MORRIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

COREY MORRIS,

Plaintiff, No. 2:25-cv-16371

(MEF)(JSA)

v.

MARC SIM, et al., OPINION and ORDER

Defendants.

* * *

For the purposes of this brief Opinion and Order, the Court

largely assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural

history of this case.

* * *

The Plaintiff1 is a state prison inmate.

His basic allegations: (i) that he has filed various New Jersey

lawsuits;2 (ii) that during 2024, he was transferred to a “close

supervision [housing] unit,” where he had “very limited access

to the [prison’s] law library,” and “no direct hands on access

to . . . law books”;3 (iii) that he needed certain “law books”4

to “do legal research and properly and effectively prepare . . .

1 Corey Morris.

2 See Complaint (ECF 1-2) at 13-14; see also id. at 27 (listing

cases).

3 Complaint at 18-19, 23.

4 The 2024 Edition of the New Jersey Criminal Code Annotated

(Title 2C), and the 2024 Edition of the Rules Governing the

Courts of the State of New Jersey. See Complaint at 19.

for his cases”;5 and (iv) that when he ordered the books, certain

prison administrators did not allow him to put hands on one of

them, because the book was “too big or too heavy,” and was

“reject[ed]” based on “[s]afety,” “security,” and “space

concerns.”6

* * *

In light of the above, the Plaintiff sued various prison

officials, among others, alleging violations of his federal

Constitutional rights,7 see Complaint at 34-38, and seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief, plus damages.8

Some of the prison officials (from here, “the Defendants”) have

now moved to dismiss. See Notice of Motion to Dismiss (ECF 4)

(Defendants Calicchio, Berryman, Gray, Iacobucci, Crowell,

Shakir, Griffin, Bobien, and Sim).9

5 Complaint at 28; see also id. at 19.

6 See Exhibit 10 to Complaint (ECF 1-2) at 55; see also

Complaint at 20-22, 24-25. The copy of the Rules Governing the

Courts of the State of New Jersey was allegedly rejected. But

the Plaintiff asserts that he received the New Jersey Criminal

Code Annotated. See Complaint at 21-22.

7 Per the Plaintiff, the Defendants violated his right to free

speech (Count I) and access to the courts (Count II), each under

the First Amendment. See Complaint at 33-35. Interfered with

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Count III). See id. at

35-36. Breached his “administrative appeal rights” under the

Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV). See id. at 36-37. And

“conspired” and “abused the process . . . in violation of [his

rights under the] First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments”

(Counts V and VI). See id. at 37-38. The Plaintiff’s complaint

also refers once to the New Jersey State Constitution, see id.

at 12, but does not seem to press any state-law claims. Cf. id.

at 34-38.

8 See Complaint at 39, 42 (describing the injunctive and

declaratory relief sought); see id. at 12 (explaining that the

Plaintiff seeks damages).

9 In addition to the moving Defendants, the Plaintiff pressed

claims against four other people and two institutions. But none

2

Their motion is granted in part and denied in part.

* * *

First, the motion is granted as to (i) the Plaintiff’s federal

claims against the Defendants in their official capacities, (ii)

the Plaintiff’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims, and (iii) any

claims the Plaintiff may potentially have raised here10 under

state law.

The Plaintiff has conceded that these claims do not work. See

Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

(“Plaintiff’s Brief”) (ECF 8) at 1, 8-9.

So they are dismissed. See Hollister v. U.S. Postal Serv., 142

F. App’x 576, at *1 (3d Cir. 2005).

* * *

Second, and as to what remains, the motion is granted to the

extent the Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages for alleged

violations of federal law.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “[n]o Federal civil

action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a . . . prison .

. . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody

without a prior showing of physical injury or the commission of

a sexual act.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

Here, the Plaintiff alleges that he suffered “physical injury.”

See Complaint at 34-38.

But the physical-injury allegation is not backed up by any

factual information. Nothing in the complaint as to what the

alleged physical injury is. When and where it happened. Or how

it came about.

This is not enough. Here, physical injury is an element of a

Prison Litigation Reform Act compensatory damages claim. But

just alleging an element does not, standing alone, check the

box. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding

that “bare assertions [that] amount to nothing more than a

‘formulaic recitation of the elements’” are insufficient to

of these has yet appeared.

10 See footnote 7.

3

survive a motion to dismiss) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

It is not sufficient to simply say in the complaint that there

has been physical injury. At least some underlying

who/what/when/where/how information must be alleged --- to put

meat on the bones, and by doing so to plausibly show that there

was, in fact, a physical injury. See Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d

523, 535-36 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a plaintiff subject

to the PLRA must “describe the extent of his physical injuries”

with enough specificity “to determine whether his injuries are

more than de minimis”).

