The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MAURICE WILKINS,
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-02026
v. (SAPORITO, J.)
MS. MILLER, .,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Maurice Wilkins, incarcerated at SCI-Huntingdon,
proceeds on First and Eighth Amendment claims against two dieticians
employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), after
they discontinued his gluten-free diet. Defendants have moved for
summary judgment. (Doc. 35).
Because the evidence does not support a reasonable inference that
the dieticians revoked Wilkins’s diet in retaliation for his complaints,
they are entitled to summary judgment on that claim. However, because
Wilkins has presented substantial evidence that he is being denied a
medically necessary diet, his Eighth Amendment injunctive relief claim
will proceed to trial against defendant Wilson. In addition, his request
for preliminary injunctive relief will be granted in part. Wilson will be
ordered to ensure that Wilkins is re-evaluated and provided any
medically necessary diet within 21 days of this memorandum and order.
I. BACKGROUND
Wilkins filed his initial complaint on November 21, 2024. (Doc. 1).
In brief, he alleged that he has Celiac disease and has required a gluten-
free and corn-free diet for many years. In May 2024, he learned that his
diet would not be “renewed” by the prison dieticians, because he bought
items from the commissary that conflicted with his diet and refused to
sign an agreement not to do so. He alleged that other inmates on
therapeutic diets “buy commissary not aligned with their diet,” and are
not “harassed” or denied their prescribed diet.
The Court permitted Wilkins to proceed on First Amendment
retaliation claims, and Eighth Amendment claims premised on denial of
a nutritionally adequate diet, against two dieticians, Felicia Miller and
Chelsea Wilson. (Doc. 8). The Court also construed Wilkins as
requesting preliminary injunctive relief and directed appropriate
briefing. (Docs. 5, 20, 24). Following defendants’ unsuccessful motion
to dismiss the complaint, (Docs. 17, 18), the case was stayed while the
Court attempted to recruit counsel for Wilkins. The Court was
unable to recruit counsel, and the case resumed with Wilkins litigating
. (Docs. 26, 34). Discovery has now completed, and the defendants
seek summary judgment.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the case. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A
dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all
inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the
movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.”
, 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994). The party seeking
summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion,” and demonstrating the absence
of a genuine dispute of material fact. , 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant
must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that
“the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to
the jury.” , 477 U.S. at 251-52.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must first
determine if the moving party has made a showing that it is
entitled to summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477 U.S.
at 331. Only once that prima facie showing has been made does the
burden shift to the nonmoving party to demonstrate the existence of a
genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); , 477
U.S. at 331. Both parties may cite to “particular parts of materials in the
record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored
information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those
made for the purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
III. MATERIAL FACTS1
Taking all facts and reasonable inferences in favor of Wilkins, the
1 No party has filed a proper statement of material facts. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56, M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. Plaintiff’s statement of material facts is
non-movant, the summary judgment record indicates as follows:
Wilkins, a prisoner in DOC custody since at least May 2013, has
Celiac disease and a corn allergy. Celiac disease causes inflammation of
the small intestine from the consumption of gluten, and “[p]eople with
Celiac disease cannot tolerate gluten.” There is no recognized cure, and
treatment generally requires “a lifelong gluten-free diet.” (Doc. 36-9,
¶¶ 5, 12, 13; Doc. 40-11). In May 2020, the DOC “confirmed” Wilkins’s
diagnosis of Celiac disease and prescribed him a “Gluten Free, No Corn
diet.” (Doc. 1-5 at 10). However, in August 2021, a Celiac Disease Panel
revealed “no clinically significant findings” related to Celiac disease.
(Doc. 36-10 at 10-11). Despite these apparently conflicting results, the
DOC and its dieticians acknowledged Wilkins’s need for a medical diet
through April 2024.
