The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 N.M., a minor, by and through his Case No. 24-cv-2306-BJC-MSB
Guardian ad Litem Pamela McKeirnan.,
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
Plaintiff,
13 DENYING IN PART MOTION TO
v. DISMISS
14
15 RAMONA UNIFIED SCHOOL [Doc. No. 17, 25]
DISTRICT, et al.,
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Defendants.
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20 On April 18, 2025, Plaintiff N.M., a minor by and through his Guardian ad Litem
21 Pamela McKeirnan (“Plaintiff”), filed a First Amended Complaint against Defendants
22 Ramona Unified School District, Chris Gunnett, Chris Rogers, Audrey Beyer, Eileen
23 Highley, and Does 1 through 100 (collectively, “Defendants”). Doc. No. 15 (“FAC”).
24 Defendants have since filed a motion to dismiss. Doc. No. 17. Plaintiff filed an opposition,
25 to which Defendants replied. Doc. Nos. 18, 19. The Court found the matter suitable for
26 determination on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule
27 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 20. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and
28 DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 Ramona Unified School District (“RUSD”) is a public education agency that
3 operates numerous schools in San Diego, California. FAC ¶ 7. Hanson Lane Elementary
4 School (“Hanson”) is one such school within RUSD. Id. ¶ 8. Prior to the 2023–2024
5 school year, Defendant Gunnett was the Principal of Hanson, and Defendant Highley was
6 Director of Special Education for RUSD. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12. At the beginning of the 2023–2024
7 school year, Defendant Rogers became the Principal of Hanson, and Defendant Beyer
8 became Director of Special Education for RUSD. Id. ¶¶ 10, 13. At all relevant times,
9 Defendant Thurman was the Superintendent for RUSD.1 Id. ¶ 11.
10 Plaintiff N.M. is an African American child who attended Hanson until May 2024.2
11 Id. ¶¶ 5, 21, 68. He has been diagnosed with numerous conditions and disorders that
12 qualify him to receive special education services and an Individualized Education Plan
13 (“IEP”). Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff alleges that while a student at Hanson, he endured severe
14 discrimination and harassment based upon his race and disabilities and that he was
15 subjected to physical abuse by other students for approximately two years. Id. ¶ 23.
16 Plaintiff explains that the bullying was so severe that he expressed suicidal intent and was
17 hospitalized for his own safety. Id. ¶¶ 86, 218. During one altercation in particular in
18 February 2024, another student repeatedly kicked Plaintiff in his head and chest, and he
19 sustained a concussion as a result. Id. ¶¶ 56–58.
20 Plaintiff’s mother became aware of the physical and emotional abuse in Spring 2022
21 and repeatedly reported the conduct to Gunnett, Highley and others within RUSD. Id. ¶
22 26, 28–29, 35. Plaintiff alleges that despite being on notice of the discrimination and abuse,
23 Defendants failed to stop the harassment or take adequate measures to protect him. Id. 36.
24 Additionally, Plaintiff contends that because of Defendants’ inaction and tolerance of the
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1 The Court hereinafter refers to Defendants Gunnett, Rogers, Highley, Beyer, and Thurman as the
27 “Individual Defendants.”
2 At the time of filing the Complaint, N.M. was nine years old. FAC ¶¶ 5, 21.
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1 abusive environment, he was deprived access to educational opportunities and benefits and
2 was denied a safe learning environment. Id. 37–38. Consequently, Plaintiff brings sixteen
3 (16) claims against Defendants for violation of his constitutional rights, as well as various
4 federal and California state laws.
5 II. LEGAL STANDARD
6 A. Rule 12(b)(1)
7 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an action for lack of subject
8 matter jurisdiction “either on the face of the pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence.”
9 Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); see also White
10 v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that
11 the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal
12 jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In
13 ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacking the complaint on its face, the Court accepts the
14 allegations of the complaint as true. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th
15 Cir. 2004). “By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the
16 allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air,
17 373 F.3d at 1039. “With a factual Rule 12(b)(1) attack . . . a court may look beyond the
18 complaint to matters of public record without having to convert the motion into one for
19 summary judgment. It also need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff[‘s]
20 allegations.” White, 227 F.3d at 1242 (internal citation omitted); see also Thornhill Pub.
21 Co., Inc. v. General Tel & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Where
22 the jurisdictional issue is separable from the merits of the case, the judge may consider the
23 evidence presented with respect to the jurisdictional issue and rule on that issue, resolving
24 factual disputes if necessary. . . ‘[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's
25 allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court
26 from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.’”) (quoting Mortensen v. First
27 Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 1977)). “However, where the
28 jurisdictional issue and substantive issues are so intertwined that the question of
1 jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits, the
2 jurisdictional determination should await a determination of the relevant facts on either a
3 motion going to the merits or at trial.” Augustine v. U.S., 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir.
