Shultz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

MATTHEW GARY SHULTZ,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-918-LHP

DUSTIN MUELLER, SMITH

PREDELUS and CITY OF ORLANDO,

Defendants

ORDER1

Plaintiff Matthew Gary Shultz, proceeding pro se, alleges claims against

Defendants Dustin Mueller, Smith Predelus, and the City of Orlando for violations

of his constitutional rights and retaliation. Doc. No. 70. Now before the Court is

Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss. Doc. No. 71. Plaintiff opposes. Doc. No.

72. For the reasons discussed herein, the motion (Doc. No. 71) will be granted in

part, and Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 70) will be dismissed

without prejudice and with leave to amend.

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge

and the Inexpensive Determination, Efficient, and Abbreviated Litigation (IDEAL)

Program. Doc. Nos. 59, 60.

I. BACKGROUND.

On May 27, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint against

Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging various constitutional rights violations.

Doc. No. 1. Defendants each moved to dismiss. Doc. Nos. 35, 41, 45. On October

23, 2025, following a preliminary pretrial conference held the previous day, the

Court issued an Order granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, and

denied as moot Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Doc. No. 69; see also Doc. Nos. 63,

67. In that Order, the Court discussed the concept of “shotgun pleading” and

provided Plaintiff with guidance on repleader in compliance with Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 8 and 10. Doc. No. 69. The Court also stayed discovery and all

other proceedings pending resolution of all pleading related matters. Id.

On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed his first amended complaint,

which is the operative pleading in this case. Doc. No. 70.2 Plaintiff asserts seven

(7) claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (a) against Mueller and Predelus for violations of

Plaintiff’s fourth amendment rights based on unlawful detention and excessive

force (Counts I and IV); (b) against the City of Orlando for violations of Plaintiff’s

fourteenth amendment rights based on “due process-firearms” (Count II) and for

violations of Plaintiff’s second amendment right to bear arms (Count III); (c) a

2 Plaintiff also filed a second amended complaint, which the Court ordered stricken

for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Doc. Nos. 73, 74.

municipal liability claim under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978) against the City of Orlando for inadequate training and supervision

(Count V); (d) a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim against Mueller and

Predelus (Count VI); and (e) a first amendment retaliation claim against the City of

Orlando (Count VII). Id. The entirety of the factual allegations set forth in the first

amended complaint are as follows:

On or about September 12, 2021, Plaintiff was detained and

arrested by Officer Mueller following a domestic dispute in which

Plaintiff was the victim. Despite visible injuries and evidence of

assault by his then-wife, Officers Mueller and Predelus treated Plaintiff

as the aggressor. Officer Mueller told Plaintiff that he was free to

leave, then reversed and arrested him without probable cause.

Plaintiff was tightly handcuffed behind his back, which caused severe

pain and later spinal complications requiring surgeries in 2023.

Plaintiff’s charges were dismissed and expunged. The Orlando Police

Department refused to return Plaintiff’s firearms after dismissal,

claiming they were lost. Plaintiff filed an Internal Affairs complaint,

which the City ignored.

Id. at 2-3.

Plaintiff does not incorporate any of these facts into any of his claims, rather

each claim simply consists of three (3) sentences: the first sentence identifies the

specific constitutional right at issue, the second identifies the defendant(s), and the

third states the violation and cites to legal authority. Id. at 3-5. As relief, Plaintiff

seeks compensatory and punitive damages exceeding $1,000,000.00; judgment

against Defendants; attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and any other relief the

Court deems just and proper. Id. at 6.

Defendants have jointly moved to dismiss the first amended complaint,

arguing that the pleading is both a shotgun pleading and fails to plausibly allege

any claims for relief. Doc. No. 71. Plaintiff opposes, and alternatively requests

leave to file a second amended complaint to cure any identified pleading

deficiencies. Doc. No. 72. The motion is now ripe for review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD.

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), so as to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). “Rule 10

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that each claim be separated into

separate counts and supported by distinct factual allegations.” Bagley v. City of

Tampa, No. 8:07-cv-218-T-27EAJ, 2007 WL 9723949, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2007)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)). Although a court must accept as true well pleaded

allegations, it is not bound to accept a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555).

