Ramjas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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RAJIV P. RAMJAS,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

-against- 26-CV-2899 (OEM) (LKE)

PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

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ORELIA E. MERCHANT, United States District Judge:

On December 3, 2025, pro se plaintiff Rajiv P. Ramjas (“Plaintiff”) filed this action in the

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against defendants Public Partnership

LLC; VillageCareMax, Inc.; New York Health Care; Agape Luxury Transportation; Wendy

Orozco; Mellissa Corzelia; and Mario Sena (collectively, “Defendants”). See generally Complaint

at 1, 3-5, Dkt. 1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”).1 That same day, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See generally Application to Proceed

Without Prepaying Fees or Costs, Dkt. 2 (“IFP Motion”). On May 5, 2026, Chief U.S. District

Judge Laura Taylor Swain issued an order transferring the case to this Court. See Transfer Order,

Dkt. 5. On May 14, 2026, the transfer was effectuated.

Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is granted and, for the reasons stated below, the Complaint is

dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within 30 days from the

date of this order.

1 When citing the Complaint, the Court refers to the page numbers contained in the automatically generated ECF

header.

BACKGROUND

On December 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a form complaint that consists of hand-written entries

and some attachments. See generally Complaint. The factual allegations are difficult to parse and

hard to follow. Among other things, Plaintiff alleges that on November 19-21 and 26, 2025, at

“118-35 Queens Blvd 4th Floor”:

e His employer, which appears to be Public Partnerships Home Care LLC, whom Plaintiff

refers to as “Public Partnership LLC,” reduced Plaintiffs hours of employment, possibly

because of “a false arrest.” Jd. at 5,11.

e Plaintiff references Defendant Agape Luxury Transportation “not taking [the] proper

person,” his mother making or receiving a home visit, and “violating” the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act. /d. at 7.

e Plaintiff describes schedule changes on November 19, 2025, that caused him to strain his

knee and shoulder while rushing to get ready and on November 20, 2025, that caused him

to miss a physical therapy appointment. /d. at 9.

e Plaintiff mentions police inquiries about a six-year-old crime, id.; includes a possible

reference to the New York City Police Department’s Civilian Complaint Review Board

dropping cases, id. at 8; and attaches a New York City Police Department Incident

Information Slip reporting petit larceny on November 12, 2025, id. at 11.

When identifying the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction, Plaintiff checks the box for

“Federal Question” and asserts violations of the following laws:

A. If you checked Federal Question

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Id. at 2. Elsewhere, Plaintiff also mentions the “Bank Secrecy Act” and “Executive Law 63.” Jd.

at 6. In his request for relief, Plaintiff states that Barbara Wilkanowski, who is not named as a

defendant, defended Plaintiff in an unspecified proceeding and requests that she pay $930,000 “for

mischievously having m[y] bank accounts reviewed correctly. No eavesdropping through NYPD.”

Id. at 6-7. He does not request any damages or other relief from any of the named Defendants.

LEGAL STANDARD

When reviewing an action filed in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss a complaint sua

sponte if it determines that the suit “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted where it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim is plausible ‘when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Matson v. Bd. of Educ., 631 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2011)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Although all allegations contained in the

complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678.

Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (“Rule 8”) requires a plaintiff to provide a “short

and plain statement of the claim” against each named defendant so that they have adequate notice

of the claims against them. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Rule 8 . . . demands

more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). A complaint that

only “tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not suffice. Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). At a minimum, a complaint must

“disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant ‘to have a fair understanding of what the

plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.’” Kittay v.

Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 941 F.2d 119,

123 (2d Cir. 1991)). A court is empowered to dismiss a complaint on its own initiative where the

complaint does not comply with Rule 8. Id. at 542.

With that said, a pro se complaint must “be liberally construed” and “held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “Even after Twombly,” the

Court “remain[s] obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66,

72 (2d Cir. 2009). Nevertheless, the “basic requirements of Rule 8 apply to self-represented and

counseled plaintiffs alike.” Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(quoting Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 n.11 (2d Cir. 2004)).

DISCUSSION

Even construed liberally, the Complaint fails to meet basic pleading requirements.

Specifically, it fails to provide a “short and plain” statement of Plaintiff’s claims against each

named Defendant such that each Defendant has a “fair understanding of what the plaintiff is

complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.” Id. (first quoting FED.

R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); then quoting Kittay, 230 F.3d at 541). Plaintiff vaguely asserts claims against his

employer for cutting his hours, but he has not included facts suggesting discrimination in

employment or any other violation of federally protected rights. See Compl. at 5-11. He names

other Defendants and mentions federal law related to credit reporting and protected medical

records, but he includes no facts linking these Defendants to any federal laws. See id. He suggests

a past criminal charge and proceedings, but he has not alleged facts showing a violation of his civil

rights. See id. The only relief he requests is against a private attorney, but he does not name this

attorney as a defendant or allege that she caused him any cognizable injury. See id. at 1, 3-11.

The Court therefore does not find that Plaintiff’s allegations state a plausible claim for relief. See

Hall v. N.Y.C. Hous. Dep’t, 22-cv-06692 (HG) (SJB), 2022 WL 17253530, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov.

28, 2022) (dismissing a pro se complaint where the court was “unable to determine exactly what

claims [p]laintiff [was] attempting to allege”).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action is dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); FED. R. CIV. P.

8(a)(2). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, Plaintiff is granted 30 days to file an amended

complaint. See Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 596-98 (2d Cir. 2000).

If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff must identify each legal claim

and set forth a short, plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim. Plaintiff should

describe what each named Defendant or Defendants did or did not do and how each Defendant

caused Plaintiff injury. Plaintiff must also provide the dates and locations for each relevant event.

Finally, Plaintiff must set forth the remedy he seeks. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint

completely replaces the Complaint; therefore, all claims Plaintiff wishes to pursue must be in the

amended complaint. The amended complaint must be captioned “Amended Complaint” and

include docket number 26-CV-2899 (OEM) (LKE). For free, confidential, limited-scope legal

assistance, Plaintiff may wish to contact the City Bar Justice Center’s Federal Pro Se Legal

Assistance Project in Brooklyn by calling (212) 382-4729 or online at https://www.

citybarjusticecenter.org/projects/federal-pro-se-legal-assistance-project. The Federal Pro Se

Legal Assistance Project is not a part of, or affiliated with, the Court.

Any amended complaint that Plaintiff elects to file will be reviewed for sufficiency. No

summons shall issue at this time, and all further proceedings shall be stayed. If Plaintiff fails to

file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date of the entry of this order, judgment shall be

entered.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal would not be taken

in good faith and, therefore, denies in forma pauperis status for the purpose of any appeal.

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to send a copy of this order to Plaintiff and to

note the mailing on the docket.

SO ORDERED.

/s/

ORELIA E. MERCHANT

United States District Judge

June 29, 2026

Brooklyn, New York