so [it] should have known of the
20 failed attempts to repair the defect”); Nguyen v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., 737 F. Supp. 3d
21 937, 945 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (finding that “under Song-Beverly, [the car manufacturer] had
22 a legal obligation to repurchase the vehicle promptly after a reasonable number of repair
23 attempts” and it was no defense to argue that the plaintiff did not request the remedy before
24 filing for arbitration).
25 Additionally, the California Supreme Court expressed approval for this
26 interpretation of Krotin, as it cited the proposition that “the Act does not require consumers
27 to take any affirmative steps to secure relief for the failure of a manufacturer to service or
28 repair a vehicle to conform to applicable warranties—other than, of course, permitting the
1 manufacturer a reasonable opportunity to repair the vehicle.” Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC
2 15 Cal. 5th 792, 818 (2024) (quoting Krotin, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 302–03). The Court also
3 stated, “Once the manufacturer is unable to repair the vehicle after a reasonable number of
4 attempts, the manufacturer’s obligation to promptly provide restitution to the buyer
5 arises.” Id. at 818–19 (emphasis added). Courts in the California Fourth District Court of
6 Appeal have also adopted this interpretation of Krotin. See Martinez v. Kia Motors Am.,
7 Inc., 193 Cal. App. 4th 187, 194 (2011) (holding that the Song-Beverly Act only requires
8 the consumer to submit the vehicle for repair); Oregel, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 1103 (holding
9 the only affirmative step required of the consumer under § 1793.2(d)(2) was to submit their
10 vehicle for repair).
11 The Court abides by Krotin and its supporting precedent and finds that Defendant’s
12 duty to replace Plaintiff’s Vehicle began after it was unable to remedy the Vehicle’s defect
13 within a reasonable number of repair attempts. The Court relies on the specific facts and
14 circumstances of this case to determine when Defendant’s repurchase obligation began.
15 See Robertson, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 798–99. Based on the record, the Court finds that
16 Defendant’s repurchase obligation arose at the earliest after the second failed repair
17 attempt, on September 18, 2023, and at the latest after the third failed repair attempt on
18 December 1, 2023. See Mot. at 9; see also Gamaty v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 21-CV-
19 1063-RGK (AFMx), 2022 WL 1591701, at *2 (C.D. Cal. March 2, 2022) (“The ‘reasonable
20 number of attempts’ bar is low, however; a plaintiff need only present the nonconformity
21 for repair twice to satisfy the standard.” (quoting Robertson, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 799)). It
22 is not necessary to decide on which date the duty began, as regardless, Defendant’s
23 repurchase obligation took effect far more than fifty days before Plaintiff filed suit on
24 August 17, 2024.
25 Plaintiff fulfilled his burden under the Song-Beverly Act of presenting the Vehicle
26 for repair. See Oregel, 90 Cal. App. 4th at 1101. The Song-Beverly Act was created to
27 provide recourse for consumers whose vehicles had unrepairable defects within the
28 warranty period, and the Court interprets its provisions in a manner consistent with this
1 purpose. See Murillo, 17 Cal. 4th at 990. Defendant claims there must be facts that “place
2 the manufacturer on notice that the vehicle cannot be confirmed to warranty and that the
3 customer desires a replacement.” Opp’n at 16. However, the Krotin court emphasized that
4 manufacturers possess the ability to assess when a vehicle cannot be conformed to warranty
5 through an examination of repair records. Krotin, 38 Cal. App. 4th at 303. Here,
6 Defendant’s three repair attempts within a short period in late 2023 provided the
7 manufacturer with notice that the Vehicle was not going to be repaired to conform with
8 warranty. See generally Mot. Considering the record in its totality, it would not be in
9 accordance with the purpose of the Song-Beverly Act, let alone common sense, to deny
10 Plaintiff prevailing party status, after he presented his Vehicle on numerous occasions for
11 repair, waited patiently before requesting that Defendant repurchase his Vehicle, and
12 eventually filed suit. See generally Mot.
13 Defendant also argues that Plaintiff is not the prevailing party because the Rule 68
14 Offer of Judgment contained the “very same terms” as Defendant’s initial repurchase
15 offers. Opp’n at 6. The Parties ultimately agreed to a payment of $31,000.00 in the Rule
16 68 Offer of Judgment, but the Parties differ in their valuation of Defendant’s initial offer.