These requirements apply to pro se litigants, although courts give a “liberal

construction” to pro se pleadings. Holsomback v. White, 133 F.3d 1382, 1386 (11th

Cir. 1998). But this leeway is not limitless, as courts cannot serve as “de facto

counsel for a party, or . . . rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain

an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)

(citation omitted). See also Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 281 (11th Cir. 2013)

(“[L]iberal construction is not the same thing as wholesale redrafting.”). Pro se

parties must comply with the minimum pleading standards set forth in the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules. Nawab v. LVNV Funding LLC, Case

No. 5:12-cv-129-Oc-10PRL, 2012 WL 12918283, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2012).

“Complaints that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often

disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty.

Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Shotgun pleadings generally

present in one of four ways: (1) a complaint “containing multiple counts where each

count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count

to carry all that came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire

complaint”; (2) a complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts

not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) a complaint that fails

to separate “into a different count each cause of action or claim for relief”; and (4)

complaints containing “multiple claims against multiple defendants without

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or

which of the defendants the claim is brought against.” Id. at 1321–23. Each of

these types of pleadings fails “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims

against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. And

while courts “construe pro se pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent

standard than those drafted by attorneys,” Arrington v. Green, 757 F. App’x 796, 797

(11th Cir. 2018), courts “have little tolerance for shotgun pleadings.” Vibe Micro,

Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018).3

Under Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While this pleading standard “does

not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555). A pleading must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555. For purposes of this analysis, exhibits attached to the complaint are

“part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); see also Saunders v.

Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1270 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[D]ocuments attached to a complaint or

incorporated in the complaint by reference can generally be considered by a federal

court in ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”).

3 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit are cited as persuasive authority.

See 11th Cir. R. 36–2.

III. ANALYSIS.

A. Sufficiency of Pleading.

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s first amended complaint remains a

shotgun pleading because none of the factual allegations or causes of action are

discretely numbered, and it is entirely unclear which, if any, facts are incorporated

into which claims. Doc. No. 71, at 3-4. Upon review, while Plaintiff has

attempted to separate out his claims and he no longer alleges facts in a lengthy

narrative (see Doc. No. 1), the Court agrees that the first amended complaint remains

a shotgun pleading – particularly the first and fourth type.4 Specifically, the first

amended complaint contains a single paragraph of facts, and Plaintiff nowhere

identifies which facts relate to which claims, leaving the Court and Defendants to

assume that the entire factual basis applies to each claim, which in turns leaves the

Court and Defendants without adequate notice of the grounds upon which each

claim rests. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321; Smith v. Knipe, No. 6:23-cv-1718-WWB-

LHP, 2024 WL 988853, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2024), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 6:23-cv-1718-JSS-LHP, 2024 WL 1619412 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 15, 2024)

(dismissing complaint as the first type of shotgun pleading where in several of the

counts the plaintiff “does not expressly reference any factual allegations

4 Plaintiff of course disputes that his first amended complaint is a shotgun pleading,

but provides no legal authority to support this assertion, and as previously mentioned,

alternatively requests leave to amend. Doc. No. 72.

whatsoever, but instead appears to incorporate the entire Complaint and several

exhibits.”); Uppal v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., No. 8:09-cv-634-T-33TBM, 2010 WL 3824220,

at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2010) (dismissing complaint as shotgun pleading where the

factual section was “not connected to the otherwise generally pled counts in any

meaningful way.”).

The first amended complaint is also the fourth type of shotgun pleading, as

several of the claims (Counts I, IV, VI) are against both Mueller and Predelus, but

Plaintiff does not specify which defendant is responsible for which acts or omissions

as to those claims. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321. See also Pyatt v. Gimenez, No. 1:20-

cv-20827, 2020 WL 4003495, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 2020) (dismissing complaint

where it “suffer[ed] from the second and fourth ‘sins’ of asserting multiple claims

against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants is

responsible for which acts or omissions and of alleging conclusory, vague, and

immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”); Hewlett

Packard Enter. Co. v. Digicom Tech., LLC, No. 6:18-cv-1847-Orl-40GJK, 2018 WL

7412892, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2018) (dismissing complaint as fourth type of

shotgun pleading where “each Count asserts claims against two named and twenty

unnamed Doe Defendants without delineating each Defendant's liability-creating

conduct.”).

