H.D.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

H.D., et al,

Civil Action No. 22-6274 (JXN)(JBC)

Plaintiffs,

v.

OPINION

WEST ORANGE BOARD OF

EDUCATION,

Defendant.

NEALS, District Judge

This is a motion for reconsideration. On May 4, 2026, the Court affirmed Magistrate Judge

Clark’s December 9, 2024 Order denying, in relevant part, Plaintiffs H.D. and N.A. on behalf of

N.D.’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) motion to compel discovery from Defendant West Orange Board

of Education (“Board”). (ECF Nos. 61, 62.) Plaintiffs now move for the Court to reconsider

affirming Judge Clark. (See ECF No. 66.) The Board did not file a response. The Court has

carefully considered Plaintiffs’ submissions and decides this matter without oral argument

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure1 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons that

follow, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statement of Facts

At the time Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, N.D. was a ninth grader in the West Orange school

district. (Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 1.) H.D. and N.A. are N.D.’s parents. (Id. ¶ 7.) N.D. was diagnosed

with auditory processing disorder (“APD”). (Id. ¶ 9.) During the summer of 2019, the Board

1 “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

offered N.D. an individualized education plan (“IEP”), which H.D. and N.A. objected to. (Id. ¶

10.) Nevertheless, Plaintiffs allege the Board forced N.D. into the IEP as “retaliation.” (Id. ¶ 11.)

Plaintiffs filed a due process petition contesting the IEP, which proceeded before an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”).2 (Id. ¶ 16.) The ALJ held a settlement conference, which

Plaintiffs claim resulted in an oral settlement (“Oral Agreement”). (Id. ¶¶ 17–18.) Plaintiffs allege

the ALJ memorialized the terms of the Oral Agreement on the record. (Id. ¶ 19.) However,

Plaintiffs assert that the Board later approved a settlement document (“Approved Settlement”) that

materially differed from the Oral Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 22–23.)

After the Board offered N.D. another IEP, Plaintiffs filed another due process petition to

an ALJ3 and moved to enforce the Oral Agreement. (Id. ¶ 25.) The ALJ denied Plaintiffs’ motion

to enforce the Oral Agreement in a June 9, 2022 Order. (See Jun. 9, 2022 Order, ECF No. 1-3 at

*1–10.) The ALJ concluded that, based on well-established contract formation principles, “it [was]

apparent that there was no enforceable contract formed between [Plaintiffs] and the Board during”

the settlement conference before the ALJ. (Id. at 9.) First, the ALJ found that

a review of the transcript and subsequent communications between [Plaintiffs] and

[the Board] clearly establishes that the terms put on the record were not intended to

be final. The record reveals that [the Board’s attorney] was expressly instructed by

[the ALJ] to memorialize the terms discussed on the record into a written settlement

agreement. During this appearance [the ALJ] also stated: “I look forward to seeing

the settlement agreement and I look forward to getting it signed and be done with.”

(Id.) The ALJ also noted that

counsel for the Board lacks the authority to agree to a settlement agreement without

first obtaining the Board’s approval. While [Plaintiffs] explicitly agreed to the

terms that were put on the record, the Board did not. Board counsel sent a written

memorialization to [Plaintiffs] on October 7, 2020, which [Plaintiffs] expressly

rejected.

2 ALJ Thomas Betancourt initially heard the matter.

3 Following ALJ Betancourt’s recusal, ALJ Julio C. Morejon heard this matter.

(Id.) Because the parties agreed that terms of the Approved Settlement differed from the Oral

Agreement, the parties lacked mutual assent, and the Oral Agreement was unenforceable. (Id. at

10.)

Two months later, the ALJ consolidated several petitions filed by Plaintiffs in an August

31, 2022 Consolidation Order. (See Aug. 31, 2022 Order, ECF No. 1-3 at *11–22.) Finally, on

September 13, 2022, the ALJ granted the Board’s motion for summary decision and dismissed

Plaintiffs’ consolidated petitions. (See Sept. 13, 2022 Order, ECF No. 1-3 at *28–50.)

