The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Commissioner of Social Services, as Designee for
H. Venture, Interstate Child Support Investigator
o/b/o Sasha G. Hendricks,
2:26-cv-03293
Petitioner, (NJC) (JMW)
-v-
Dujohn P. Hendricks,
Respondent.
ORDER OF REMAND
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY, United States District Judge:
On June 1, 2026, pro se Respondent Dujohn P. Hendricks filed a Notice of Removal
together with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) seeking to remove to this Court a
Petition for Violation of Support Order (the “State Court Petition”) pending in the Family Court
of the State of New York, Nassau County (“State Court”) under Docket No. U-04776-20/26G.
(Not. Removal ¶ 1, ECF No. 1; IFP Mot., ECF No. 2.) The Court grants the IFP motion for the
limited purpose of this Order of Remand and, for the following reasons, remands the Petition to
the State Court.
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Removal Requirements
Removal of a state court case to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which
provides as follows:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (emphasis added). Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 governs the procedure for
removal and requires that a notice of removal “shall be filed within 30 days after receipt by the
defendant . . . of a copy of the initial pleading . . . containing a short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon such
defendant or defendants in such action.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a); BP P.L.C. v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore, 593 U.S. 230, 238 (2021) (“To remove a case, a defendant must comply
with 28 U.S.C. § 1446.”). “A party seeking removal bears the burden of showing that federal
jurisdiction is proper.” Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local 272, 642 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir.
2011).
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction
exists over this case. See Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2006). “[F]ailure of subject
matter jurisdiction is not waivable and may be raised at any time by a party or by the court sua
sponte.” Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700 (2d Cir. 2000). If a
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action. See Doe v. McDonald,
128 F.4th 379, 384 (2d Cir. 2025); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). “It is well-settled that the party
asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction,” and district courts
“may not assume subject-matter jurisdiction when the record does not contain the necessary
prerequisites for its existence.” Platinum-Montaur Life Scis., LLC v. Navidea Biopharms., Inc.,
943 F.3d 613, 617–18 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
-2-
Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires complete diversity among the
plaintiffs and defendants and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Tagger v.
Strauss Grp. Ltd., 951 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2020). In determining the citizenship of a party, the
following standards apply.
“An individual’s citizenship, within the meaning of the diversity statute, is determined by
his domicile,” or in other words, “the place where a person has his true fixed home and principal
establishment, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.” Van
Buskirk v. United Grp. of Cos., Inc., 935 F.3d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 2019). Allegations of “residence
alone [are] insufficient to establish domicile for jurisdictional purposes.” Id. at 54; accord
RainMakers Partners LLC v. NewSpring Cap., LLC, No. 23-cv-899, 2024 WL 1846321, at *2
n.1 (2d Cir. Apr. 29, 2024) (“[A] complaint that alleges that the plaintiff and defendant are
merely residents of different states has failed adequately to allege the existence of diversity
jurisdiction.”). In order to determine an individual’s domicile, courts consider numerous factors,
which include:
current residence; voting registration; driver’s license and automobile registration;
location of brokerage and bank accounts; membership in fraternal organizations,
churches, and other associations; places of employment or business; . . . payment
of taxes; . . . whether a person owns or rents his place of residence; the nature of
the residence (i.e., how permanent the living arrangement appears); . . . and the
location of a person’s physician, lawyer, accountant, dentist, stockbroker, etc.
Lever v. Lyons, No. 16-cv-5130, 2021 WL 302648, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021) (citations
omitted); see also Lawrence Moskowitz CLU Ltd. v. ALP, Inc., 830 F. App’x 50, 51 (2d Cir.
2020) (“[T]he determination of domicile considers factors such as voting, taxes, property, bank
accounts, places of business or employment.”) (citation omitted).
The second requirement of diversity jurisdiction—an amount in controversy of at least
$75,000—is equally important. “[A party] invoking federal [diversity] jurisdiction must
-3-
demonstrate a ‘reasonable probability’ that the amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied.”