The Court further agrees with Defendants that the first amended complaint

fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b), as it does not state its

facts and claims in separately numbered paragraphs. See Topa v. Kerbs, No. 2:18-

cv-475-FtM3-8MRM, 2018 WL 6249847, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2018) (dismissing

complaint that failed to “set out claims in separate, numbered paragraphs, which

makes it difficult to decipher the precise claims [plaintiff] brings,” and where

plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts to state plausible claims for excessive force,

false arrest, or entrapment).

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is due to be granted to the extent

that the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint as a shotgun

pleading.

B. Leave to Amend.

“If a court identifies that a complaint is a shotgun complaint, it generally must

give the litigant one chance to replead, with instructions on the deficiencies.”

Armstrong v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 23-10323, 2024 WL 1554758, at *2 (11th Cir. Apr.

10, 2024) (citing Vibe Micro, Inc., 878 F.3d at 1296); see also Woldeab v. Dekalb Cty. Bd.

of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted) (“Where a more

carefully drafted complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least

one chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the action

with prejudice.”); Lacy v. BP P.L.C., 723 F. App’x 713, 717 (11th Cir. 2018) (noting

that “it is usually an abuse of discretion for a district court to dismiss a pro se

complaint without granting leave to amend”).

As discussed above, Plaintiff has already been provided leave to amend, and

the Court previously addressed shotgun pleading standards with Plaintiff. Doc.

Nos. 67, 69. However, it is clear that Plaintiff is attempting to rectify his shotgun

pleading deficiencies, and in light of his pro se status as well as his request that he

be provided leave to amend (Doc. No. 72), the Court will afford Plaintiff one final

opportunity to assert claims that comply with all pleading requirements and assert

plausible claims for relief. See, e.g., Sbrocco v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Se., No. 2:19-

cv-59-FtM-99UAM, 2019 WL 2211112, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2019) (dismissing pro

se amended complaint as a shotgun pleading but permitting another opportunity

to replead); Jablonski v. Travelers Co., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-365-FtM-38CM, 2016 WL

614655, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2016) (giving pro se plaintiff leave to file a second

amended complaint after dismissal of amended complaint).

Because repleader is appropriate, Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

denied without prejudice as to their remaining arguments under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and as to their request for dismissal with prejudice.

Defendants are free to reassert these and any other appropriate arguments in

response to an amended pleading. See, e.g., Ally v. Hous. Auth. of City of Orlando,

Fla., No. 6:20-cv-1518-WWB-LRH, 2021 WL 2446760, at *4 & n.5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8,

2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2446712 (M.D. Fla. May 4, 2021)

(finding Rule 12(b)(6) arguments premature and declining to address them when

the shotgun complaint was due to be repleaded (citing Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d

1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001))); Alvarez v. Lakeland Area Mass Transit Dist., No. 8:19-cv-

1044-T-33SPF, 2019 WL 2868943, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 3, 2019) (“Because the

[Amended] Complaint is a shotgun complaint, repleader is necessary and the Court

need not delve into the merits of the claims at this juncture.” (alteration in original)

(quoting Madak v. Nocco, No. 8:18-cv-2665-T-33AEP, 2018 WL 6472337, at *3 (M.D.

Fla. Dec. 10, 2018))); Fabing v. Gill, No. 8:12-cv-2579-T-30TBM, 2013 WL 308900, at

*1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 25, 2013) (“[T]he Court need not address the merits of the Rule

12(b)(6) motion because . . . the complaint fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). See also Sibley v. Lakeland, No. 8:24-cv-2853-

VMC-AEP, 2025 WL 1043429, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2025) (declining to address

qualified immunity issue because the complaint was dismissed without prejudice

as a shotgun complaint).

That said, several of Defendants’ arguments regarding pleading deficiencies

appear to have merit, therefore the Court provides the following guidance on

repleader. Plaintiff is reminded that he must “plead[ ] factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must allege

clearly the legal basis of the cause of action, whether a constitutional provision,

treaty, statute, or common law. He must also allege in the body of the complaint,

in numbered paragraphs, under a section titled “Statement of Facts,” how each

named defendant participated in the activity that allegedly violated his rights.

