Young

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

HAROLD DEAN YOUNG, : Case No. 2:26-cv-429

:

Plaintiff, :

: Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

:

OHIO DEPARTMENT OF :

REHABILITATION AND :

CORRECTION, et al., :

:

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights complaint in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc. 6). By separate order, the Court granted him leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 5).

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendants Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction

(“ODRC”), Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“OAPA”), John/Jane Doe “APA” Officers, and

Supervisory Officials created a dangerous condition and false sense of safety by publishing

materially inaccurate offender status information and failing to notify Plaintiff―a victim of the

offender’s―of critical changes in the offender’s compliance with supervision requirements.

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s Complaint to

determine whether the Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons set

forth below, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED

without prejudice for failure to state any claims upon which relief can be granted.

I. SCREENING LEGAL STANDARD

In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant

whose filing fee and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an

economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v.

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To

prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma

pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot

make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328–29; see

also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal

basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when the plaintiff claims a violation of a legal

interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. And an action has no arguable

factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly

incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true

factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness.

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a

pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Though by the same token, the complaint “must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

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face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (“[D]ismissal standard articulated in Iqbal

and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim [under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)].”).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does

a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id.

at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds

upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).

II. ALLEGATIONS AND PARTIES

Plaintiff’s Complaint states that Defendants maintain and operate the Ohio Offender Search

system and related databases intended to provide accurate offender status information. (Doc. 6 at

3). Plaintiff explains that, on or about March 9, 2026, a state prisoner named Virgil Johnson was

released from custody. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, the Ohio Offender Search system indicated

that Johnson was compliant with supervision requirements. (Id.). But Plaintiff was unable to

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locate Johnson on the Ohio Sex Offender Registry, which his supervision required. (Id.). Plaintiff

contacted ODRC about the discrepancy. (Id.). ODRC personnel confirmed that they were unable

to locate Johnson on the Sex Offender registry and advised Plaintiff that they would contact OAPA

about the matter. (Id.). ODRC personnel subsequently confirmed to Plaintiff that Johnson had an

active warrant for his arrest, due to his failure to comply with registration and/or other supervision

requirements. (Id.).

Plaintiff complains that, as Johnson’s victim, he was entitled to be notified of Johnson’s

failure to register as a sex offender; Johnson’s noncompliance with supervision; and the existence

of an active warrant for Johnson’s arrest. (Id. at 4) But he received none of those notifications.

He asserts that Defendants maintained public records indicating that Johnson was compliant,

when, in fact, Johnson was not. (Id.). Plaintiff states that he made personal safety decisions in

reliance on those public records. (Id.). He contends that Defendants knew or should have known

that inaccurate reporting and failure to notify would expose Plaintiff to a foreseeable risk of harm.

(Id.). And even though an OAPA parole supervisor contacted Plaintiff on or about March 18,

2026, to acknowledge Plaintiff’s concerns, Defendants failed to correct records, to notify Plaintiff,

or to mitigate risk. (Id.). Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff concludes, created a dangerous condition

and increased Plaintiff’s vulnerability to harm. (Id.).

Plaintiff names as Defendants: ODRC, OAPA, John/Jane Doe APA Officers, in their

individual and official capacities, and Supervisory Officials, in their individual and official

capacities. (Id. at 2–3).

For relief, Plaintiff requests: compensatory damages not less than $500,000; punitive

damages; injunctive relief (including correction of offender records, real-time notification systems,

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and disclosure of violations and warrants), costs and fees, and any additional relief. (Id. at 7).

III. ANALYSIS

Based on the above allegations, Plaintiff raises, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a Fourteenth

Amendment claim of state-created danger; a claim of deliberate indifference; a Monell liability

claim; a claim of failure to train and supervise; and a violation of the Ohio Constitution’s Marsy’s

Law.

For the following reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED

for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A. Official Capacity

As a preliminary matter, insofar as Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their official capacities,

his claims are subject to dismissal to the extent that he seeks monetary damages. Absent an express

waiver, a state is immune from damages suits under the Eleventh Amendment. See Puerto Rico

Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (and cases cited

therein); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The State of Ohio has neither

constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts.

