The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
LARRY BROWN, II,
Petitioner, : Case No. 3:20-cv-00113
Related Case No. 3:25-cv-00023
- vs - District Judge Michael J. Newman
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
WARDEN,
Noble Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
TRANSFER ORDER
This habeas corpus case is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion Pursuant to Federal Civil
Rule 60(d)(the “Motion”), Although Petitioner previously was proceeding pro se, he is now
represented by Attorney John Manuel Gonzales, the counsel who also represented him in the
related case referenced in the caption.
The judgment which is sought to be set aside is the final judgment of May 9, 2022 (ECF No.
60) which dismissed the case with prejudice. Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability from
the circuit court which that Court denied one on September 9, 2024 (ECF No. 80).
On January 23, 2025, now represented by Attorney Gonzales, Petitioner filed a new habeas
corpus case directed to the same conviction of which he complained in this case (Case No. 3:25-
cv-00023, hereinafter the “New Case”). The undersigned determined that the New Case was a
second or successive petition which required the permission of the circuit court before it could
proceed and transferred the case to the circuit court for its consideration of that issue (New Case
ECF No. 5). Accepting the transfer1, the circuit court on June 20, 2025, denied permission to
proceed (New Case ECF No. 6).
Attorney Gonzales then filed the instant Motion on Petitioner’s behalf on June 17, 2026.
The Motion asserts the final judgment should be vacated because it was procured by the fraud of
Assistant Attorney General William Lamb when he filed the State Court Record in this case
(Motion, ECF No. 83, PageID 2520). Petitioner enumerates the instances of alleged fraud as
follows:
Claim One: The Respondent Willfully Concealed And Suppressed
The 2014 Preble County Children's Services Report Concerning The
Alleged Victim, B.H., In Mr. Brown's Criminal Case 15cr011706
And Represented That Christine "Shinn" Woodruff Was A
"Different Victim" From 1996 When In Fact Ms. Woodruff Had
Produced An Affidavit To The Contrary. (See Claim Two) Thereby
Affecting This Court's Decision On Several Grounds And Claims In
Mr. Brown's First Petition For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus (Doc.No.3)
By Way Of Biasing This Court. This Had An Adverse Effect On
This Court's Decision Of Ground One, P.7, Ground Three, P.1-3
And Ground Four, P.1-2, P.4-5 And P.8 Of Mr. Brown's 2254
Petition.
Claim Two: The Respondent Represented That Christine "Shinn"
Woodruff Was A "Different Victim" From 1996. Then Noted The
Response From The State Proving That The Falsified Police Report
And The Falsified Preble County Children's Services Report From
1996 Being Read By The Trier Of Facts, Could Cause Irreparable
Harm To A Case. This Is True Because The 1996 False Reports and
The 2014 False Reports Are "Eerily Similar." These Falsified
Reports Of A "Different Victim" Was Seen By The Trier Of Fact
and By This Court And Had To Cause Harm To Mr. Brown's Case
By Way Of A Bias Trier Of Facts And This Court. Thereby
Affecting This Court's Decision On Several Grounds And Claims In
Mr. Brown's First Petition For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus
1 Inferentially agreeing with this Court’s determination that the Petition was second or successive. When the circuit
court disagrees with a conclusion of that a petition is second or successive, it typically remands the case.
(Doc.No.3).By Way Of Biasing This Court. This Had An Adverse
Effect On This Court's Decision Of Ground One, P.7, Ground Three,
P.1-3 And Ground Four, P.1-2, P.4-5 and P.8 Of Mr. Brown's 2254
Petition.
CLAIM THREE: The Respondent Presented Known False
Statements About Material And Positive Character Witnesses Not
Testifying Favorably For Mr. Brown Had They Known The Charges
Against Him. This Fraud Had To Further Effect [sic] This Court's
Decision On Mr. Brown's Ground One P.7, Because The Statements
Are Clearly False And Misleading Which Were Designed To Bias
This Court Against Mr. Brown. The Following Will Demonstrate
The Witnesses Did Testify At Mr. Brown's Trial And Respondent
Clearly Knew This As The Testimony Is In The State Court Record,
Respondent Filed In This Court.
CLAIM FOUR: The Respondent Has Committed Fraud Upon The
Federal Court By Concealing And Suppressing The Favorable And
Material Dayton Children's Hospital Report That The State Has
Now Acknowledged In Their Trial Court Brief And Appellate Brief.
This Issue Demonstrates The Prosecutorial Misconduct And The
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Mr. Brown Asserted In In His
Original Petition.
CLAIM FIVE: The Respondent Has Committed Fraud Upon The
Federal Court By Concealing And Suppressing The Favorable And
Material 2015 Samaritan Behavioral Health Reports That The State
Has Now Acknowledged In Their Trial Court Brief And Appellate
Brief. This Is Relevant Due To The Fact That Mr. Brown Was
Indicted On February 2nd 2015 And The 2015 Samaritan Report
Was Started On 4-25- 15 and Ended On 12-12-15.
CLAIM SIX: The Respondent Concealed And Suppressed The Fact
That The State's Witness Dr. Vosler Was Aware Of Other False
Allegations Made By B.H. Against Two Other Persons. The State
Investigated Those Prior False Allegations Without Disclosing Dr.
Vosler's Knowledge Of The False Allegations. A Report Of That
Investigation Is Quoted Below.
CLAIM SEVEN: The Respondent Concealed And Suppressed The
Fact That The State's Witness Dr. Vosler Was Always In Mr. Brown
And B.H.'S Presence When And Where The Alleged Abuse
Occurred. This Was Told To Detective Schneider That Failed To
Put It In A Report From Dr. Vosler.
(Motion, ECF No. 83, PageID 2516-17).
When Petitioner sought leave to proceed with his second Petition in the circuit court, that
court denied his application, citing six claims made in his corrected application (Order, In re Larry
Brown, 6th Cir. Case No. 25-3050, June 20, 2025)(unpublished, copy at New Case ECF No. 6).
The Sixth Circuit Order does not reproduce Brown’s claims in his corrected application nor have
those claims been otherwise made available to this Court, so the undersigned cannot directly
compare those claims with the claims made in the instant Motion. Nonetheless there appear to be
at least some parallels: the claims quoted above advert to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). Thus it may be that the instant Motion is barred
at least in part by res judicata by virtue of the Sixth Circuit’s denial of permission to proceed in
the New Case.
The application of res judicata as between two applications for permission to proceed on
a second or successive habeas petition is a question of first instance in this Court and one that is
properly decided by the Sixth Circuit.
Without purporting to decide that issue, the Court finds the instant Motion is legally
equivalent to a second or successive petition which this Court does not have jurisdiction to decide.
A district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition without approval by
the circuit court. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007); Franklin v. Jenkins, 839 F.3d 465(6th
Cir. 2016). If a purported motion for relief from judgment attacks the conviction rather than the
district court’s judgment, it should be transferred to the circuit court for permission to file. United
States v. Alford, Case No. 11-4067 (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 2013)(unreported, copy at 3:00-cr-065, Doc.
No. 156), citing Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), and In re Sims, 111 F.3d 45 (6th Cir.
1997). The instant Motion does “attack” the judgment, but reads in terms which, if accepted,
would render the underlying state court judgment voidable. Because a District Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition without circuit permission and federal
courts are always bound to consider sua sponte whether or not they have jurisdiction, the safer
course is to transfer the case to the circuit court for their consideration, The undersigned is
confident the circuit court will promptly remand the matter if it finds the transfer was improvident.
Accordingly, the Clerk is ORDERED to transfer the instant Motion to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for its determination of whether this Court may proceed to
decide the Motion.
June 18, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge