The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
SCOTT BAKER,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:25-cv-128-VMC-SPF
KURT A. HOFFMAN as
SHERIFF OF SARASOTA COUNTY,
FLORIDA,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Defendant
Kurt A. Hoffman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 34),
filed on December 19, 2025, seeking summary judgment on all
claims in this Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 case. Plaintiff Scott
Baker responded on January 26, 2026. (Doc. # 39). Sheriff
Hoffman replied on February 5, 2026. (Doc. # 40). For the
reasons that follow, the Motion is granted.
I. Background
A. Mr. Baker’s Employment with SCSO
Kurt A. Hoffman, as Sheriff of the Sarasota County
Sheriff’s Office (“SCSO”), operates the chief law enforcement
agency within Sarasota County, Florida. (Doc. # 1 at 2). SCSO
employed Mr. Baker as a deputy from 2002 until February 2018,
when he was promoted to sergeant. (Doc. # 34-2, Pl. Depo. at
18:1-17).
As a sergeant, Mr. Baker supervised deputies assigned to
his squad, including Deputy Stacy Brown. (Id. at 68:12-18;
110:18-111:3). His responsibilities included monitoring
dispatch calls, ensuring proper prioritization, and
coordinating backup for deputies. (Id. at 80:14–81:2,85:10-
87:5, 90:24–93:18). Mr. Baker had a duty to report concerns
of discrimination or retaliation to SCSO’s Human Resources
Director, Staci Pickavance. (Id. at 96:23–101:10).
B. SCSO’s Lieutenant Promotional Process
SCSO promotes sergeants to lieutenant through an annual
promotional process consisting of four components: a written
examination, an oral board interview, a practical
examination, and an interview with the Sheriff. (Id. at 172:5–
173:8, 176:4–178:18, 186:4–189:4, 195:2–12, 202:15–203:20,
Ex. 12, Ex. 15).
The written examination is administered by a third-
party. (Doc. # 34-18, Pickavance Decl. at ¶ 4). The oral board
interview and practical examination are scored by a
promotional board consisting of five evaluators designated by
the Sheriff, to include a member from an outside law
enforcement agency and at least one female member. (Pl. Depo.
at Ex. 15; Pickavance Decl. at ¶ 6). As part of the regular
scoring process for the practical examination and the oral
board interview, both the highest and lowest evaluator scores
are dropped before calculating the final scores for those
portions of the exam. (Pl. Depo. at Ex. 15; Pickavance Decl.
at ¶ 6). Once a final score is made, candidates are ranked
accordingly and vacant positions are filled in rank order
over the following year. (Pl. Depo. at 173:9-21, Ex. 15).
C. Mr. Baker Sought Promotion in 2021 and 2022
On multiple occasions, Mr. Baker has sought a promotion
from sergeant to lieutenant. He first became eligible for
promotion to lieutenant in 2021 after he obtained an
associate’s degree. (Id. at 26:1–12, 176:4–177:7, Ex. 1).
In May 2021, Mr. Baker ranked eighth overall in the
lieutenant promotional process, but was not promoted. (Id. at
176:4–181:14, 184:1–9, 198:25–10, 201:25–202:11, Ex. 9, Ex.
10, Ex. 11; Pickavance Decl. at ¶¶ 7–8, Ex. 1).
In May 2022, he ranked tenth overall in the lieutenant
promotional process, but again was not promoted. (Pl. Depo.
at 198:25–199:10, 201:25–202:11, Ex. 13, Ex. 14; Pickavance
Decl. at 10–11, Ex. 2).
D. Deputy Stacy Brown’s Complaints
Sometime in 2021 or 2022, Deputy Brown came to believe
that SCSO was subjecting her to unfair treatment and a hostile
work environment. (Doc. # 39-1, Brown Decl. at ¶ 5; Doc. #
34-19, Brown Depo. at 17:10-15, 20:5-9). Deputy Brown
eventually came to believe that certain SCSO employees,
including Lieutenant Jonathan Varley, “spread false rumors
and allegations, gossip and defamatory information” about
her, and that SCSO employees were intentionally not providing
her with backup support when she responded to calls for
service. (Brown Decl. at ¶¶ 4-5; Brown Depo. at Ex. 1).
On August 6, 2022, Deputy Brown first complained of
unfair treatment and a hostile work environment in a meeting
with Lieutenant Neil Wilson. (Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19, 115:19–
24, 145:13–147:13, Ex. 8; Brown Depo. at 17:10–15, 20:24–
21:11, 25:10–26:15; Doc. # 34 at 5, n.5). Although Mr. Baker
attended the meeting (Pl. Depo. at 146:7-11), Mr. Baker did
not report that Deputy Brown was subjected to a hostile work
environment or otherwise advocate on Deputy Brown’s behalf.
According to Mr. Baker, Deputy Brown only indicated there was
a general hostile work environment, not that she was
experiencing gender discrimination. (Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19,
115:19–24, 145:13–146:14, 147:15– 149:4, 151:22–152:24, Ex.
8 at 3; Brown Depo. at 25:10–26:15).
Instead, in the August 6, 2022 meeting, Mr. Baker’s only
concern was that Lt. Varley had requested him to put Deputy
Brown on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”) without going
through preliminary coaching steps. Lt. Varley had requested
the PIP when other deputies complained about Deputy Brown’s
communications with civilians. (Pl. Depo. at 141:19–144:24;
Doc. # 34-20, Varley Depo. at 22:2–27:23). During the meeting,
Mr. Baker accused Lt. Varley of tolerating blunt
communications by another female deputy, Deputy Emilius, but
not any discrimination towards females or favoring males
generally. (Pl. Depo. at 142:21–143:16). Ultimately, SCSO
never placed Deputy Brown on a PIP. (Doc. # 34-16, Leonard
Depo. at 17:2–19).
Deputy Brown subsequently told Mr. Baker that she felt
she was receiving inadequate backup during patrol calls. (Pl.
Depo. at 147:15–149:4). Deputy Brown and Mr. Baker never
expressed any concern to SCSO’s Human Resource Director or
others that Deputy Brown’s issues with inadequate backup were
related to gender discrimination. (Leonard Depo. at 12:1-
13:11; Pl. Depo. at 151:22–152:24).
On November 8, 2022, Deputy Brown’s attorney sent a
letter to SCSO asserting that her inadequate backup
constituted a hostile work environment and that she intended
to bring claims of gender discrimination against SCSO. (Brown
Depo. at Ex. 1). Upon receipt of the letter, Captain Bridgit
Leonard began investigating Deputy Brown’s claims. (Leonard
Depo. at 9:16-11:20). As part of that investigation, Capt.
Leonard met with Mr. Baker on November 11, 2022. (Pl. Depo.
at 159:20-25). During the meeting with Capt. Leonard, Mr.
Baker attributed any backup shortcomings solely to a
“personality” issue between Deputy Brown and her co-workers.
(Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19, 115:19–24, 162:17–24, Ex. 8 at 8).
Mr. Baker never communicated to Capt. Leonard that he believed
Deputy Brown received inadequate backup because of her
gender. (Leonard Depo. at 12:24–13:11). Capt. Leonard
instructed Mr. Baker to monitor Deputy Brown’s calls to ensure
she received appropriate backup and to provide documentation
regarding Deputy Brown’s calls for backup and what actions
were taken in response. (Id. at 162:10-16). In addition, while
the investigation was ongoing, Capt. Leonard moved Lt. Varley
to work a different rotation and, thereafter, Lt. Varley had
no interactions with either Deputy Brown or Mr. Baker. (Varley
Depo. at 11:15-14:20, 17:10-19:20).
Captain Leonard again spoke to Mr. Baker on December 20,
2022, to request documentation compiled from the past month
pertaining to Deputy Brown’s dispatch calls and backup
provided. Mr. Baker provided documentation on December 20,
2022, and December 29, 2022, which reflected there were no
backup issues. (Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19, 115:19–24, Ex. 8 at
8; Leonard Depo. at 13:12-17). Capt. Leonard’s final
conclusion from the investigation was that Deputy Brown
received adequate backup. (Leonard Depo. at 13:12-17).
SCSO’s Human Resources Director, Staci Pickavance, also
investigated Deputy Brown’s concerns. (Brown Depo. at 21:12–
24:23). On December 14, 2022, Ms. Pickavance concluded Deputy
Brown’s complaint, as set forth in her November 8, 2022 letter
and subsequent communications with SCSO, did not raise any
allegations of gender-based discrimination or hostile work
environment. (Brown Depo. at 21:12–24:23, 27:10–29:3, Ex. 2,
Ex. 3). Specifically, Ms. Pickavance concluded that Deputy
Brown provided no evidence that any SCSO members engaged in
discrimination because of her gender. (Id. at Ex. 3).
On January 5, 2023, Deputy Brown filed her charge of
discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations
(“FCHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). (Brown Depo. at 29:12–30:2, 33:12, Ex. 4).
Subsequently, Deputy Brown retired from SCSO, effective
February 6, 2023. (Brown Depo. at 32:9–33:10). In December
2023, Deputy Brown initiated a discrimination lawsuit against
SCSO under the case name Brown v. Hoffman, No. 8:23-cv-2988-
WFJ-NHA. (Brown Depo. at Ex. 6). In February 2024, Deputy
Brown and SCSO reached a confidential settlement (Id. at Ex.
7), and Deputy Brown voluntarily dismissed her claims. (Id.
at Ex. 8).
E. Mr. Baker Sought Promotion in 2023
In 2023, Mr. Baker again participated in the lieutenant
promotional process and ranked tenth, with a composite score
of 82.26. (Pl. Depo. at 204:1–207:13, Ex. 18 at 1–2;
Pickavance Decl. ¶¶ 13–14, Ex. 3).
As a result of the 2023 promotional process, SCSO
promoted the highest ranked candidates to five lieutenant
vacancies. (Pl. Depo. at 206:14–208:16; Pickavance Decl. at
¶¶ 13, 17, Ex. 3). Because he was not one of the top five
ranked candidates, Mr. Baker was not promoted into a
lieutenant position. (Pl. Depo. at 206:14–208:16).
F. Mr. Baker’s Complaints and Retirement from SCSO
On August 18, 2023, Mr. Baker filed a charge of
discrimination with the FCHR and EEOC, alleging SCSO
retaliated against him based on his purported opposition to
alleged gender discrimination against Deputy Brown. (Pl.
Depo. at 221:14–222:5, Ex. 20). In relevant part, Mr. Baker’s
charge of discrimination describes SCSO’s conduct as follows:
Such retaliatory conduct has included but is not
limited to allowing me to be subjected to hostile
comments, gossip, and attitudes; scrutinizing my
job performance in an unwarranted and disparate
manner, including disciplining me and/or attempting
to discipline me in such a disparate manner when
compared to co-workers; and failing to provide me
with a fair and equitable promotion process as I
have tried to move forward in my career. I have
attempted to switch my work rotation to avoid such
retaliation, but such attempts have been denied. My
complaints about such retaliatory conduct have not
only been ignored, but have resulted in further
retaliation, including complaints to my Captain in
December of 2022. . . . My employer’s
discriminatory and retaliatory treatment is due to
my decision to oppose the discrimination I
witnessed and the retaliation I have experienced.
(Id. at Ex. 20). On September 27, 2023, Mr. Baker submitted
his notice of retirement, effective October 11, 2023.(Id. at
Ex. 19). He retired on October 11, 2023, the same week he
turned 55 years old and first became eligible for retirement
with full pension benefits. (Id. at 14:9–10, 102:24–103:7,
209:18–210:13, 220:15–221:11). In his employee exit
questionnaire, Mr. Baker stated he was forced to retire
because SCSO has shown that he was “not appreciated” and that
he has “no future” with SCSO. (Id. at Ex. 24 at 6).
G. Procedural History
On January 16, 2025, Mr. Baker initiated this action
against SCSO. (Doc. # 1). In his complaint, Mr. Baker asserts
claims of retaliation in violation of Title VII (Count 1) and
the FCRA (Count 2). (Id.). SCSO answered the complaint (Doc.
# 16), and the case proceeded through discovery.
SCSO now seeks summary judgment on all claims. (Doc. #
34). Mr. Baker has responded (Doc. # 39), and SCSO has
replied. (Doc. # 40). The Motion is ripe for review.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to
defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude
a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742
(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g
Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if
it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.
1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing
the Court, by reference to materials on file, that there are
no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at
trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986)).
“When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-
moving party must then ‘go beyond the pleadings,’ and by its
own affidavits, or by ‘depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th
Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).
If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations
or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to
be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344
F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder
evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference
from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine
issue of material fact, the Court should not grant summary
judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846
F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s
response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his
conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only
proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034
(11th Cir. 1981).
III. Analysis
A. Failure to Dispute the SCSO’s Statement of Material
Facts
As an initial matter, Mr. Baker’s response violates the
Court’s requirements for summary judgment briefing, as laid
out in a March 18, 2025 order. (Doc. # 24). The Court requires
every response to a summary judgment motion to
include a section titled “Response to Statement of
Material Facts.” The opposing party’s response must
mirror the statement of material facts by admitting
and/or denying each of the moving party’s
assertions in matching numbered paragraphs. Each
denial must set forth a pinpoint citation to the
record where the fact is disputed. Although the
opposing party’s response must correspond with the
paragraph scheme used in the statement of material
facts, the response need not repeat the text of the
moving party’s paragraphs. In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, the Court will deem admitted any
fact in the statement of material facts that the
opposing party does not specifically controvert,
provided record evidence supports the moving
party’s statement.
(Id. at 2-3).
Mr. Baker’s response does not respond at all to SCSO’s
statement of material facts in its Motion. (Doc. ## 34, 39).
Thus, Mr. Baker has failed to dispute any of SCSO’s numerous
statements of material fact. Therefore, provided the record
evidence cited by the SCSO supports each statement, the Court
deems admitted all facts in the Motion’s statement of material
facts.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
SCSO contends that Mr. Baker’s claims are procedurally
barred for two reasons. First, SCSO argues that any alleged
retaliatory conduct prior to August 18, 2022 is time-barred.
(Doc. # 34 at 13-14). Second, SCSO argues that Mr. Baker has
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his
resignation, because Mr. Baker’s administrative charge of
discrimination preceded his resignation and “raises no claim
that his forthcoming resignation was retaliatory or
constituted constructive discharge.” (Id.). In response, Mr.
Baker states:
Plaintiff herein alleges that the 2023 promotional
process was unfairly prejudiced against him in
retaliation for his involvement in opposing the
discriminatory and hostile work environment that
Deputy Brown experienced. While background evidence
of prior acts may be helpful in understanding the
context of Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, the
primary act focused upon by Plaintiff was the
promotional process in 2023, which occurred before
his discrimination [] charge was filed in August of
2023. Moreover, the failure to provide Baker with
a fair and untainted promotional process
opportunity is specifically addressed and
identified in said charge of discrimination.
(Doc. # 39 at 10). In addition, Mr. Baker contends “[t]hat
the retaliation resulted in the constructive termination of
Plaintiff is a natural and logical assertion that grew from
the underlying allegations in his discrimination charge. As
such, Plaintiff did not fail to properly exhaust his
administrative remedies.” (Id. at 11).
In essence, Mr. Baker states that his retaliation claim
in the instant case relates to two alleged retaliatory acts:
(1) the alleged failure to provide a fair promotional process
in 2023, and (2) his alleged constructive termination. He
argues that he has not failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies because his August 18, 2023 charge of discrimination
explicitly includes the allegation of an unfair promotional
process, and his alleged constructive termination grew from
the underlying allegations.
Upon review, the Court agrees with SCSO. Mr. Baker’s
retaliation claims are, in part, procedurally barred in two
ways: (1) any alleged retaliatory conduct prior to August 18,
2022 is time-barred, and (2) Mr. Baker has failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies as to his alleged constructive
termination.
“As a prerequisite to filing both a Title VII and a FCRA
action, a plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies
by filing a timely charge with the appropriate agency. The
scope of a plaintiff’s judicial complaint under Title VII and
the FCRA is limited by the scope of any administrative
investigation that may reasonably arise from the plaintiff’s
initial charge of discrimination.” Bridges v. Standard Pac.
of Tampa GP, Inc., No. 8:06-cv-1937-SDM-TGW, 2007 WL 177688,
at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2007) (citing Gregory v. Georgia
Dept. Of Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th
Cir.2004); and Harper v. Blockbuster Entertainment Corp., 139
F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir.1998)). Florida courts generally
analyze FCRA claims in the same manner as claims brought under
Title VII. See Harper, 139 F.3d at 1387 (“The Florida courts
have held that decisions construing Title VII are applicable
when considering claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act,
because the Florida act was patterned after Title VII.”
(citations omitted)).
Specifically, “[t]o maintain a Title VII or FCRA action,
a plaintiff must have filed a charge with the EEOC [or
appropriate state agency] within 300 days of the last
discriminatory act (365 days in the case of the FCRA).”
Shedrick v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Miami-Dade Coll., 941 F.
Supp. 2d 1348, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s
Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th Cir. 2002); and
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); and Fla. Stat. § 760.11(1). “Only
those claims arising within 300 [and/or 365] days prior to
the filing of the charge of discrimination are actionable.”
Short v. Immokalee Water & Sewer Dist., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1129,
1142 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (citation omitted). “Untimely claims
are barred.” Id.
“A distinction is made between Title VII claims
alleging discrete acts and those alleging continuing
violations. An EEOC Charge raising a claim based upon discrete
discriminatory or retaliatory acts must be filed within 300
days of the discrete act. If not filed within this time
period, the discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable,
even when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed
charges. Continuing violations, on the other hand, are
exceptions to this general rule regarding discrete
discriminatory acts. When the allegedly unlawful employment
practices amount to a continuing violation, the time period
for filing an EEOC charge does not begin until the last
occurrence of the discrimination.” Id. (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Notably, the Supreme Court has held that a failure to
promote and a termination are both discrete acts. See Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)
(“Discrete acts such as termination, failure to promote,
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire are easy to identify.
Each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse
employment decision constitutes a separate actionable
‘unlawful employment practice.’ Morgan can only file a charge
to cover discrete acts that ‘occurred’ within the appropriate
time period.”); see also Makere v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 24-
11336, 2025 WL 3022497, at * 8 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025)
(“When a plaintiff alleges that the defendant took ‘separate
and discrete acts that repeatedly violate[d] the law, the
continuing violation doctrine does not apply.’ Instead, each
discrete action ‘is a separate actionable unlawful employment
practice that starts a new clock for filing charges’ with the
EEOC. ‘Discrete discriminatory’ or retaliatory acts ‘are not
actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts
alleged in timely filed charges.’” (citations omitted)); see
also Id. at *9 (“In this lawsuit, he brought Title VII
discrimination and retaliation claims challenging his
termination, but his termination qualifies as a separate and
discrete act, meaning he cannot rely on the continuing
violation doctrine.”).
Here, Mr. Baker filed his charge of discrimination on
August 18, 2023. (Pl. Depo. at Ex. 20). To the extent that
Mr. Baker seeks to challenge the 2022 or 2021 promotional
processes, such claims are time-barred because his August 18,
2023 charge of discrimination was filed more than 365 days
after those promotional processes concluded (in May of 2022
and 2021, respectively). Each alleged failure to promote
constitutes a separate and discrete act, Morgan, 536 U.S. at
114, and therefore, Mr. Baker’s August 18, 2023 charge of
discrimination only covers the 2023 promotional process.
Likewise, Mr. Baker has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies as to his alleged constructive
termination. He submitted his retirement letter on September
27, 2023, and his retirement was effective as of October 11,
2023. (Pl. Depo. at 14:9–10, 102:24–103:7, 209:18–210:13,
220:15–221:11). However, the alleged constructive termination
is a discrete retaliatory act. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114;
Makere, 2025 WL 3022497, at * 8-9. Therefore, Mr. Baker’s
August 18, 2023 charge of discrimination pertaining to the
promotional process cannot exhaust his administrative
remedies as to the constructive termination. See, e.g., Green
v. SVC Mfg., Inc., No. 1:16-cv-04156-TWT-RGV, 2017 WL
3382566, at *5 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2017) (finding constructive
discharge to be a discrete act and not within the scope of
earlier EEOC charge), report and recommendation adopted, No.
1:16-cv-4156-TWT, 2017 WL 3335756 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2017);
see also Makere, 2025 WL 3022497, at * 9 (“[H]is termination
qualifies as a separate and discrete act, meaning he cannot
rely on the continuing violation doctrine.”).
Accordingly, Mr. Baker’s claims are limited to his
challenge to the 2023 promotional process.
C. The Merits
“Title VII and the FCRA prohibit an employer from
retaliating against an employee because the employee ‘opposed
any practice’ made unlawful by those statutes.” Weatherly v.
ABC Legal, Inc., No. 23-11143, 2024 WL 2698023, at *7 (11th
Cir. May 24, 2024) (citations omitted). In assessing a
retaliation claim, courts may apply the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework. Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP,
84 F.4th 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, (1973)). “First, the
employee must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by
proving that she engaged in statutorily protected conduct;
she suffered an adverse employment action; and a causal
relation exists between the two events.” Id. (citing Tolar v.
Bradley Arant Boult Commings, LLP, 997 F.3d 1280, 1289 (11th
Cir. 2021)). “If an employee establishes a prima facie case,
the employer may proffer a ‘legitimate, nonretaliatory
reason’ for the adverse action. If the employer does so, the
employee must prove that the employer's proffered reason was
a pretext for retaliation.” Id. (citations omitted).
That said, “[t]he McDonnell Douglas framework is also
not the only way to prove retaliation; instead, it is one way
to prove retaliation with circumstantial evidence. Without
relying on the McDonnell Douglas framework, an employee may
prove retaliation with any circumstantial evidence that
creates a reasonable inference of retaliatory intent.” Id. at
1310. “Some of our precedents refer to this evidentiary
approach as the ‘convincing-mosaic framework.’ But a
‘convincing mosaic’ is a metaphor, not a legal test and not
a framework. The legal standard — and the question for the
court at summary judgment — is only whether the evidence
permits a reasonable factfinder to find that the employer
retaliated against the employee. That legal standard applies
no matter how an employee presents her circumstantial
evidence.” Id. at 1310-11 (citation omitted); see also Ismael
v. Roundtree, 161 F.4th 752, 760 (11th Cir. 2025) (“As in
other contexts, a plaintiff may avoid summary judgment by
presenting a wide range of circumstantial evidence. Such
evidence may include ‘(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous
statements . . . , and other bits and pieces from which an
inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn, (2)
systematically better treatment of similarly situated
employees, and (3) that the employer’s justification is
pretextual.’” (citation omitted)).
SCSO argues that Mr. Baker fails to establish a prima
facie case of retaliation. (Doc. # 34 at 14). In response,
Mr. Baker contends that there are genuine disputes of material
fact as to each element of his retaliation claim. (Doc. # 39
at 11). The Court addresses each element before turning to an
analysis under the convincing mosaic standard.
i. Statutorily Protected Conduct
“Under Title VII, an employee has engaged in protected
activity if she has: (1) opposed an unlawful employment
practice, or (2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing’ under Title VII’s retaliation provision.” Smith
v. City of Fort Pierce, Fla., 565 F. App’x 774, 776–77 (11th
Cir. 2014) (quoting EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d
1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 2000)). The Eleventh Circuit has
explained that to establish protected activity, “a plaintiff
must show that she had a good faith, reasonable belief that
the employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices”
and that the “belief was objectively reasonable in light of
the facts and record presented.” Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp.,
291 F.3d 1307, 1311–12 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Saffold v.
Special Counsel, Inc., 147 F. App’x 949, 951 (11th Cir. 2005).
In the context of a Title VII retaliation claim, “opposed”
means “to resist or antagonize; to contend against; to
confront; resist; withstand.” Patterson v. Georgia Pac., LLC,
38 F.4th 1336, 1347 (11th Cir. 2022)(quoting Crawford v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276
(2009)).
Here, Mr. Baker argues that he opposed SCSO’s alleged
discrimination against Deputy Brown because he “had made
complaints on Brown’s behalf and pushed back against or
opposed Varley’s harassment of Brown, including Varley’s
unwarranted attempt to place Brown on a PIP.” (Doc. # 39 at
12) (citing Pl. Depo. at 143:1-7, 21-25, 146:13-17, 158:18-
24, 168:8-21, 202:1-4, 242:10-245:14, 248:9-249:10).
First, the record is unclear as to exactly what
“complaints” Mr. Baker made on Deputy Brown’s behalf. Mr.