See Johns v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1985); State of Ohio v. Madeline

Marie Nursing Homes No. 1 and No. 2, 694 F.2d 449, 460 (6th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh

Amendment bar extends to actions where the state is not a named party but where the action is

essentially one for the recovery of money from the state. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (citations

omitted); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury of State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). A

suit against Defendants in their official capacities would, in reality, be a way of pleading the action

against the entity of which Defendants are agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436

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U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Thus, actions against state officials in their official capacities are included

in this bar. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 237 (1974); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n official-capacity

suit against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the state and is thus barred by the Eleventh

Amendment, absent a waiver.” (citation and ellipsis omitted)). Because all properly named

Defendants are immune from suit in their official capacities to the extent that Plaintiff seeks

monetary damages, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS the claims against the properly named

Defendants in their official capacities be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(iii).

B. Improperly Named Defendants

Next, Plaintiff names OAPA and ODRC as Defendants. But for two reasons, OAPA and

ODRC are not entities capable of being sued under § 1983.

First, “[t]o state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when

construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted). As for the second requirement, the Sixth Circuit is clear

that “[s]ection 1983 creates liability for ‘persons’ who deprive others of federal rights under color

of law. Only a ‘person’ faces liability under the statute.” Hohenberg v. Shelby Cnty., 68 F.4th

336, 342 (6th Cir. 2023) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989)). The

OAPA is a state agency that has been found not to be a “person” subject to suit under § 1983.

Tolliver v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-4566, 2023 WL 6622251, at *2–3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 11,

2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-4566, 2023 WL 7926522 (S.D. Ohio

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Nov. 16, 2023) (citation omitted); Latham v. Board, No. 1:15-cv-488, 2015 WL 5905833, at *3

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15-cv-488, 2015 WL

5882979 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 2015). ODRC is not a person either. See Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of

Corr., 65 F. App’x 922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that Department of Corrections is not a

“person” under § 1983); Vizcarrondo v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:18-cv-1255, 2019

WL 6251775, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2019) (noting “multiple courts have found that ODRC is

not a ‘person’ subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).

In addition to not being “persons,” state agencies such as OAPA and ODRC are “absolutely

immune from suit in this Court by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” Harris v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., No. 2:21-cv-1401, 2021 WL 1949270, at *3

(S.D. Ohio May 14, 2021) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-cv-

1401, 2021 WL 3169156 (S.D. Ohio July 26, 2021). “Sovereign immunity protects states . . . from

suit in federal court.” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 409–10 (6th Cir. 201) (citation omitted).

This immunity “also applies to state agencies or departments.” Id. at 410 (citation omitted). While

there are some exceptions to sovereign immunity, those exceptions do not apply here. See Smith

v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d 635, 652 (S.D. Ohio 2020) (“The State of Ohio has immunity for all

claims against it because Ohio has not consented to suits in federal court nor has Congress

abrogated Ohio’s immunity under § 1983.”); Stone v. Ohio Parole Bd., No. 2:21-cv-884, 2021 WL

5071827, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2021) (“Absent an express waiver, the Eleventh Amendment

to the United States Constitution bars suit against a State or one of its agencies or departments in

federal court regardless of the nature of the relief sought.”) (citations omitted).

Consequently, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claims against OAPA

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and ODRC be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

C. Remaining Defendants and Claims

Having considered those two threshold issues, the Undersigned now turns to Plaintiff’s

remaining claims under Section 1983 and Ohio law.

1. Fourteenth Amendment State-Created Danger and Deliberate

Indifference Claims

Plaintiff first contends that Defendants, by publishing inaccurate and misleading

information, affirmatively created and enhanced the danger to Plaintiff and placed him at greater

risk than he otherwise would have been. (Doc. 6 at 4–5). He says this violated his Fourteenth

Amendment due process right against state-created danger. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendants knew of Johnson’s noncompliance with supervision requirements and failed to act

despite that knowledge. (Id. at 5). The Undersigned construes this as Plaintiff raising a separate

Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.

