The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DEVON ALVIN PHILLIPS, Case No.: 24-CV-1818 TWR (DDL)
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER (1) GRANTING
13 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
LODGMENT, AND (2) GRANTING
14 SGT. P. WHITE, BRYAN SISON
IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
(CV1269), CORPORAL N. HICKS, and
15 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
CHULA VISTA POLICE
DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FOURTH
16 DEPARTMENT,
AMENDED COMPLAINT
17 Defendants.
(ECF Nos. 44, 45)
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19 Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Devon Alvin Phillips’ Motion for Lodgment
20 (“Pl.’s Mot.,” ECF No. 44) and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended
21 Complaint and Claims Therein Under Rule 12(b)(6) (“Defs.’ Mot.,” ECF No. 45) filed by
22 Defendants Patrick White, Nathan Hicks, Bryan Sison, and Dustin Dubois, as well as
23 Plaintiff’s Response to (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 47) and Defendants’ Reply in Support of
24 (“Reply,” ECF No. 48) Defendants’ Motion. The Court took Defendants’ Motion under
25 submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (See ECF No.
26 46.) Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF
27 No. 42) and Plaintiff’s Lodgment, the Parties’ arguments, and the relevant law, the Court
28 / / /
1 GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 44) and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN
2 PART Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 45), as follows.
3 BACKGROUND
4 I. Plaintiff’s Allegations1
5 On September 28, 2023, Plaintiff was standing on the sidewalk near his vehicle at
6 trailer space #88 at 288 Broadway, Chula Vista, waiting for “police assistance regarding a
7 fraud suspect (Sepulveda).” (FAC at 3, 17.) It appears that the trailer in space #88 was
8 occupied by a man named Sepulveda and his girlfriend, R. Pedraza. (Id. at 17–18.) From
9 what the Court is able to glean from IMG_0738, one of the videos in Plaintiff’s Lodgment,
10 Plaintiff and his fiancée (Veronica) suspected that Sepulveda (perhaps in concert with
11 Pedraza) had been cashing fraudulent checks purportedly signed by Veronica’s father, who
12 was in the hospital. (See Lodgment IMG_0738.) It appears that Plaintiff and Veronica’s
13 son, Mercado, had gone to Sepulveda’s trailer to see whether he was home. (See id.) When
14 Mercado confirmed that Sepulveda was in the trailer, Plaintiff called his family to request
15 that they send the police to their location. (FAC at 5.)
16 Plaintiff has provided photos taken outside the trailer and timestamped 1:01 p.m.
17 (See Lodgment IMG_0007 & IMG_0008; see also FAC at 23 (“Ex. 3”) & 24 (“Ex. 4”).)
18 While Plaintiff was in the car taking photos, Mercado exited the vehicle to approach the
19 open gate in front of Sepulveda’s trailer. (See FAC at 25 (“Ex. 5”).) The next timestamp
20 available is from video IMG_0738, which Veronica recorded at 1:42 p.m.
21 It is not entirely clear what happened between 1:01 p.m. and 1:42 p.m., when
22 Plaintiff appears to be handcuffed and under arrest. Pedraza claimed that “she [had been]
23 walking with Sepulveda when they were approached.” (FAC at 17.) Pedraza told officers
24
25
26 1 For purposes of the Motion, the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are
accepted as true. See Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in
27 ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true”). The Court
is also mindful that “pro se pleadings are liberally construed, particularly where civil rights claims are
28
1 that Plaintiff and/or Mercado hit Sepulveda several times with a baseball bat and then threw
2 it over a fence, (see id. at 5, 10), and that Sepulveda had run away and was then chased by
3 Mercado. (See id. at 9, 10, 18.) Plaintiff contends that Pedraza was not a witness, (See d.
4 at 10, 18), and that Sepulveda’s and Pedraza’s comments to the police were not true. (See
5 id. at 12.) He also claims that he would not “have been able to strike anyone with a bat
6 because he was recovering from a spinal surgery.” (Id. at 5; see also id. at 18.)
7 When Sergeant White arrived at the scene, he ordered Officer Harper to handcuff
8 Plaintiff “until we figure out what is going on.” (Id. at 3.) Although Officer Harper
9 directed Plaintiff to sit on the ground, Plaintiff explained that he was unable to comply
10 because he was recovering from spinal surgery. (See id.) Plaintiff was also searched. (See
11 id. at 7.) Ultimately, Plaintiff was charged with kidnapping in violation of Section 207(a)
12 of the California Penal Code, assault with a deadly weapon (not firearm) in violation of
13 Section 245(a)(1) of the California Penal Code, and vandalism ($400 or more) in violation
14 of Section 594(b)(1) of the California Penal Code. (See FAC at 7, 8, 16.)
15 Officer Sison took Plaintiff’s car keys and conducted a search of Plaintiff’s vehicle.
16 (See id.) He removed a small lock box from Plaintiff’s glovebox, which Plaintiff contends
17 contained money, (see id.), but which the Officer commented to Veronica contained a
18 firearm. (See Lodgment IMG_0868 at 15:25–50 (asking Veronica for a key to the “gun
19 safe” which felt like he contained a firearm).) Ultimately, Plaintiff’s vehicle was towed
20 and impounded. (See FAC at 12, 43 (“Ex. 23”).)
21 Officer Dubois prepared the official report, which contained several inconsistent
22 comments from Sepulveda and Pedraza, (see id. at 5–6, 7–8, 9–11), as well as statements
23 Officer Dubois attributed to Plaintiff that Plaintiff denies having made. (See id. at 6–7, 10,
24 13, 15.) For example, Officer Dubois’ report indicated that, “several times while [Officer
25 Dubois] was in booking with Phillips, [Plaintiff] would make statements about how
26 [S]epulveda pushed [Plaintiff] first. Phillips said that he was just trying to detain Sepulveda
27 [and] did not intend to kidnap him.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff claims he never made such a
28 statement, and that he had invoked his right to remain silent. (See id.) Officer Dubois also
1 reported that “Plaintiff was armed with 17-Club, Blackjack, [and] Brass knuckles,”
2 although those weapons were not found on Plaintiff’s person or in his vehicle. (Id. at
3 15–16.) Officer Dubois misrepresented “statements that were being made by family
4 members by saying ‘so they came for revenge[.]’” (Id. at 19.)
5 Plaintiff spent four days in jail, (id. at 9; see also id. at 13), before being permitted
6 to post bail in the amount of $100,000. (See id. at 9.) The district attorney ultimately
7 declined to prosecute because of the contradictory versions of events and lack of sufficient
8 evidence. (See id. at 11.)
9 II. Procedural Background
10 Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint against Sergeant White, Officer Sison, Corporal
11 Hicks, and the Chula Vista Police Department on October 9, 2024. (See ECF No. 1.)
12 Plaintiff filed a document listing his “cause[s] of action” on December 3, 2024, (see ECF
13 No. 10), which the Court construed as a clarifying addition to Plaintiff’s initial Complaint.
14 On December 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint as a matter of
15 right against the same Defendants, (see ECF No. 11), and sought service through the United
16 States Marshals Service (“USMS”), (see ECF No. 12), and leave to “submit a thumb drive
17 with evidence to support” his amended complaint. (See ECF No. 13.) Although the Court
18 denied Plaintiff’s request for service through the USMS, (see ECF No. 14 at 2), the Court
19 granted Plaintiff leave to file a thumb drive containing videos and photos in support of his
20 First Amended Complaint. (See id.) Plaintiff lodged his thumb drive with the Court, (see
21 ECF No. 15), and filed additional exhibits, (see ECF No. 20), on December 16, 2024.
22 Following Plaintiff’s service of his First Amended Complaint on Defendants, (see
23 ECF Nos. 16–19), Defendants moved to dismiss that pleading. (See ECF No. 24.) On
24 March 17, 2025, at the request of the Parties, (see ECF No. 31), the Court granted Plaintiff
25 leave to file a further amended complaint and continued the hearing date and briefing
26 schedule for Defendants’ anticipated motion to dismiss. (See ECF No. 32.)
27 On March 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” ECF
28 No. 33), which asserted causes of action for unlawful seizure and imprisonment in violation
1 of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Sergeant White, (see id. at 10–12);
2 wrongful arrest and improper investigation against Sergeant White, (see id. at 13–15); and
3 violation of constitutional rights without probable cause in violation of the Fourteenth
4 Amendment against Sergeant White, (see id. at 16–18), Officer Sison, (see id. at 18–21),
5 and Corporal Hicks, (see id. at 21–24).2 Defendants moved to dismiss on April 14, 2025.
6 (See generally ECF No. 34.)