4 1983). It is the plaintiff who bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court has subject
5 matter jurisdiction to hear the action. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S.
6 375, 377 (1994); Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir.
7 1989).
8 B. Rule 12(b)(6)
9 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro
10 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain “a short and plain
11 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
12 However, plaintiffs must also plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
13 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ.
14 P. 12(b)(6). The plausibility standard demands more than a “formulaic recitation of the
15 elements of a cause of action,” or “‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual
16 enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
17 at 555, 557); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a
18 right to relief above the speculative level.”). Instead, the complaint “must contain
19 sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party
20 to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
21 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth
22 of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the
23 nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996)
24 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). The court need
25 not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual
26 allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting W. Min.
27 Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981)). Similarly, “conclusory allegations of
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1 law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto
2 v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
3 In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not
4 look beyond the complaint for additional facts. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903,
5 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents
6 attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters
7 of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
8 judgment.” Id. at 908; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir.
9 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119,
10 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002). “However, [courts] are not required to accept as true conclusory
11 allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.” Steckman
12 v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (9th Cir. 1998).
13 Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the
14 plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of
15 Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127
16 (9th Cir. 2000)).
17 III. DISCUSSION
18 Plaintiff pleads the following sixteen claims: (1) “Violation of 42 U.S.C. Section
19 1983 – Equal Protection” against the Individual Defendants; (2) “Violation of 42 U.S.C.
20 Section 1983 – Fourteenth Amendment – Danger Creation” against the Individual
21 Defendants; (3) “Violation of Constitutional Rights, 42 USC Section 1983 (Monell – Equal
22 Protection)” against the Individual Defendants; (4) “Violation of Constitutional Rights, 42
23 USC Section 1983 (Monell – 14th Amendment Danger Creation)” against the Individual
24 Defendants; (5) racial harassment in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act against
25 RUSD; (6) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
26 against RUSD; (7) violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
27 794, against RUSD; (8) violation of California’s Ralph Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7, against
28 the Individual Defendants; (9) violation of California’s Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1,
1 against the Individual Defendants; (10) discrimination in violation of California Education
2 Code § 220 against the Individual Defendants; (11) assault and battery against the
3 Individual Defendants; (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress against the
4 Individual Defendants; (13) negligence per se in violation of California Penal Code §
5 11166 against the Individual Defendants; (14) “Negligent Supervision/Failure to Warn”
6 against the Individual Defendants; (15) “Negligent Failure to Warn, Train, or Educate
7 Plaintiff” against the Individual Defendants; and (16) negligence against the Individual
8 Defendants.
9 As a threshold matter, Plaintiff improperly characterizes his first two causes of
10 action as claims for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See FAC at 11, 12.3 Title 42 of the
11 United States Code, Section 1983 is not itself the source of any substantive rights. This
12 statute merely provides “a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.”
13 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
14 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, “Section 1983
15 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state law,
16 violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070,
17 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Consequently, there is no such claim for “Violation of 42 U.S.C.
18 Section 1983.” See Sernoffsky v. Novak, 773 F. Supp. 3d 988, 1006 (S.D. Cal. 2025). To
19 this extent, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s first two claims.
20 A plaintiff alleging a claim under § 1983 must plead that (1) the defendants acting
21 under color of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or
22 federal statutes. Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021).
23 Here, Plaintiff references the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,4 as
24 well as his substantive due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. FAC
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3 Unless otherwise noted, all citations include the pagination assigned by the CM/ECF system.
27 4 Plaintiff also appears to rely on the right to equal protection the Supreme Court has identified within
the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013).
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1 ¶¶ 73–74, 83. Accordingly, the Court presumes for the limited purpose of resolving the
2 present motion to dismiss that Plaintiff brings his first and second claims for violations of
3 these constitutional rights, respectively.
4 The Court further presumes that by way of his third and fourth causes of action
5 Plaintiff seeks to bring these two claims pursuant to Monell v. New York City Dep’t of
6 Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Monell provides that a local governmental entity:
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may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees
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or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom,
9 whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be
said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
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entity is responsible under § 1983.
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12 Id. at 694; see also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 417 (2011) (“A municipality or
13 other local government may be liable under [Section 1983] if the governmental body itself
14 ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such
15 deprivation.” (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692)).