Pyskaty v. Wide World of Cars, LLC, 856 F.3d 216, 223 (2d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The
Second Circuit “recognize[s] a rebuttable presumption that the face of the complaint is a good
faith representation of the actual amount in controversy.” Id. The amount in controversy alleged
must be plausible, i.e., supported by factual allegations in the complaint. Wood v. Maguire
Automotive, LLC, 508 F. App’x 65, 65 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal of complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction where the complaint’s allegation “of $75,000 in controversy is
conclusory and not entitled to a presumption of truth”). “[I]f the jurisdictional amount is not
clearly alleged in the . . . complaint, and the defendant’s notice of removal fails to allege facts
adequate to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount, federal
courts lack diversity jurisdiction as a basis for removing the plaintiff’s action from state court.”
Lupo v. Hum. Aff. Int’l Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273–74 (2d Cir. 1994).
DISCUSSION
This case is remanded to State Court for four independent reasons, any one of which is
sufficient to support remand to State Court.
First, Hendricks has not demonstrated that he timely removed this action to federal court.
The State Court action was initiated on April 27, 2026. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) However, Hendricks
filed the Notice of Removal 35 days later on June 1, 2026. (See generally id.) Because Hendricks
does not identify when he received a copy of the State Court Petition or was served with this
document or the summons, this Court is unable to determine whether Hendricks filed the Notice
of Removal within the 30-day window as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). See 28 U.S.C. §
1446(b)(2)(B) (“Each defendant shall have 30 days after receipt by or service on that defendant
of the initial pleading or summons . . . to file the notice of removal.”).
-4-
Second, Hendricks has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that this Court has
subject matter jurisdiction. According to the Notice of Removal, Hendricks removed this action
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) However,
neither the Notice of Removal nor the underlying State Court Petition alleges the citizenship of
any party. (See ECF No. 1 generally). Although the Notice of Removal generally alleges that
Hendricks resides in Great Neck, New York, it does not address his domicile. (Id.) As a result,
the operative documents do not establish Hendricks’ citizenship because “residence alone is
insufficient to establish domicile for jurisdictional purposes.” Van Buskirk, 935 F.3d at 54;
accord Canedy v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is well-
established that allegations of residency alone cannot establish citizenship . . . .”). Moreover, the
Notice of Removal entirely fails to address the citizenship of Petitioner, the Commissioner of
Social Services, as required to establish complete diversity of the parties.
Moreover, there is no basis to find that the amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is satisfied. Indeed, the State Court Petition alleges that
Hendricks “failed to obey the order of support since 8/15/25, [and] [] is in arrears in the sum of
$13,572.38.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Thus, the sum sought in the State Court Petition is well below the
statutory amount. The Notice of Removal does not contain any additional information to suggest
that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Moreover, there is no basis to conclude that this
Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.1
1 The Court has also considered whether federal question subject matter jurisdiction may be
invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under this statute, the federal “district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, because the Petition seeks to enforce a State Court
child support order, it does not present a federal question.
-5-
Third, even if Hendricks properly invokes the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and he
does not, this Court would be divested of subject matter jurisdiction under the domestic relations
abstention doctrine. Domestic relations is “an area of law that federal courts and Congress leave
almost exclusively to state law and state courts.” Khalid v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.
2018); see also Demuth v. Chenango Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., No. 18-cv-0767, 2018 WL
5114175, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.,
Demuth v. Chenango Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., No. 18-cv-0767, 2018 WL 5113132 (N.D.N.Y.
Oct. 19, 2018) (“There exists, however, a judicially recognized exception to federal subject
matter jurisdiction in matters involving domestic relations.”) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
504 U.S. 689, 701–704 (1992) (add’l citation omitted)); Sekou Camera v. New York City Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 2024 WL 4107256, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2024) (citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S
586, 593–94) (“[T]he whole subject of the domestic relations . . . belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States.”). Under the domestic relations abstention
doctrine, cases involving child support generally remain outside federal court jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Bey v. Furman, No. 21-cv-04090, 2021 WL 3725987, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2021)
(abstaining from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over claims challenging plaintiff’s duty to
pay child support under the domestic relations abstention doctrine); Lions v. New York State Off.
of Child Support Enf’t, No. 1:24-cv-7181, 2025 WL 81421, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2025)
(“Here, Plaintiff’s challenge to the amount of his child support obligations falls squarely within
the domestic relations doctrine.”); Sekou, 2024 WL 4107256 at *2 (“[F]ederal courts must
abstain from exercising federal question jurisdiction over claims involving relations issues such
as child support.” (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Block, 905 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990))).