B. Procedural History

On October 26, 2022, Plaintiffs brought this action under the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415. Plaintiffs appealed: (1) the ALJ’s June 9, 2022 Order

denying Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the Oral Agreement; (2) the ALJ’s August 31, 2022 Order

consolidating Plaintiffs’ petitions; and (3) the September 13, 2022 Order granting the Board’s

motion for summary disposition. (See Compl.)

The matter proceeded to discovery, where three disputes arose about the adequacy of the

Board’s responses to Plaintiffs’ requests. (See Pls.’ Mot. to Compel., ECF No. 39; Def.’s Opp’n,

ECF No. 40.) First, Plaintiffs sought responses to their interrogatories from two Board employees

and a former Board member—none of whom are parties to the current action. (See Pls.’ First

Interrogs., ECF No. 32.) The Board’s current Executive Director of Special Services answered the

Interrogatories and provided objections. (See Def.’s Reply to Interrogs., ECF No. 58-1 at *123–

25.)

Next, Plaintiffs’ Document Request No. 1 sought all,

Written procedures, policies, directives, rules, and protocols issued by the [Board]

concerning the delegation of due process and dispute resolution, encompassing

aspects such as legal authority and responsibility, delegation of authority,

settlement authority, reporting requirements, approval process, confidentiality and

privilege, and review and evaluation, particularly concerning special education.

(Req. for Docs. at *3, ECF No. 31-2.) The Board responded that no such documents were within

its care, custody, or control. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 2.) However, the Board consented to Plaintiffs

“propounding an additional interrogatory . . . addressing this information.” (Id.)

Finally, Plaintiffs’ Document Request No. 3 sought,

A copy of the [Board’s] regulations, policies, practices, and procedures for special

education, consistent with New Jersey laws and the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (IDEA). This should include, but not be limited to, guidelines for

assessments and the foundation for Individualized Education Program (IEP)

planning, criteria for selecting members of the IEP team, and the responsibilities of

case managers, service providers and teachers….etc.

(Req. for Docs. at *3.) The Board produced “all District Policies relating in any way to special

education.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 2.) However, the Board explained that “[n]o other documents

responsive to Request No. 3 are in the Board’s care, custody, or control.” (Id.)

Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the non-party Board employees and

members to answer Plaintiffs’ interrogatories, to compel production of documents responsive to

Requests Nos. 1 and 3, and to disqualify the Board’s counsel due to a purported conflict of interest.

(See Pls.’ Mot. at 3–4.) The Board opposed. (See Def.’s Opp’n.)

Judge Clark held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion on December 9, 2024. (See Tr., ECF No.

58-1.) Starting with the motion to compel discovery, Judge Clark remarked that

Interrogatory Request Number 1 sought Board written procedures, policies,

directive, rules and protocols concerning legal authority and responsibility,

delegation of authority, settlement authority, reporting requirements, approval

process, confidentiality and privilege, and review and evaluation, particularly

concerning special education.

That is, frankly, overbroad. There’s no way any person to whom that was

directed would be able to answer that with any confidence that they were giving

you what you need and what you are entitled to.

(Id. at 3:16–4:1.) After the Board’s counsel stated that all documents the Board produced were

responsive to Plaintiffs’ interrogatory, Judge Clark addressed Plaintiffs and stated:

If [the Board’s attorney] has represented, as an officer of the Court, that he has

given you everything that he’s got, it’s time to move on. There is -- I mean, I am

not even sure that there is an entitlement to discovery in this kind of a case. This is

an administrative review of a decision by a board of education in the state court,

and we provided a -- or we permitted discovery so that there wouldn’t be any loose

ends.

But, again, I could have forced everybody to brief the question of whether

there’s even an entitlement to discovery here. And I am not sure what the answer

would be. But [the Board’s attorney] agreed to provide what he has to you. He has

represented that he’s provided what he has to you. There is nowhere else to go with

this. I mean, I can engage in procedural niceties for another six months, and you’re

just postponing your opportunity to make a summary judgment and have this thing

decided by Judge Neals. So at this point, that’s where I’m going. I’m going to give

you dates to file summary judgment motions and let the judge decide this dispute.

