Young

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

HAROLD DEAN YOUNG, : Case No. 2:25-cv-1459

:

Plaintiff, :

: Judge Algenon L. Marbley

vs. :

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

:

CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. (Doc. 12). The Court previously

granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, screened his Complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2), and recommended dismissal of his case. (Docs. 7, 9). In response to Plaintiff’s

objection that “dismissal without leave to amend is improper” (Doc. 10 at 2, 6), the Undersigned

gave Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint (Doc. 11). Plaintiff did so on April 29,

2026. (Doc. 12). Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint became the operative complaint upon filing and

supersedes his original Complaint. Plaintiff, however, is cautioned that he will not be given

unlimited opportunities to amend his complaint. See Kanu v. Siemens PLM, No. 1:18-CV-38,

2019 WL 1090398, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No.

1:18-CV-38, 2019 WL 4110434 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2019) (“[J]ustice simply does not require this

Court to permit a pro se plaintiff unlimited opportunities to amend [their] complaint, in hopes of

eventually stating some claim.”).

Accordingly, the Undersigned WITHDRAWS the prior recommendation that Plaintiff’s

original Complaint be dismissed (Doc. 9), and this matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte

review of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to determine whether the Amended Complaint, or any

portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief (Doc. 12). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Expedited Discovery to Identify John Doe

Defendants. (Doc. 13).

For the following reasons, the Undersigned concludes that the Court should dismiss

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint in its entirety because he fails to state any claim upon which relief

can be granted and deny his Motion for Expedited Discovery as moot.

I. SCREEN OF AMENDED COMPLAINT

Previously, the Court construed Plaintiff’s original complaint as raising a Fourth

Amendment claim of unlawful seizure again Columbus Police Department officers (“Officers”);

Fourteenth Amendment claims of due process violations against the Columbus Police Department;

a Monell liability claim against the City of Columbus; and state law claims of negligence and

intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants. (Doc. 8; Doc. 9 at 5). Plaintiff’s

claims stem from what he calls an unlawful arrest, detention, and seizure of property on November

19, 2025, that led to police releasing Plaintiff in freezing 44-degree rain, wearing only shorts and

a t-shirt, and in distress—crying, humiliated, and begging for help. (Doc. 8 at 3).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is substantially similar to his original Complaint with three

primary exceptions: (1) he attempts to identify which Officers committed each unconstitutional

act alleged in the original Complaint; (2) he replaces his state-law claims accusing Defendants of

negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress with a Fourteenth Amendment state-

created danger claim; and (3) he adds an “Individual Liability” claim alleging that each Officer

participated directly, or failed to intervene, in unconstitutional conduct. (Doc. 12 at 3–5). But

Plaintiff’s amendments are not enough to survive the Court’s review under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

A. Capacity

To begin, Plaintiff does not state whether he is suing Defendants in their official capacities

or their individual capacities. To the extent Plaintiff brings claims seeking monetary damages

against Defendants in their official capacities, those claims are subject to dismissal. (Doc. 12 at

5). Absent an express waiver, a state is immune from damages suits under the Eleventh

Amendment. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,

144 (1993) (collecting cases); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). The State of Ohio

has neither constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal

courts. See Johns v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1985); State of Ohio v.

Madeline Marie Nursing Homes No. 1 and No. 2, 694 F.2d 449, 460 (6th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh

Amendment bar extends to actions where the state is not a named party but where the action is

essentially one for the recovery of money from the state. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (citations

omitted). A suit against Defendants in their official capacities would, in reality, be a way of

pleading the action against the entity of which Defendants are agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Thus, actions against state officials in their official

capacities are included in this bar. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989);

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974); Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010)

(“[A]n official-capacity suit against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the state and is

thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment, absent a waiver.” (citation and ellipsis omitted)).

Because all of the properly named Defendants are immune from suit in their official capacities to

the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, the Court should dismiss with prejudice the

claims against those Defendants in their official capacities.

B. Count I – Fourth Amendment (Unlawful Arrest/Seizure)

Next, Plaintiff contends that Officer Bell (#2900), as well as other John Doe officers,

arrested Plaintiff on November 19, 2025, for traffic-related offenses before properly verifying that

a warrant existed. (Doc. 12 at 2–3). Plaintiff suggests that a warrant should not have been issued

or executed because he already had a scheduled court date on the charges for which the warrant

was issued. Plaintiff further asserts that he was transported and detained without probable cause.

At base, Plaintiff raises a wrongful arrest claim. False or wrongful arrest claims can be

brought under either federal or state law. Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669, 677

(6th Cir. 2005) (citing Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 258 (6th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff’s

Complaint does not specify whether he intended to bring his wrongful arrest claim under federal

law or state law. Thus, the Undersigned addresses his claim under both standards. “A false arrest

claim under federal law requires a plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause

to arrest the plaintiff.” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677 (citing Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 872

(6th Cir. 2002)). “An arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant is normally a complete defense to

a federal constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment made pursuant to § 1983.” Id.

(citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143–44 (1979)). “Similarly, under Ohio law, an arrest

warrant, ‘issued by a court, unless utterly void is a complete defense to an action for false arrest

or false imprisonment.’” Id. (quoting McFarland v. Shirkey, 106 Ohio App. 517 (1958)). To

defeat the facial validity of a warrant, a plaintiff must prove “by a preponderance of the evidence

that in order to procure the warrant the defendant knowingly and deliberately, or with reckless

disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that created a falsehood and such

statements or omissions were material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.”

Trakhtenberg v. Cnty. of Oakland, 661 F. App’x 413, 419 (6th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).

Here, Plaintiff argues that there was no probable cause for his arrest. But that argument

misses the mark because he does not dispute that there was a warrant for his arrest. Instead, he

alleges that there should not have been a warrant issued for his arrest because a court date on the

same charges had already been set. That is not the same as asserting that the facts set forth in the

warrant could not conceivably constitute an offense or that the court that issued the warrant was

without jurisdiction over Plaintiff or the charged offenses. Although Plaintiff disputes the timing

and methodology of the Officers’ verification of his arrest warrant, his Amended Complaint does

not dispute that they did in fact endeavor to confirm the existence of a warrant for his arrest. Even

if Plaintiff protested that the warrant should not have been issued, or should have been voided,

given his pending court date, police officers are “under no obligation to give any credence to a

suspect’s story or alibi, nor should a plausible explanation in any sense require the officer to forego

arrest pending further investigation if the facts as initially discovered provide probable cause.”

Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1988); Cleveland v. City of Detroit, 275 F. Supp.

2d 832, 839 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (“Respondent’s innocence of the charge contained in the warrant .

. . is largely irrelevant to his claim of deprivation of liberty” and “we do not think a sheriff

executing an arrest warrant is required by the Constitution to investigate independently every claim

of innocence, whether the claim is based on mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite

intent.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Henderson v. Euclid, No. 101149, 2015

WL 114601, at *7 (Ohio App. Jan. 8, 2015). Said differently, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a

claim because police officers are not required to forgo arresting a person on facially valid warrant

just because the arrestee protests that the warrant is invalid. Plaintiff did not file the affidavit or

warrant, nor did he describe any of the statements made therein—much less attribute those

statements to the Officers who arrested him. Even construing liberally and accepting Plaintiff’s

allegations as true, the Undersigned concludes that the Court should dismiss Count I without

prejudice for failure to state a claim.

C. Count II – Fourth Amendment (Unlawful Property Seizure)

Plaintiff next alleges that in connection with his arrest, Officers #1378 and #2522 seized

and impounded Plaintiff’s vehicle, which was parked on private residential property. (Doc. 12 at

2). Plaintiff maintains that there was no warrant, citation, or lawful justification for seizing his

automobile. (Id. at 4).

“The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures of personal property, see Farm

Lab. Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 543 (6th Cir. 2022), but it is not

‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment for police to seize items in the

possession of a person being arrested, see United States v. Cunningham, 520 F. App’x 413, 416

(6th Cir. 2013).” Black v. City of Royal Oak, No. 23-12371, 2024 WL 4220711, at *10 (E.D.

Mich. Sept. 17, 2024). Officers may seize items within an arrestee’s immediate proximity if

incident to a lawful arrest. See Davis v. Robbs, 794 F.2d 1129, 1131 (6th Cir. 1986); Foster v.

Paralexis, No. 2:18-11290, 2020 WL 4722426, at *14–15 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2020).

It is unclear from the Complaint whether Plaintiff was arrested in or near his vehicle that

was subsequently seized and impounded. But it is reasonable to infer that he was—Plaintiff states

that he was arrested and detained “during an encounter involving alleged traffic-related matters.”

(Doc. 12 at 2). Plaintiff identifies Officer Bell (#2900) as one of the officers involved in detaining

Plaintiff. (Id.). Plaintiff later states that his “vehicle was parked on residential property at the time

of the incident[,]” and that Officers #1378 and #2522 were involved in the towing and

impoundment of Plaintiff’s vehicle. (Id.). That being so, the seizure of Plaintiff’s vehicle was

incident to his arrest and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the Undersigned

finds that the Court should dismiss Count II without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

D. Count III – Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process)

Plaintiff complains that he was detained based on inaccurate or improperly maintained

warrant records. (Doc. 12 at 4). He asserts that the “governmental failure” to maintain accurate

records caused unlawful deprivation of liberty in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process. (Id.).

