Whitfield

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

CALEB WHITFIELD, Case No. 3:24-cv-252

Plaintiff, Rose, J

Litkovitz, M.J.

vs.

CORRECTIONS OFFICER RUNYAN, et al., REPORT AND

Defendants. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Caleb Whitfield, an inmate at the Toledo Correctional Institution (ToCI) in

Toledo, Ohio, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil rights

while he was a pretrial detainee at the Montgomery County Jail (MCJ) in Dayton, Ohio. (Doc.

1). This matter is before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendants

Corrections Officer Runyan (“CO Runyan”) and Montgomery County Board of Commissioners

(“MCBC”). (Doc. 33). On December 4, 2025, the Clerk issued a Notice To Pro Se Plaintiff(s)

Upon Filing By Defendant(s) of Motion(s) For Summary Judgment, which alerted plaintiff to his

21-day deadline to respond to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 34). Plaintiff

did not file a response to the summary judgment motion and instead filed an untimely motion to

continue discovery. (Doc. 37). The Court denied that motion but granted plaintiff a further

extension of time of 21 days to respond to the motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 41).

Plaintiff has not filed any response in opposition to defendants’ motion, and the time for doing so

has expired. This matter is also before the Court on plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint

(Doc. 43) and defendants’ memorandum in opposition (Doc. 44). Plaintiff did not file a reply.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. Background

Plaintiff alleges that on February 16, 2022, five defendants subjected him to excessive

force in an elevator following his refusal to comply with an order, causing lacerations to his

wrists and repeated blows to his groin, and that the incident was never documented. (Doc. 1, at

PageID 5-6). Plaintiff further alleges that shortly after filing a grievance regarding that incident,

defendants Runyan, Deputy John Doe No. 3, and Sergeant Eaton retaliated against him by

forcing him into a filthy cell, physically assaulting him, and systematically intercepting and

denying his subsequent grievances. (Id. at PageID 6-7). Finally, plaintiff alleges that Captain

Stephens was aware of the misconduct but failed to intervene, that Jail policy requiring body-

camera escorts was disregarded during both incidents, and that the Jail maintains an institutional

custom of tolerating and acquiescing to the use of excessive force. (Id. at PageID 9-10). In its

Order and Report and Recommendation screening plaintiff’s unverified complaint, the Court

allowed the following claims to proceed:

1. Defendant Deputies John Doe Nos. 1 and 2 used excessive force and improperly

allowed defendant APA Officers (John Doe No. 1, John Doe No. 2, and APA

Officer Jane Doe) to intervene in the use of force in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment1;

2. Defendant APA Officers improperly intervened and used excessive force in

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment;

3. Defendant Runyon used excessive force in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment;

4. Deputy John Doe No. 3 used excessive force by pointing a taser to plaintiff’s

head and failed to intervene to protect plaintiff in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment;

5. Excessive-force claims against the MCBC under Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

1 On March 24, 2026, the District Judge adopted the undersigned’s report and recommendation (Doc. 40) to deny

plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint to identify and substitute Gabriel Fragasse and Gregory Staten for

Deputies John Doe Nos. 1 and 2 (Doc. 29). (Doc. 42).

(Doc. 10 at PageID 21, 26-27).

Defendants CO Runyon and MCBC moved for summary judgment on these remaining

claims. (Doc. 33). Plaintiff failed to respond and therefore fails to offer any evidence or

argument to support his claims.2 The only evidence before the Court, submitted by defendants,

is CO Runyon’s affidavit.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the court

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled

to summary judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, All U.S.

317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). “[A] party

seeking summary judgment . . . bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of

the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323.

See also Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 1982). The

movant may do so by merely identifying that the non-moving party lacks evidence to support an

essential element of its case. See Barnhart v. Pickrel, Shaeffer & Ebeling Co. L.P.A., 12 F.3d

1382, 1389 (6th Cir. 1993).

The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment “may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (quoting First Nat. ‘l Bank of

Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968)). In response to a properly supported

2 Filings verified as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1746 have the same force and effect as affidavits for purposes of

responding to a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605

(6th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Browman, 981 F.2d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff’s complaint, however, is

unverified.

summary judgment motion, the non-moving party “is required to present some significant

probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the

dispute at trial.” 60 Ivy Street Corp. v. Alexander, 822 F.2d 1432, 1435 (6th Cir.1987) (quoting

First Nat’l Bank, 391 U.S. at 288-89).

