The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
DAVID C. LETTIERI,
Plaintiff
Civil No. 25-18965 (RMB-SAK)
v.
BROWN AND CONNERY LLP, et al., MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendants
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff David C. Lettieri’s Motion
for Reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) of this Court’s order
denying his application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“IFP
application”) based on the three strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Dkt. No. 4
(“Motion for Reconsideration”) For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Plaintiff contends the Court should have granted his IFP application because he
alleged he was in imminent danger of being stabbed. Motion for Reconsideration at 2.
Among his many claims against approximately twenty defendants, Plaintiff alleged in
his Complaint:
On March 27, 2025, the defendants D. English, S. Gonzalez,
and B. Cinnatu had the plaintiff pulled from the education
building to wait for an hour to be threaten[ed] if continue to
do grievances the plaintiff would be transfer[red] to a more
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dangerous facility to be stabbed in which d[ue] to a
para[lyzed] vocal cord can’t yell. Thus would die.
Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 2-3.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if
the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or
appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on
the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner
is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
The Third Circuit has determined, as a matter of statutory construction, that the
existence of an “imminent danger” is to be assessed at the time the Complaint is filed.
Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d Cir. 2001). Plaintiff’s allegation that
defendants threatened to transfer him to a more dangerous facility where he might be
stabbed fails to state an “imminent” danger because Plaintiff’s transfer was not
imminent based on a threat alone, and the possibility of Plaintiff being stabbed at
another facility was very remote at the time his Complaint was filed. Plaintiff is not
entitled to reconsideration of the order denying is IFP application, Dkt. No. 3, under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).1 Accordingly,
1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides grounds for relief from an Order:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:
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IT IS on this 3rd day of June 2026,
ORDERED that the Clerk shall reopen this matter solely for entry of this Order;
and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Dkt. No. 4, is DENIED;
and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall ADMINISTRATIVELY
TERMINATE this action; and it is further
ORDERED that if Plaintiff wishes to reopen this matter, he shall notify the Court
in writing within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of this Order and shall include
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged;
it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable;
Or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
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payment of the full civil filing fee; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order upon
Plaintiff by regular U.S. mail.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
Chief United States District Judge
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