As relevant to Plaintiff’s state-created danger claim, the Sixth Circuit has explained that

“[t]he purpose of the Due Process Clause is ‘to protect the people from the States, not to ensure

that the State protect[s] them from each other.’” Stiles ex rel. D.S. v. Grainger Cnty. Tenn., 819

F.3d 834, 853 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489

U.S. 189, 196 (1989)). There are three exceptions to the idea that that the Due Process Clause

does not create an affirmative right to governmental aid—one of which is the “state-created

danger” exception that Plaintiff invokes. McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 463–

64 (6th Cir. 2006).

In the Sixth Circuit, a state-created danger claim has three elements: (1) an affirmative

act that creates or increases the risk to the plaintiff of violence by private actors; (2) a special

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danger to the plaintiff as distinguished from the public at large; and (3) the requisite degree of

state culpability. Stiles, 819 F.3d at 854 (citation omitted); Cf. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus,

136 F.3d 1055, 1066–67 (6th Cir. 1998). Accepting every allegation as true, Plaintiff has not

alleged facts from which this Court could infer either that Defendants’ actions constituted an

“affirmative act” or that Defendants exhibited the requisite level of culpability.

“Liability under the state-created-danger theory is predicated upon affirmative acts by

the state which either create or increase the risk that an individual will be exposed to private acts

of violence.” McQueen, 433 F.3d at 464 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

Sixth Circuit has “set a high bar” for what constitutes an affirmative act. Id. at 465, 468

(collecting cases finding acts that did not constitute “affirmative acts” to plead state-created

danger claim). Plaintiff does not overcome that bar here. Construed liberally, Plaintiff’s

allegations establish only that Defendants did not act. In other words, he alleges that Defendants

did not ensure that the ODRC Offender Search system and/or OAPA Sex Offender registry

accurately and timely reflected Johnson’s status. In the Sixth Circuit, non-actions and omissions

are not affirmative acts that would give rise to a state-created danger claim. See Renick v.

Dearborn Heights Sch. Dist. #7, 764 F. Supp. 3d 551, 559–60 (E.D. Mich. 2025) (citing Engler

v. Arnold, 862 F.3d 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not meet the third element either, which requires him to allege

that the defendants acted with at least recklessness or deliberate indifference to establish liability.

Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 510 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that mere negligence is

not sufficient to establish a due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment) (citations

omitted); Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1066 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Gross negligence is

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not actionable under § 1983, because it is not ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’”). Here,

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges no facts which plausibly support that the supposed inaccurate

reporting or failure to notify was the result of gross negligence, recklessness, or deliberate

indifference—as opposed to inadvertent error or oversight—by Defendants.

Additionally, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that he has a protected interest in

ODRC’s and/or OAPA’s handling of the Offender Search system or other reporting systems that

would give rise to a substantive or procedural process claim of deliberate indifference. That is,

if Plaintiff cannot meet the elements to state a Fourteenth Amendment state-created danger

claim, then he cannot show that Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference sufficient to state

a substantive due process claims. Cf. Brooks v. Werth, No. 4:20-cv-38, 2020 WL 2615516, at

*3–5 (N.D. Ohio May 22, 2020) (finding no state-created danger supporting substantive due

process deliberate indifference claim). And if Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he has a

constitutionally protected interest in ODRC’s and/or OAPA’s handling of their respective

Offender Search and other reporting systems, then he cannot show that Defendants exhibited

deliberate indifference by not affording him constitutionally sufficient process before depriving

him of that “right.” Cf. id. at *5–6 (finding no protected property interest supporting procedural

due process deliberate indifference claim).

Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

state-created danger claim and deliberate indifference claim be dismissed without prejudice

for failure to state a claim.

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2. Marsy’s Law

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants’ actions violated the Ohio

Constitution―specifically Marsy’s Law. (Doc. 6 at 6). “The constitutional amendment known

as Marsy’s Law became effective on February 5, 2018, and expands the rights afforded to victims

of crimes.” Brooks, 2020 WL 2615516, at *2 (citation omitted). The amendment in question

states the section “does not create any cause of action for damages or compensation against the

state, any political subdivision of the state, any officer, employee, or agent of the state or of any

political subdivision, or any officer of the court.” Ohio Const., art. I, § 10a(C); see also Brooks,

2020 WL 2615516, at *2–3. Nor does it support a private cause of action under Section 1983.

Id.