The movant bears the burden of demonstrating that no material facts are in dispute. See

Guarino, 980 F.2d at 410. The non-moving party’s failure to respond to the motion does not

lessen the burden on either the moving party or the court to demonstrate that summary judgment

is appropriate. Mongan v. Lykins, No. 1:09-cv-00626, 2010 WL 2900409, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July

21, 2010) (citing Guarino, 980 F.2d at 410; Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-455 (6th Cir.

1991)). The reviewing court must:

review carefully those portions of the submitted evidence designated by the moving

party. The Court will not, however, sua sponte comb the record from [the non-

moving party’s] perspective. Instead, the Court may reasonably rely on [the

movant’s] unrebutted recitation of the evidence, or pertinent portions thereof, in

reaching a conclusion that certain evidence and inferences from evidence

demonstrate facts which are uncontroverted. If such evidence supports a

conclusion that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the Court should

determine that [the movant] ha[s] carried [his] burden. . . .

Mongan, 2010 WL 2900409, at *3 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

III. Evidence Presented

Affidavit of CO Runyan

Defendants present the affidavit of CO Runyan in support of their motion for

summary judgment. Because it is the only evidence before the Court, the Court includes

the contents of this affidavit in its entirety:

I, David Runyan, being under oath or affirmation, state based on my personal

knowledge. I am a resident of Montgomery County, Ohio, who is of adult age and

sound mind. I currently work for the Montgomery County Sheriff[’]s Office

(“MCSO”) as a Corrections Officer in the Montgomery County Jail. I have held

this position since July 16, 2018. I have been employed by MCSO since July 16,

2018.

From July 16, 2018 to present, I have been a Corrections Officer at the Montgomery

County Jail in Dayton, Ohio. As a Corrections Officer at the Jail, I have been

primarily assigned to housing or Specialty positions. One of my responsibilities is

transporting inmates from different locations within the Jail.

On February 17, 2022, at approximately 0530 Hours, Sgt Eaton authorized the

transfer of Inmate Caleb Whitfield from Alpha Pod cell 201 to cell 211. Corrections

Officer Harrison and I were assigned to move Inmate Whitfield. We instructed

Whitfield to pack up his belongings and told him he was being relocated. Deputy

Madrid arrived in the pod to assist. He was then placed into handcuffs and escorted

to cell 211. Upon entering the door of the cell, Whitfield refused to go in willingly.

After several attempts to talk him into going into the cell and explaining to him that

this was a direct order, he was still refusing to go in. At that time, I attempted to

take control of his arm to escort him into the cell. Whitfield rapidly turned toward

us and attempted to charge at us. Officer Harrison and I were able to use our

combined efforts to take control of his arms and using our momentum, we were

able to escort him into the cell and onto his stomach so that the hand restraints could

be removed. We removed the handcuffs and ordered Whitfield to stay on the

ground so that we could safely exit the cell.

We exited the cell and as we were closing the door, he jumped up off the ground

and attempted to charge out of the cell. However, we were able to secure the door

before he could break through. At no point during the altercation did he hit his

head, had punches thrown at him or had a taser pointed at his head. There is also

no record of him ever complaining of any injuries or that these accusations ever

took place after the incident occurred.

(Runyan Aff., Doc. 33-1 at PageID 126-28).

IV. Analysis

A. Defendant CO Runyan

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits any person “under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” from depriving a United States citizen “of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and laws.” Excessive force claims can be

resolved under the Fourth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, depending on the plaintiff’s status

at the time of the incident. Coley v. Lucas Cnty., Ohio, 799 F.3d 530, 537 (6th Cir. 2015).

“While the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures bars excessive force

against free citizens, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment bars

excessive force against convicted persons.” Hopper v. Plummer, 887 F.3d 744, 751 (6th Cir.

2018) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 318-19). The

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause governs a pretrial detainee’s claims of excessive

force and prohibits all “punishment.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397-98, 400

(2015) (“pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all”; the Eighth

Amendment, in contrast, prohibits only punishment that is “cruel and unusual.”). The inquiry

under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment is “whether the plaintiff has shown that the ‘force

purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.’” Hopper v. Plummer,

887 F.3d 744, 752 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397) (noting that the test “under

either amendment,” requires the court to “employ the same objective test for excessive force”).