(Id. at 5:20–6:14.) After denying Plaintiffs’ motion to compel discovery, Judge Clark turned to

Plaintiffs’ motions to disqualify the Board’s counsel and for sanctions. He denied both, stating:

I don’t see any grounds for granting a motion for disqualification of counsel. The

knowledge that counsel’s alleged to have is the knowledge that any counsel who

handles cases at the administrative level and at the district court level would have,

and we don’t disqualify counsel for those reasons.

And I don’t see any ground for imposing sanctions on either side. I have

every reason to believe that [the Board’s counsel] received the requests from

[Plaintiffs], has provided what he’s got, and it’s time to move on to summary

judgment motions.

(Id. at 7:25–8:10.) Judge Clark then set a January 31, 2025 filing date for summary judgment

motions. (Id. at 8:22.) Judge Clark memorialized his decision in a December 9, 2024 Order. (Dec.

9, 2024 Order, ECF No. 47.)

Plaintiffs timely appealed the Order, but failed to provide a transcript of the December 9,

2024 conference. (See Sept. 15 Order, ECF No. 56.) The Court, accordingly, dismissed the appeal

without prejudice to refile with the transcript. (Id.) Plaintiffs then refiled their appeal on October

13, 2025. (See Pls.’ Appeal, ECF No. 58.)

This Court affirmed Judge Clark in a May 5, 2026 Opinion and Order. (See Op., ECF No.

61; Order, ECF No. 62.) The Court found that Judge Clark did not err in denying Plaintiffs’ motion

to compel responses to Document Requests Nos. 1 and 3. Specifically, the Court determined Judge

Clark did not abuse his discretion in concluding that Request No. 1 was “vague, spans a potentially

enormous number of documents, has no temporal limitation, and would unduly burden the Board,

considering the limited relevance of those documents to an IDEA appeal,” and that the Board

provided all responsive documents to both requests. (Op. at 7–8.)

On May 13, 2026, Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration. (See Pls.’ Recons. Mot., ECF No.

66.) Plaintiffs claim the Court overlooked the following arguments, which appeared in their appeal

as follows:

Additionally, [the Board] failed to:

• Certify interrogatory answers under oath (Rule 33(b)(3)–(5));

• Provide a privilege log (Rule 26(b)(5)); and

• Produce unredacted minutes and internal communications necessary to evaluate

the disputed settlement agreement.

(Pls.’ Appeal at 4.) Plaintiffs further claim that the Court incorrectly considered those arguments

“newly raised.” (Pls.’ Moving Br. at 4, ECF No. 66-1.) And Plaintiffs request the Court correct an

error in stating the summary judgment deadline Judge Clark set. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) governs motions for reconsideration. Reconsideration is “an

extraordinary remedy” courts grant “very sparingly.” Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.,

215 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D.N.J. 2002) (citations omitted). The Court may grant a motion for

reconsideration if the moving party shows (1) “an intervening change in the controlling law”; (2)

“the availability of new evidence that was not available when the court granted the motion”; or (3)

“the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Adkins v.

Sogliuzzo, 820 F. App’x 146, 149 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting In re Vehicle Carrier Servs. Antitrust

Litig., 846 F.3d 71, 87 (3d Cir. 2017)).

A motion for reconsideration “is not an appeal.” Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F. Supp. 2d at

507. The moving party may not “relitigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present evidence

or allegations that could have been raised prior to entry of the original order.” Bosco v. Compass

Grp. USA, Inc., No. 22-6909, 2026 WL 800530, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2026) (quoting Martinez

v. Robinson, No. 18-1493, 2019 WL 4918115, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 4, 2019)). The Court will not

grant a reconsideration motion based on “[m]ere disagreement with a decision of the District

Court.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001). Rather,

the Court will grant a reconsideration motion “only when ‘dispositive factual matters or controlling

decisions of law’ were presented to the court but were overlooked.” Interfaith Cmty. Org., 215 F.

Supp. 2d at 507.