Baker generally cites to his deposition, in which he testified
about certain meetings he attended with SCSO personnel
regarding Deputy Brown. But Mr. Baker does not cite to record
evidence indicating that he made any complaints to SCSO that
Deputy Brown was being subjected to gender discrimination. On
the other hand, SCSO has supplied record evidence that
indicates: (1) at the August 6, 2022 meeting with Lt. Wilson,
neither Mr. Baker nor Deputy Brown complained of any gender
discrimination (Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19, 115:19–24, 145:13–
146:14, 147:15– 149:4, 151:22–152:24, Ex. 8 at 3; Brown Depo.
at 25:10–26:15); (2) at the November 11, 2022 meeting with
Capt. Leonard, Mr. Baker attributed the problems faced by
Deputy Brown to “personality” issues with co-workers rather
than gender discrimination (Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19, 115:19–
24, 162:17–24, Ex. 8 at 8); (3) Mr. Baker never communicated
to Capt. Leonard that he believed Deputy Brown received
inadequate backup due to her gender (Leonard Depo. at 12:24–
13:11); and (4) in December 2022, Mr. Baker provided Capt.
Leonard with documentation that reflected Deputy Brown was
not actually receiving inadequate backup. (Pl. Depo. at
113:13–19, 115:19–24, Ex. 8 at 8; Leonard Depo. at 13:12-17).
Accordingly, the record reflects there are no genuine
disputes of material fact as to whether Mr. Baker made
complaints on Deputy Brown’s behalf regarding alleged gender
discrimination.
Second, the record does not support Mr. Baker’s
contention that his opposition to Lt. Varley’s request to
place Deputy Brown on a PIP constituted opposition to gender
discrimination. True, Mr. Baker testified that he refused to
put Deputy Brown on a PIP when he was asked to by Lt. Varley.
(Pl. Depo. at 142:21-145:12). However, when explaining the
reasons why he refused the PIP, Mr. Baker testified that his
concerns were (1) that it would be inconsistent treatment in
comparison to that of different deputies, and (2) it would be
improper to implement a PIP without first implementing lower-
level disciplinary actions, such as verbal counselling or a
written warning. (Id. at 143:21-144:6). Specifically, as to
the concern of inconsistent treatment, Mr. Baker testified he
was concerned that Lt. Varley was not suggesting a PIP for a
different female deputy, Deputy Emilius, even though “people
don’t like working with [her] either.” (Id. at 143:9-16). The
record therefore reflects that Mr. Baker’s opposition to Lt.
Varley’s request for a PIP was not opposition to alleged
gender discrimination against Deputy Brown. Instead, Mr.
Baker opposed the PIP because he was concerned about purported
inconsistent treatment between female deputies. Mr. Baker
provides no record evidence creating a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether his refusal to implement the PIP
was based on an objectively reasonable belief that Deputy
Brown was being subjected to gender discrimination.
Indeed, Mr. Baker testified that, at the August 6, 2022
meeting with Lt. Wilson, Mr. Baker did not have any basis or
belief that Deputy Brown was being singled out because of her
gender. (Pl. Depo. at 145:13-20). In response to being asked
when he came to believe that Deputy Brown’s treatment
constituted gender discrimination, Mr. Baker testified “it
wasn’t until she filed her complaint.” (Id. at 148:16-21).
The deposition also included the following exchange:
[SCSO’s Counsel]: Right. So let me ask you this,
then: In terms of her – because we talked about
under the general orders there was – obviously, as
her supervisor, you had a responsibility that if
you believed there was discrimination or
retaliation, you had an obligation to report that
to the director of human resources; is that
correct?
[Mr. Baker]: Right.
[SCSO’s Counsel]: Did you ever do that?
[Mr. Baker]: No, I didn’t. Again --
[SCSO’s Counsel]: But I’m assuming it’s because at
no point did you fully see or believe that there
was any – like, that she was actually being
discriminated against because of her gender; is
that right?
[Mr. Baker’s Counsel]: Object to the form.
[Mr. Baker]: Yeah. I have already stated that.
There was obvious harassment going on. It was
obvious that she wasn’t getting backup. But do I
know the underlying reason for that specifically?
I don’t. She has not made that specific allegation.
[SCSO’s Counsel]: Right. Which is why – I mean,
honestly, that’s why you never reported it to the
director of HR, right?
[Mr. Baker]: That would be correct, yes.
(Id. at 151:21-152:24). Thus, the record reflects that Mr.
Baker did not believe that Deputy Brown was being
discriminated against on the basis of her gender until at
least November 2022, when Deputy Brown submitted her internal
complaint to SCSO and when Captain Leonard initiated an
investigation. Thus, Mr. Baker’s earlier opposition to Lt.
Varley’s request for a PIP cannot constitute opposition to
gender discrimination.
In short, Mr. Baker has failed to establish that he
opposed an unlawful employment practice. In addition, though
he does not raise the argument, Mr. Baker fails to establish
that he made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under Title VII’s retaliation provision. “The participation
clause . . . protects proceedings and activities which occur
in conjunction with or after the filing of a formal charge
with the EEOC; it does not include participating in an
employer’s internal, in-house investigation, conducted apart
from a formal charge with the EEOC.” Total Sys. Servs., Inc.,
221 F.3d at 1174. Mr. Baker’s participation in SCSO’s internal
investigations of Deputy Brown’s complaints does not
constitute statutorily protected conduct for purposes of his
retaliation claims.
Accordingly, the Motion is granted because there are no
genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Mr. Baker
engaged in any statutorily protected conduct. Mr. Baker fails
to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
ii. Adverse Action and Causal Connection
Even assuming Mr. Baker could demonstrate that he
engaged in some statutorily protected conduct, SCSO argues
that he did not suffer an adverse employment action that had
any causal connection to such conduct. (Doc. # 34 at 18).
An adverse employment action for purposes of a Title VII
retaliation claim is an action that “well might have
‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.’” Burlington N. & Sante Fe Ry. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citation omitted). This
standard protects an employee from “a wider range of
retaliatory conduct than would be available under the
standard applied” in Title VII discrimination cases. See
Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 974 (11th Cir. 2008).
Nonetheless, an employee’s decision to engage in protected
activity “cannot immunize that employee from those petty
slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and
that all employees experience.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68.
As the Supreme Court has explained, “Title VII’s anti-
retaliation provision . . . applies only when the retaliatory
action is ‘materially adverse,’ meaning that it causes
‘significant’ harm.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri,
601 U.S. 346, 348 (2024) (citation omitted).
In attempting to establish an adverse employment action,
Mr. Baker states as follows:
In the present matter Plaintiff was threatened by
Varley when he told Baker that he could transfer
him anywhere; a statement that Plaintiff took as
[a] threat and attempt to intimidate him for having
opposed his efforts regarding Brown. A jury could
conclude that such a comment was intended to have
a “chilling effect” upon Plaintiff and any future
efforts to oppose Varley’s actions. . . . Likewise,
the work environment for Plaintiff and its
applicable context must be viewed in that Captain
Leonard stated that Baker would never be promoted
and then said Captain sat on Plaintiff’s oral board
for his attempt to promote in 2023, wherein Baker’s
attempt to promote was unsuccessful and his oral
board score was curiously low compared to others
arguably less qualified or experienced. The
foregoing conduct, coupled with the constructive
termination, constitute adverse actions, such that
an ordinary person could also be dissuaded from
continuing a career with an agency that has no
intention of promoting him.
