Brown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

TANYA BROWN PLAINTIFF

V. 4:24CV001098 JM

AREA AGENCY ON AGING

OF SOUTHEAST ARKANSAS, INC. DEFENDANT

ORDER

Plaintiff Tanya Brown (Brown), a former employee of Defendant Area Agency on Aging

of Southeast Arkansas (Agency) alleges that she was discharged because of her race in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C.

§1981. The Agency has moved for summary judgment. (Docket # 31). Brown has responded

and the Agency has filed a reply.

The Agency is a private non-profit organization that provides home care, transportation,

housing and senior center access for Southeast Arkansas’s senior citizens. The Agency operates

Southeast Arkansas Transportation (SEAT) a rural transit program designed to offer non-

emergency transportation to qualified residents of Southeast Arkansas. The Agency employs

drivers who, because of their job duties, fall under the authority of the Federal Transit

Authorization (FTA) and federal Department of Transportation (DOT). The Agency maintains a

zero-tolerance substance abuse policy for all employees in compliance with FTA and DOT legal

requirements. The Agency’s substance abuse policy gave it the right to conduct pre-

employment, post-accident and random drug testing of its employees.

Vault Health, an independent third-party company, administered the Agency’s employee

drug test protocol. Vault Health created a quarterly list of the Agency’s drivers who would be

tested in a specified month. Vault Health provided that list to Helen Jones, a nurse employed by

the Agency. Nurse Jones then notified the designated drivers of the required test. When drivers

who were not based in Pine Bluff were listed on the random drug testing list, Nurse Jones would

typically have those drivers take their drug tests when they came to Pine Bluff for vehicle

maintenance. Employee drug tests were typically administered by way of uranalysis with an

independent laboratory conducting the test analysis and Vault Health’s medical review officer

reviewing the test results.

The Agency employed drivers to operate the vans and provide transportation to riders in

Southeast Arkansas. The drivers’ essential job functions included conducting daily pre-trip

vehicle inspections, reporting problems immediately and following instructions to get authorized

service and repair. The drivers were working in positions classified as DOT positions and were

required to pass a pre-employment drug test and pass an annual physical and random drug test as

conditions of employment.

Brown, a black female, was employed by the Agency from May 2018 to September 2019,

when she resigned because of health reasons. During that time Brown took and passed numerous

drug tests. On May 1, 2023, Brown reapplied for a driver position with the Agency. She tested

negative on her pre-employment drug test and Mr. Biggs, a white supervisor for the Agency,

hired her for the driver position and acted as her direct supervisor. Brown began work as a

driver on June 22, 2023.

In August 2023, the van provided to Brown to drive for work needed repairs, so she took

it to the Agency’s shop in Monticello, Arkansas. She was given another van to drive, numbered

549. Brown did not inspect the new van to verify whether it had all necessary components and

parts. For approximately three weeks, the van did not have an oil stick, meaning the oil could not

be checked. Despite this, Brown completed pre-trip inspection paperwork indicating that she

checked the van’s oil. As a result, Mr. Biggs issued Brown a three-day suspension for falsifying

her pre-trip inspection paperwork. Brown does not dispute that the suspension occurred but

protested the disciplinary action.

On March 4, 2024, Elaine Sledge, a white female who worked as a van inspector for the

Agency, performed an inspection of Brown’s 549 van. Sledge inspected all vans assigned by the

Agency to its drivers. Sledge’s inspection report for Brown’s 549 van reflected that it was

generally “okay” but the check engine light was on and the tire guard was damaged and needed

attention. Brown acknowledges that the tire guard was missing screws but denies that it was

cracked or otherwise damaged. The next day, March 5, 2024, Mr. Biggs called Brown in the

early afternoon to ask whether she had taken the van to the Agency’s Pine Bluff depot to get it

repaired. Brown told Mr. Biggs that Sledge lied in her report when she wrote that the tire guard

was cracked. Biggs asked Brown to come to his office in Monticello. Brown contends that

when meeting with Mr. Biggs he became angry and told her “never call Elaine a liar. . . .because

we stick together.” Brown alleges that Biggs was “thinking about separating” her based on her

statement. Brown claims that she responded to Biggs statement that “a lie ain’t got no color,

Billy . . . . A lie’s a lie. You don’t want nobody lying on you, do you?” Biggs has submitted an

affidavit denying that he made the statements attributed to him. Brown concedes that Biggs

never referred to Sledge’s or Brown’s race.