7 The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion on July 25, 2025,
8 dismissing with prejudice Plaintiff’s claims under the Fifth Amendment and dismissing
9 without prejudice Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See
10 generally ECF No. 38 (the “Prior Order”).) Specifically, with respect to the claims for
11 which the Court granted leave to amend, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs had failed
12 sufficiently to plead his Fourth Amendment claims for wrongful detention and arrest of his
13 person and unlawful search of his vehicle, (see id. at 6–10), and Fourteenth Amendment
14 claims for malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence. (See id. at 11–13.) Although
15 the Court concluded that Plaintiff had adequately alleged a claim for the impoundment of
16 his vehicle, (see id. at 10–11), the Court was required to dismiss that claim on grounds of
17 qualified immunity, (see id. at 16–17), but the Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend.
18 Plaintiff filed his Third Amended Complaint on August 22, 2026, (see generally
19 ECF No. 39), and, with leave of Defendants and the Court, (see ECF Nos. 40, 41), the
20 operative Fourth Amended Complaint on September 5, 2026. (See generally ECF No. 42.)
21 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint adds a fourth Defendant, Officer Dustin Dubois
22 (erroneously sued as Dustin Dubios), and asserted claims for unlawful search and seizure
23 in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights against Sergeant White, Officer Sison,
24 and Corporal Hicks, (see FAC at 12); false arrest/imprisonment in violation of Plaintiff’s
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2 Unlike Plaintiff’s prior complaints, (see generally ECF Nos. 1, 11), Plaintiff’s Second Amended
27 Complaint did not name the Chula Vista Police Department as a Defendant. See Hal Roach Studios, Inc.
v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (because amended pleading supersedes
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1 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against Sergeant White, Officer Sison, and
2 Corporal Hicks, (see id. at 12–13); and fabrication of evidence in violation of Plaintiff’s
3 Fourteenth Amendment rights against Officer Dubois, (see id. at 13). Plaintiff filed his
4 Motion lodging two thumb drives containing photographic and video evidence with the
5 Court on September 19, 2025, (see generally ECF No. 44), which the Court treats as
6 incorporated by reference into Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint.
7 Defendants’ Motion followed on September 26, 2025. (See generally ECF No. 45.)
8 LEGAL STANDARD
9 “A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
10 state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’”
11 Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro
12 v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). “A district court’s dismissal for failure to
13 state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of
14 a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
15 theory.’” Id. at 1242 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
16 Cir. 1988)).
17 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
18 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
19 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
20 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
21 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
22 misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded
23 facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
24 complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
25 Id. at 679 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
26 “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be
27 granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the
28 challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight
1 Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
2 Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). “A district court does not err in
3 denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Reddy v. Litton
4 Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991)).
5 ANALYSIS
6 Through the instant Motion, Defendants seek dismissal with prejudice, (see ECF No.
7 45-1 (“Mem.”) at 1, 15–16), of each of Plaintiff’s causes of action in his Fourth Amended
8 Complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), (see Mem. at 4–10), and on the
9 grounds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (See id. at 10–15.)
10 I. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Allegations
11 A. Fourth Amendment
12 The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” See U.S.
13 Const. amend. IV. Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant White, Officer Sison, and Corporal Hicks
14 (the “Fourth Amendment Defendants”) violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
15 unlawfully detaining and arresting him and by unlawfully searching his vehicle. (See FAC
16 at 12–13.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under any of these Fourth
17 Amendment theories. (See generally Mem. at 4–8.)
18 1. Unlawful Seizure of Person
19 Plaintiff alleges that the Fourth Amendment Defendants unlawfully detained and
20 arrested him when they placed him in handcuffs and searched him without reasonable
21 suspicion or probable cause. (See, e.g., FAC at 2–3, 12–13, 14–15.) “There are two
22 categories of police seizures under the Fourth Amendment: Terry stops and full-scale
23 arrests.” Reynaga Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 937 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Allen
24 v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 235 (9th Cir. 1995)).
25 “Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), police officers may conduct a brief,
26 investigative stop of an individual when they have reasonable suspicion that the ‘person
27 apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.’” Id. (quoting Arizona v.
28 Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009)). The court “examine[s] the ‘totality of the
1 circumstances’ to determine whether a detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective
2 basis’ for suspecting criminal wrongdoing.” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
3 266, 273 (2002)). “An officer cannot rely only upon generalizations that ‘would cast
4 suspicion on large segments of the lawabiding population.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
5 Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 2006)). “‘Seemingly innocuous behavior,’
6 unless combined with other circumstances indicating criminality, does not justify a Terry
7 stop.” Id. (quoting Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d at 935). “During a Terry stop motivated by
8 reasonable suspicion, the officer may ask investigatory questions, but the ‘scope of the
9 detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.’” Id. at 938 (quoting
10 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).