17 See Opp’n at 19; Reply at 5. Defendant contends its August 2024 Song-Beverly repurchase
18 offer would have totaled $30,947.37. Opp’n at 19. Plaintiff contends Defendant’s first
19 itemized repurchase offer on October 11, 2024, was for $30,420.00 and required that
20 Plaintiff consent to a waiver of liability. Mot. at 17. Plaintiff also claims Defendant’s Rule
21 68 Offer of Judgment did not include confidentiality terms and denials of liability that are
22 usually present in Defendant’s settlement agreements. Reply at 6.
23 To support its position, Defendant cites Campos v. Ford Motor Co., No. EDCV 17-
24 02221 AG (AGRx), 2020 WL 256125, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020). In Campos, the
25 plaintiff declined the defendant’s pre-litigation offer and filed suit, only to accept a nearly
26 identical offer over a year later in the form of a Rule 68 Offer. Id. at *2. This is
27 distinguishable from the present matter, where Defendant never made a pre-litigation
28 repurchase offer. See generally Mot. Plaintiff rejected offers early in litigation, but courts
1 have previously held that plaintiffs rejecting settlement offers, even pre-litigation offers,
2 do not preclude them from being the prevailing party. See Goglin v. BMW of N. Am., LLC,
3 4 Cal. App. 5th 462, 471 (2016) (holding plaintiff acted reasonably by rejecting pre-
4 litigation offers with “extraneous terms”); McKenzie v. Ford Motor Co., 238 Cal. App. 4th
5 695, 705–08 (2015) (holding plaintiff was justified in rejecting initial settlement offer that
6 contained a broad waiver of liability); Gezalyan v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 697 F. Supp. 2d
7 1168, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (holding plaintiff acted reasonably in rejecting settlement
8 offer with a confidentiality agreement).
9 There is nothing in the record to suggest Plaintiff acted unreasonably by rejecting
10 Defendant’s early settlement offers. Although the Parties ultimately settled for a similar
11 monetary figure, the Court considers material the absence of non-monetary terms in the
12 Rule 68 Offer of Judgment that were present in early settlement negotiations. See Reply
13 at 6.
14 Most importantly, when determining the prevailing party, courts consider which
15 party obtained their litigation objectives from a practical point of view. See Wohlgemuth,
16 207 Cal. App. 4th at 1264. Here, Plaintiff filed suit to force Defendant to repurchase his
17 Vehicle, and he succeeded in that goal. Therefore, on a practical level, Plaintiff achieved
18 his litigation objective. See id. In determining the prevailing party, the Court is guided by
19 the Song-Beverly Act’s remedial purpose and relies on equitable principles. See Murillo,
20 17 Cal. 4th at 990; Rangel, 2021 WL 9059844, at *3. Examining the record with this in
21 mind, the Court finds Plaintiff to be the prevailing party in this matter, making him entitled
22 to reasonable attorneys’ fees.
23 B. Lodestar Figure
24 1. Reasonableness of Hourly Rates
25 “[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition
26 to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing
27 in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,
28 experience[,] and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th
1 Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). “[T]he relevant
2 community is the forum in which the district court sits.” Id. (citing Barjon v. Dalton, 132
3 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997)). “[A]ffidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney[s] and other
4 attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other
5 cases . . . are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” Id. at 980 (quoting United
6 Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990)). “Once
7 the fee applicant has proffered such evidence, the opposing party must produce its own
8 affidavits or other evidence to rebut the proposed rate.” Cortes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380
9 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d at 407). If
10 the fee target fails to dispute the market rate with countervailing evidence, a court is
11 permitted to presume the requested rates are reasonable. See U.S. v. $28,000.00 in U.S.
12 Currency, 802 F.3d 1100, 1105–06 (9th Cir. 2015). Because this case was pending in 2025,
13 the Court will use 2025 rate determinations to establish the prevailing market rate.
14 Here, Plaintiff seeks approval of the following hourly rates for Plaintiff’s counsel
15 and paraprofessionals: $595.00/hour for Joseph Kaufman, shareholder with twenty-two
16 years of experience; $375.00/hour for Associate Christopher R. Hunt with two years of
17 experience; and $175.00/hour for paralegal Melissa Lopez, with three years of experience.
18 See Mot. at 21. Plaintiff contends these hourly rates have been approved by courts within
19 the Southern District of California and are similar to the rates of other attorneys in the
20 market. Id. Plaintiff argues that because counsel took this case on a contingency basis,
21 counsel is expected to receive a higher hourly fee. Id. (citing Rader v. Thrasher, 57 Cal.
22 2d 244, 253 (1962)). Plaintiff also states that Defendant delayed resolution of the case,
23 causing fees to rise. Id. at 22 (citing Hunt Decl. ¶¶ 7–12). Additionally, Plaintiff contends
24 counsel exhibited expertise that provided Plaintiff with a favorable result. Id. at 23.
25 Defendant argues Plaintiff prolonged litigation by declining reasonable settlement
26 offers and failing to provide Defendant with the necessary information to formulate a Song-
27 Beverly repurchase offer. Opp’n at 17. Defendant also contends counsel was not needed,
28 considering Defendant was planning to repurchase the Vehicle regardless of litigation. Id.
1 at 20. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff’s hourly rates are excessive, as the reasonable
2 hourly rate is the prevailing rate for attorneys practicing noncontingent litigation in the
3 same area of law. Id. at 22 (citing Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1133). Defendant cites
4 California Superior Court cases that have reduced the fees of law firm partners in Song-
5 Beverly cases to $350/hour and contends Plaintiff’s proposed rates are excessive for lemon
6 law litigation. Id., Ex. K–M. Defendant asks that, should fees be awarded, the Court strike
7 at least 86.9 hours in unnecessary fees incurred after Ford’s August 30, 2024, settlement
8 offer and apply only a $350 hourly rate to the hours billed prior to that date. See id. at 26.
9 Plaintiff asserts his hourly rate has been approved “in at least nineteen cases,” and
10 provides fourteen prior cases in state and federal court where his hourly rate of $595/hr
11 was approved. Kaufman Decl. ¶ 6. Courts in the Central District and Northern District of
12 California approved Mr. Kaufman’s hourly rate as recently as 2024. See id.; Nguyen v.
13 Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 23-CV-4104-HDV-JC, ECF No. 64, at 4 (C.D. Cal.
14 Nov. 6, 2024); Kohndrow v. Ford Motor Co., No. 23-CV-4354-PCP, ECF No. 37, at 2
15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2024). Additionally, as early as 2016, an hourly rate of $575 was
16 deemed reasonable for a senior attorney handling a Song-Beverly action. See Goglin, 4
17 Cal. App. 5th at 473. Plaintiff is the founder and shareholder of Joseph Kaufman &
18 Associates, Inc., and has practiced lemon law for over twenty years. Kaufman Decl. ¶¶ 1–
19 3. Plaintiff provides evidence of lemon law attorneys with similar levels of experience
20 who bill at a greater hourly rate. Id. at ¶ 11. Based on prior case law and the evidence
21 Plaintiff provides, Mr. Kaufman’s hourly rate of $595 appears reasonable, and Defendant
22 fails to demonstrate otherwise. See Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979; Cortes, 380 F. Supp. 2d at
23 1129.
24 Defendant does not contest Mr. Hunt’s fee rate of $375/hr. Mr. Hunt has worked
25 for Joseph Kaufman & Associates since 2023, when he began practicing law. Hunt Decl.
26 ¶ 13. During this time, Mr. Hunt has been involved in over 100 matters and has been the
27 primary attorney on “at least 6 cases.” Id. Plaintiff provides fourteen cases in which his
28 hourly rate of $375 was approved by a superior court. Id. at ¶ 15. For the foregoing
1 reasons, the Court finds Mr. Hunt’s hourly rate to be reasonable.
2 Additionally, Defendant does not contend that the hourly rate of $175.00 for Ms.
3 Lopez, a third-year paralegal, is unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court finds the $175/hour
4 rate to be reasonable. Because the Court deemed Plaintiff’s rejection of Defendant’s
5 August 30, 2024, settlement offer to be reasonable, the Court will not strike 86.9 hours of
6 fees as Defendant requests.