On March 6, 2024 Brown drove a client to Pine Bluff. While there, Brown went to the

Agency’s depot to have her van repaired and to undergo her annual physical and training.

Brown was listed on Vault Health’s quarterly random drug test list so the nurse sent Brown to

take a random drug test. Brown contends that she was not initially on the random drug testing

list but the nurse contacted Biggs who indicated he would talk to his supervisor, Randy Emerson.

Shortly thereafter, Brown claims the nurse told her she was on the drug testing list. Brown

received and signed a testing notification form indicating that she would be taking the random

drug test. She traveled to a nearby clinic where a third-party nurse administered the drug test.

Vault Health received the sample that afternoon and sent it for testing. The sample tested

positive for opioids, specifically oxycodone.

On March 12, 2024, a Vault Health employee notified the Agency stating that they had

not been able to contact Brown about her test result and asked for the Agency to tell Brown to

contact them. On March 15, 2024, Vault Health informed Brown that the test result was

positive. The nurse who contacted Brown advised her to send a list of all medications she was

taking to Vault Health. On March 18, 2024, Vault Health informed Brown that they had

reviewed the medication list and nothing would have caused a positive flag for opioids. Brown

asked for a second test. The nurse explained that the lab would instead test her split sample. On

March 21, 2024, Brown requested the split-sample test. The lab performing the split-sample test

released the result of the test on April 8, 2024. The result was positive for opioids. On April 9,

2024, Biggs terminated Brown for failing the drug test.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact, so

that the dispute may be decided solely on legal grounds. Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874

(8th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The Supreme Court has established guidelines to assist trial

courts in determining whether this standard has been met:

The inquiry is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is

a need for trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that summary judgment should be

invoked carefully so that no person will be improperly deprived of a trial of disputed factual

issues. Inland Oil & Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,

444 U.S. 991 (1979). The Eighth Circuit set out the burden of the parties in connection with a

summary judgment motion in Counts v. M.K. Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1988):

[T]he burden on the moving party for summary judgment is only to

demonstrate, i.e.,”[to] point out to the District Court,” that the

record does not disclose a genuine dispute on a material fact. It is

enough for the movant to bring up the fact that the record does not

contain such an issue and to identify that part of the record which

bears out his assertion. Once this is done, his burden is discharged,

and, if the record in fact bears out the claim that no genuine dispute

exists on any material fact, it is then the respondent’s burden to set

forth affirmative evidence, specific facts, showing that there is a

genuine dispute on that issue. If the respondent fails to carry that

burden, summary judgment should be granted.

Id. at 1339 (quoting City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., 838 F.2d 268, 273-274 (8th

Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (brackets in original)). Only disputes over facts that may affect the

outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. “There is no ‘discrimination case exception’ to the application of

summary judgment, which is a useful pretrial tool to determine whether any case, including one

alleging discrimination, merits a trial.” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th

Cir.2011) (en banc).

Discussion

Brown claims that the Agency committed race discrimination in violation of Title VII

and Section 1981 when it terminated her employment. Claims of race-based employment

discrimination under § 1981 are analyzed under the same framework as Title VII claims. Stepps

v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Arkansas, No. 4:21-CV-00986-LPR, 2024 WL 3345336, at *16 (E.D.

Ark. July 9, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-2636, 2024 WL 5398621 (8th Cir. Sept. 12, 2024).

A plaintiff either relies on direct evidence or uses the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

analysis to try to establish discriminatory motive. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S.

792, 802–805 (1973).