-6-
Fourth, given that the underlying State Court action is ongoing,2 this Court must abstain
from exercising jurisdiction under the abstention doctrine set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971), and Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013). The Younger
abstention doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over claims
when adjudication of those claims would interfere with any one of three types of state-level
proceedings that present “exceptional circumstances”: (1) “ongoing state criminal prosecutions”;
(2) state “civil enforcement proceedings” that are “akin to criminal prosecutions”; and (3)
proceedings that are “uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions,” including “enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint, 571 U.S at 72–
73, 78 (defining the scope of Younger abstention). After applying this categorical approach,
courts consider three additional, non-dispositive factors to determine whether Younger abstention
is appropriate: (1) whether there is a “pending state proceeding,” (2) whether that proceeding
“implicates an important state interest,” and (3) whether “the state proceeding affords an
adequate opportunity for judicial review of . . . federal constitutional claims.” Falco v. Justs. of
Matrim. Parts of Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Middlesex
Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982)); see, e.g., Lowell v.
Vermont Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 835 F. App’x 637, 639 (2d Cir. 2020), as amended (Dec. 15,
2020) (describing the Younger/Sprint abstention analysis) (summary order). “[E]ven if Younger’s
prerequisites are satisfied, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction if the plaintiff can make a
2 The Notice of Removal includes a “Summons (Violation of Support Order) (Virtual)” to
Hendricks that ordered his virtual presence on June 1, 2026 for a “Preliminary Proceeding and
Willfulness Finding.” (ECF No. 1 at 19.) Thus, the State Court action is ongoing. The Court
notes that the Notice of Removal was also filed on that same date, June 1, 2026, in an apparent
attempt to delay those proceedings.
-7-
showing of ‘bad faith, harassment or any other unusual circumstance that would call for
equitable relief.’” Lowell, 835 F. App’x at 639 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 54). Courts in this
Circuit have found that Younger abstention applies to state court actions involving child support
issues. See, e.g., Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F. Supp. 2d 350, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying the
Younger abstention doctrine to dismiss claims which arose from “pending state court
proceedings involving child support.”) (citation omitted); Tomczyk v. New York Unified Ct. Sys.,
No. 19-cv-2753, 2019 WL 2437849, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2019) (“[T]his Court abstains
under Younger from interfering in Plaintiff’s ongoing state-court proceedings, involving divorce
and child support issues and ‘implicat[ing] a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts.’” (citing Sprint, 571 U.S. at 72–73 (2013))).
“[A]ny doubts should be resolved against removability ‘out of respect for the limited
jurisdiction of the federal courts and the rights of states.’” Baum v. Brown, No. 22-CV-3415
(CS), 2022 WL 2315072, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2022) (quoting In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl
Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 124 (2d Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, the
Petition is remanded to the State Court for the reasons explained above.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Hendricks’ motion to proceed IFP is granted for the limited purpose of this
Order of Remand and, for the reasons set forth above, this action is remanded to State Court
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1447(c) because Hendricks has failed to show that he timely removed
this action as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.
The Clerk of the Court shall: (1) mail a certified copy of this Order of Remand to the Clerk of
the Family Court of the State of New York, Nassau County, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1447(c); (2)
close this case; and, (3) pursuant to Rule 77(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, serve
-8-
notice of entry of this Order of Remand upon all parties as provided in Rule 5(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and record such service on the docket.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order of
Remand would not be taken in good faith and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of
any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
Dated: Central Islip, New York
June 24, 2026
/s/ Nusrat J. Choudhury
NUSRAT J. CHOUDHURY
United States District Judge
-9-