A. Wilkins’s Diet Complaints
Wilkins’s medical diet has been a subject of ongoing dispute
unsupported by citation to the record, (Doc. 40 at 5-7), while
defendants’ statement of facts consists largely of legal conclusions, see,
, (Doc. 36, ¶¶ 15, 17, 19, 20, 30, 35, 45). Nonetheless, in the interest
of considering this matter on the merits, we have reviewed all the
evidence the parties have submitted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). Wilkins’s
“Motion for Default Judgment” (Doc. 44), premised on perceived errors in
defendants’ statement of facts, will be denied.
between Wilkins and the DOC. (Doc. 40-4) (listing approximately 40
food-related grievances since December 2019). In 2022, in a previous case
in this district, Wilkins reached a settlement with a DOC dietician, Anne
Brown, on an Eighth Amendment claim premised on the alleged denial
of a medically adequate diet. , No. 1:20-CV-00540
(M.D. Pa.) (Docs. 66, 67, 72, 73).
More recently, on March 19 and April 2, 2024, Wilkins complained
to Craig Copper, Chief of the DOC’s Food Services Division, about the
content of his diet. In brief, Wilkins alleged that after a recent “refresh”
of the prison menu, numerous meals served to him had contained gluten
or corn. Although some of these items were removed after Wilkins
complained, “there were still some conflicts on the menu.” In addition,
Wilkins believed he was now receiving inferior food, such as “excessive
bean meals,” after the refresh. Wilkins claimed that the dieticians were
“using food as a punishment” for his prior complaints. E-mail exchanges
among DOC employees document their efforts to address the “conflicts”
within the new diet, such as removing certain foods that they discovered
to contain corn syrup. (Doc. 36-3 at 2-6). Ultimately, Copper responded to
the letters, emphasizing that Wilkins’s “medical need is for Gluten Free
No Corn ingredients,” not any particular food, and explaining the basis
for various food choices for his diet. ( . at 9-13).
B. Revocation of Wilkins’s Diet
The record shows that around the time of his letters to Copper,
Wilkins was sporadically refusing his diet tray and accepting a “regular”
tray at mealtimes. The DOC documented that on March 6, 7, 8, 18, and
20, he refused his diet tray, and on March 12, 14, and 15, he accepted a
regular tray. (Doc. 36-7). Wilkins was also running what he describes
as a “store” by purchasing foods from the commissary, including foods
that contain gluten and/or corn, and selling or trading them with other
inmates. Wilkins and other prisoners attest that he was not eating any
food containing gluten or corn; he was either obtaining foods to trade or
eating foods from regular trays that he believed did not contain gluten or
corn. (Doc. 40-6 at 3-8).
On March 25, defendant Chelsea Wilson, a DOC dietician, sent an
e-mail to various DOC employees: “If [Wilkins is] refusing the diet tray,
taking a regular tray and ordering gluten/corn containing items in
commissary[,] he is making it clear, he doesn’t want the diet and isn’t
experiencing side effects from these items.” (Doc. 36-4 at 3). On March
28, Wilson drafted an “addendum” to Wilkins’s medical notes describing
his commissary purchases: “pop-tarts, fish sticks in hot sauce, townhouse
crackers, oatmeal that isn’t identif[ied] as gluten free, bagels, flour
tortillas and sandwich cracker cookies. These items contain gluten and
likely . . . high fructose corn syrup.” (Doc. 36-8 at 153). Wilson told the
staff that if Wilkins’s diet was not medically necessary, he should be
removed from it. (Doc. 40-7 at 12).
The issue came to a head when Wilkins refused to sign a “Receipt
of Therapeutic Diet Rules” Form, DC-465-C. Under DOC policy, inmates
receiving a medical diet “shall have the rules for the Therapeutic Diet
Program explained to them by the medical staff and shall sign a receipt
for their copy of the rules by using the DC-465-C.” In general, the form
requires inmates receiving a medical diet to agree not to take more than
the prescribed amount of food, give away food, or receive food not
prescribed by the diet, among other rules.