(Doc. # 39 at 14) (citations omitted).
Again, Mr. Baker cannot argue that his alleged
constructive termination constituted an adverse employment
action for purposes of this retaliation case. Mr. Baker failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies as to that discrete
act. In any event, Mr. Baker has still failed to establish
that he suffered any adverse employment action.
Mr. Baker first argues that he suffered an adverse
employment action when Lt. Varley “told Baker that he could
transfer him anywhere; a statement that Plaintiff took as [a]
threat and attempt to intimidate him for having opposed his
efforts regarding Brown.” (Id. at 14). It is unclear from the
record when Lt. Varley made this comment to Mr. Baker, but
Lt. Varley acknowledges that he made the comment and that he
had the discretion to reassign Mr. Baker to different
geographical locations during his shift. (Varley Depo. at
36:14-38:5, 42:21-43:15). Lt. Varley testified that he made
the comment to suggest moving Mr. Baker to a different
geographic location because “his leadership style was
affecting my employees.” (Id. at 37:19-22).
Mr. Baker unpersuasively urges that “[a] jury could
conclude that such a comment was intended to have a ‘chilling
effect’ upon Plaintiff and any future efforts to oppose
Varley’s actions.” (Id.)(citing EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs.,
240 F.3d 899, 902 (11th Cir. 2001) (Barkett, C.J.,
dissenting)). To the contrary, a mere “uncomfortable
conversation with a coworker, without more,” does not
constitute an adverse employment action. Davis v. Collins,
781 F. Supp. 3d 1258, 1279 (M.D. Fla. 2025). See also Muldrow,
601 U.S. at 348 (requiring the alleged retaliatory action to
cause “significant harm”); Troupe v. DeJoy, 861 Fed. App’x
291, 295 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Title VII is not a ‘general
civility code’ and does not make ordinary workplace conflicts
actionable.”). Here, the record does not reflect that Lt.
Varley’s comment caused Mr. Baker any significant harm, as
Mr. Baker’s only allegation of harm arises under his claim
that the 2023 promotional process was unfair. Indeed, Lt.
Varley’s comment has little bearing Mr. Baker’s retaliation
claims, as Lt. Varley was not involved in the 2023 promotional
process and Mr. Baker no longer worked with Lt. Varley after
November 2022. (Pl. Depo. at 156:5-7; Varley Depo. at 12:22–
14:5, 39:17–40:1, 42:10–20); see also Davis, 781 F. Supp. 3d
at 1279 (comments by HR representative not involved in alleged
adverse employment actions deemed irrelevant). In sum, Lt.
Varley’s comment does not constitute an adverse employment
action that is causally connected to Mr. Baker’s alleged
protected conduct.
Next, Mr. Baker argues he suffered an adverse employment
action because (1) “Capt. Leonard stated that Baker would
never be promoted,” (2) Capt. Leonard sat on his 2023 oral
board, and (3) “his oral board score was curiously low
compared to others arguably less qualified or experienced.”
(Doc. # 39 at 14). The Court notes that Mr. Baker has not
cited any evidence for his contention that the other promotion
candidates were “less qualified or experienced” than himself.
As detailed in the sections above, SCSO promotes
candidates annually based solely on their performance during
a four-part test. (Pickavance Decl. at ¶ 3). Whether a
particular candidate is promoted depends entirely on both
that candidate’s final ranking and the number of lieutenant
positions vacated in a given year. (Pl. Depo. at 173:9-21,
Ex. 15). During the 2023 promotional year, Mr. Baker was
ranked tenth based on the outcome of the four-part test, and
higher-ranked candidates were ultimately promoted to five
vacant lieutenant positions. (Pickavance Decl. at ¶¶ 13-17).
Hypothetically, had 10 or more lieutenant positions become
available during the 2023 promotional year, Mr. Baker would
have been promoted into a lieutenant position, assuming he
remained employed. (Pl. Depo. 172:9–174:21).
Thus, the fact that Mr. Baker was not promoted in 2023
is not an adverse employment action alone. Instead, Mr.
Baker’s challenge to the 2023 promotional process is entirely
centered on his scores and final ranking. He believes that
(1) his scores were “curiously low” and would have been higher
if not for SCSO’s alleged retaliation, and (2) his higher
scores would have obtained him a higher ranking, such that he
would have been among the highest ranked candidates who were
selected for the five lieutenant vacancies.
Mr. Baker’s 2023 promotional process board consisted of
five evaluators: Capt. Leonard, Capt. Brian Ivings, Lt. Paul
Cernansky, Major Ryan Brown, and Capt. Kenneth Rainey.
(Pickavance Decl. ¶¶ 13, 15). All the evaluators were SCSO
employees, except for Captain Rainey who was an employee of
the Sarasota Police Department. (Id.). In his deposition, Mr.
Baker testified that he believes Capt. Leonard, Capt. Ivings,
Lt. Cernansky, and Maj. Brown (i.e., the SCSO employees) all
engaged in retaliatory conduct by giving him lower rankings
in the oral board and practical examination. (Pl. Depo. at
212:11-18). However, Mr. Baker also testified that he has no
knowledge of any comments or statements made by Capt. Ivings,
Lt. Cernansky, and Maj. Brown that indicate these three
individuals scored him in a retaliatory manner. (Id. at 213:1-
22, 216:9-13). Nor has Mr. Baker presented any evidence
indicating Capt. Ivings, Lt. Cernansky, and Maj. Brown
harbored retaliatory animus against him.
The only evidence that Mr. Baker presents to demonstrate
retaliatory animus among the promotional board is Capt.
Leonard’s alleged statement that Mr. Baker would never be
promoted. (Doc. # 39 at 14; Pl. Depo. at 212:19-25). Mr. Baker
does not identify anything else, beyond this statement,
indicating that Capt. Leonard was retaliating against him.
(Pl. Depo. at 212:19-25). According to Mr. Baker, Capt.