For this reason, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Marsy’s Law claim

be dismissed without prejudice insofar as he seeks damages or compensation. And to the

extent the requested injunctive relief―which itself is vague and conclusory (see Doc. 6 at

7)―implicates Marsy’s Law, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS the Court decline to extend

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state constitution claim. See Rainey v. Perkins

Twp./Perkins Bd. of Trs., No. 3:22-cv-42, 2025 WL 2711402, at *9 n.9 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 23,

2025) (noting it is unclear if Ohio courts would conclude a plaintiff could seek injunctive relief

under the relevant provision).

3. Monell Liability and Failure to Train and Supervise

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants maintain polices and practices that allow inaccurate

reporting, delayed updates, and a failure to notify victims. (Doc. 6 at 5). He also alleges that

Defendants failed to properly train personnel regarding the enforcement of supervision

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requirements and duty to provide crime-victim notification. (Id. at 5–6). Because both counts

evoke Monell liability, the Court addresses them together. Ultimately, Plaintiff’s allegations fail

to state a Monell claim, because Monell addresses municipal liability stemming from municipal

policy or custom. It does not extend to state entities. Even if it did, the Court cannot plausibly

infer from a single incident a policy or custom of unconstitutional actions sufficient to trigger

Monell, or Monell-type, liability.

The Undersigned has already determined that state entities such as ODRC and OAPA

are “absolutely immune from suit in this Court by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment to the

United States Constitution.” Harris, 2021 WL 1949270, at *3. Monell does not change this

because Monell-municipal liability does not extend to state entities. See Krainski v. Nevada ex

re. Bd. of Regents of Nevada Syst. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 2010)

(acknowledging, based on Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989), that

the Supreme Court has expressly declined to extend Monell’s theory of municipal liability under

§ 1983 to state entities); see also Lowe v. Kentucky Atty. Gen., No. 2:14-141-KKC, 2015 WL

1526089, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 2, 2015) (“Conway correctly responds that he is state, not county,

official, and Monell provides no basis for recovery against state entities or against him

personally.”); Gille v. Stony Brook University, No. 2:22-cv-02974 (NRM)(LGD), 2025 WL

850420, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. March 18, 2025) (“states and state entities are legally distinct from

municipalities, and the Supreme Court has declined to extend Section 1983 liability to state

entities.” (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 68 for proposition that Monell’s holding that municipalities

are “persons” under § 1983 does not extend to states because states are protected by sovereign

immunity while municipalities are not)). Cf. Richardson v. California Dep’t of Corr. And

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Rehab., No. 22-cv-06137-NC, 2023 WL 2394543, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 6, 2023) (“Taken

together, Plaintiffs’ wrongful death and Monell claims fail because the State Entities are

protected by sovereign immunity). But see McClure v. Trumbull County, No. 4:24-cv-116, 2025

WL 3033495, at *13 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2025) (“In Monell, 436 U.S. at 658, the Supreme Court

held that local governments may be sued for civil rights violations. Accordingly, state entities

may be civilly liable under § 1983 when their policies ‘subject, or cause to be subjected, any

person . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.”).

Even assuming—out of an abundance of caution—that Monell liability extended to state

entities, Plaintiff still fails to state a claim. “To state a municipal-liability claim under § 1983,

the plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1) of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy or custom.” Nichols v. Wayne

Cnty., 822 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted and emphasis added) (discussing

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). “A plaintiff may prove

an unconstitutional ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ by demonstrating one of the following: ‘(1) the existence

of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision

making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or

supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights

violations.’” Cline v. Wiedimen, No. 2:21-cv-112, 2021 WL 123006, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13,

2021) (quoting Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-cv-112, 2021 WL 391724 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2021).

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Here, Plaintiff alleges he suffered deprivations of constitutional rights under seemingly

two possible theories of Monell-type liability: illegal policies and customs and failure-to-train.

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under either theory.