11 “The second category of police seizures are arrests.” Id. “An arrest must be
12 supported by probable cause to believe that the person being arrested has committed a
13 crime.” Id. (citing Allen, 73 F.3d at 236). “Probable cause is more difficult to establish
14 than reasonable suspicion, and is determined at the time the arrest is made.” Id. (citing
15 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273–74; Allen, 73 F.3d at 236). “It must be based on ‘reasonably
16 trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused
17 had committed or was committing an offense.’” Id. (quoting Allen, 73 F.3d at 237). “Like
18 reasonable suspicion, it can ‘only exist in relation to criminal conduct.’” Id. (quoting Allen,
19 73 F.3d at 237).
20 The first question confronting the Court is whether the Fourth Amendment
21 Defendants had reasonable suspicion or probable cause to handcuff Plaintiff upon arriving
22 at the scene. Although it remains unclear precisely what events precipitated the call(s) to
23 the Chula Vista Police Department and Plaintiff’s role in those events, construing the facts
24 most favorably to Plaintiff—as the Court must in ruling on Defendants’ Motion—it appears
25 that Defendants arrived in response to a call concerning a report that a fraud suspect was
26 on the premises. (See FAC at 3, 5–6.) Defendants arrived to find Plaintiff standing beside
27 his parked car at the reported residence. (See id. at 3.) Sergeant White then ordered Officer
28 Harper to handcuff Plaintiff “until we figure out what is going on.” (See id.)
1 Based on the facts alleged by Plaintiff, the Fourth Amendment Defendants had no
2 reasonable suspicion, much less probable cause, to handcuff Plaintiff when they arrived on
3 the scene. The Ninth Circuit has
4 only allowed the use of especially intrusive means of effecting a stop[, such
as the use of handcuffs,] in special circumstances, such as 1) where the suspect
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is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that raises a reasonable possibility
6 of danger or flight; 2) where the police have information that the suspect is
currently armed; 3) where the stop closely follows a violent crime; and
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4) where the police have information that a crime that may involve violence
8 is about to occur.
9 Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 1996). “An additional factor courts
10 consider in analyzing the reasonableness of the use of aggressive investigatory tactics as
11 part of a Terry stop is the number of police officers present.” Id. at 1190. Accepting
12 Plaintiff’s allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Fourth
13 Amendment Defendants were responding to a call concerning the location of a fraud
14 suspect and arrived to find Plaintiff unarmed and cooperative. Under these circumstances,
15 Plaintiff has adequately alleged that the Fourth Amendment Defendants’ initial
16 handcuffing of him was not justified under the Fourth Amendment.
17 The calculus changes, however, once Defendants began to question Sepulveda and
18 Pedraza, who told Defendants that Plaintiff and/or Mercado had struck Sepulveda more
19 than once with a baseball bat, (see FAC at 5, 10), following which Sepulveda ran away
20 from Plaintiff, (see id. at 9), and was chased by Mercado. (See id. at 18.) “[T]hese
21 statements would be sufficient to persuade ‘a person of reasonable caution to believe that
22 an offense has been or is being committed.’” See Johns v. City of Eugene, 771 F. App’x
23 739, 740 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir.
24 2007)) (reversing district court’s denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity
25 grounds where “the officers that responded to the incident were told by [the alleged victim]
26 that [the alleged aggressor and plaintiff] had struck her with a baseball bat and then used
27 the bat to smash her phone”); see also, e.g., Brainerd v. Cnty. of Lake, 357 F. App’x 88, 90
28 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
1 defendant deputies because they had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff “for threatening
2 to hit his co-resident . . . in the head with a baseball bat during the course of an argument”).
3 Plaintiff faults Defendants for not investigating more thoroughly and for arresting
4 him despite the numerous inconsistencies both between Sepulveda’s and Pedraza’s
5 statements and with Plaintiff’s account. (See FAC at 5–6, 7–8, 9–11.) To the extent
6 “Plaintiff appears to suggest that [Defendants] should have done more . . . [,] clearly
7 established law requires only a reasonable investigation, not an exhaustive one.” Hart v.
8 Sandoval, No. 1:24-CV-00071-HBK, 2025 WL 2675833, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2025)
9 (citing Johns, 771 F. App’x at 741). As Defendants note, (see Mem. at 6), “[p]robable
10 cause requires more than bare suspicion but need not be based on evidence sufficient to
11 support a conviction, nor even a showing that the officer’s belief is more likely true than
12 false.” United States v. Brobst, 558 F.2d 982, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Brinegar v. United
13 States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). “[O]fficers may not solely rely on the claim of a citizen
14 witness that he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the basis of the
15 witness’ knowledge or interview other witnesses.” Peng v. Hu, 335 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir.