Leonard told Deputy Brown that Mr. Baker would never be
promoted, and Deputy Brown subsequently told Mr. Baker about
the statement. (Id. at 168:25-170:10). In explaining the
context of that comment, Mr. Baker testified that Deputy Brown
told him that Capt. Leonard said Mr. Baker would never be
promoted because he was “sloppy” and “cared too much about
being friends with [his] deputies.” (Id. at 170:1-6). Mr.
Baker acknowledges that he has no knowledge that this
statement reflects anything other than Capt. Leonard’s
personal opinion and that his belief in the statement’s
retaliatory animus is speculative. (Id. at 239:24-241:21).
Capt. Leonard testified that she does not recall making any
such statement. (Leonard Depo. at 28:9-23). Deputy Brown was
not asked about the statement during her deposition, but her
unsworn declaration provides that Capt. Leonard “stated to me
a couple times that Sgt. Baker would never be promoted.”
(Brown Decl. at ¶9).
SCSO argues the alleged statement by Capt. Leonard
constitutes inadmissible hearsay within hearsay, to which no
hearsay exception applies. (Doc. # 34 at 24, n.12). As the
Eleventh Circuit has held, “[t]he general rule is that
inadmissible hearsay ‘cannot be considered on a motion for
summary judgment.’” Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322
(11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). “This rule also applies
to testimony given on deposition.” Id. at 1323 (citation
omitted). Nevertheless, “a district court may consider a
hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary judgment
if the statement could be reduced to admissible evidence at
trial or reduced to admissible form.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Court finds that Mr. Baker’s deposition testimony
about Capt. Leonard’s statement is inadmissible hearsay, but
Deputy Brown’s declaration about that statement is not
hearsay. Deputy Brown’s recounting of the statement to Mr.
Baker is hearsay because it is presented for the truth of the
matter that Deputy Brown asserted, i.e., that Capt. Leonard
in fact made the alleged statement. But Deputy Brown’s
declaration about the statement is not hearsay because it is
not presented for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather
to demonstrate Capt. Leonard’s alleged retaliatory animus.
Accordingly, the Court will consider Capt. Leonard’s alleged
statement about Mr. Baker for purposes of this Motion.
Nonetheless, Capt. Leonard’s alleged statement, that Mr.
Baker would never be promoted, does not save Mr. Baker’s
claims from summary judgment. “To survive summary judgment,
the employee must present a story, supported by evidence,
that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the employer
engaged in unlawful retaliation against the employee. The
court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the employee and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor.
But inferences in favor of an employee can be based only on
evidence — not on speculation. A scintilla of evidence in
support of the employee’s position is always insufficient.
When an employer offers abundant and uncontroverted
independent evidence that no retaliation occurred, the
employer will be awarded summary judgment.” Berry, 84 F.4th
at 1311 (cleaned up).
Here, Mr. Baker presents a mere scintilla of evidence in
attempting to demonstrate retaliation, as he identifies no
evidence of retaliatory animus other than Capt. Leonard’s
alleged statement. In his deposition, Mr. Baker admitted that
his belief in the alleged statement’s retaliatory animus is
speculative. (Pl. Depo. at 239:24-241:21). Moreover, SCSO has
presented abundant and uncontroverted evidence indicating
that Capt. Leonard did not retaliate against Mr. Baker for
his purported opposition to alleged gender discrimination
against Deputy Brown. Indeed, the undisputed facts show that
(1) at the August 6, 2022 meeting with Lt. Wilson, neither
Mr. Baker nor Deputy Brown complained of any gender
discrimination (Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19, 115:19–24, 145:13–
146:14, 147:15– 149:4, 151:22–152:24, Ex. 8 at 3; Brown Depo.
at 25:10–26:15); (2) at the November 11, 2022 meeting with
Capt. Leonard, Mr. Baker attributed the problems faced by
Deputy Brown to “personality” issues with co-workers rather
than gender discrimination (Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19, 115:19–
24, 162:17–24, Ex. 8 at 8); (3) Mr. Baker never communicated
to Capt. Leonard that he believed Deputy Brown received
inadequate backup due to her gender (Leonard Depo. at 12:24–
13:11); (4) in December 2022, Mr. Baker provided Capt. Leonard
with documentation that reflected Deputy Brown was receiving
adequate backup (Pl. Depo. at 113:13–19, 115:19–24, Ex. 8 at
8; Leonard Depo. at 13:12-17); and (5) Mr. Baker never
expressed any concern to SCSO’s human resource director that
Deputy Brown’s issues with inadequate backup were related to
gender discrimination (Leonard Depo. at 12:1-13:11; Pl. Depo.
at 151:22–152:24).
Even if the Court were to accept Mr. Baker’s contention
that Capt. Leonard’s alleged statement reflected retaliatory
animus, the record does not support his argument that he
received lower scores because of any alleged retaliation. As
part of the regular scoring process, both the highest and
lowest evaluator scores are dropped. (Pickavance Decl. at
¶6). Excluding the highest and lowest scores, Mr. Baker’s
practical examination scores were 25, 25, and 24, and his
oral board scores were 33, 33, and 33. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15, Ex.
3). Accordingly, among the scores that were used to compute
Mr. Baker’s final ranking, the scores that Capt. Leonard gave
for Mr. Baker (i.e., 25 on practical examination and 33 on
oral board) are either equal to or greater than the scores
that other evaluators gave Mr. Baker during the 2023
promotional process. Indeed, the scores that Capt. Leonard
gave for Mr. Baker in the 2023 promotional process are largely
aligned with the scores she gave for Mr. Baker in the 2021
and 2022 promotional processes:
Captain Leonard's Scores for Mr. Baker
Year Practical Examination Oral Board
2021 48 out of 60 points (80%) 70 out of 100 points (70%)
2022 24 out of 30 points (80%) 35 out of 50 points (70%)
2023 25 out of 30 points (83%) 33 out of 50 points (66%)
(Pickavance Decl. at ¶¶ 9-16).
Accordingly, there are no genuine disputes of material
fact as to any adverse employment action or causal connection.
iii. Nonretaliatory Reasons and Pretext
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Baker has failed to
establish a prima facie case for retaliation. Accordingly,
the Motion is granted.