Direct evidence is “evidence showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory

animus and the challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact finder

that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated the adverse employment action.” Griffith v. City

of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotation and citation omitted). Direct

evidence can be circumstantial, but it must carry strong causal proof. Id. Brown alleges that

Biggs statement “never call Elaine a liar. . . . because we stick together” provides direct evidence

of discrimination. However, Brown does not dispute that Biggs never referred to race at any

time during her employment. Further, Biggs did not refer to her or Sledge’s race during their

conversation. Biggs statement is facially and contextually race neutral. To find that the

statement refers to a discriminatory bias would require inference. See McCullough v. Univ. of

Arkansas for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 2009) (stating that direct evidence “most

often comprises remarks by decisionmakers that reflect, without inference, a discriminatory

bias”). The Court finds that Brown has not submitted direct evidence of discrimination, and the

analysis will proceed under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Under McDonnell Douglas, Brown must first establish a prima facie case of

discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If she does, the burden shifts to the

employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.

See Davis v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, 685 F.3d 675, 681 (8th Cir.2012). If the employer meets this

burden, the “presumption of discrimination disappears, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the

proffered justification is merely a pretext for discrimination.” Id.

A prima facie case of race discrimination requires that the plaintiff prove she “(1) is a

member of a protected group; (2) was meeting the legitimate expectations of the employer; (3)

suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) suffered under circumstances permitting an

inference of discrimination.” Id. Brown failed to present a prima facie case of race

discrimination. Brown offered no probative evidence that demonstrates that she was meeting the

legitimate expectation of her employer or that she was terminated under circumstances

permitting an inference of discrimination. Further, even if Brown could be found to have

presented a prima facie case she cannot establish that the Agency’s articulated reason for her

termination was pretext for unlawful discrimination.

Brown was terminated for failing the drug test and violating the Agency’s zero-tolerance

substance abuse policy. “An employee who violates a significant company policy, such as a

prohibition on an employee not using, possessing or selling controlled substances on the

employer's premises, is not meeting an employer's legitimate expectations.” Wright v.

Winnebago Indus., Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 836, 847 (N.D. Iowa 2008). It is undisputed that the

initial drug test administered by a third-party independent laboratory March 6, 2024 tested

positive for opioids, specifically oxycodone. Further, the follow up split-sample test also

resulted in a positive result. Brown denies the use of drugs and submits that she obtained a hair

follicle test nearly a month after her termination which was negative. Brown’s subsequent drug

test is irrelevant in the analysis because at the time the Agency made its decision to terminate

Brown, it was unaware of the subsequent test. Taylor v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 4:10CV01141

JLH, 2011 WL 3475502, at *5 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 9, 2011). The critical inquiry in discrimination

cases like this one is not whether the employee actually engaged in the conduct for which he was

terminated, but whether the employer in good faith believed that the employee was guilty of the

conduct justifying discharge. McCullough v. Univ. of Arkansas for Med. Scis., 559 F.3d 855,

861–62 (8th Cir. 2009). “An employer need not be factually correct that an employee has

committed a violation—the employer need only honestly believe that the employee committed

the violation.” Taylor 2011 WL 3475502 at *5, citing, Johnson v. AT & T Corp., 422 F.3d 756,

762 (8th Cir.2005).

Brown also argues that similarly situated white employees were treated differently.

However, none of the comparators were drivers who failed a drug test and were not terminated.

The only driver included in Brown’s comparator list was a white driver, Hensley, who was

involved in a vehicle accident in an Agency van in 2023 and was not terminated. However,

Hensley’s post-accident drug test was negative for drugs. To be similarly situated, employees

must be “involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different

ways.” Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011). The comparators listed by

Brown are not similarly situated to her.

The Agency has offered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Brown’s termination

and Brown has offered no evidence demonstrating pretext. Wilking v. Cnty. of Ramsey, 153 F.3d

869, 874 (8th Cir. 1998) (To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to

demonstrate both “that the employer's articulated reason for the adverse employment action was

false and that discrimination was the real reason.”). For these reasons, Brown’s racial

discrimination claims fail. Because Brown’s substantive claims fail, she cannot maintain a claim

for declaratory judgment under 29 U.S.C. § 2201.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No.31) is GRANTED. A

separate judgment will be entered dismissing the complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 24" day of June, 2026.

&. M. LC) Jr.

United States District Judge