16 Here, Plaintiff vaguely titles these two claims “Violation of Constitutional Rights”
17 and references Monell. FAC at 15, 18. The substance of these two claims strongly suggests
18 he is bringing his first two constitutional violation claims pursuant to Monell. See FAC ¶¶
19 94–96 (alleging a custom of inadequately responding as moving force behind violation),
20 110–111 (alleging a custom of harassment as moving force behind violation).
21 With this in mind, the Court turns to the substance of Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
22 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
23 Defendants first ask the Court to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims against the
24 Individual Defendants pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. According to the Individual
25 Defendants, they are immune from suit. Doc. No. 17-1 at 12–16.
26 The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment, with limited
27 exceptions, to prohibit a citizen from suing a state in federal court. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
28 Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669–70. (1999). The Supreme
1 Court has further held that state officials acting within their official capacity are not
2 “persons” within the meaning of § 1983; when a state official is sued their official capacity
3 the suit “is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office” and
4 as such “is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
5 Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Eleventh Amendment immunity also extends to state law
6 claims brought against states and state officials in their official capacities in federal court.
7 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984); Pena v. Gardner,
8 976 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1992); Stanley v. Trustees of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129,
9 1133–34 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes school districts
10 in California from tort claims and claims brought under the Unruh Act and the Education
11 Code). As the Ninth Circuit has aptly explained: “the Eleventh Amendment deprives
12 federal courts [of] jurisdiction to order state actors to comply with state law . . . It is difficult
13 to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state
14 officials on how to conform their conduct to state law.” Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological,
15 Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106) (internal
16 quotation marks omitted); see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
17 363 (2001) (“The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that non-consenting
18 States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court.”). The Ninth Circuit has
19 held that, under California law, school districts are considered state agencies for purposes
20 of the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d
21 248, 254 (9th Cir. 1992).
22 Plaintiff pleads Claims 1–4 and 8–16 against the Individual Defendants. Defendants
23 seem to acknowledge that Plaintiff only names the Individual Defendants in their
24 individual capacities. See Doc. No. 17-1 at 16 (“Here, there is no dispute that the First
25 Amended Complaint sues the individual Defendants in their individual capacities.”); but
26 see id. at 11–12 (“. . . Plaintiff has continued to sue the individual Defendants in their
27 official capacities as employees of the District.”). In any event, a review of the First
28 Amended Complaint reveals that Plaintiff explicitly pleads these claims against the
1 Individual Defendants in their individual—not official—capacities. FAC ¶ 17 (alleging
2 that the Individual Defendants are “sued only in their individual capacity.”). Seemingly
3 recognizing this, Defendants contend that, despite this express language, Plaintiff
4 nevertheless raises these claims against them in their official capacities. The Court
5 disagrees. As the Supreme Court has explained:
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The distinction between individual- and official-capacity suits is paramount
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here. In an official-capacity claim, the relief sought is only nominally against
8 the official and in fact is against the official’s office and thus the sovereign
itself. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U. S. 58, 71 (1989); Dugan
9
v. Rank, 372 U. S. 609, 611, 620-622 (1963). This is why, when officials sued
10 in their official capacities leave office, their successors automatically assume
their role in the litigation. Hafer, 502 U. S. at 25. The real party in interest is
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the government entity, not the named official. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
12 U.S. 651, 663-665 (1974). “Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to
impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under
13
color of state law.” Hafer, 502 U. S. at 25 (emphasis added); see also id., at
14 27-31 (discharged employees entitled to bring personal damages action
against state auditor general); cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
15
Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971). “[O]fficers sued in their personal capacity come
16 to court as individuals,” Hafer, 502 U. S. at 27, and the real party in interest
is the individual, not the sovereign.
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18 Lewis v. Clarke, 581 U.S. 155, 162–63 (2017).
19 Here, there is no indication that Plaintiff intends to sue the offices of the Hanson
20 Principal or RUSD Special Education Director or Superintendent. Stated differently, the
21 real parties in interest here are the Individual Defendants, not their offices. The mere fact
22 that the Individual Defendants were all RUSD employees and acting within those roles
23 does not overcome the fact that Plaintiff seeks to hold them personally liable for their
24 actions taken under color of state law. And it is well-settled that Plaintiff can pursue his
25 claims for damages against them in this manner. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31
26 (1991). Accordingly, because Plaintiff brings his claims against the Individual Defendants
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1 in their individual capacities, they are not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
2 Court therefore DENIES Defendants’ motion on this basis.5
3 B. Qualified Immunity & Absolute Privilege
4 Next, Defendants argue that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified
5 immunity. Doc. No. 17-1 at 16–17. “The Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly . . . stressed the
6 importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage of litigation.'’”