First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants maintain policies and practices that allow

inaccurate reporting, delayed updates, and failure to notify victims. The term “‘official policy’

often refers to formal rules or understandings—often but not always committed to writing—that

are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances

consistently and over time.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1986). Even

accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Plaintiff fails to allege facts from which the Undersigned

could infer that Defendants had a “formal” or “fixed” policy of allowing inaccurate reporting,

delayed updates, and failure to notify victims. See Lipman v. Budish, 974 F.3d 726, 748 (6th

Cir. 2020) (noting a policy is “created through the official acts of the municipality’s ultimate

decision makers”) (citation omitted). Cf. Sistrunk v. City of Hillview, 545 F. Supp. 3d 493, 502

(W.D. Ky. 2021) (noting that even where a complaint labeled a city’s alleged constitutional

failing as a “policy,” the complaint did not allege facts supporting the existence of a policy).

Here, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations merely assert that the constitutional deprivations

he claims he suffered were due to Defendants’ policies and customs. Cf. Grandizio v. Smith,

No. Civ. 14-3868 (RBK/KMW), 2015 WL 58403, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2015) (stating that a

plaintiff “may not simply include a Monell claim in his Complaint as a matter of course by

making the conclusory allegation that the alleged constitutional deprivations were due to a policy

or custom of the Borough. Rather, Plaintiff must allege some actual facts suggesting as much.”).

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Without more, Plaintiff would fail to state a Monell claim under the illegal-policies-and-customs

theory of liability, even assuming Monell liability extended to state entities.

The Undersigned turns next to Plaintiff’s accusation that Defendants fail to train and

supervise personnel regarding enforcement of compliance with supervision requirements and

victim notification. A municipality’s inadequate training constitutes liability under § 1983 only

“when it evinces deliberate indifference for the rights of those with whom the governmental

employees have contact, such that the inadequate training may be fairly said to represent the

government’s policy or custom.” Brown v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 517 F. App’x 431, 436 (6th Cir

2013) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989)). Deliberate indifference,

in turn, requires “proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of

his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation modified). A plaintiff can

meet this “stringent standard” in one of two ways. Either he must allege (1) “evidence of prior

instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the municipality had notice that the

training was deficient and likely to cause injury but ignored it”; or (2) “evidence of a single

violation . . . accompanied by a showing that the municipality had failed to train its employees

to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.” Okolo v.

Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 892 F. Supp. 2d 931, 942 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (citation modified)

(quoting Harvey v. Campbell Cnty., 453 F. App’x 557, 562–63 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also id. at

943 (“Liability for unconstitutionally inadequate supervision or discipline is treated, for all

intents and purposes, as a failure to train.”); cf. Harvey, 453 F. App’x at 563 (“[M]ere allegations

that an officer was improperly trained or that an injury could have been avoided with better

training are insufficient to make out deliberate indifference.”).

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Plaintiff has not alleged evidence of prior instances of unconstitutional conduct that

would demonstrate Defendants were on notice that their training or supervision of personnel

tasked with maintain offender search system and/or sex offender registry data was deficient and

likely to cause injury. Nor has Plaintiff plausibly alleged that Defendants failed to train

personnel to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation. Cf.

Weaver v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, No. 3:24-cv-103-RGJ, 2024 WL 2819556, at

*3 (W.D. Ky. June 3, 2024) (considering allegations of a federal rights violation coupled with

news articles and a report detailing a police department’s “shortcomings” related to investigatory

searches and unreasonable use of force as adequate to state a failure to train claim). At base,

Plaintiff fails to specify any facts pertaining to global training or supervision of Defendants’

personnel from which the Undersigned could infer that any constitutional deprivation Plaintiff

experienced was related to inadequate training. In fact, Plaintiff’s own allegations that

Defendants reached out to acknowledge his concerns and investigate the matter (Doc. 6 at 3),

undercut his claim that Defendants failed to properly train personnel regarding compliance

enforcement and victim notification.

Finally, any Monell-based claim against the John/Jane Doe OAPA supervisors also fails

to state a claim. Monell claims are not properly brought against individuals. See, e.g., Baar v.

Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 476 F. App’x 621, 634 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that in Monell-based

claims the party of interest is the governmental entity) (citations omitted); see also Phillips v.

City of Cincinnati, No. 18-cv-541, 2019 WL 2289277, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2019) (“[T]he

[purpose] of Monell is to impose liability on a municipality under certain circumstances—not

individuals.” (emphasis in original)).