“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations

of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural protection must establish

that one of these interests is at stake.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). See also

U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. Even accepting as true Plaintiff’s contention that his arrest warrant

was invalid, a search or arrest stemming from negligent police error does not amount to a

Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Cleveland, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 839 (finding that a several-

days detention under a facially valid warrant does not constitute a due process violation even if it

turns out that the detainee was wrongfully arrested) (quoting Baker, 443 U.S. at 144).1

What’s more, Plaintiff does not allege which Officers were responsible for maintaining the

allegedly inaccurate records. This failure is fatal to his claim. To state a claim against a defendant

in his or her individual capacity, a plaintiff must allege personal involvement by the defendant in

causing Plaintiff’s injury. Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193, 1196–98 (6th Cir. 1992). A party

cannot be held liable under Section 1983 unless the party personally participated in, or otherwise

authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. Leach

v. Shelby Co. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989) (“There is no claim in this case that the

1 The cases cited by Plaintiff do not establish a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the accuracy of a

municipality’s or court’s records. (Doc. 12 at 4). In Baker v. McCollan, the Supreme Court rejected a claim that the

respondent’s arrest and detention on the basis of mistaken identity in an otherwise valid warrant did not give rise to a

claim under the United States Constitution. 443 U.S. at 143–44. In Herring v. United States, the Supreme Court held,

in the context of a criminal case, that the exclusionary rule did not apply to a search or arrest stemming from negligent

police recordkeeping errors. 555 U.S. 135, 137, 146–47 (2009).

Sheriff directly participated in or encouraged the alleged deprivations of Leach.”). “A plaintiff,

even one proceeding pro se, must plead sufficient facts to show how each defendant allegedly

violated plaintiff’s rights.” Johnson v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-cv-4179, 2023 WL 2555446, at

*18 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 17, 2023) (citations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-

cv-4179, 2023 WL 6065130 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 18, 2023). “Merely listing names in the caption of

the complaint and alleging constitutional violations in the body of the complaint is not enough to

sustain recovery under § 1983.” Gilmore v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir.

2004) (citation omitted). See also Marshall v. Westcomb, No. 2:25-cv-144, 2025 WL 2166304, at

*6 (W.D. Mich. July 31, 2025) (“Furthermore, any ‘[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed

Defendants does not support a reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable. . . .’” Boxill [v.

O’Grady], 935 F.3d [510,] 518 [(6th Cir. 2019)] (citation omitted)).

The Undersigned concludes that the Court should dismiss Count III without prejudice for

failure to state a claim.

E. Count IV – Fourteenth Amendment State-Created Danger

Plaintiff then argues that Defendants “affirmatively placed him in danger by releasing him

into severe weather conditions without clothing appropriate for the environment or assistance.

(Doc. 12 at 4). He contends that Defendants’ actions created a “foreseeable and substantial risk of

serious harm.” (Id. at 5).

In the Sixth Circuit, a state-created danger claim has three elements: (1) an affirmative act

by the state that creates or increases the risk that an individual will be exposed to private acts of

violence; (2) exposure of an individual to a special danger not posed to the public at large; and (3)

that the state knew or clearly should have known that its actions specifically endangered an

individual. Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1066–67 (6th Cir. 1998). Accepting

every allegation as true, Plaintiff’s claim fails on the first element. Plaintiff has not alleged facts

from which this Court can infer that the Officers’ actions created or increased the risk that Plaintiff

would be exposed to private acts of violence. Where the risk of harm that Defendants’ actions

posed to Plaintiff stemmed from the environment, rather than private acts of violence, a Fourteenth

Amendment state-created danger claim cannot survive. See, e.g., McQueen v. Beecher Community

Schools, 433 F.3d 460, 464-65 (6th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases finding either no “affirmative act”

or no “risk of private violence to the plaintiff”). Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that the Court

should dismiss Count IV without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

F. Count V – Municipal Liability (Monell)

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant City of Columbus maintains policies or customs that

permit “arrests based on unverified or outdated warrant database information.” (Doc. 12 at 5). He

further asserts that the City “failed to properly train police officers on warrant verification

procedures” and exhibited “deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” (Id.).

