Etuk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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AKANIYENE WILLIAM ETUK,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER

24-CV-5180(EK)(SDE)

-against-

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT et

al.,

Defendants.

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AKANIYENE WILLIAM ETUK,

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

-against- 24-CV-5985(EK)(SDE)

CITY OF NEW YORK et al.,

Defendants.

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ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge:

Akaniyene William Etuk alleges that he was unlawfully

arrested and subjected to a forced period of hospitalization.

His request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s claims are

partially dismissed.

Background

Plaintiff filed two related cases in the Southern

District of New York. After the first action was transferred

here, he amended the complaint. See Am. Compl. (“5180 Compl.”),

No. 24-CV-5180, ECF No. 10. He then filed a second action that

was also transferred. See Compl. (“5985 Compl.”), No. 24-CV-

5985, ECF No. 1.

Both cases are based on the same events. Plaintiff

alleges that in September 2022, police officers entered the

apartment he sublet from Corey Copeland and “forcefully and

unlawfully” removed him. 5985 Compl. 3-4. He was placed in

handcuffs and taken to Brookdale Hospital, where he was forcibly

injected with medication. Id. at 4; 5180 Compl. 4. Following

his arrest, he contacted Copeland to get back his belongings

from the apartment. 5985 Compl. 4-5. Copeland referred him to

the police, who denied taking possession of Etuk’s belongings.

Id.

Plaintiff alleges a violation of his right to privacy,

excessive force, violation of due process, false arrest, false

imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and conversion. He

seeks monetary damages.

Legal Standard

A district court will dismiss an in forma pauperis

action when the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)

fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). At this stage, “the

court’s task is to assess the legal feasibility of the

complaint.” Lynch v. City of New York, 952 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir.

2020). In doing so, the court “must take the facts alleged in

the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in [the

plaintiff’s] favor.” In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503

F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2007).

Pro se complaints are “held to less stringent

standards” than pleadings drafted by attorneys, and the court

will read a pro se complaint liberally and interpret it to raise

the strongest claims it suggests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d

185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008). Still, a pro se plaintiff is not

exempt from “compliance with relevant rules of procedural and

substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.

1983). Thus, to survive at this stage, the complaint must plead

sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007).

A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Courts

“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.” Id.

Discussion

A. Consolidation

Courts may consolidate actions that “involve a common

question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). Plaintiff’s

two actions are entirely based on the same facts; therefore,

consolidation is proper. Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d

1281, 1285 (2d Cir. 1990). The Clerk of the Court is directed

to (1) consolidate these actions into the first filed case, No.

24-CV-5180, and (2) mark No. 24-CV-5985 closed. All future

filings are to be docketed in No. 24-CV-5180.

B. Section 1983 Claims

Etuk brings constitutional claims against all

defendants, alleging “right to privacy” violations, excessive

force, deprivation of due process, false imprisonment, and false

arrest, all which we construe as brought under Rev. Stat.

§ 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: “(1) that the defendants deprived

him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States; and (2) that they did so under color of state law.”

Giordano v. City of New York, 274 F.3d 740, 750 (2d Cir. 2001).

The Constitution regulates only the conduct of state actors.

Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir.

2002). A private party will be deemed a state actor only when

“there is such a close nexus between the State and the

challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly

treated as that of the State itself.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.

Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).

1. Claims Against the CCRB and EMS

The claims against the CCRB and EMS cannot proceed

because those bodies are not suable entities. The New York City

Charter provides that “all actions and proceedings for the

recovery of penalties for violation of any law shall be brought

in the name of the City of New York and not that of any agency

except where otherwise provided by law.” N.Y.C. Charter ch. 17,

§ 396. CCRB and EMS are both agencies of the City and therefore

not suable. See Carmody v. City of New York, No. 05-CV-8084,

2006 WL 1283125, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2006) (CCRB); Petway v.

City of New York, No. 02-CV-2715, 2005 WL 2137805, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 2, 2005) (EMS). Moreover, even if we construe

these claims as against the City, they fail as set forth below.

