The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 EDWARDO STULTZ, Case No.: 3:25-cv-2840-AJB-DDL
CDCR #AR-0732,
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ORDER:
Plaintiff,
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vs. (1) GRANTING MOTION TO
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PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
15 [Doc. No. 2] AND
CALIFORNIA DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS
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AND REHABILITATION, CALIPATRIA, (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT
17 CALIPATRIA WARDEN, CALIPATRIA WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR
MEDICAL STAFF, CENTINELA, FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM
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CENTINELA WARDEN, CENTINELA PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§
19 MEDICAL STAFF, JOHN DOES, et al., 1915(e)(2)(B) AND 1915A(b)
JANE DOES, et al.,
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Defendants.
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23 I. INTRODUCTION
24 Edwardo Stultz (“Stultz” or “Plaintiff”), a state inmate proceeding pro se, has filed
25 a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a Motion to Proceed In
26 Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 1; 2.) In his Complaint, Stultz alleges Defendants
27 violated his civil rights by failing to protect him, requiring him to take COVID tests which
28 were improperly administered, and tampering with his mail. (See Doc. No. 1.) For the
1 reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Stultz’s IFP motion and DISMISSES the
2 Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
3 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).
4 II. IFP MOTION
5 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the
6 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
7 $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay the entire
8 fee at the time of filing only if the court grants the plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant
9 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007);
10 cf. Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an]
11 IFP application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the
12 fee[s] [a]re paid.”).
13 To proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of
14 all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account
15 statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding
16 the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1), (2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,
17 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Using this financial information, the court “assess[es] and when funds
18 exist, collect[s], … an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the average
19 monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the
20 prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly
21 payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s
22 account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1)–(2)). In short, while
23 prisoners may qualify to proceed IFP without having to pay the full statutory filing upfront,
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26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See
27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.
Dec. 1, 2023). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
28 IFP. Id.
1 they remain obligated to pay the full amount due in monthly payments. See Bruce v.
2 Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281
3 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
4 In support of his IFP Motion, Stultz provided a copy of his Prison Certificate and
5 trust account, which reflect an average monthly balance of $85.25, average monthly
6 deposits of $71.66; and an available account balance of $0.00. (Doc. No. 3 at 4.)
7 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Stultz’s’s IFP motion and assesses no initial payment.
8 Stultz will be required to pay the full $350 filing fee in installments which will be collected
9 from his trust account as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
10 II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)
11 A. Standard of Review
12 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), the Court must screen a
13 prisoner’s IFP complaint and sua sponte dismiss it to the extent that it is frivolous,
14 malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See
15 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Rhodes v. Robinson,
16 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010). “The standard for determining whether Plaintiff has
17 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
18 same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”
19 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint
20 to “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
21 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 While detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements
23 of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice” to state a
24 claim. Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-
25 harmed-me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.
26 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
27 In his Complaint, Stultz states that in 2018 he was wrongfully convicted of
28 murdering “Johnny Rodriguez.” (Doc. No. 1 at 16.) After his sentencing, Stultz was taken
1 into the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”).
2 He was initially sent to Wasco State Prison “Reception,” where he was classified. (Id.) He
3 was then transferred to Calipatria State Prison (“CSP”) in February of 2019. (Id.)
4 After arriving at CSP, Stultz “discovered” that that “employees that worked in the
5 prison as custody staff” were “related to . . . the deceased victim” in Stultz’s criminal case.
6 (Id. at 17.) In March of 2019, a correctional officer “made a verbal threat” against Stultz in
7 which he referenced the family of the victim and told Stultz he would “never allow [him]
8 the option to prove his innocence.” (Id.)
9 At some point, Stultz wrote to the California Innocence Project regarding his
10 “wrongful conviction.” (Id.) Stultz alleges this, and other mail which was related to his
11 criminal conviction and was supposed to remain confidential, was “tampered with.” (Id.)
12 Shortly thereafter a correctional officer told Stultz “he knew Stultz was a rat” and he
13 was going to tell all the inmates on the yard. (Id. at 18.) Later, Stultz lost the privilege to
14 use recreational equipment and therefore was “forced to run laps” for exercise. (Id.)