A previous version of the form required inmates to “receive all
scheduled meals” and not possess “food items that are not prepared on
the diet tray,” but did not specifically address the commissary. (Doc. 40-
5). In April 2024, Wilkins was asked to sign an updated version of the
form, which required him to “[e]nsure that the food [he] purchase[s] from
commissary follows with the diet restrictions . . . Foods purchased via
commissary are presumed to the consumed by the person purchasing
them. I understand that if I make commissary purchases not part of my
therapeutic diet it shows that I do not want to be on a therapeutic diet
and I may be removed from the diet program.” (Doc. 40-6). Wilkins
refused to sign this form, believing that the additional stipulations were
unlawful and that he was being personally targeted for prior complaints
about his diet.
Wilkins’s medical records indicate that on April 12 and 18, he met
with physician assistant Gabrielle Smith to discuss his medical diet. The
records reflect that a scheduled renewal of Wilkins’s diet was “denied due
to commissary purchases.”2 Wilkins told Smith that he “only takes
regular trays to get the protein source (does not take any corn or gluten
products)” because he believed the diet tray offered inadequate protein.
He also admitted to “purchas[ing] items on commissary for other people.”
(Doc. 36-8 at 137, 141). On April 18, Wilson drafted an addendum to
2 The record is unclear as to the precise date Wilkins’s diet expired,
but that does not affect the outcome of the motion.
Wilkins’s medical notes to reflect that his “diet renewal is not approved
at this time”:
Inmate is purchasing items in commissary that contain
corn: 5 Cheetos crunch and 20 Oreos as well as gluten:
50 Ramen Noodles, 20 Oreos and 10 fish sticks in hot
sauce within the last month . . . The provider met with
the inmate who refused to sign the DC465-C receipt of
therapeutic diet rules . . .
Provider noted to this writer that sensitivity is very low
therefore a reaction is unlikely. Due to non-compliance
with therapeutic diet trays, commissary and refusal to
sign DC-465C receipt of therapeutic diet rules . . . the
requested gluten free, no corn diet renewal will not be
approved at this time. Inmate may request to be placed
back on a gluten free, no corn diet at any time after he
signs the DC-465C receipt of therapeutic diet rules and
commissary is compliant with dietary restriction.
(Doc. 36-8 at 145).
C. Aftermath of Revocation
After his diet was discontinued, Wilkins repeatedly complained to
medical staff about gastrointestinal symptoms or lack of adequate food.
On June 20, 2024, Wilkins attended a sick call and told PA Smith that he
had “not been eating his trays since his diet order was discontinued.”
(Doc. 36-8 at 114). Ultimately, he began to eat foods from the regular
trays that contained corn and gluten. On July 3, a provider documented
the following complaints:
Patient [complains of] not having a gluten free diet at
this time which is causing him GI distress. Having
stomach upset and loose bowels over the last week or so.
Believes that he is moving his bowels 10-15 times a day
at this time. Was trying to just eat commissary but it
became too expensive for him to maintain . . . Noting
today that he orders these foods and runs a store in the
jail selling the gluten containing foods to other inmates.
He denies ever eating any gluten containing foods until
the past week when he started eating the regular trays.
( . at 111). The provider wrote: “The dietician did note that if [Wilkins]
agreed to sign the therapeutic rules, she would approve his diet again.”
( . at 112).
On September 20, at a sick call, Wilkins complained of “excess
gas/bloating, abdominal pain, and diarrhea for the las[t] few months.” He
reported that he was eating the “normal” trays, and that his symptoms
occurred “almost every time he eats.” In response, nurse Jaclyn Talasky
“discussed [the] risk of eating gluten with [C]eliac disease. Inmate has
refused to sign DC 465C and dietician will not approve it otherwise due
to commissary purchases.” ( . at 90-91). On December 20, Wilkins
reported gas/bloating, diarrhea, fatigue and joint pain, which he
“believe[d] was related” to Celiac disease; he stated that he “tries to avoid
gluten in his diet but is limited.” ( . at 57).