In contrast, under the Eighth Amendment, a convicted prisoner “must satisfy both an objective

and a subjective component” to make out an excessive-force claim. Hopper, 887 F.3d at 752

(citing Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)).

As plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in February 2022, the Fourteenth Amendment governs

the Court’s analysis of his excessive force claims. The Fourteenth Amendment standard “is

solely an objective one.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. To establish his claims against CO Runyan,

plaintiff must show that the force used by defendant Runyan was purposeful or knowing (as

opposed to accidental) and was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. Determining whether the force

used against plaintiff was objectively unreasonable, the Court must examine CO Runyan’s use of

force “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew

at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. The Court must also consider the

“legitimate interests that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the

individual is detained. . . .” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540, 547 (1979)).

Factors relevant to the objective reasonableness of force applied include the following

non-exhaustive list:

the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used;

the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to

limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.

Id. at 397.

CO Runyan has asserted qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s excessive force claim, which

“shields officers from damages suits unless their conduct ‘violate[d] clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Clark v. Abdallah,

131 F.4th 432, 444 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

Qualified immunity not only insulates government officials from individual liability for money

damages, but also from the burdens and expenses of litigation and trial. Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Once

a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense to a claimed constitutional violation, the plaintiff

must satisfy a two-pronged analysis: (1) Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

the injury, do the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and

(2) if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of plaintiff’s submissions, was the right

clearly established at the time of the injury. Id. at 201. The Court may address these questions

in any order. Pearson, 555 U.S. 223.

When a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of

showing that defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649,

653 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 623 (6th Cir. 2012)). The

qualified immunity analysis “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not

as a broad general proposition. . . .” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. Showing that a right is clearly

established “do[es] not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed

the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Gradisher v. City of Akron, 794 F.3d

574, 583 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Clearly-

established law for qualified immunity purposes must be defined specifically and not “at a high

level of generality.” Clark, 131 F.4th at 452 (quoting Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 742). “Our focus

must be on ‘whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established . . . in light

of the specific context of the case.’” Id. (quoting Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907, 934 (6th

Cir. 2019)).

It is undisputed that the use of force at issue occurred while plaintiff was being

transferred from one cell to another. (Runyan Aff., Doc. 33-1 at PageID 127; see also Doc. 1 at

PageID 6). According to CO Runyan’s affidavit, upon arrival at the new cell, plaintiff initially

refused to enter.3 (Runyan Aff., Doc. 33-1 at PageID 127). CO Runyan states he first attempted

to resolve the situation through verbal commands before “tak[ing] control of [plaintiff’s] arm to

escort him into his cell.” (Id.). CO Runyan states that plaintiff turned quickly toward him and

another officer and charged toward them. (Id.). CO Runyan states that he and the other officer

“escort[ed] him into the cell and onto his stomach” so that CO Runyan could remove Plaintiff’s

handcuffs. (Id.). CO Runyan then states they removed plaintiff’s handcuffs and ordered him to

remain on the ground until they could safely exit the cell. (Id.).

Defendants argue that CO Runyan is entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff has

not established sufficient facts to show that CO Runyan’s use of force was excessive or that it

3 Defendants additionally argue that “[p]laintiff admitted to being disruptive and argumentative,” but do not cite to

any evidence in the record to support that assertion. (Doc. 33 at PageID 121).

was employed maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.4 (Doc. 33 at PageID 120-21).

Defendants argue that CO Runyan’s actions were not unreasonable, or excessive, and were

intended to maintain order and control plaintiff. (Id. at PageID 122).

“In response to a properly supported summary judgment motion, the non-moving party

‘is required to present some significant probative evidence which makes it necessary to resolve

the parties’ differing versions of the dispute at trial.” Maston v. Montgomery Cnty. Jail Med.

Staff Pers., 832 F. Supp. 2d 846, 849 (S.D. Ohio 2011) (quoting 60 Ivy Street Corp., 822 F.2d at

1435). Here, plaintiff has not responded to defendants’ motion for summary judgment nor

provided any evidence to raise a genuine question of fact regarding whether the force used

against him was excessive. The need for some degree of force was present, based upon evidence

in the record. Defendants have provided an affidavit from CO Runyan explaining that the force

used was in response to plaintiff’s refusal to follow orders. (Runyan Aff., Doc. 33-1 at PageID

127). A handcuffed detainee refusing to enter a cell and then attempting to charge officers

presents a meaningful, if not extreme, security concern. Maintaining order during cell transfers

is a routine but essential function of jail operations, and an inmate who physically resists such a

transfer and attempts to charge officers elevates that concern significantly.