15 Sometime later, Stultz spoke to Lt. Newmen2 at CSP and expressed his concern
16 about the “close proximity of the deceased victim’s family,” but Newmen failed to “enable
17 a safe path to rehabilitation” for Stultz. (Id. at 19.) On another occasion, Stultz asked the
18 CSP Classification Coordinator to “help enable a safe transfer” because he “knew he was
19 being targeted by custody officers” connected to the victim’s family. (Id.)
20 In March of 2020, “Defendant 2” referenced “physical objects/evidence” in
21 Plaintiff’s criminal court case that “contained DNA” and told Plaintiff he was “fucked.”
22 (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff states he was subject to “verbal and inappropriate statements that [he]
23 was a snitch” but it is unclear from the facts alleged in the Complaint, who made these
24 statements. (See id. at 21.)
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27 2 Stultz does not name Newmen as a defendant.
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1 Stultz alleges that during his time at CSP he was “forced” to take COVID tests,
2 during which “medical staff displayed bias, unprofessional conduct and mishandle[ed] his
3 DNA.” (Id. at 20.) On February 4, 2021, after he was exposed to COVID, Stultz refused to
4 be tested “because he knew medical staff and correctional officers were conspiring to
5 tarnish his life.” (Id. at 21.) That same day, Stultz told Sergeant Reyes3 he was concerned
6 about staying at the same prison of Johnny Rodriguez’s family.” (Id.) But Reyes
7 disregarded his concerns. (Id.)
8 Stultz states that on October 16, 2021, while in custody at CSP, he was “battered”
9 by four inmates. He alleges this was because he “reported” the Rodriguez family and
10 medical personnel. (Id. at 22.) After the assault, Plaintiff mas moved to administrative
11 segregation for his safety “pending transfer.” (Id.)
12 Plaintiff was transferred from CSP to Centinela State Prison (“CEN”) on November
13 23, 2021. (Id.) On December 4, 2021, Stultz was again “subject to COVID-19 testing” and
14 during the process, his DNA was “mishandl[ed]” (Id. at 23.)
15 On December 28, 2021, “Defendant 2 made it clear he would utilize [a] COVID
16 swab to plant evidence in a case where . . . Stultz was wrongfully convicted.” (Id. at 21.)
17 On January 30, 2022, a “med tech” at CSP4 “obtained a COVID-19 swab [from Stultz] and
18 never documented [the] procedure to establish a safe chain of custody.” (Id. at 20.)
19 Stultz states that on October 10, 2023, he “suffered from severe puncture wounds
20 and was badly beaten,” requiring him to be sent to the “ER.” (Id. at 24.) It is not clear where
21 Stultz was housed at that time, and he does not elaborate on the specific circumstances of
22 the incident. (See id.)
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3 Stultz does not name Reyes as a Defendant.
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4 While in one portion of the Complaint Plaintiff states he was at CSP in December of 2021 and January
of 2022, see Doc. No. 1 at 20, 21, in another portion, Plaintiff states he was transferred from CSP to CEN
28 on November 23, 2021. Id. at 22.
1 At some point, Stultz was housed at “Cois Byrd Detention Center.” (Id.) An inmate
2 who was placed in Stutz’s cell there “confessed” that he was an “agents [sic] informant.”
3 (Id. at 25.) While at SBDC, Stultz was “refused a shower and a blanket.” (Id.)
4 C. Discussion
5 In his Complaint, Stultz names the following Defendants: CDCR, CSP, CEN, CSP
6 Warden, CEN Warden, CSP Medical Staff, CEN Medical Staff, “John Doe, et al.” and
7 “Jane Doe, et al.” (Doc. No. 1 at 1, 11–13.) Stultz raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
8 alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment, First Amendment, and Fourteenth
9 Amendment rights. (Id. at 28, 32, 33.) He also raises pendent state law claims,
10 including “medical negligence,” “fraud,” and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
11 (Id. at 29–31.) Stultz seeks compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 34.)
12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a right secured
13 by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) the alleged violation
14 was committed by “a person” acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
15 42, 48 (1988). Federal courts may also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
16 claims, but a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. See
17 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
18 1. State Agency Defendants
19 First, Defendants CDCR, CSP and CEN must be dismissed. The Eleventh
20 Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing a § 1983 lawsuit in which damages or
21 injunctive relief is sought against a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons
22 (such as CSP and CEN), absent “a waiver by the state or a valid congressional override.”
23 Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Franceschi v.
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26 5 It is unclear when Stultz arrived at Cois Byrd Detention Center, which is a local jail facility in Riverside
27 County, California. Allegations in the Complaint indicate Stultz was in custody there on or before
March 11, 2023, see Doc. No. 1 at 25, until March 14, 2023, when he was “transferred back to Wasco
28 State Prison” and then ultimately “relocated” to CEN. See id. at 26.
1 Schwartz, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits which
2 seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, an ‘arm of the state,’ its
3 instrumentalities, or its agencies.”). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh
4 Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court.”
5 Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1025–26; see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752
6 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding CDCR and California Board of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh
7 Amendment immunity).
8 Here, because CDCR, CSP and CEN are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983,
9 and instead are agencies and sub-agencies of the State of California, they are immune from
10 suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
11 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity extends to state
12 agencies); Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he State is not a
13 ‘person’ for purposes of § 1983.”); see also Dragasits v. California, 2016 WL 680947,
14 at *3 (S.D. Cal. 2016) (“The State of California’s Department of Corrections and
15 Rehabilitation and any state prison, correctional agency, sub-division, or department under
16 its jurisdiction, are not ‘persons’ subject to suit under § 1983.”). The Court therefore
17 dismisses Defendants CDCR, CSP and CEN. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
18 1915A(b).
19 2. Warden Defendants
20 Next, Stultz names as Defendants, the “Wardens of Calipatria” and the “Wardens of
21 Centinela” who held the positions during the “events described in th[e] complaint.” (Doc.
22 No. 1 at 11, 12.) Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions
23 of their employees. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. When a named defendant holds a
24 supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation
25 must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). To
26 do so, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that the supervisory defendant either:
27 (1) personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) knew of
28 the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or (3) promulgated or implemented a policy
1 “so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights” and is “the
2 moving force of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.
3 1989) (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987)); Taylor v. List, 880
4 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the
5 involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey
6 v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
7 Here, Stultz has not alleged any facts indicating that the CSP or CEN Wardens
8 personally participated the alleged deprivations of constitutional rights, knew of the
9 violations and failed to act to prevent them, or promulgated or “implemented a policy so
10 deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving
11 force of the constitutional violation.’” See Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. In the absence of any
12 such allegations, Stultz has failed to state a claim against Wardens of CSP or CEN. See
13 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b).
14 3. “Medical Staff” Defendants
15 To the extent Stultz names “Calipatria Medical Staff” and “Centinela Medical Staff”
16 as Defendants, he fails to state a claim because he does not make clear what specific
17 conduct is attributable to any specific individual. As noted above, to state a claim under
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual connection or link between the actions
19 of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs.,
20 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another
21 to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an
22 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which
23 he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
24 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
25 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient.
26 See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268. Rather, the plaintiff must set forth specific facts as to each
27 individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Leer v.
28 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
1 “Generic identifiers” such as “Centinela Medical Staff” and “Calipatria Medical
2 Staff” are insufficient to link a specific defendant’s actions to the alleged deprivation. See
3 Wright v. Pleasant Valley State Prison Med. Staff, 2009 WL 546214, at *2 (E.D. Cal.
4 Mar. 4, 2009) (“Generic identifiers such as ‘PVSP Medical Staff,’ ‘Chief Medical Staff,’
5 and ‘Medical Doctors’ (without surname specificity) are insufficient to link a specific
6 defendant to offending actions.”). Therefore, Stultz has failed to state a claim against
7 Defendants “Centinela Medical Staff” and “Calipatria Medical Staff.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
8 at 678; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b).
9 4. Doe Defendants
10 Stultz also names “John Doe, et al.” and “Jane Doe, et al.” as Defendants, but again
11 fails to provide sufficient facts to identify any individual Doe Defendants. First, the use of
12 fictitiously named Doe defendants, such as “John Doe” and “Jane Doe,” is generally not
13 favored. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). However, amendment
14 may be permitted to substitute true names for fictitiously named defendants. Merritt v.
15 Cnty. of L.A., 875 F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1989).
16 Here, Stultz has failed to make any specific allegations against any clearly and
17 separately identified “John Doe” or “Jane Doe.” Instead, he references unidentified
18 defendants collectively in some portions of the Complaint, and in other portions, he
19 references a “Doe” but does not provide any distinguishable identifier. Stultz also
20 references “John Doe, et al.,” and “Jane Doe, et al.” as to both medical staff and
21 correctional staff. (See Doc. No. 1 at 12, 13.) In other portions of the Complaint, he
22 references “Defendant 1” or “Defendant 2.” (See id. at 18.) Stultz also refers to two
23 different groups listed as “Does 1–5,” one from CSP and another from CEN, but fails to
24 provide information necessary to distinguish between them. (Id. at 12, 13.) The lack of
25 clarity and consistency makes it impossible for the Court to determine what allegations
26 relate to which “Doe” Defendant.
27 Even where a plaintiff is unaware of a particular defendant’s name, he must still
28 allege facts specific to each Doe defendant. As such, Plaintiff must name each Doe
1 Defendant individually and separately (i.e., Doe 1, Doe 2, etc.) and clearly specify what
2 each unknown individual did. A plaintiff “must allege sufficient facts to show how each
3 doe defendant individually violated his constitutional rights. If he does so, he may be given
4 leave to obtain the names of doe defendants during discovery and seek leave to amend to
5 name those defendants.” Finefeuiaki v. Maui Police Dep’t, 2018 WL 4839001, at *3 (D.
6 Haw. Oct. 4, 2018) (citing Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999)).
7 Because Stultz has not clearly identified any specific action taken by any separately
8 identifiable Doe defendant, he fails to state any claim against any unnamed Defendant and
9 as such, the Court dismisses all Doe Defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
10 1915A(b).
11 5. Dismissal With Leave to Amend
12 For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety without
13 prejudice for failure to state a plausible claim against any Defendant. See 28 U.S.C.
14 §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend. See Akhtar v.
15 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should not dismiss a pro se
16 complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the
17 complaint could not be cured by amendment.”)
18 In amending his pleading, Stultz should consider the following legal standards
19 applicable to his claims, as discussed below. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th
20 Cir. 1987), superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
21 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating a court should briefly explain a pro se litigant’s pleading
22 deficiencies when dismissing claims with leave to amend).
23 a. Eighth Amendment: Failure to Protect
24 Stultz appears to allege his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was
25 housed at a correctional facility where “custody staff” who were “related to . . . the
26 deceased victim [in Stultz’s] criminal case” worked. (Doc. No. 1 at 16–17, 28.) The Eighth
27 Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety
28 of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). In particular, prison officials
1 have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. Id. at 833;
2 Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036,
3 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). But the failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by
4 other inmates, or from dangerous conditions at the prison, violates the Eighth Amendment
5 only when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation alleged is, objectively, sufficiently
6 serious; and (2) the prison official is, subjectively, deliberately indifferent to inmate health
7 or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he knows
8 of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take reasonable
9 steps to abate it. Id. at 837.
10 Neither negligence, nor gross negligence, warrant liability under the Eighth
11 Amendment. Id. at 835–36 & n.4. An “official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that
12 he should have perceived but did not, . . . cannot under our cases be condemned as the
13 infliction of punishment.” Id. at 838. Instead, “the official’s conduct must have been
14 ‘wanton,’ which turns not upon its effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints
15 facing the official.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilson v.
16 Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1991)).
17 In his Complaint, Stultz alleges that at some unspecified time while he was confined
18 at CSP, he “experienced . . . verbal and inappropriate statements” from staff implying that
19 he was a “snitch.” (Doc. No. 1 at 21.) On February 4, 2021, Stultz told “Sgt. Reyes” that
20 he feared being held at CSP because he believed staff had ties to his victim’s family, but
21 Reyes ignored his concerns. (Id.) On October 16, 2021, Stultz states he was “battered by 4
22 inmates.”6 (Id.) He also alleges that on October 10, 2023, he “suffered from severe puncture
23 wounds and was badly beaten” but provides no additional facts regarding the incident. (Id.
24 at 24.) While Plaintiff appears to assert these attacks were the result of his reporting
25
26
27
6 After the October 19, 2021 incident, Stultz was housed in administrative segregation for his safety until
28 he was transferred to CEN on November 23, 2021. (Doc. No. 1 at 22.)
1 concerns about officers having ties to the “Rodriguez family,” to state a plausible claim,
2 Stultz must allege sufficient facts to show a causal connection or link between the actions
3 of the defendant(s) and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered. See Rizzo, 423 U.S.
4 at 373–75. As currently pleaded, however, Stultz’s allegations are vague, conclusory, and
5 insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim.7 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Ivey, 673
6 F.2d at 268.
7 b. First Amendment: Mail Tampering and Access to Courts
8 Stultz alleges his legal mail related to his criminal case was “tampered” with and
9 some of his legal materials were “confiscated.” (Doc. No. 1 at 32.) Inmates have a right
10 under the First and Sixth Amendments to have their properly marked legal mail opened in
11 their presence, and prison officials may not read their legal mail. Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr.,
12 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that the First Amendment protects a
13 prisoner’s right to be present when his civil legal mail is opened); Mangiaracina v.
14 Penzone, 849 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding that pretrial detainee had a Sixth
15 Amendment right to privately confer with counsel and not have legal mail opened outside
16 his presence); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 910–11 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that
17 the Constitution prohibits reading ongoing attorney-client correspondence). To state a
18 claim, however, a plaintiff must “clarify who sent the mail or whether it was properly
19 marked as ‘legal mail.’” Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211. Additionally, a plaintiff must allege more
20 than mere negligence. Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1989)
21
22
23 7 To the extent Plaintiff also alleges unspecified Defendants “conspired” to violate his Eighth Amendment
rights (see Doc. No. 1 at 32), he cannot state a claim because he has not adequately alleged an Eighth
24 Amendment violation. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 641 (“To state a cause of action under [42 U.S.C.] §
1985(3), a complaint must allege (1) a conspiracy; (2) to deprive any person or class of persons of the
25
equal protection of the laws; (3) an act done by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy;
26 and (4) a personal injury, property damage, or deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.”); see also Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A mere
27 allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.”).
28
1 (“Stevenson has not shown, based on this record, that Koskey’s conduct concerning
2 plaintiff’s mail rose beyond the level of mere negligence.”).
3 To the extent Stultz states that “on numerous [occasions] [his] legal mail was opened
4 and tampered with” (see Doc. No. 1 at 17–18), his allegations as currently pleaded are
5 conclusory and speculative. Although Stultz states the mail in question was related to his
6 criminal case, he fails to clearly specify the items of mail he alleges were opened or
7 tampered with, who did so, and when. Nor does Stultz allege the items were properly
8 marked as “legal mail.” See Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1211 (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s
9 claim regarding “legal mail” because the plaintiff had not met his burden of plausibly
10 alleging that the item opened outside his presence was protected legal mail and properly
11 marked as such); see also Mangiaracina, 849 F.3d at 1196 (concluding the district court
12 properly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim at the pleading stage when he failed to allege the
13 envelopes were properly marked as legal mail).
14 Stultz also states he could “not properly argue his case” because some of his legal
15 materials were “confiscated.” (Doc. No. 1 at 32.) To the extent he seeks to raise a First
16 Amendment access to the courts claim, he must allege facts showing that he suffered an
17 “actual injury” as a result of a specific defendant’s alleged actions, by explaining how the
18 challenged official acts or omissions hindered his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal
19 claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351–55 (1996). Actual injury may be shown if the
20 alleged shortcomings “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim,” such as having his
21 complaint dismissed “for failure to satisfy some technical requirement,” or if he “suffered
22 arguably actionable harm that he wished to bring before the courts.” Id. at 351. As currently
23 pleaded, Stultz fails to adequately allege he suffered actual injury.
24 c. Due Process
25 Stultz appears to raise a due process claim, but it is difficult to parse. Stultz states
26 Defendants “violated due process by continuously forcing Plaintiff to be in confinement
27 where [Plaintiff] was safeguarded by state policy, to be housed in a different prison
28 facility.” (Doc. No. 1 at 33.) It is well settled that prisoners have no due process right to
1 placement in any particular prison, to any security classification, or to any particular
2 housing assignment.8 Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Meachum v. Fano,
3 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (finding no liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause
4 is implicated in a prison’s reclassification and transfer decisions); Myron v. Terhune, 476
5 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty
6 interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of confinement.” Wilkinson v.
7 Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) (citation omitted). Thus, Stultz has not stated a due
8 process claim as currently pleaded.
9 d. State Tort Claims
10 Stultz also raises state tort claims including “medical negligence,”9 “fraud,” and
11 intentional infliction of emotional distress. (See Doc. No. 1 at 29–31.) Generally, state law
12 claims are not sufficient to state a claim for relief under § 1983, which requires a
13 deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory right. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693
14 (1976). As noted above, federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
15 law claims, but a plaintiff must first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law.
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
17 To the extent Stultz may seek to allege a pendent state tort claim for “medical
18 negligence,” he must allege sufficient facts to support the following elements: “(1) the duty
19 of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of his
20 profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal
21 connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or
22 damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220,
23
24
25 8 As discussed above, however, inmates have an Eighth Amendment right that prison officials take
26 reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of prisoners. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832
27
9 Claims of negligence and medical malpractice do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004) (“A showing of medical malpractice or negligence
28 is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.”).
1 229–30 (1982).
2 Next, “[t]he elements of fraud are misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to
3 induce reliance on the misrepresentation, justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation, and
4 resulting damages.” Reeder v. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC, 52 Cal. App. 5th 795, 803
5 (2020) (citing Lazar v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. 4th 631, 638 (1996)).
6 The elements for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under
7 California law are: “(1) outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or
8 reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe emotional
9 suffering, and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress.” Wong v. Tai
10 Jing, 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1376 (2010) (quoting Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932,
11 946 (1979)). Conduct is “outrageous if it is ‘so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
12 usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” Simo v. Union of NeedleTrades, Indus. &
13 Textile Emps., 322 F.3d 602, 622 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Saridakis v. United Airlines, 166
14 F.3d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1999)).
15 The Court further notes that under the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), set
16 forth in California Government Code §§ 810 et seq., a plaintiff may not bring a suit for
17 monetary damages against a public employee or entity unless the plaintiff first presented
18 the claim to the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board
19 (“Board”), and the Board acted on the claim, or the time for doing so expired. “The Tort
20 Claims Act requires that any civil complaint for money or damages first be presented to
21 and rejected by the pertinent public entity.” Munoz v. California, 33 Cal. App. 4th 1767,
22 1776 (1995). Compliance with this “claim presentation requirement” constitutes an
23 element of a cause of action for damages against a public entity or official. State v. Super.
24 Ct. (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1244 (2004). Thus, state tort claims included in a federal
25 action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, may proceed only if the claims were first
26 presented to the state in compliance with the claim presentation requirement. See id. at
27 1239; see also Karim–Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988)
28 (affirming district court’s dismissal of state tort claims for failure to allege compliance with
1 California tort claim procedures). In his Complaint, Stultz fails to allege compliance with
2 the CTCA as to any of his state tort claims.
3 In sum, Stultz should consider the above standards and identified deficiencies in
4 preparing any amended pleading. See Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448 (“The requirement that courts
5 provide a pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies in his or her complaint helps ensure
6 that the pro se litigant can use the opportunity to amend effectively.”)
7 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
8 Based on the foregoing, the Court:
9 1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
10 (Doc. No. 2).
11 2. ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect the $350
12 filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an amount
13 equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward payments to
14 the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with
15 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). All payments must clearly identify the name and case number
16 assigned to this action.
17 3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff
18 Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, by
19 U.S. Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov.
20 4. DISMISSES the Complaint in its entirety without prejudice for failure to state
21 a claim against any Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1).
22 5. GRANTS Plaintiff sixty (60) days leave from the date of this Order in which
23 to file a First Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted in this
24 Order. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by itself without reference to his
25 original Complaint. See CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.,
26 Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the
27 original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims
28 dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be
1 || ‘“considered waived if not repled”).
2 If Plaintiff fails to timely file a First Amended Complaint, the Court will enter a final
3 || Order dismissing this civil action based both on failure to state a claim upon which relief
4 || can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i1) and § 1915A(b)(1), and failure to
5 || prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427
6 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the opportunity
7 ||to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the complaint into
8 || dismissal of the entire action.”).
9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 || Dated: March 5, 2026
12 United States District Judge
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