16 2003) (quoting Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir.
17 2001)). “A sufficient basis of knowledge is established if the victim provides facts
18 sufficiently detailed to cause a reasonable person to believe a crime had been committed
19 and the named suspect was the perpetrator.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
20 (quoting Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1444 (9th Cir. 1991)).
21 Here, despite contradictions regarding how many times Sepulveda was hit or who
22 chased Sepulveda, Sepulveda and Pedraza did corroborate each other in reporting that
23 Plaintiff had committed an assault by striking Sepulveda with a bat. Sepulveda’s and
24 Pedraza’s reports were further corroborated by the recovery of a baseball bat at the scene.
25 (See FAC at 7.) In other words, “[t]he officers did not just accept [Sepulveda]’s version of
26 events at face value and arrest [Plaintiff]. Instead, . . . the officers questioned [Sepulveda,
27 Pedraza, Plaintiff, and Mercado], and observed some physical evidence that corroborated
28 [Sepulveda]’s claims before arresting [Plaintiff].” See Johns, 771 F. App’x at 741.
1 “Because the information that the officers obtained during the course of that investigation
2 was ‘sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or
3 is being committed by the person being arrested,’ . . . the officers” had probable cause to
4 arrest Plaintiff. See id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir.
5 2007)). Although the Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s frustration at finding himself in a
6 “he said, she said” situation, “not all wrongs, even when perpetrated by a government actor,
7 are redressable under § 1983.” See Hennick v. Bowling, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1208 (W.D.
8 Wash. 2000).
9 The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES
10 Plaintiff’s causes of action against the Fourth Amendment Defendants under the Fourth
11 Amendment for wrongful arrest of his person. The Court, however, DENIES IN PART
12 Defendants’ Motion to the extent Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant White and Officer Harper
13 unlawfully handcuffed him upon their arrival at the scene.
14 2. Unlawful Search and Seizure of Vehicle
15 Plaintiff also alleges that the Fourth Amendment Defendants illegally searched his
16 vehicle. (See, e.g., FAC at 3–5, 12.) “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process,
17 without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
18 Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
19 exceptions.” Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States,
20 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
21 Here, Defendants contend that they lawfully searched Plaintiff’s vehicle incident to
22 his arrest. (See Mem. at 7–8.) “The exception derives from interests in officer safety and
23 evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations.” Gant, 556 U.S. at
24 338. Consequently, “an automobile search incident to a recent occupant’s arrest is
25 constitutional (1) if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the vehicle during the search,
26 or (2) if the police have reason to believe that the vehicle contains ‘evidence relevant to the
27 crime of arrest.’” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 234–35 (2011) (quoting Gant, 556
28 U.S. at 343).
1 As the Court previously concluded, (see Prior Order at 9–10), because Plaintiff had
2 been handcuffed and separated from his vehicle, it appears unlikely that the first of the
3 Supreme Court’s search justifications under Gant would apply here. Under the second
4 Gant justification, however, the Fourth Amendment Defendants could have believed that
5 Plaintiff’s vehicle may have contained evidence of the crimes for which he was arrested,
6 including kidnapping and assault with a deadly weapon (not a firearm). Consequently, for
7 the same reasons Plaintiff fails to allege an unlawful arrest, see supra Section I.A.1,
8 Plaintiff fails plausibly to allege that the search of his vehicle conducted incident to that
9 arrest was unconstitutional. The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART Defendants’ Motion
10 and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against the Fourth Amendment
11 Defendants to the extent they are premised on the unlawful search of his vehicle incident
12 to his arrest.
13 B. Fourteenth Amendment
14 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Dubois fabricated evidence in his police report
15 in violation of Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See FAC at 13.) As
16 the Court previously explained, (see Prior Order at 12), in Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d
17 1070 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit recognized that “there is a clearly
18 established constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the
19 basis of false evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.” See id. at
20 1074–75. “To prevail on a § 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove
21 that (1) the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate
22 fabrication caused the plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789,
23 798 (9th Cir. 2017).