7 Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.
8 224, 227 (1991)). However, the Ninth Circuit has found that “[d]etermining claims of
9 qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage raises special problems for legal decision
10 making,” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018), particularly where the Court
11 is “aided only by the skeletal . . . factual picture sketched out in the complaint,” Kwai Fun
12 Wong v. United States INS, 373 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2004). “When, as here, defendants
13 assert qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is not
14 appropriate unless we can determine, based on the complaint itself, that qualified immunity
15 applies.” O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 936 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted)).
16 Here, the Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to a determination on their
17 qualified immunity defense at this stage of the litigation. Defendants merely set forth the
18 relevant legal standard and do not substantively argue why they should be entitled to a
19 finding of qualified immunity based upon the facts alleged in the First Amended Complaint
20 alone. In light of the scant record before the Court, the Court declines to reach Defendants’
21
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5 To the extent Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against RUSD (Claims 5, 6, and 7)
23 pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, see Doc. No. 17-1 at 19–20, the Court DENIES their motion. Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act (Claim 5), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (Claim 6), and Section
24 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Claim 7) are all examples of Congress’ express abrogation of states’
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (providing that states are not immune
25
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment for violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
26 or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (providing that states are not immune from
suit under the Eleventh Amendment for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
27 1990). Moreover, Defendants repeat their Eleventh Amendment immunity argument elsewhere in their
motion. See Doc. No. 17-1 at 18 (arguing that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims cannot be brought against RUSD
28 and the Individual Defendants pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment).
1 qualified immunity defense at this time. Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 241 F. Supp. 3d
2 959, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d in part, dismissed in part, 897 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2018)
3 (“[I]n many cases it is impossible to determine based on a complaint alone that qualified
4 immunity is warranted. In such circumstances, a court may deny a qualified immunity
5 defense without prejudice and after further factual development a defendant may re-raise
6 the qualified immunity issue at summary judgment or at trial.”) (citation and internal
7 quotation marks omitted). Consequently, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion without
8 prejudice to Defendants renewing their request at summary judgment.
9 Defendants also argue in passing that the Individual Defendants are entitled to
10 absolute privilege. Doc. No 17-1 at 17. However, Defendants provide no legal support for
11 their position that the Individual Defendants’ challenged communications here—if any—
12 are privileged. Both California Civil Code § 47 and Brody v. Montalbano, 87 Cal. App.
13 3d 725, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978), are inapposite as this case does not appear to involve any
14 published or broadcasted communications, and Plaintiff does not claim Defendants
15 defamed him or made any libelous statements. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
16 Defendants’ motion on this basis as well.
17 C. Monell Claims – Claims 3 & 4
18 Defendants also ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Monell claims, arguing that
19 RUSD, as a school district, is not a municipality subject to liability. Doc. No. 17-1 at 18–
20 19. Even assuming that is true, Plaintiff does not bring his Monell claims against RUSD.
21 He only pleads Claims 3 and 4 against the Individual Defendants. FAC at 15, 18. For this
22 reason, Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of these claims.
23 That said, there is simply no legal basis to pursue Monell claims against the
24 Individual Defendants. As discussed above, Monell provides a vehicle for holding a
25 government entity liable when its employees are found to have committed constitutional
26 violations, and “a policy, practice or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving
27 force behind the violation of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d
28 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). Simply stated, a Monell claim may be brought only against a
1 municipality, not an individual acting in their individual capacity. See Guillory v. Orange
2 Cty., 731 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Monell does not concern liability of individuals
3 acting under color of state law.”); see also Robles v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 3:23-cv-00898-
4 JES-BLM, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128996, at *31 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2024); Doe v. Cty.
5 of San Joaquin, No. 2:24-cv-00899 WBS CKD, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140233, at *4 (E.D.
6 Cal. Aug. 6, 2024); Cooper v. City of Fairfield, No. 2:21-cv-01538-JAM-KJN, 2023 U.S.
7 Dist. LEXIS 15238, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2023); Green v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab.,
8 No. 1:23-cv-01108-JLT-SAB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209693, at *29 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22,
9 2023); De Magdaleno v. Cty. of Riverside, No. EDCV 21-2027 (SHKx), 2022 U.S. Dist.