Plaintiff’s federal claims against these defendants are thus

dismissed.

2. Claims Against the City of New York

The claims against the City of New York do not

survive. To hold a municipality liable under Section 1983, “a

plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements: (1) an

official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be

subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional” or other federal

right. Lucente v. County of Suffolk, 980 F.3d 284, 297 (2d Cir.

2020). Plaintiff’s allegations concern the actions of

individual NYPD officers, and he does not plausibly allege that

an official policy or custom of the City of New York caused any

violation. Thus, his federal claims against the City of New

York are dismissed.

3. Claims Against Brookdale Hospital

The claims against Brookdale — a private hospital — do

not properly allege state action. Hall v. Brookdale Univ. Hops.

& Med. Ctr., No. 18-CV-3290, 2018 WL 3421453, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.

July 12, 2018) (“Brookdale is a private hospital . . . .”). In

general, private hospitals are not proper Section 1983

defendants because they do not act under color of state law.

White v. St. Joseph’s Hosp., 369 F. App’x 225, 226 (2d Cir.

2010). Plaintiff offers no plausible facts to suggest that

Brookdale meets the state-action requirement of Section 1983.

See McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 2014)

(reaffirming the principle that “forcible medication and

hospitalization . . . by private health care providers” cannot

be attributed to the state). Therefore, plaintiff’s federal

claims against Brookdale Hospital are dismissed.

4. Claims Against Corey Copeland

Plaintiff also alleges no facts to indicate that

Copeland is anything other than his private landlord. See 5985

Compl. 3-5. Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Copeland

acted under color of state law or conspired with another state

actor who did so; therefore, plaintiff’s federal claims against

him are dismissed. See, e.g., Grant v. Adult Protective Serv.,

No. 22-CV-775, 2022 WL 504409, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2022).

5. Claims Against the John Doe Officers

Plaintiff’s federal claims will proceed against the

John Doe Police Officers, for now, once the Officers are

identified. In accordance with Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72

(2d Cir. 1997) (per curiam), the Court hereby directs that the

Corporation Counsel of the City of New York ascertain the full

name of the Officers who are alleged to have been involved in

the September 17, 2022, incident at the subleased apartment,

including the names of the Officers who entered the apartment

and transported him to Brookdale Hospital. The Corporation

Counsel is to provide the full name(s) of the Officer(s) and the

address(es) where these individuals can currently be served; the

government need not undertake to defend or indemnify these

individuals at this juncture.

Pursuant to Valentin, Corporation Counsel is hereby

directed to produce the information specified above to the Court

within forty-five days from the date of this order. Once the

Officers are identified, plaintiff’s complaint shall be deemed

amended to reflect the full names of these individuals as

defendants, summonses shall issue, and the Court shall direct

the U.S. Marshals Service to serve these defendants.

C. State-Law Claims

Plaintiff also brings three state-law claims:

conversion, against Copeland and the Officers; negligent

infliction of emotional distress, against all defendants; and

intentional infliction of emotional distress, against all

defendants. Because a federal claim proceeds, the state-law

claims may also proceed for now.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s federal claims against the City of New

York, Emergency Medical Services, the Civilian Complaint Review

Board, Corey Copeland, and Brookdale Hospital are dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Plaintiff is granted twenty-eight days from the date of this

order to file a single, consolidated amended complaint bearing

docket No. 24-CV-5180. Any amended complaint should explain the

federal laws or constitutional provisions he believes were

violated and clearly identify each defendant who violated such

law.

The other claims may proceed as identified in this

order. Summons shall issue, and the U.S. Marshals Service shall

direct service on the defendants.

The Clerk of Court is respectfully ordered to mail a

copy of this Order to the Corporation Counsel, Special Federal

Litigation Division, and mark such a mailing on the docket.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),

that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith

and, therefore, in forma pauperis status, is denied for the purpose

of an appeal. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45

(1962).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Eric Komitee

ERIC KOMITEE

United State

s District Judge

D ated: June 15, 2026

Brooklyn, New Y ork