Even if Mr. Baker could establish a prima facie case,
however, SCSO has supplied legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons
for Mr. Baker’s 2023 promotional process scores and his final
ranking. Those reasons are reflected in the various evaluator
sheets for Mr. Baker’s 2023 promotional process. (Pl. Depo.
at Ex. 17). The evaluator sheets include multiple pages of
rubric-style scoring tables, rating scales, and spaces for
written notes by the evaluators. (Id.). Nothing in these
evaluator sheets reflects any indication of retaliatory
animus against Mr. Baker. Rather, all the evaluator notes
reflect scoring and commentary on Mr. Baker’s performance in
answering the relevant questions. (Id.). Mr. Baker does not
dispute that SCSO’s four-part promotional process tests
legitimate skills pertaining to the lieutenant position or
that SCSO administers identical examinations each year to all
lieutenant candidates. (Pl. Depo. at 172:5–173:8, 176:4–
178:18, 186:4–189:4, 195:2–12, 202:15–203:20, Ex. 12, Ex. 15;
Leonard Depo. at 20:2–23:8; Doc. # 34-17, Mruczek Depo at
11:4–13:9. 15:2–13, 20:3–21:7).
As SCSO has proffered nonretaliatory reasons, Mr. Baker
bears the burden of proving that SCSO’s proffered reasons are
pretext for retaliation. Berry, 84 F.4th at 1307. “To prove
that an employer’s explanation is pretextual, an employee
must cast enough doubt on its veracity that a reasonable
factfinder could find it ‘unworthy of credence.’” Id.
(citation omitted). “If the employer’s stated reason is
legitimate — in other words, if it might motivate a reasonable
employer to act — then the employee must address that reason
head on and rebut it. An employee cannot rebut a reason by
simply quarreling with the wisdom of it. Instead, she must
point to weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the justification. To
avoid a summary judgment, an employee must establish a genuine
dispute of material fact that the employer’s reason is
pretextual.” Id. at 1307-08 (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Here, in his attempt to show pretext, Mr. Baker
states in full:
Again, context matters, and a jury considering
Capt. Leonard’s statement regarding SCSO never
going to promote Plaintiff, with the failure to
promote while Leonard sat on the board, as well as
Varley’s intimidating threat to move Plaintiff
certainly call into question whether Defendant’s
proffered reason may indeed be a pretext to engage
in such retaliation; certainly a conclusion the
fact finders could reach. Fueling such a theory is
that, as Baker pointed out, the oral board and
practical sections of the promotional process are
very subjective and open to manipulation wherein a
decision maker with animus towards Plaintiff could
certainly adjust his scores in these areas such
that it has an adverse effect on Plaintiff’s
promotional opportunity. Plaintiff described that
he, based upon his experience as a Sergeant and
with the promotional process, successful projects,
and qualifications, did not believe it was logical
that his score should be so low in this subjective
area. As such, a jury could also conclude that
Plaintiff’s view is accurate and that Defendant’s
reason for not promoting Plaintiff was indeed a
pretext.
(Doc. # 39).
Mr. Baker fails to establish any genuine dispute of
material fact that SCSO’s proffered reasons are pretextual.
As stated earlier, Lt. Varley was not involved in the 2023
promotional process; thus Lt. Varley’s alleged “intimidating
threat” has no bearing on Mr. Baker’s scores and ranking.
Moreover, the mere scintilla of evidence of Capt. Leonard’s
statement fails to establish retaliatory intent. Even
considering Capt. Leonard’s statement, Mr. Baker still fails
to establish pretext because he fails to address head on and
rebut the proffered reasons for his scores in the evaluator
sheets, including Capt. Leonard’s evaluator sheets.
Finally, Mr. Baker’s assertions that SCSO’s promotional
process was subjective and “open to manipulation” fail to
establish pretext. Title VII does not prohibit employers from
utilizing subjective criteria in making employment decisions.
See Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (“A subjective reason is a legally sufficient,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason if the defendant
articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual bases
upon which it based its subjective opinion.”). Mr. Baker’s
conclusory belief that his scores were low fails to create
any genuine dispute of material fact.
iv. Convincing Mosaic
For the reasons above, Mr. Baker’s claims fail under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. Accordingly, the Court now turns
to assess his claims under the convincing mosaic standard.
Under that approach, “[t]he legal standard — and the
question for the court at summary judgment — is only whether
the evidence permits a reasonable factfinder to find that the
employer retaliated against the employee. That legal standard
applies no matter how an employee presents her circumstantial
evidence.” Berry, 84 F.4th at 1311; see also Ismael, 161 F.4th
at 765 (“[T]he court must proceed to ask whether the record,
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents
a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would
allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination [or
retaliation] by the decisionmaker.” (citation and quotation
marks omitted)). “Such evidence may include ‘(1) suspicious
timing, ambiguous statements . . . , and other bits and pieces
from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be
drawn, (2) systematically better treatment of similarly
situated employees, and (3) that the employer’s justification
is pretextual.’” Id. at 760.
Here, viewing the record in the light most favorable to
Mr. Baker, his circumstantial evidence fails to create a
genuine issue concerning SCSO’s alleged retaliation. First,
Mr. Baker failed to establish that he engaged in any
statutorily protected conduct that would give rise to alleged
retaliation. Second, Mr. Baker’s circumstantial evidence of
retaliation is insufficient. The only evidence that Mr. Baker
presents to establish SCSO’s retaliatory animus is (1) Lt.
Varley’s comment that he could transfer Mr. Baker, and (2)
Capt. Leonard’s alleged statement that Mr. Baker would never
be promoted. (Doc. # 39 at 14). Again, Lt. Varley’s comment
has no bearing on Mr. Baker’s claims because Lt. Varley was
not involved in the 2023 promotional process. Capt. Leonard’s
alleged statement is hardly enough to paint a convincing
mosaic, and Mr. Baker himself admits that his belief in its
retaliatory animus is speculative. (Pl. Depo. at 239:24-
241:21). For the same reasons, Mr. Baker’s arguments for
pretext fail. Further, Mr. Baker presents no evidence of
suspicious timing or systematically better treatment of
similarly situated employees. His conclusory assertions that
SCSO’s process was “open to manipulation” and that “a jury
could also conclude that [Mr. Baker’s] view is accurate” fail
to establish any genuine dispute of material fact.
The Motion is granted on all claims.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
(1) Defendant Kurt A. Hoffman’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. # 34) is GRANTED.
(2) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendant Kurt A. Hoffman as Sheriff of Sarasota County
and against Plaintiff Scott Baker on all counts of the
complaint.
(3) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to terminate all
pending deadlines and CLOSE the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this
27th day of March, 2026.
VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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