In a notice-pleading regime, stating the legal theory under

which a person seeks to recover might be enough to survive a

motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. But in our

current pleading regime, some factual allegations are needed.

See id. at 555-56. And as to physical injury, there are none.

This means that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act the

Plaintiff cannot seek compensatory damages based on any “mental

or emotional” distress he has allegedly suffered. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(e).

And here, that marks the end of the road as to compensatory

damages. As the Court “read[s] his complaint, the only actual

injury that could form the basis for the award [of compensatory

damages the Plaintiff] seeks would be mental and/or emotional

injury” --- because under Third Circuit law “the abstract value

of a constitutional right” cannot itself be the basis for

compensatory damages. Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250-51

(3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,

477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986)); see also Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309,

314 n.3.11

* * *

Third, and as to the Plaintiff’s remaining First Amendment

claims, the Defendants’ motion is denied.

11 The Prison Litigation Reform Act does not limit the

Plaintiff’s claims to the extent he seeks injunctive or

declaratory relief, or nominal and punitive damages. See

Mitchell, 318 F.3d at 533-34.

4

Under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), “when a prison

regulation [allegedly] impinges on inmates’ constitutional

rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” Id. at 89.

There are four key Turner factors for “determining the

reasonableness of [a] regulation.” Id. “First, there must be a

‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and

the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.”

Id. Second, courts must inquire into “whether there are

alternative means of exercising the right [at issue] that remain

open to prison inmates.” Id. at 90. Third, courts must

evaluate “the impact accommodation of the asserted

constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates.”

Id. And fourth, courts must ask there are “ready alternatives”

to the regulation. Id.

For the reasons laid out by the Plaintiff, see Plaintiff’s Brief

at 2-6, the Turner factors cannot be properly evaluated here

without some factual development.

For example, it is all-but impossible to assess the third

“impact” factor, see Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, without at least a

modest understanding of the facility where the Plaintiff is held

and its security needs.12

Similarly, it is difficult to tackle the fourth “ready

alternatives” factor, id. at 90, without some fact-based sense

of the other channels that may have been available to the

Plaintiff for consulting law books.13

And the somewhat fuller factual picture that is necessary to

perform a meaningful Turner analysis here also precludes, for

12 And note that, as to the cases cited by the Defendants, a

particular weight limit on books may pass muster at one facility

but not another, given the facilities’ operational needs,

populations, etc.

13 The Plaintiff acknowledges that, in some circumstances,

“prisoners may read [certain materials] in the law library.”

Complaint at 25. But he also alleges that he was told by a

prison official that “[b]ooks” were “no longer authorized” in

his housing unit. See Exhibit 5 to Complaint at 50.

5

now, a qualified immunity analysis.'4

* * *

For the above-stated reasons, the motion to dismiss at ECF 4 is

granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS on this 3rd day of June, 2026, so ORDERED.

Michael BE. Farbiarz, U.S.D.Jd.

14 The question of whether the access-to-courts claim has been

adequately made out is a close one, because the Plaintiff has

not set out in detail how he was injured by not having the

relevant law book. See Rivera v. Monko, 37 F.4th 909, 915 (3d

Cir. 2022) (requiring an “actual injury” be articulated to state

a claim for denial of access to the courts). But for now, the

claim clears the bar. First, when he drafted the complaint, the

Plaintiff was proceeding pro se. Second, the Plaintiff was

pursuing various lawsuits in New Jersey state court, see

Complaint at 13-14, 27, and it stands to reason that the

relevant law book (about the New Jersey rules of court) may have

been helpful to those New Jersey lawsuits. And third, it can be

especially difficulty for a non-lawyer to explain how he was

injured by not having access to a given law book. How is a non-

lawyer to articulate the incremental injury of not having a

particular law book? How can he readily pinpoint the precise

legal argument he might have made if he had the law book? After

all, the non-lawyer may not be aware of the unmade legal

argument until he is able to read the law book. Cf. United

-States v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256

n.5 (1957) (“The ordinary rule ... does not place the burden

upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the

knowledge of his adversary.”); Makdisi v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

2026 WL 1217053, at *9 (D.N.J. May 5, 2026).

15 Hard to tell whether he Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

claim as to his “administrative appeal rights,” see Complaint at

36-37, is live. The Plaintiff does not seem to clearly concede

this claim. And for their part, the Defendants do not

meaningfully take it up. The Court does not address the appeal-

rjiqhteae claim here.