7 2. Reasonableness of Time Expended
8 “The party seeking an award of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours
9 worked.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. “The district court . . . should exclude . . . hours that
10 were not ‘reasonably expended’” and “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise
11 unnecessary.” Id. “Overlitigation deemed excessive does not count towards the reasonable
12 time component of a lodestar calculation.” Puccio v. Love, No. 16-CV-2890 W (BGS),
13 2020 WL 434481, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2020) (citing Tomovich v. Wolpoff & Abramson,
14 LLP, No. 08-CV-1428-JM (BLM), 2009 WL 2447710, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2009)).
15 However, the Ninth Circuit has also instructed that, “[b]y and large, the court should defer
16 to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to
17 spend on the case; after all, he won, and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.”
18 Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). Ultimately, “the
19 [opposing party] bears the burden of providing specific evidence to challenge the accuracy
20 and reasonableness of the hours charged.” McGrath v. Cnty. of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 255
21 (9th Cir. 1995) (first citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 892 n.5; and then citing Gates v. Gomez, 60
22 F.3d 525, 534–35 (9th Cir. 1995)). “[F]ail[ure] to offer either countervailing evidence or
23 persuasive argumentation in support of [the fee target’s] position” permits the district court
24 to presume a properly supported fee application is reasonable. $28,000.00 in U.S.
25 Currency, 802 F.3d at 1106–07 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
26 Plaintiff provided the Court with detailed billing records, which indicate Plaintiff
27 spent 98.3 total hours on this matter, with Mr. Kaufman billing 13.8 hours, Mr. Hunt billing
28 78.0 hours, and Ms. Lopez billing 3.5 hours. Mot., Ex. 2. Plaintiff claims fees should be
1 based not on the total amount of damages recovered, but on the time counsel exerted on
2 the matter. Mot. at 25–26. Plaintiff also contends the Court should defer to Plaintiff’s
3 counsel’s professional judgment and that the time claimed must be “obviously and
4 convincingly excessive” to be reduced. Id. at 23 (first citing Blackwell v. Foley, 724 F.
5 Supp. 2d 1068, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2010); and then citing Moreno 534 F.3d at 1112 (9th Cir.
6 2008)).
7 Defendant argues that ultimately none of the work done by Plaintiff was necessary
8 at any rate, because Plaintiff filed suit prematurely, and failed to obtain a favorable result.
9 Opp’n at 21–24. As previously explained, the Court is unpersuaded by this argument and
10 finds Plaintiff to be the prevailing party, meaning the Court exhibits deference to Plaintiff’s
11 billing record. See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112. Defendant also contends Plaintiff drove up
12 billing by discrediting and rejecting Ford’s early settlement offers. Opp’n at 17. The Court
13 also finds this unpersuasive, as rejecting settlement offers earlier in litigation does not
14 preclude Plaintiff from collecting attorneys’ fees, and there was no evidence Plaintiff acted
15 unreasonably in the present matter. See Goglin, 4 Cal. App. 5th at 471. Additionally, the
16 Court does not engage in second guessing of the prevailing party’s litigation tactics.
17 Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112.
18 Defendant argues Plaintiff’s alleged work is “manifestly excessive” and refers to
19 several of Plaintiff’s entries as “facially dubious.” Opp’n at 23–24. Specifically,
20 Defendant targets the following 2.8-hour entry by Mr. Kaufman, which stated: “Prepare
21 detailed memo re case handling assignment, discovery, and case handling strategy and
22 supplement memo re sales, service, and pre-litigation case history.” Id. Defendant argues
23 this was excessive for a lemon law matter with only four repair representations. Id.
24 Additionally, Defendant attacks the 2.4 hours Plaintiff billed for drafting the Motion to
25 Remand that was later withdrawn after Plaintiff accepted the Rule 68 Offer. Id.
26 The Court addresses these two entries in turn. The 2.8-hour entry for preparing a
27 case handling memorandum does not appear manifestly unreasonable and does not appear
28 excessive in time. Defendant contends this is a less complex issue, as the Vehicle was only
1 presented for repair on four occasions, but fails to provide any further detail as to why this
2 billing is unreasonable and therefore fails to “[provide] specific evidence to challenge the
3 accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged.” See McGrath, 67 F.3d at 255. As for
4 the Motion to Remand, there is no evidence presented that this Motion was prepared in bad
5 faith, or with the intention of increasing fees. Plaintiff filed the Motion on February 12,
6 2025, and only filed his withdrawal of the Motion on July 15, 2025, after accepting
7 Defendant’s Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. See ECF Nos. 6, 17. For the foregoing reasons,
8 the Court finds no reason to believe either of these entries were “excessive, redundant, or
9 otherwise unnecessary.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.