10 LEXIS 101086, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2022); Reason v. City of Richmond, No. 20-cv-
11 01900-WBS-EFB, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6015, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2021);
12 Casandra Pastora v. Cty. of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 21-1410 JGB (SPx), 2021 U.S.
13 Dist. LEXIS 258874, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2021). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks
14 to hold the Individual Defendants liable for the constitutional violations asserted in Claims
15 1 and 2 pursuant to Monell, the Court DISMISSES Claims 3 and 4 with prejudice.
16 D. California’s Ralph Act and Bane Act – Claims 8 & 9
17 Plaintiff’s eighth and ninth claims are for violation of California’s Ralph Civil Rights
18 Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 (“Ralph Act”), and Tom Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal Civ. Code
19 § 52.1 (“Bane Act”), respectively. Defendants move to dismiss these claims, asserting that
20 Plaintiff fails to adequately plead them. Doc. No. 17-1 at 20–21.
21 The Ralph Act broadly provides that “[a]ll persons . . . have the right to be free from
22 any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence committed against their persons or
23 property” on the basis of a variety of protected characteristics, including, as relevant here,
24 race. Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7(b)(1). Intending to supplement the Ralph Act and further deter
25 violence, California later enacted the Bane Act, which imposes liability on a person who
26 “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat,
27 intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals
28 of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured
1 by the Constitution or laws of this state.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). Together, these statutes
2 were enacted to “provide a civil remedy for hate crimes.” D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch.,
3 176 Cal. App. 4th 836, 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009).
4 In order to state a claim under the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must show:
5 (1) that the defendant threatened or committed violent acts against the plaintiff
or his or her property; (2) that a motivating reason for the defendant’s conduct
6
was his or her perception of race (or other protected status); (3) that the
7 plaintiff was harmed; and (4) that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial
factor in causing the plaintiff harm.
8
9 Rodriguez v. Cty. of Contra Costa, No. C 13-02516 SBA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158511,
10 at *17 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2013) (citing Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 57 Cal.
11 Rptr. 3d 454, 470 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).
12 A plaintiff pleading a Bane Act claim must allege: “(1) intentional interference or
13 attempted interference with a state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the
14 interference or attempted interference was by threats, intimidation or coercion.” Allen
15 v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 676 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015)
16 Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead how each Individual Defendant violated
17 these statutes. Doc. No. 17-1 at 20. Defendants also maintain that these claims are not
18 viable because mere negligence is not actionable. Id. at 20–21. While it appears that
19 Plaintiff pleads conduct which, if true, would amount to more than mere negligence, see,
20 e.g., FAC ¶¶ 26, 28, 35, 36, 41, 87 (alleging that the Individual Defendants were aware of
21 the bullying and harassment), ¶¶ 80, 92 (alleging that the Individual Defendants’ inaction
22 and failure to protect was intentional), the Court agrees that Plaintiff’s group pleading is
23 problematic as he does not put each Individual Defendant on notice of how his or her
24 conduct allegedly violated these statutes. With respect to his Bane Act claim, Plaintiff
25 responds to Defendants’ argument by pointing to paragraphs 182–185. Doc. No. 18 at 19.
26 However, these paragraphs are merely a formulaic recitation of the elements of his claim
27 and are utterly devoid of any factual support. And having independently reviewed the First
28 Amended Complaint in its entirety, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to plausibly plead his
1 Bane Act claim. The Court agrees with Plaintiff that retaliatory actions may be sufficient
2 to state a Bane Act claim based upon coercion or intimidation. See Bailey v. Shasta Union
3 High Sch. Dist., No. 2:23-cv-01750-KJM-DMC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210247, at *7
4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2024). However, unlike in Bailey, Plaintiff does not allege that any
5 Individual Defendant retaliated against him for reporting the alleged abuse and assaults.
6 At best, Plaintiff vaguely alleges that “yard duty personnel” punished him for reporting the
7 discrimination and harassment, “going so far as to deprive him of his recess time.” FAC ¶
8 47. Assuming this amounts to retaliation that could plausibly support a finding of coercion
9 or intimidation, Plaintiff does not plead that any Individual Defendant deprived him of his
10 recess time. Nor does Plaintiff plead who these individuals on yard duty are and why the
11 Individual Defendants should be held liable for their allegedly retaliatory conduct. To that
12 end, Plaintiff pleads that the suggestion by his IEP team, which included Defendants Beyer
13 and Rogers, id. ¶ 43, that Plaintiff be removed from recess was rejected by Plaintiff’s
14 parents, id. ¶ 44. And, according to Plaintiff himself, his IEP team “suggested that Plaintiff
15 should immediately report any bullying to school administrators,” id. ¶ 44, which he
16 seemingly had not done, id. ¶ 51. These allegations do not plausibly support a finding that
17 the Individual Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff for reporting the alleged
18 discrimination and harassment. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
19 motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim.