III. DISCUSSION

Viewing their motion liberally, Plaintiffs appear to argue that reconsideration is warranted

to “correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.” Adkins, 820 F. App’x at

149. A court makes a clear error of law “only if the record cannot support the findings that led to

the ruling.” In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-699, 2025 WL 2717592, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 24,

2025) (quoting ABS Brokerage Servs. v. Penson Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 09-4590, 2010 WL 3257992,

at *6 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2010)).

The record amply supports the findings that led the Court to affirm Judge Clark. As

recounted in the Court’s May 5 Opinion, the Court may only reverse a magistrate judge’s discovery

order for abuse of discretion. (See Op. at 6.) A magistrate judge abuses their discretion if their

decision “rests on an incorrect legal standard, a clearly erroneous factual finding, or a

misapplication of the law to the facts.” TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 270 (3d Cir. 2019).

“An abuse of discretion is a clear error of judgment, and not simply a different result which can

arguably be obtained when applying the law to the facts of the case.” Allen v. Banner Life Ins. Co.,

340 F.R.D. 232, 237 (D.N.J. 2022) (quoting Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d

212, 240 (3d Cir. 2007)). The appealing party has the burden of demonstrating the Magistrate

Judge’s decisions were clearly erroneous, contrary to law, or an abuse of discretion. Id. “Unless

that burden is met, the magistrate judge’s findings should not be rejected even if the district court

could have decided the matter differently.” Id. (quoting Evans v. Emp. Ben. Plan, No. 03-4915,

2007 WL 77325, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2007)).

Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden then and fail to meet it now. Initially, Plaintiffs claim

the Court overlooked three one-sentence arguments in the appeal brief; specifically, that the Board

did not:

• Certify interrogatory answers under oath (Rule 33(b)(3)–(5));

• Provide a privilege log (Rule 26(b)(5)); and

• Produce unredacted minutes and internal communications necessary to evaluate

the disputed settlement agreement.

(Pls.’ Appeal at 4.) In their appeal, Plaintiffs did not explain why any of those arguments showed

that Judge Clark abused his discretion. While Plaintiffs’ reconsideration brief now expands on

those assertions, reconsideration is not the place to raise new arguments. Bosco, 2026 WL 800530,

at *2.

More to the point, none of Plaintiffs’ arguments lead the Court to conclude that Judge Clark

abused his discretion as to either request.

To start, the Board complied with the interrogatory signature requirement; both the

individual answering the interrogatories and the attorney making objections signed certifications.

(See ECF No. 58-1 at *129, 133.)

Next, the record provides no grounds for the Board to produce a privilege log. To be sure,

Rule 26 provides:

When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the

information is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the

party must:

(i) expressly make the claim; and

(ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications, or tangible

things not produced or disclosed--and do so in a manner that, without

revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties

to assess the claim.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). “The more progressive approach to interrogatories dealing with legal

matters is to view them in the factual context within which they arise.” Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis

U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168, 2011 WL 5416330, at *15 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2011) (quoting Microtron

Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 269 F.Supp. 22, 25 (D.N.J. 1967)). “If the answer might serve

some legitimate purpose, either in leading to evidence or in narrowing the issues, and to require it

would not unduly burden or prejudice the interrogated party, the court should require [an] answer.”

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Microtron, 269 F.Supp. at 25).

The Board raised the issue of privilege only in response to Document Request No. 1. (See

ECF No. 58-1 at *130–31.) But Judge Clark reasonably concluded that Request No. 1 was overly

broad, vague, spanned a potentially enormous number of documents, had no temporal limitation,

and would unduly burden the Board, considering the limited relevance of those documents to an

IDEA appeal. Correspondingly, an answer would not have served a legitimate purpose, and Judge

Clark did not err in declining to require one.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Board should be required to state whether it withheld

materials is meritless. As the Board repeatedly represented before Judge Clark, the Board produced

all responsive documents. The Board cannot produce what it does not have. Judge Clark, therefore,

did not abuse his discretion in finding that the Board did not withhold required documents from

Plaintiffs.

Because the record amply supports the Court’s earlier findings, reconsideration is

unwarranted. /n re Insulin Pricing Litig., 2025 WL 2717592, at *2.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 66) is DENIED.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

DATED: 6/16/2026 fe ~~

JULI VIER NEALS

United States District Judge

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