Plaintiff must allege some causal connection between each defendant named and

the injury he allegedly sustained. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; 10. Plaintiff must also

separately allege, in numbered paragraphs, each cause of action in separate counts,

and must specifically identify which facts relate to which claim. Finally, Plaintiff

must specifically allege the harm or injury caused by the actions and/or omissions

of the defendants and the relief sought.

To the extent Plaintiff repleads claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must

allege “(1) a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d

1256, 1258 (11th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). See also Sherman v. Blair, No. 5:15-cv-

36-Oc-34PRL, 2015 WL 9685940, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 18, 2015), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 5:15-cv-36-Oc-34PRL, 2016 WL 99570 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 8,

2016) (listing elements of a § 1983 claim for false arrest as “(1) the unlawful detention

and deprivation of liberty of a person; (2) against that person's will; (3) without legal

authority or ‘color of authority’; and (4) which is unreasonable and unwarranted

under the circumstances.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted));

Lancaster v. Adams, No. 3:21-cv-559-BJD-JBT, 2021 WL 4502796, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct.

1, 2021) (discussing pleading requirements for an excessive force claim). And for

any claims asserted against a law enforcement officer in his or her individual

capacity, Plaintiff must also allege that each officer was acting within the scope of

his or her discretionary authority, and that each officer violated a clearly established

constitutional right. See Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019)

(“Generally speaking, it is proper to grant a motion to dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds when the complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly

established constitutional right.”).

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a municipal liability claim under Monell

against the City, he must allege facts showing “(1) that his constitutional rights were

violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate

indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the

violation.” See Grimes v. City of Orlando (Fla.), No. 6:19-cv-1811-Orl-40EJK, 2019 WL

13546192, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:19-

cv-1811-Orl-78EJK, 2019 WL 13546191 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2019) (quoting McDowell

v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).

Plaintiff is further advised that to state a claim for First Amendment

retaliation under § 1983, he must plead that: “(1) the plaintiff engaged in

constitutionally protected speech; (2) the defendant's retaliatory conduct adversely

affected the protected speech; and (3) the retaliatory action caused the adverse effect

on plaintiff's speech.” Hoffman v. Delgado, No. 2:23-cv-130-SPC-NPM, 2023 WL

6161796, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2023) (quoting Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247,

1250 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, No. 23-13213, 2025 WL 25856 (11th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025). To

the extent Plaintiff seeks to allege an equal protection claim based on his gender,

Plaintiff must allege that: “(1) he is similarly situated with other persons who

received more favorable treatment; and (2) his discriminatory treatment was based

on some constitutionally protected interest such as race or gender.” See Giraldo v.

City of Hollywood Fla., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted). And as for any procedural due process claims, Plaintiff must

allege “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest;

(2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Chen v. Lester, No.

6:08-cv-1954-Orl-22GJK, 2009 WL 10698631, at *14 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2009) (citation

omitted).

Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s second amendment claim, the Court draws

Plaintiff’s attention to persuasive authority in this Circuit suggesting that “there is

no cognizable cause of action by a gun owner against a government agency or

employee for [violations of the right to bear arms].” See Raymond v. Hillsborough

Cnty., Fla., No. 8:24-cv-1404-TPB-CPT, 2024 WL 4792016, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14,

2024), aff'd sub nom. Raymond v. Hillsborough Cnty., No. 24-14124, 2025 WL 2409096

(11th Cir. Aug. 20, 2025).

Because Plaintiff is currently proceeding without a lawyer, the Court again

directs his attention to the Court's website, http://www.flmd.uscourts.gov. On

the Court's homepage, Plaintiff can find basic information and resources for parties

who are proceeding without a lawyer in a civil case by clicking on the “For

Litigants” tab and then clicking on “Litigants without Lawyers.”

IV. CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 71) is GRANTED in

part, to the extent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc.

No. 70) as a shotgun pleading.

2. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 70) is DISMISSED

without prejudice.

3. Within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, Plaintiff shall

file a second amended complaint addressing the issues identified herein.

4. Withing twenty-one (21) days of the filing of Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint, Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond.

5. Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 71) is DENIED in all

other respects.

6. The stay of proceedings remains in effect pending further order from

the Court. See Doc. No. 69, at 3.

DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on March 27, 2026.

Ayr □□□□

LESLIE AN PRICE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties

AK