20 As to his Ralph Act claim, the Court similarly finds that Plaintiff fails to plausibly
21 plead that the Individual Defendants threatened to commit or actually committed acts of
22 violence against him.
23 According to Plaintiff, the Individual Defendants:
24 subjected him to violence and fear of violence by failing to protect him from
harassment and assault (including by failing to provide proper supervision)
25
and refusing to take corrective action after being on notice of the harassment
26 and abuse, thus enabling the violence, bullying, and harassment to continue
and escalate unabated.
27
Doc. No. 18 at 19.
28
1 Even assuming that is true, Plaintiff does not explain how “enabling the violence”
2 of other students plausibly amounts to a threat of violence or the commission of actual
3 violence. Stated differently, Plaintiff does not argue that Ralph Act liability can be imputed
4 on the Individual Defendants based upon another student’s violent acts. And while
5 respondeat superior and ratification might permit liability against an employer for
6 California law civil rights violations, see Vasquez v. Ramos, 2025 Cal. Super. LEXIS
7 43898, *12 (Cal. Sup. Ct. July 30, 2025) (“Courts have applied principles of ratification
8 and respondeat superior to these civil rights statutes.”), Plaintiff does not persuasively
9 argue that these principles should apply in the school administrator-student context.
10 Plaintiff first relies on three district court cases that involved violence in the prison
11 setting, claims of deliberate indifference, and in one case, supervisory liability. See
12 Armstead v. Cty. of Alameda, No. 21-cv-05257-LB, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54807, at *25-
13 26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2022) (“Here, the plaintiffs similarly pleaded deliberate indifference
14 and the allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the Bane Act.”); Luttrell v. Hart,
15 No. 5:19-cv-07300-EJD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173856, at *15–16 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 22,
16 2020) (“[I]f a plaintiff adequately pleads a claim for deliberate indifference, which requires
17 a pleading of reckless disregard, then he has sufficiently alleged the intent required for the
18 Bane Act claim.”); see also Johnson v. Baca, No. CV 13-04496 MMM (AJWx), 2014 U.S.
19 Dist. LEXIS 196976, at *45 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2014) (declining to dismiss Ralph Act and
20 Bane Act claims absent such “authority holding that a Ralph or Bane Act claim cannot be
21 asserted against a sheriff as a supervisor for his role in promoting the use or threat of
22 violence against a plaintiff”). These cases are inapposite, and Plaintiff fails to meaningfully
23 argue otherwise.
24 Plaintiff also relies on Black Lives Matter-Stockton Chapter v. San Joaquin Cty.
25 Sheriff’s Office, 398 F. Supp. 3d 660, 679 (E.D. Cal. 2019), in support of his position that
26 the Individual Defendants can be held liable because they “made him feel extremely fearful
27 for his safety and vulnerable to continued abuse.” Doc. No. 18 at 23. But in Black Lives
28 Matter-Stockton Chapter, the plaintiffs’ Ralph Act claim was not viable merely because
1 they pleaded the defendants made them fear for their safety but also because numerous
2 unnamed defendants physically chased them and engaged in “menacing and threatening
3 conduct” and because of this, the court allowed the plaintiff’s Ralph Act claim to proceed
4 against these doe defendants, specifically. 398 F. Supp. 3d at 679. Here, there are no
5 allegations that any Individual Defendant engaged in threatening or menacing behavior.
6 Similarly, Stallworth v. Nike Retail Services, does not aid Plaintiff, as the Individual
7 Defendants are not alleged to have chased him or engaged in threatening conduct. No.
8 2:20-cv-05985-VAP-GJSx, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 243299, at *34 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
9 2021). As such, absent allegations of other threatening or menacing conduct, the mere
10 allegation that the Individual Defendants caused Plaintiff to feel fearful is insufficient to
11 state a Ralph Act claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and
12 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Ralph Act claim.
13 E. California Education Code § 220 – Claim 10
14 Plaintiff’s tenth claim is for discrimination in violation of California Education Code
15 § 220, and he pleads this claim against the Individual Defendants. California Education
16 Code § 220 prohibits, as relevant here, “discrimination on the basis of . . . race . . . in any
17 program or activity conducted by an educational institution that receives, or benefits from,
18 state financial assistance.” Cal. Educ. Code § 220. An “[e]ducational institution” is
19 defined as “a public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school or institution;
20 the governing board of a school district; or any combination of school districts or counties
21 recognized as the administrative agency for public elementary or secondary schools.” Cal.