24 Defendants address only the first of these elements, arguing that Plaintiff’s
25 Devereaux claim must be dismissed because the inconsistencies in Officer Dubois’ report
26 and the alleged insufficiency of his investigation do not give rise to a plausible inference
27 that Officer Dubois fabricated material evidence. (See Mem. at 8–10.) Although
28 Defendants are correct in that regard, they fail to address Plaintiff’s critical allegations that
1 Officer Dubois included in his report several statements that Plaintiff never made,
2 including, “several times while I was in booking with Phillips, he would make statements
3 about how [S]epulveda pushed him first. Phillips said that he was just trying to detain
4 Sepulveda and did not intend to kidnap him,” (FAC at 6), and “Plaintiff was armed with
5 17-Club, Blackjack, [and] Brass knuckles.” (Id. at 15–16.) Because Plaintiff alleges that
6 Officer Dubois included incriminating statements that Plaintiff never made in his police
7 report, the Court must conclude that Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Officer Dubois
8 engaged in deliberate fabrication of evidence. See, e.g., Caldwell v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,
9 889 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2018) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment
10 in favor of sergeant defendant who included in his report that the plaintiff had “made a
11 ‘spontaneous statement’ on the street about being present at the shooting and dealing
12 drugs” where the plaintiff testified at his deposition that ‘[t]he only thing correct in [the
13 disputed statement] is my name’”) (alterations in original)); Spencer, 857 F.3d at 798
14 (reversing district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendants
15 on deliberate fabrication claim where the defendant officer’s “investigative reports
16 contained scores of quotations attributed to [the accused plaintiff’s children], both of whom
17 unequivocally testified at trial that they had never made those statements”).
18 Because Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s allegations regarding causation, the
19 Court declines to do so in the first instance. Accordingly, the Court DENIES IN PART
20 Defendants’ Motion to the extent Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Devereaux claim
21 against Officer Dubois.
22 II. Qualified Immunity
23 Alternatively, Defendants contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. (See
24 Mem. at 10–15.) “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
25 liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
26 statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
27 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
28 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold
1 public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield
2 officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties
3 reasonably.” Id.
4 “In assessing whether qualified immunity applies, [the Court] consider[s] whether
5 (1) the plaintiff has plausibly alleged a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) the
6 constitutional right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.”
7 DeFrancesco v. Robbins, 136 F.4th 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Ballentine v. Tucker,
8 28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022)). Where the plaintiff has failed plausibly to allege a
9 violation of a constitutional right, “then the officer’s conduct was constitutional, and there
10 can be no violation of § 1983,” and, consequently, “the officer has no need for immunity”
11 because “he is innocent of the alleged infractions.” See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d
12 896, 915 (9th Cir. 2012).
13 Here, the Court has determined that Plaintiff alleges plausible claims for wrongful
14 detention, see supra pages 8–9, and fabrication of evidence, see supra pages 12–13.
15 Accordingly, the Court must determine whether those “constitutional right[s] w[ere]
16 ‘clearly established’ at the time of the alleged misconduct.” See DeFrancesco, 136 F.4th
17 at 938. “To meet the ‘clearly established’ requirement, the law at the time of the conduct
18 must have been ‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood
19 that what he is doing’ was unlawful.” Id. at 939 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S.
20 731, 741 (2011)). “In other words, ‘the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that
21 her conduct was unlawful, . . . judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the
22 conduct.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Evans v. Skolnik, 997 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th
23 Cir. 2021)). “A constitutional right may be ‘clearly established by controlling authority or
24 a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’” Id. (quoting Tuuamalemalo v.
25 Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 2019)) (citing Waid v. Cnty. of Lyon, 87 F.4th 383,
26 388 (9th Cir. 2023); Hopson v. Alexander, 71 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2023)). “The
27 plaintiff bears the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly established
28 / / /
1 at the time of the alleged misconduct.” Shooter v. Arizona, 4 F.4th 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2021)
2 (quoting Romero v. Kitsap Cnty., 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1991)).
3 A. Fourth Amendment Claim for Wrongful Detention with Handcuffs
4 Plaintiff contends that it was clearly established that he could not be detained without
5 reasonable suspicion, citing to Terry v. Ohio and “Davis v. Mississippi and Hicks v.
6 Officers.” (See Opp’n at 14–15.) Defendants counter that “temporary detentions during
7 the rapidly evolving scene [sic] have been routinely upheld as constitutionally valid.” (See
8 Mem. at 12 (first citing Saunders v. Knight, No. CV F 04-5924 LJO WMW, 2007 WL
9 3482047, *16 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2007); then citing Cannon v. City of Petaluma, No. C
10 11-0651-PJH, 2012 WL 1183732, *9 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012); then citing United States v.
11 Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982)).)
12 In reviewing the cases cited by Plaintiff, the Court bears in mind that “[t]he ‘clearly
13 established’ standard . . . requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the officer’s
14 conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Distr. of Columbia v. Wesby, 583
15 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). “The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is ‘clear to a
16 reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id.
17 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), abrogated in part on other grounds by
18 Pearson, 555 U.S. 223). “This requires a high ‘degree of specificity.’” Id. (quoting
19 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015) (per curiam)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly
20 stressed that courts must not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality,
21 since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the
22 particular circumstances that he or she faced.’” Id. at 63–64 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard,
23 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). “A rule is too general if the unlawfulness of the officer’s
24 conduct ‘does not follow immediately from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly
25 established.’” Id. at 64 (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
26 635, 641 (1987)). “In the context of a warrantless [detention], the rule must obviously
27 resolve whether the circumstances with which [the particular officer] was confronted . . .
28 / / /
1 constitute[d] [reasonable suspicion].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and second
2 through fourth alterations in original) (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 13).
3 The Supreme Court also has “stressed that the ‘specificity’ of the rule is ‘especially
4 important in the Fourth Amendment context,’” id. (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12), and
5 “the need to ‘identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was
6 held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting White
7 v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)). “While there does not have to be ‘a case directly on
8 point,’ existing precedent must place the lawfulness of the particular [detention] ‘beyond
9 debate.’” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
10 The Court has carefully reviewed Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Davis, 394 U.S. 721; and
11 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S., 321 (1987), to determine whether they put Sergeant White and
12 Officer Harper on notice that their handcuffing of Plaintiff was unlawful based on the facts
13 provided by Plaintiff, namely, that the Fourth Amendment Defendants were responding to
14 a call concerning a non-violent and non-emergent crime, had no reason to suspect that
15 Plaintiff was armed, and found Plaintiff waiting for them calmly. Ultimately, the Court
16 necessarily concludes that Terry, Davis, and Hicks involved factual patterns too distinct
17 from those at issue here to provide the requisite degree of specificity. In Terry, for
18 example, the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction for carrying a concealed weapon where
19 the revolver had been discovered during a stop and frisk of a man whom the police officer
20 had seen “acting in a manner [the officer] [had taken] to be a preface to a ‘stick-up’” and
21 whom “a reasonably prudent man would have been warranted in believing . . . was armed
22 and thus presented a threat to the officer’s safety while he was investigating his suspicious
23 behavior.” See 392 U.S. at 28. In Davis, the Supreme Court reversed a conviction based
24 on fingerprint evidence that had been obtained during a second detention not supported by
25 probable cause as part of a rape investigation. See 394 U.S. at 728. Finally, in Hicks, the
26 Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion of evidence found in a search because the defendant
27 policeman had only reasonable suspicion, and not probable cause, to believe that the stereos
28 in question had been stolen. See 480 U.S. at 326. These cases define the law regarding
1 warrantless detention at too high a level of generality to provide the Fourth Amendment
2 Defendants with notice that their handcuffing of Plaintiff upon their arrival at the scene
3 violated the Fourth Amendment.
4 Although the law was clearly established at the time based on the Court’s
5 independent research, see, e.g., Washington, 98 F.3d at 1192 (“The law was also clearly
6 established that if the Terry-stop suspects are cooperative and the officers do not have
7 specific information that they are armed or specific information linking them to a recent or
8 inchoate dangerous crime, the use of such aggressive and highly intrusive tactics is not
9 warranted, at least when, as here, there are no other extraordinary circumstances
10 involved.”), as the Court previously noted, (see Prior Order at 16–17), “[t]he plaintiff bears
11 the burden of proof that the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of
12 the alleged misconduct.” Shooter, 4 F.4th at 961 (quoting Romero, 931 F.2d at 627), and
13 “Plaintiff is not relieved of this burden because he represents himself.” See Williams v.
14 Alvarez, No. CV-22-00154-PHX-MTL (CDB), 2025 WL 588233, at *4 (D. Ariz. Feb. 24,
15 2025) (collecting cases); see also Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir. 2007)
16 (“A district court lacks the power to act as a party’s lawyer, even for pro se litigants.”). As
17 before, the Court therefore must conclude that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden here
18 and that the Fourth Amendment Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on
19 Plaintiff’s surviving Fourth Amendment claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN
20 PART Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claim that his immediate
21 detention and handcuffing violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
22 B. Fourteenth Amendment Devereaux Claim
23 Plaintiff claims that it was clearly established in both Devereaux and Spencer that
24 “[f]abrication of evidence by law enforcement to initiate or sustain prosecution violates
25 due process.” (See Opp’n at 14.) Defendants contend that Devereaux is distinguishable
26 because that case “involved hours-long, suggestive interviews with young children
27 regarding extreme claims of sexual abuse,” where this case involves “statements made by
28 the alleged victim and witness.” (See Mem. at 14.)
1 Even assuming that Devereaux did not suffice to put Officer Dubois on notice that
2 his alleged fabrication of statements in his police report violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
3 rights, Spencer unquestionably did. In Spencer, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior
4 holding in Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2010), that
5 “an interviewer who deliberately mischaracterizes witness statements in her investigative
6 report . . . commits a constitutional violation.” Spencer, 857 F.3d at 798 (alteration in
7 original) (quoting Costanich, 627 F.3d at 1111). In that case, the defendant detective
8 attributed several quotations to the plaintiff’s minor children, who later testified that the
9 quotations had been fabricated. See, e.g., id. at 795–96, 798–99. In reversing the district
10 court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law to the defendants on the fabrication-of-
11 evidence claim, the Ninth Circuit held that “the Constitution prohibits the deliberate
12 fabrication of evidence whether or not the officer knows that the person is innocent.” See
13 id. at 800.
14 Here, as in Spencer, Officer Dubois allegedly included statements in his
15 investigative report that the witness—here, Plaintiff—denied making. The Court therefore
16 concludes that Plaintiff has carried his burden of establishing that a reasonable officer
17 would have understood that falsely attributing a fabricated statement to a witness in an
18 investigative report was unlawful at the time of Plaintiff’s arrest. The Court therefore
19 DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s
20 Deveraux claim on the grounds that Officer Dubois is entitled to qualified immunity.
21 III. Leave to Amend
22 Finally, Defendants request that Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint be dismissed
23 without leave to amend. (See Mem. at 1, 15; Reply at 7–8.) As Defendants acknowledge,
24 (see Mem. at 15), where a complaint is dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), leave to amend
25 should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent
26 with the challenged pleading could not cure the deficiency. See Schreiber Distrib., 806
27 F.2d at 1401. “The ‘rule favoring liberality in amendments to pleadings is particularly
28 important for the pro se litigant.’” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012)
1 (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000)). “At the same time, futile
2 amendments should not be permitted.” Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv.
3 Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
4 (1962); Smith v. Commanding Officer, 555 F.2d 234, 235 (9th Cir. 1977)).
5 For the reasons discussed above, see supra Section I.A, the Court concludes that
6 amendment would be futile as to Plaintiff’s claims for unlawful arrest and unlawful search
7 of his vehicle. The Court therefore DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Fourth
8 Amendment claims based on his unlawful arrest and the search of his vehicle. Because
9 Plaintiff could allege that the law concerning his unlawful detention was clearly established
10 at the time, the Court DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to the extent it seeks
11 dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims against the Fourth
12 Amendment Defendants based on their initial detention and handcuffing of Plaintiff, which
13 claims the Court therefore DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
14 CONCLUSION
15 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
16 Defendants’ Motion. Specifically, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE
17 Plaintiff’s claims against the Fourth Amendment Defendants for his unlawful arrest and
18 the unlawful search of his vehicle under the Fourth Amendment and DISMISSES
19 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against the Fourth Amendment Defendants
20 for his unlawful initial detention and handcuffing under the Fourth Amendment, for which
21 the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend. Defendants’ Motion is otherwise DENIED.
22 Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint on or before March 26, 2026.
23 As before, (see Prior Order at 19), the Court advises Plaintiff that any amended
24 complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his prior complaints. Any
25 defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint—such as
26 Plaintiff’s prior claims against the Chula Vista Police Department and concerning the
27 impoundment of his vehicle—will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal
28 Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1546 (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”);
1 || Lacey, 693 F.3d at 928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not
2 ||re-alleged in an amended pleading may be considered waived if not repled). Should
3 || Plaintiff elect not to file an amended complaint, this case SHALL PROCEED as to
4 || Plaintiff's surviving claim against Officer Dubois under Devereaux.
5 Defendants SHALL RESPOND to Plaintiff's operative complaint on or before
6 || April 9, 2026.
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8 || Dated: March 4, 2026 —— (2
9 [an (re
10 Honorable Todd W. Robinson
United States District Judge
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