“To state a municipal-liability claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation

(1) of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) that was directly caused

by a municipal policy or custom.” Nichols v. Wayne Cnty., 822 F. App’x 445, 448 (6th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted) (discussing Monell, 436 U.S. 658). “A plaintiff may prove an unconstitutional

‘policy’ or ‘custom’ by demonstrating one of the following: ‘(1) the existence of an illegal official

policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with final decision making authority ratified

illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) the

existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.’” Cline v.

Wiedimen, No. 2:21-cv-112, 2021 WL 123006, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2021) (quoting Burgess

v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:21-cv-

112, 2021 WL 391724 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 4, 2021).

Here, Plaintiff alleges he suffered deprivations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights under seemingly three possible theories of Monell municipal liability: illegal policies and

customs; failure-to-train and supervise; and custom of tolerance.

First, Plaintiff alleges that the City maintains policies or customs that permit arrests based

on unverified or outdated warrant database information. (Doc. 12 at 5). In support, he says that

officers initially stated that a warrant “may exist” but then did not confirm the existence of a valid

warrant before seizing and handcuffing him. (Id. at 2). Plaintiff further claims that officers

conducted multiple database checks while he remained detained.

The term “‘official policy’ often refers to formal rules or understandings—often but not

always committed to writing—that are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be

followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469, 481–82 (1986). Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations of his arrest and detention as

true, he fails to allege facts from which the Undersigned could infer that the City had a “formal”

or “fixed” policy of permitting arrests based on unverified or outdated warrant database

information. Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege facts supporting the existence of any policy at all. See

Lipman v. Budish, 974 F.3d 726, 748 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting a policy is “created through the

official acts of the municipality’s ultimate decision makers”) (citation omitted); cf. Sistrunk v. City

of Hillview, 545 F. Supp. 3d 493, 502 (W.D. Ky. 2021) (noting that even where a complaint labeled

a city’s alleged constitutional failing as a “policy,” the complaint did not allege facts supporting

the existence of a policy).

Here, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations merely assert that the constitutional deprivations

he claims he suffered were due to the City’s policies and customs. Cf. Grandizio v. Smith, No.

Civ. 14-3868, 2015 WL 58403, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2015) (stating that a plaintiff “may not simply

include a Monell claim in his Complaint as a matter of course by making the conclusory allegation

that the alleged constitutional deprivations were due to a policy or custom of the Borough. Rather,

Plaintiff must allege some actual facts suggesting as much.”). Without more, Plaintiff fails to state

a Monell claim under the illegal-policies-and-customs theory of liability.

The Undersigned turns next to Plaintiff’s accusation that the City fails to properly train

officers on warrant verification process. A municipality’s inadequate training constitutes liability

under Section 1983 only “when it evinces deliberate indifference for the rights of those with whom

the governmental employees have contact, such that the inadequate training may be fairly said to

represent the government’s policy or custom.” Brown v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 517 F. App’x 431, 436

(6th Cir. 2013) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989)). Deliberate

indifference, in turn, requires “proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious

consequence of his action.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (cleaned up). A plaintiff

can meet this “stringent standard” in one of two ways. Either he must allege (1) “evidence of prior

instances of unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the municipality had notice that the

training was deficient and likely to cause injury but ignored it,” or (2) “evidence of a single

violation . . . accompanied by a showing that the municipality had failed to train its employees to

handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.” Okolo v. Metro

Gov’t of Nashville, 892 F. Supp. 2d 931, 942 (M.D. Tenn. 2012) (cleaned up) (quoting Harvey v.

Campbell Cnty., 453 F. App’x 557, 562–63 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also id. at 943 (“Liability for

unconstitutionally inadequate supervision or discipline is treated, for all intents and purposes, as a

failure to train.”); cf. Harvey, 453 F. App’x at 563 (“[M]ere allegations that an officer was

improperly trained or that an injury could have been avoided with better training are insufficient

to make out deliberate indifference.”).

Plaintiff has not alleged evidence of prior instances of unconstitutional conduct that would

demonstrate the City was on notice that its training or supervision of officers executing arrest

warrants was deficient and likely to cause injury. Nor has he pleaded that the City failed to train

its officers to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation. Cf.

Weaver v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, No. 3:24-cv-103, 2024 WL 2819556, at *3

(W.D. Ky. June 3, 2024) (considering allegations of a federal rights violation coupled with news

articles and a report detailing a police department’s “shortcomings” related to investigatory

searches and unreasonable use of force as adequate to state a failure to train claim). At base,

Plaintiff fails to specify any facts pertaining to global training or supervision of City officers from

which the Undersigned could infer that any constitutional deprivation Plaintiff experienced was

related to inadequate training. In fact, Plaintiff’s own allegations that officers “conducted multiple

database checks while Plaintiff remained detained” (Doc. 12 at 2), belie any suggestion that the

City failed to properly train officers on warrant verification process.