22 Educ. Code § 210.3.
23 The Defendants are not an educational institution and therefore cannot be held liable
24 under § 220. See E.M. v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., No. 24-cv-07397-NW, 2025 U.S. Dist.
25 LEXIS 129681, at *19 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2025) (citing Donovan v. Poway Unified Sch.
26 Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 296 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)). Plaintiffs seemingly concede
27 this as their opposition is devoid of argument on this point. Consequently, the Court
28
1 GRANTS Defendants’ motion and DISMISSES Claim 10 against the Individual
2 Defendants with prejudice.
3 F. Assault and Battery – Claim 11
4 Next, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff eleventh claim, for assault and battery
5 against the Individual Defendants. Plaintiff does not plead that any Individual Defendant
6 physically touched him. Instead, the dispute here turns on whether Plaintiff may maintain
7 his claim against the Individual Defendants based upon their alleged ratification of the
8 attacks by other students. See Doc. No. 18 at 25. Plaintiff appears to be correct that
9 ratification is a valid theory of intentional tort liability in California. See Rakestraw v.
10 Rodrigues, 104 Cal. Rptr. 57, 60–61 (Cal. 1972) (“Ratification is the voluntary election by
11 a person to adopt in some manner as his own an act which was purportedly done on his
12 behalf by another person, the effect of which, as to some or all persons, is to treat the act
13 as if originally authorized by him.”); see also, e.g., C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 87 Cal.
14 Rptr. 3d 424, 437 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“As an alternate theory to respondeat superior, an
15 employer may be liable for an employee’s act where the employer either authorized the
16 tortious act or subsequently ratified an originally unauthorized tort.”); Cisco Sys. v. Wilson
17 Chung, 462 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Garcia ex rel. Marin v.
18 Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“Ratification
19 applies to intentional torts like battery, assault, and false imprisonment.”)). However,
20 again, Plaintiff does not explain how or why this theory of liability should apply in the
21 school administrator-student context. Nor does he cite any applicable authority in support
22 of such a position. Cf. Benthin v. Washoe Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:24-cv-00428-ART-CSD,
23 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185543, at *21 (D. Nev. Sep. 19, 2025) (reviewing Nevada state
24 law). Rather, the two cases Plaintiff relies on involved an employer’s liability for
25 ratification of its employee’s torts. See Baptist v. Robinson, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 153, 167 (Cal.
26 Ct. App. 2006); see also Amini v. Cnty. of Ventura, C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:22-cv-05420-
27
28
1 DSF-ADS, ECF Doc. No.140. Absent any authority showing that the Individual
2 Defendants, as school administrators, can be held liable for the intentional torts of their
3 students under a theory of ratification, the Court finds that this claim is not actionable as
4 pleaded. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion and DISMISSES Claim
5 11.
6 G. Intention Infliction of Emotional Distress – Claim 12
7 Plaintiff’s twelfth claim is for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).
8 Defendants argue that it is well-settled that there is no common law tort liability for public
9 entities in California; municipal tort liability must be based on statute. See Miklosy v.
10 Regents of Univ. of Cal., 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 690, 708 (Cal. 2008) (“[S]ection 815 abolishes
11 common law tort liability for public entities.”). Pursuant to California Government Code
12 § 815, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is not liable for an
13 injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public
14 employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov. Code § 815(a); see also Becerra v. Cnty. of
15 Santa Cruz, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (“In California, all government
16 tort liability must be based on statute.”) (citing Cal. Gov. Code § 815); In re Groundwater
17 Cases, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“Of course there is no common law
18 tort liability for public entities in California; such liability is wholly statutory.”).
19 However, Plaintiff pleads his IIED claim against the Individual Defendants. And
20 California Government Code § 820 provides that “a public employee is liable for injury
21 caused by his act or omission to the same extent as a private person.” Cal. Gov. Code
22 § 820(a); C.B. v. Moreno Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 544 F. Supp. 3d 973, 986 (C.D. Cal.
23 2021) (“A public employee can be held liable for an injury caused by their act or omission
24 ‘to the same extent as a private person.’”) (quoting Cal. Gov. Code § 820(a)).
25
26
6 It appears that Plaintiff cites to a Supplemental Summary Judgment Order available on the docket in a
27 Central District case but not otherwise available on the legal research databases.
28
1 Consequently, Plaintiff’s IIED claim is not subject to dismissal on this basis and for this
2 reason, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion.
