The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA
7
MONTE ALBERT, CASE NO. C25-6139 BHS
8
Plaintiff, ORDER
9 v.
10 PIERCE COUNTY, et al.,
11 Defendants.
12
13 THIS MATTER is before the Court following Magistrate Judge Grady J.
14 Leupold’s Order granting pro se plaintiff Monte Albert’s application to proceed in forma
15 pauperis based on his indigency, Dkt. 5, leaving to this Court evaluation of whether
16 Albert’s proposed complaint, Dkt. 6, asserts a facially plausible claim and should be
17 served.
18 A court should “deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears
19 from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.”
20 Tripati v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted);
21 see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous if “it
22 ha[s] no arguable substance in law or fact.” Tripati, 821 F.2d at 1370 (citing Rizzo v.
1 Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,
2 1228 (9th Cir. 1984).
3 A pro se plaintiff’s complaint is to be construed liberally, but like any other
4 complaint it must nevertheless contain factual assertions sufficient to support a facially
5 plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic
6 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief is facially plausible
7 when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
8 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
9 678. “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’
10 requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
11 cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
12 above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and footnotes omitted).
13 This requires a plaintiff to plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-
14 harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly at 555).
15 Albert’s complaint does not meet this standard. He seeks to sue Pierce County, its
16 Superior Court Clerk, Kevin Stock; the Superior Court’s offices services supervisor,
17 Kayla Ayers; and various “John Doe” Superior Court clerk staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
18 for violating his constitutional right to access the Court’s administrative records. He
19 claims he requires, and was unlawfully denied access, “transcripts, email logs, routing
20 records, redaction procedures,” as well as all communications between Superior Court
21 judicial and administrative staff and Army personnel. Dkt. 60 at 2–3.
22
1 Albert’s proposed amended complaint, Dkt. 10 at 3, seeks only to add as a
2 defendant the Pierce County public records officer Tyler Wherry, asserting that his
3 failures to provide this information (including “bench notes”) also violated Superior
4 Court General Rule (GR) 31.11 and Albert’s constitutional rights by failing to provide the
5 information he sought.
6 Albert asserts he wants this information to “reveal how and whether external
7 military personnel interacted with court staff regarding his case.” Id. at 3. The case to
8 which he refers is not clear, but his other allegations suggest that he was the subject of a
9 Domestic Violence Protection Order. He asserts a Monell claim against the Pierce County
10 Superior Court, alleging that it “has institutionalized a low threshold, rapid approval
11 process for DVPOs under which such orders are “routinely granted with no inquiry, and
12 that the court’s findings, bench notes and administrative logs are not preserved.” Id. at 2.
13 He asserts that the combination of “rubber stamp protection orders plus opacity” creates a
14 system that is insulated for post judgment scrutiny.
15 Albert does not name the Pierce County Judge who presided over his case, perhaps
16 recognizing that absolute judicial immunity would bar that claim at the outset. He also
17 asserts that he is “not challeng[ing] any judicial ruling,” Dkt. 6 at 1, perhaps recognizing
18 that this Court cannot and will not review or reverse decisions made in state court. The
19 Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
20 injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review and
21
1 Albert may be able to obtain some of the information he seeks under Washington’s
22 Public Records Act, but there is no allegation he has attempted to do so.
1 rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S.
2 280, 284 (2005).
3 But Albert has not pled his way around these hurdles, and he has failed to state a
4 plausible claim.
5 First, Pierce County is a municipality, not a “person” subject to suit under 42
6 U.S.C. § 1983. It is beyond debate that the state is not a “person” for purposes of §
7 1983. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Howlett v. Rose, 496
8 U.S. 356, 365 (1990); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007); and Doe
9 v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab, 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997).
10 Second, his attempt to couch his claim as a Monell claim based on the County’s
11 “policy” of “rubber stamping DVPO applications” is not plausible. He seeks to obtain
12 monetary and other relief from the county based on the decision of a Pierce County
13 Superior Court Judge. He is asking this Court to determine that the DVPO was issued in
14 error, and was unconstitutional. Under Rooker Feldman, it does not have jurisdiction to
15 do so.
16 Nor is Albert’s attempt to couch his claim as a First Amendment request for access
17 to the Court’s internal processes effective. He has cited no authority for the proposition
18 that he has a constitutional right to such internal communications, and the Court is aware
19 of none. GR 31.1(m) itself expressly provides that “chambers records are not
20 administrative records and are not subject to disclosure.” But that is exactly what Albert
21 seeks, to support his appeal of the DVPO.
22
1 Equally unavailing is the attempt to name court staff as defendants as a way
2 around judicial immunity. Judicial staff are also entitled to absolute immunity “when they
3 perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial process,” unless they act in the
4 “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828
5 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987). This immunity cannot be overcome by allegations of
6 legal error, bad faith, or malice. Albert cannot state a plausible claim against the court
7 staff.
8 Nor has Albert pointed to any authority clearly establishing that the staff has a
9 constitutional obligation to provide Albert the “inside information” he seeks about the
10 decisions made in his case, and he cannot. Even if the conduct violated GR 31.1, that is
11 not a constitutional violation remediable in this Court.
12 Ordinarily, “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to
13 amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly
14 be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe v. N. Cal. Collection
15 Serv., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). However, when the facts are not in dispute and
16 the sole issue is whether there is liability as a matter of substantive law, courts may deny
17 leave to amend. Albrecht v. Lund, 845 F.2d 193, 195–96 (9th Cir. 1988).
18 Albert’s claim relates only to his effort to obtain “inside information” about the
19 DVPO that was apparently entered against him, under GR 31.1, the First Amendment,
20 and the Due Process clause, in order to attack that Order. He asks the Court to declare
21 that the Superior Court’s redaction practices violated his rights, and he is necessarily
22 asking this Court to conclude that the resulting DVPO was unconstitutional. This claim is
1 not plausible and he cannot make it plausible by filing another amended complaint. The
2 case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
3 Albert’s premature motion for service by the U.S. Marshal, Dkt. 9, and his motion
4 to amend to add Wherry as a defendant, Dkt. 10, are DENIED.
5 The Clerk shall close the case.
6 IT IS SO ORDERED.
7 Dated this 5th day of March, 2026.
A
8
9
BENJAMIN H. SETTLE
10
United S tates District Judge
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22