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Wilkins proceeds on First Amendment retaliation claims, and
Eighth Amendment claims premised on the denial of a medically
adequate diet, against defendants Miller and Wilson.
A. Retaliation
To state a case of First Amendment retaliation, a
plaintiff must show that (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected
conduct, (2) he suffered an “adverse action” by prison officials sufficient
to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First
Amendment rights, and (3) the plaintiff’s protected conduct was a
“substantial or motivating factor” in the prison officials’ decision to take
the adverse action. , 857 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citations and quotations omitted). Typically, the plaintiff must show
“unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity
and the allegedly retaliatory action,” or “a pattern of antagonism coupled
with timing to establish a causal link.” , 834 F.3d 417,
424 (3d Cir. 2016).
In some cases, causation can be established “from the evidence
gleaned from the record as a whole.” . Even if the plaintiff states a
case, “the prison officials may still prevail by proving that
they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for
reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”
, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3d Cir. 2001).
In his complaint, Wilkins ascribed a variety of perceived problems
with his diet to his “prior civil suit and high volumes of grievances.”
(Doc. 1 at 13). However, his summary judgment brief indicates that the
alleged retaliatory action in this case is the revocation of the diet, not
“excessive bean meals” or any other complaint about the diet itself.3
(Doc. 40 at 11-13) (“It is clear that the complaints [led] up to this
retaliatory action upon the plaintiff . . . [A]ll the protected activity . . .
occurred from January to April of 2024 and the end result was the denial
[of the medical diet].”).
Even if Wilkins could state a case of retaliation
3 We have previously noted that if Wilkins wanted to pursue a
retaliation claim based on changes to diet menus, he had not plausibly
explained how these changes applicable to numerous inmates in the DOC
were intended to punish him specifically. (Doc. 7 at 9, n.4).
Regardless, the record indicates that the “refresh” of the menus arose
from a broader review of all therapeutic diets, not from Wilkins’s
protected activity. (Doc. 36-3 at 9-11, 13).
premised on the revocation of his diet, defendants are entitled to
summary judgment because they have shown that they would have made
the same decisions regardless of his complaints. The record indicates that
Wilson initially decided to revoke the diet because of Wilkins’s perceived
“low sensitivity” to gluten, his failure to take the appropriate trays at
mealtimes, his use of the commissary, and his refusal to sign the DC-
465C form. (Doc. 36-8 at 145). Regardless of whether that decision
was justified, it is beyond dispute that the defendants were acting to
enforce the prison’s own rules, which effectively forecloses any claim that
they acted out of retaliation. , 292 F.3d 152, 158-
59 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Even if prison officials were motivated by animus . . .
we cannot say that the disciplinary action taken against Carter was
retaliatory.”); , No. 4:21-CV-1957, 2024 WL 4341350, at *14
(M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2024).
Wilkins argues that prior complaints about his diet “plausibly
suggest” a retaliatory motive, but at this stage, plausibility is not enough.
Given defendants’ evidence of non-retaliatory reasons for the decision, he
must present evidence that the defendants were motivated in the way he
claims. He has not presented such evidence; to the contrary, the only
evidence that his complaints influenced the DOC’s decision-making is an
e-mail chain in which staff resolved to “double check” the menu for
accuracy. (Doc. 36-3 at 2-6). Therefore, defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on his retaliation claims.
B. Eighth Amendment
In general, an Eighth Amendment violation exists when a prison
official deprives an inmate of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,” and the official is deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s
health or safety. , 974 F.3d 431,
441 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
The Eighth Amendment therefore requires that inmates receive a
“nutritionally adequate diet,” , 263 F. App’x 192, 198
(3d Cir. 2008), free of food that “present[s] an immediate danger to the
health and well being of the inmates who consume it.”