3 H. Negligence Per Se – Claim 13
4 Plaintiff’s thirteenth claim is for negligence per se in violation of California Penal
5 Code § 11166. Defendants argue that this section of the California Penal Code sets forth
6 an evidentiary presumption, not a private right of action. Doc. No. 17-1 at 22. Under
7 California law, negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine not an independent cause of
8 action. See, e.g., Jones v. Awad, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 596, 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019)
9 (“Negligence per se is an evidentiary doctrine, rather than an independent cause of action.”)
10 (citing Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 245 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)). “[I]t
11 operates to establish a presumption of negligence for which the statute serves the subsidiary
12 function of providing evidence of an element of a preexisting common law cause of
13 action.” Quiroz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244. As such, the doctrine creates a presumption of
14 negligence if the plaintiff shows four elements:
15 (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation; (2) the violation
proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the death or
16
injury resulted from an occurrence the nature of which the statute, ordinance,
17 or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the death
or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for
18
whose protn the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.
19
Cal. Evid. Code § 669(a); Alcala v. Vazmar Corp., 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 407 (Cal. Ct. App.
20
2008); Quiroz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244. “Even if the four requirements . . . are satisfied,
21
this alone does not entitle a plaintiff to a presumption of negligence in the absence of an
22
underlying negligence action.” Quiroz, 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244.
23
Plaintiff elsewhere pleads a common law claim for negligence (Claim 16). Thus,
24
Plaintiff’s Claim 13 for negligence by proof of violation of California Penal Code § 11166
25
would appear to be subsumed by Plaintiff’s general negligence claim. Nevertheless, the
26
Court is not convinced Plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed. Despite the clear authority
27
explaining that negligence per se is not an independent cause of action, it appears to be also
28
1 true that some courts in California have nevertheless permitted a claim entitled negligence
2 per se to proceed. See, e.g., Garcia v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1187,
3 1205 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“It has been held that Penal Code § 11166(a) may form the basis
4 of a negligence per se claim.”) (citing Alejo v. City of Alhambra, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1180,
5 1185–95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s thirteenth claim is an
6 alternative theory of liability for common law negligence, the Court declines to dismiss
7 this claim. For this reason, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion.
8 I. Punitive Damages
9 Defendants also ask the Court to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages.
10 Doc. No. 17-1 at 23–24. In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, Plaintiff
11 must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, California Civil
12 Code § 3294. These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been
13 guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. See Cal. Civ. Code, § 3294(a). To prove malice,
14 Plaintiff must show the Individual Defendants’ conduct was despicable, or circumstances
15 that are “base,” “vile,” or “contemptible.” Id. (“The statute plainly indicates that absent an
16 intent to injure the plaintiff, . . . the additional component of ‘despicable conduct’ must be
17 found.”); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c). “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that
18 subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s
19 rights.” Id. § 3294(c)(2). “‘Fraud’ is ‘an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
20 concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the
21 defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing
22 injury.’” Id. § 3294(c)(3).
23 Plaintiff argues that he sufficiently pleads facts that demonstrate the Individual
24 Defendants acted with the requisite malice and oppression. Doc. No. 18 at 27. The Court
25 agrees. Accepting the facts in the First Amended Complaint as true, the Individual
26 Defendants were repeatedly informed over a period of approximately two years that
27 Plaintiff was being subjected to pervasive racial bullying and physical attacks by his peers
28 and that they failed to take any steps to protect Plaintiff or otherwise deter the other
1 |}students’ abuse. This is sufficient, at this stage, to pursue punitive damages under
2 || California law. For this reason, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion.
3 IV. CONCLUSION
4 Based upon the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ motion to
5 || dismiss. Consistent with the discussion above, the Court DISMISSES Claims 3, 4, and 10
6 || against the Individual Defendants with prejudice. The Court further DISMISSES Claims
7 2, 8, 9, and 11 with leave to amend. Defendant’s motion as to Claims 5, 6, and 7 1s
8 || DENIED, and those claims survive. If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended pleading, he
9 ||must do so on or before April 6, 2026. Defendants may then respond within the time
10 || prescribed by Rule 15. Any claim not re-alleged and any defendant not named in the third
11 |}amended complaint will be considered waived. See CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc.
12 ||v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989); Lacey v. Maricopa
13 || Caty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that after dismissal with leave to amend,
14 || claims may be “considered waived if not repled’”).
15 IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 ||Dated: March 6, 2026
17
19
20 Honorable Benjamin J. Cheeks
United States District Judge
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