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For these reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Monell claim and

Failure-to-Train claim be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

4. Unidentified Defendants

Beyond the foregoing, Plaintiff’s claims against the John/Jane Doe OAPA Officers and

Supervisory Official Defendants also should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. To state a claim against a defendant in their individual capacity, a plaintiff

must allege personal involvement by the defendant in causing Plaintiff’s injury. Hardin v.

Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1196–98 (6th Cir. 1992). A party cannot be held liable under § 1983

unless the party personally participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved, or knowingly

acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Leach v. Shelby Co. Sheriff, 891 F.2d

1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989) (“There is no claim in this case that the Sheriff directly participated

in or encouraged the alleged deprivations of Leach.”). “A plaintiff, even one proceeding pro se,

must plead sufficient facts to show how each defendant allegedly violated plaintiff’s rights.”

Johnson v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-4179, 2023 WL 2555446, at *18 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17,

2023) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted Johnson v. Chambers-Smith, No.

2:22-cv-4179, 2023 WL 6065130 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 18, 2023). “Merely listing names in the

caption of the complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is

not enough to sustain recovery under § 1983.” Gilmore v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188,

190 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). See also, Marshall v. Westcomb, No. 2:25-cv-144, 2025

WL 2166304, at *6 (W.D. Mich. July 31, 2025) (“Furthermore, any ‘[s]ummary reference to a

single, five-headed “Defendants” does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is

liable . . . .” Boxill [v. O’Grady], 935 F.3d [510,] 518 [(6th Cir. 2019)] (citation omitted)).

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Here, the only individual persons Plaintiff lists as Defendants are unidentified “John/Jane

Doe” officers and supervisory officials. The Undersigned is not unsympathetic to the difficulties

Plaintiff might face in trying to ascertain the identities of the individuals who he contends

violated his rights. But that is a basic pleading standard even pro se plaintiffs must satisfy for a

case to proceed and Plaintiff did not even try. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710,714 (6th Cir.

2004) (citation omitted). And while the discovery processes attendant to a federal court case

may be utilized to develop facts once a party states a plausible claim, they may not be used to

determine if a party can state a plausible claim. See Lewis v. Tyrant, No. 5:16-cv-03224-RBH-

KDW, 2016 WL 7118558, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 4, 2016), report and recommendation adopted

sub nom., Lewis v. Williams, No. 5:16-cv-03224-RBH, 2016 WL 7104927 (D.S.C. Dec. 6, 2016)

(“As currently drafted, however, Plaintiff’s Complaint resembles a prohibited fishing expedition

rather than a properly pleaded complaint”); see also Capalbo v. Hollingsworth, No. Civ. A. No.

13-3291 (RMB), 2013 WL 6734315, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2013 (same).

Under certain circumstances, Courts should give a plaintiff the chance to amend his

Complaint when he fails to state a claim. But where, as here, the Undersigned concludes that

none of Plaintiff’s claims should proceed to further development, amendment would be futile.

See generally Knight Cap. Partners Corp. v. Henkel AG & Co., KGaA, 930 F.3d 775, 786 (6th

Cir. 2019) (when determining whether to allow leave to amend a complaint, the Court considers

“undue delay or bad faith in filing the motion, repeated failures to cure previously identified

deficiencies, futility of the proposed amendment, and lack of notice or undue prejudice to the

opposing party.” (emphasis added and citation omitted).

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Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants John/Jane Doe OAPA Officer and Supervisor

Official Defendants should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

V. Conclusion

The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be DISMISSED without

prejudice for failure to state a claim against the Defendants capable of being sued in their

individual capacities.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The Court DISMISS the official capacity claims for monetary damages and the

claims against ODRC and OAPA with prejudice and DISMISS the remainder of the claims

without prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

2. The Court CERTIFY pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that, for the foregoing

reasons, an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendations would not be taken

in good faith and therefore DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Date: June 30, 2026 s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served a copy of the

recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring at an oral hearing, the

objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as

all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District

Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections WITHIN 14 DAYS

after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in accordance with this

procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019).

See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.

1981).

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