Finally, the Undersigned considers Plaintiff’s claim suggesting a custom-of-intolerance

theory of municipal liability. To state a Monell claim under this theory, Plaintiff must allege “(1)

a ‘clear and persistent pattern’ of misconduct, (2) notice or constructive notice on the part of the

municipality, (3) the defendant’s tacit approval of the misconduct, and (4) a direct causal link to

the violations.” Nouri v. Cnty. of Oakland, 615 F. App’x 291, 296 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation

omitted). Plaintiff’s claim does not even pass the first hurdle. He alleges no facts suggesting a

pattern of misconduct. And that allegation is key to pleading a custom-based Monell claim.

Franklin v. Franklin Cnty., 115 F. 4th 461, 472 (6th Cir. 2024) (stating that the crux of a custom-

based Monell claim is a showing of “particularized” similarities between the prior incidents and

the instant case). Plaintiff’s own experience is not enough. Cf. id. (“[T]his court has observed that

a plaintiff ‘cannot rely solely on a single instance to prove the existence of an unconstitutional

custom.’” (citation omitted)). In addition, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that the

City had notice of any pattern of misconduct, that it tacitly approved of the misconduct, or any

causal link to the constitutional violations he now claims.

The Undersigned recognizes that at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff need not provide

“detailed factual allegations.” But basic pleading requirements demand “well-pleaded factual

allegations” that plausibly show the City has a custom of ignoring similar constitutional violations.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); see also Burgess, 735 F.3d at 478 (“[A]

custom . . . claim requires a showing that there was a pattern of . . . similar claims.”). Because

Plaintiff has not met this requirement, he should not be permitted to proceed on this theory of

Monell liability.

As a final note, to the extent that Plaintiff names the City of Columbus as a defendant under

any theory of liability other than Monell, his claim should be dismissed. See, e.g., Monell, 436

U.S. at 694 (“a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

employees or agents.”). In sum, the Undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Count V

without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

G. Count VI – Individual Liability

Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim titled “Individual Liability.” (Doc. 12 at 5). As discussed

more fully above, to state a claim against a defendant in their individual capacity, a plaintiff must

allege personal involvement by the defendant in causing Plaintiff’s injury. Hardin, 954 F.2d at

1196–98. A party cannot be held liable under Section 1983 unless the party personally participated

in, or otherwise authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional

conduct. Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246. “A plaintiff, even one proceeding pro se, must plead sufficient

facts to show how each defendant allegedly violated plaintiff’s rights.” Johnson, 2023 WL

2555446, at *18.

Here, Plaintiff lists as Defendants several Columbus Police Officers—one identified by

name and six identified by badge numbers—and states that they “all participated in the arrest,

impound, or reckless endangerment.” (Doc. 12 at 2). He also lists ten John Doe Officers. (Id.).

He alleges that “[e]ach Defendant Officer participated directly in, or failed to intervene in,

unconstitutional conduct. Officers acted jointly in detention, seizure, and release decisions.” (Id.

at 5). These conclusory assertions are insufficient to support an inference that every Defendant

violated Plaintiff’s rights when Plaintiff offers allegations ranging from his arrest, to the seizure

of personal property and the impound of his car, to his release into freezing rain wearing only

shorts and a t-shirt, and to officers driving by and ignoring his obvious distress. The Court finds

that the Court should dismiss Count VI without prejudice for failure to state a claim.

II. MOTION FOR EXPEDITED DISCOVERY

Plaintiff moves the Court for expedited discovery to identify the John Doe Defendants.

(Doc. 13). Based on the foregoing recommendation against any of Plaintiff’s claims proceeding

for further development, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Plaintiff’s

Motion for Expedited Discovery as moot.

III. CONCLUSION

The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint should be dismissed. Accordingly,

the Undersigned RECOMMENDS the following:

1. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary

damages be DISMISSED with prejudice;

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their individual capacities and against the

City of Columbus be DENIED without prejudice;

3. If the Court adopts the Report and Recommendations, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Expedited Discovery (Doc. 13) be DENIED as moot; and

4. The Court CERTIFY under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons,

an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendations would not be taken in good

faith and therefore DENY Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.

June 25, 2026 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served a copy of the

recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring at an oral hearing, the

objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as

all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District

Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections WITHIN 14 DAYS

after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in accordance with this

procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019).

See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.

1981).