10 C. Lodestar Multiplier Enhancement
11 “[I]n appropriate cases, the district court may adjust the ‘presumptively reasonable’
12 lodestar figure based upon the factors listed in Kerr.” Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6
13 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing D’Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 904 F.2d
14 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by, City of Burlington, 505 U.S.
15 557). The Kerr factors are:
16 (1) the time and labor required[;] (2) the novelty and difficulty of
the questions involved[;] (3) the skill requisite to perform the
17
legal service properly[;] (4) the preclusion of other employment
18 by the attorney due to acceptance of the case[;] (5) the customary
fee[;] (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent[;] (7) time
19
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances[;] (8) the
20 amount involved and the results obtained[;] (9) the experience,
reputation, and ability of the attorneys[;] (10) the ‘undesirability’
21
of the case[;] (11) the nature and length of the professional
22 relationship with the client[;] and (12) awards in similar cases.
23 526 F.2d at 70. “The lodestar amount presumably reflects the novelty and complexity of
24 the issues, the special skill and experience of counsel, the quality of representation, and the
25 results obtained from the litigation.” Intel Corp., 6 F.3d at 622 (citing D’Emanuele, 904
26 F.3d at 1383). While the court may rely on any of these factors to increase or decrease the
27 lodestar figure, there is a “‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar is the reasonable fee.”
28 Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of Burlington, 505
1 U.S. at 562); accord Harman v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 158 Cal. App. 4th 407, 416
2 (2007).
3 Plaintiff seeks a 0.1 multiplier enhancement because of the favorable result counsel
4 obtained, the contingent risk incurred, and the delay in payment. Mot. at 27–28. Defendant
5 contends an enhancement for contingent risk cannot be applied when the lodestar already
6 accounts for continent risk, and states that admitting the multiplier on this basis would
7 amount to “double counting.” Opp’n. at 25. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff does not
8 deserve a multiplier for obtaining what was a standard result, and that the delayed recovery
9 was already factored into the lodestar analysis. Id. at 26.
10 Here, the Court relies on the Kerr factors to determine that the lodestar amount
11 should not be increased. While there was some risk taken by Plaintiff in working on a
12 contingency basis and obtaining a delayed payment, none of the other Kerr factors favor
13 applying a multiplier. Although Plaintiff succeeded in getting the Vehicle repurchased,
14 this is not such an extreme result that justifies altering the lodestar figure. Additionally,
15 lemon law litigation does not present complex legal issues that are considered unduly
16 burdensome or time intensive. See Steel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 912 F. Supp. 724, 746
17 (D.N.J. 1995), aff’d sub nom., Cardona v. Gen. Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp. 968 (D.N.J.
18 1996) (“[T]he issues in lemon law litigation are not complex and do not require a
19 significant amount of legal analysis or novel pleading.”). Plaintiff’s experience and ability
20 were already factored into the lodestar calculation, and there is nothing to suggest this
21 matter presented any novel issues or challenges. Bearing in mind the “strong presumption”
22 that the lodestar calculation is reasonable and the lack of any exceptional circumstances in
23 the present matter, the Court finds a lodestar multiplier enhancement to be inappropriate in
24 this case. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149.
25 D. Additional Fees and Costs Incurred for this Motion and All Further Work
26 Plaintiff contends they should collect fees incurred in filing the present Motion and
27 reviewing Defendant’s Opposition and filing a Reply. Mot. at 29. Plaintiff anticipates
28 exerting another seven hours of attorney work and two hours of paralegal work in resolving
1 ||this matter, which includes communicating with the client, preparing and filing the
2 || dismissal, and finalizing any other issues. Jd.
3 Plaintiff provides a list of all expenses incurred throughout litigation, and
4 || Defendant does not contest these costs. See Mot., Ex. 2; see generally Opp’n. The Court
5 ||does not find any of these costs to be unnecessary or duplicative and therefore sees no
6 ||reason to reduce the award of $897.43 in costs.
7 CONCLUSION
8 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff's Motion for
9 || Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 27) and AWARDS Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of
10 $38,073.50 plus costs in the amount of $897.43, for a total reward of $38,970.93. As this
11 ||Concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk of Court SHALL close the file.
12 IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 || Dated: March 16, 2026 wo
4 pen Janis L. Sammartino
15 United States District Judge
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