CO Runyan made several attempts to verbally persuade plaintiff to comply before

resorting to physical force. Force was applied only after those efforts failed and plaintiff

attempted to charge the officers. This course of conduct indicates that the officers exercised

some degree of restraint before escalating to physical control. The force used—controlling

plaintiff’s arms and guiding him to the ground—appears proportionate to the immediate need

4 Defendants also discuss the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment excessive-use-of-force test; however,

only the objective test is considered in cases of pretrial detention. (Doc. 33 at PAGEID 120). See Kingsley, 576

U.S. at 397.

presented by a resisting, charging detainee. Further, plaintiff has presented no evidence in

response to defendants’ motion documenting injuries sustained as a result of that force. (Runyan

Aff., Doc. 33-1 at PageID 127). Cf. Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014)

(“Corrections officers do not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights when they apply

force ‘in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.’”) (quoting Jennings v. Mitchell, 93

Fed. App’x 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Stoudemire v. Mich. Dept.

of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 2013) (“In evaluating if a defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity, the Court must adopt the plaintiff’s version of the facts . . . unless the plaintiff’s

version is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.”), the

Court finds plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether CO Runyan

used excessive force against plaintiff. As explained above, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate

that CO Runyan violated a constitutional right. Accordingly, CO Runyan is entitled to qualified

immunity on plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive use of force claim.

B. Defendant MCBC

As it relates to MCBC, plaintiff alleges that “[d]ue to the custom of tolerance and/or

acquiescence to excessive force and/or assaultive behavior allowed by the county, MCJ staff felt

they could do whatever they want, whenever they want, to whomever they want irrespective of

the United States Constitution.” (Doc. 1 at PageID 9). Plaintiff alleges that this “custom of

tolerance and/or acquiescence” was evidenced by defendants “tolerating and attempting to

maintain a code of silence about staff misconduct[]” and failing to ensure the alleged use of force

against plaintiff was documented and investigated. (Doc. 1 at PageID 9-10).

Defendants argue that the MCBC should be dismissed from this action because it had no

authority over the policies or operations of the Montgomery County Jail, and that such authority

rests exclusively with the county sheriff. (Doc. 33 at PageID 123). Because the sheriff is

unnamed in this action, defendant contends that plaintiff’s Monell claims against the MCBC

must be dismissed. (Id. at PageID 122-23). Defendants further argue that any claim regarding

conditions at a county jail is properly asserted against the party with authority over those

conditions and the power to redress them, in this case the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office

(MCSO). (Id. at PageID 123).

Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against the MCBC are properly understood as claims

against Montgomery County itself. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (“[A]n

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.”). In Monell, 436 U.S. 658, the Supreme Court held that a government entity may be held

liable under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent an official policy,

inflicts the injury. . . .” Id. at 694. To succeed on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must establish “(1)

that a violation of a federal right took place, (2) that the defendants acted under color of state

law, and (3) that a municipality’s policy or custom caused that violation to happen.” Bright v.

Gallia Cnty., 753 F.3d 639, 660 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439

(6th Cir. 2008)). A municipality may be held liable where it was the “moving force” behind the

alleged constitutional deprivation but not where it had “the mere right to control without any

control or direction having been exercised and without any failure to supervise. . . .” Monell, 436

U.S. at 694 & n.58 (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). See also Ridgeway v.

Union Cnty. Comm’rs, 775 F. Supp. 1105, 1110 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (Smith, J.) (“[T]he liability of

supervisory personnel and government entities must be based on more than merely the right to

control.”).

In this case, summary judgment should be granted for the MCBC. Plaintiff has failed to

establish a genuine issue of fact as to whether defendant Runyan used excessive force against

him. As plaintiff has failed to establish a Fourteenth Amendment claim against defendant

Runyan, the MCBC cannot be held liable under Monell as the violation of a constitutional right

is a pre-requisite for Monell liability. Bright, 753 F.3d at 660. Thus, “it does not matter whether

that action was taken pursuant to a policy or custom adopted by the Board or the Commission.”

Id. Therefore, defendant MCBC’s motion for summary judgment should be granted.

MOTION TO AMEND

The granting or denial of a motion to amend pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) is within

the discretion of the trial court. Leave to amend complaint should be liberally granted. Foman v.

Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962). The Court should consider factors such as undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, the repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, lack of notice to the opposing party, undue prejudice to the

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, and futility of amendment. Id. See

also Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Centers, Inc., 427 F.3d 996, 1001 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Coe

v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 341-42 (6th Cir. 1998); Brooks v. Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 130 (6th Cir.

1994)). “Ordinarily, delay alone, does not justify denial of leave to amend.” Morse v.

McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 2002). “At some point, however, ‘delay will become

‘undue,’ placing an unwarranted burden on the court, or will become ‘prejudicial,’ placing an

unfair burden on the opposing party.” Id. (quoting Adams v. Gould, 739 F.2d 858, 863 (3d Cir.

1984)).

On April 6, 2026, plaintiff filed a motion to amend his complaint to add spoliation and

civil conspiracy claims and name six new defendants stemming from the February 16, 2022

incident forming the basis of this lawsuit. (Doc. 43). He alleges that “since it became clear the

plaintiff would not get discovery continued the plaintiff now appropriately requests to amend his

complaint. . . .” (Doc. 43 at PageID 188). Plaintiff appears to allege that the new defendants

failed to properly document the February 16, 2022 incident or retain alleged video evidence of

the incident. He further alleges he did not “have knowledge of these facts” until November 10

through November 30, 2025 “upon receiving the discovery from the defendants.” (Id. at PageID

187).

Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint should be denied because his unjustified delay

in seeking to amend his complaint at this late stage of the litigation would unfairly prejudice

defendants. Plaintiff has failed to justify his failure to seek an amendment earlier in these

proceedings. First, discovery in this case closed on November 4, 2025, and the dispositive

motion deadline was set as December 4, 2025. Those case deadlines have long since passed, and

plaintiff should have identified any new claims or injuries before those dates, especially before

defendants filed their summary judgment motion.

Plaintiff claims he did not receive discovery related to his new claims and new

defendants until November 2025. This argument, however, has already been considered and

rejected. When plaintiff raised the same issue in his prior motion to compel (Doc. 26) and

motion to continue discovery (Doc. 27), the Court denied both motions based on defendants’

unrefuted evidence that all the allegedly missing discovery had been produced on September 26,

2025. (Doc. 30.)

Plaintiff’s effort to blame defendants for his own delay is unavailing. His motion to

amend was filed nearly four months after defendants moved for summary judgment — a delay

that rests squarely on plaintiff’s shoulders. It is plaintiff’s obligation to diligently prosecute his

own lawsuit, and his pro se status does not excuse that obligation.

Likewise, by his own admission, plaintiff is seeking to amend his complaint and restart

the discovery process “since it became clear the plaintiff would not get discovery continued” in

this matter. Plaintiff’s previous requests for an extension of the discovery deadline were denied.

(Docs. 30, 41). The instant motion to amend appears to be a backdoor attempt to reopen

discovery in contravention of this Court’s rulings.

In addition, permitting amendment at this late stage unfairly prejudices defendants.

Defendants have filed a summary judgment motion and have supported their arguments with

evidence. Despite being granted an extension of time to respond to the motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 41), plaintiff did not file a memorandum in opposition and instead filed a motion

to amend the complaint. Allowing an amendment now would require the Court to re-open

discovery and further extend the dispositive motion deadline. Allowing plaintiff to amend his

complaint at this late date would prejudice defendants by requiring them to expend additional

resources on discovery and dispositive motions, further prolonging the resolution of this case.

See Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 662-63 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Tokio Marine & Fire Ins.

Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 786 F.2d 101, 103 (2d Cir. 1986)). As plaintiff fails to justify

waiting until after discovery was closed and after defendants filed their summary judgment

motion to seek leave to amend his complaint, his motion to amend should be denied. See Wade

v. Knoxville Util. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (when seeking to amend at a late stage

in litigation, the movant has “an increased burden to show justification for failing to move

earlier”).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 33) be GRANTED.

2. Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint (Doc. 43) be DENIED.

3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an

appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in

good faith. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on

other grounds, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).

Date: 4/27/2026 Foun, Xethov

Karen L. Litkovitz

United States Magistrate Judge

15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

CALEB WHITFIELD, Case No. 3:24-cv-252

Plaintiff, Rose, J

Litkovitz, M.J.

vs.

CORRECTIONS OFFICER RUNYAN, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on

timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected

to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report

and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).