, No. 3:18-CV-0209, 2023 WL 2527353, at *11
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2023) (quoting , 639 F.2d 559, 571
(10th Cir. 1980)). This may include the elimination of allergens or foods
that are dangerous to the inmate. , , , 145 F.
App’x 774, 776 (3d Cir. 2005) (lactose intolerance and allergy to eggs).
Claims of a denial of a necessary medical diet are evaluated by the
same deliberate indifference standards as other Eighth Amendment
medical care claims. , No. 3:18-CV-1437, 2019 WL
3784570, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2019) (listing cases). Under this
standard, deliberate indifference can be shown where the prison official
“(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally
refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment based on a
non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or
recommended medical treatment.” , 182 F.3d 192, 197
(3d Cir. 1999).
We agree with the defendants that Wilson’s initial decision to
revoke Wilkins’s diet does not itself demonstrate deliberate indifference.
Even if Wilson was wrong in her initial belief that Wilkins would show a
“low sensitivity” to gluten, that error would not be a constitutional
violation. , 833 F.3d 313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016) (an
“error in medical judgment” is not deliberate indifference). The initial
judgment was buttressed by evidence that Wilkins was obtaining gluten-
containing foods, which is a relevant consideration, although not
dispositive.4 Contrary to Wilkins’s argument, he has no constitutional
right of access to the commissary or to barter food.
, No. 2:07-CV-928, 2008 WL 2699988, at
*2 (W.D. Pa. July 7, 2008) (collecting cases).
However, the record indicates that Wilkins is no longer being denied
the diet based on a genuine assessment of his needs. Rather, Wilson and
the DOC are refusing to even consider renewing Wilkins’s medical diet
unless he signs Form DC-465-C, despite the medical staff’s own notes
suggesting that he needs it.5 , 95 F.4th 852, 860
4 , , , No. CIV.A. 06-160, 2008 WL 2693860, at
*8 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2008), report and recommendation adopted as
modified, 2008 WL 2693859 (W.D. Pa. June 30, 2008); ,
450 F. App’x 187, 189 (3d Cir. 2011) (religious diet discontinued based on
commissary purchases); DC-ADM 610, § 2(D)(7): “The
Department Dietitian may utilize the Meal Management System as well
as review commissary purchases to assess need for a therapeutic diet and
make appropriate recommendations regarding nutrition interventions.”
(Doc. 36-5 at 6).
5 (Doc. 36-8 at 90-91 (acknowledging the “risk of eating gluten
with [C]eliac disease. Inmate has refused to sign DC 465C and dietician
will not approve it otherwise due to commissary purchases”), 112 (“[I]f
[Wilkins] agreed to sign the therapeutic rules, [Wilson] would approve
his diet again.”); Doc. 36-9 at 7 (“The Plaintiff continues to have
the opportunity to return to medical at any time to request a gluten free,
no corn diet and sign the DC-465C that was noted on the 4/12/2024 diet
order . . .”). The conditional offers to restore Wilkins’s diet further suggest
(4th Cir. 2024) (despite plaintiff’s commissary purchases, medical staff’s
“words and actions” contradicted any justification for later revoking his
gluten-free diet). This policy potentially violates the Eighth Amendment;
if Wilkins needs a nutritionally adequate diet, the DOC must provide it.6
From this record, a reasonable jury could infer Wilson’s deliberate
indifference to his need for a medical diet.7
Defendants argue that Wilkins’s commissary purchases equate to
Wilson’s awareness of the medical need, given her statement that such
diets “should always be avoided when medically able.” (Doc. 40-7 at 12).
6 There are cases in which inmates refused to accept food from staff
in a manner consistent with prison safety, and courts determined that
denying them food was not an Eighth Amendment violation. , ,
, 441 F.3d 543, 544-45 (7th Cir. 2006) (inmate wore a
sock that could be used as a weapon, and his cell walls were smeared with
blood and feces that he refused to clean); , 138 F.3d 211,
214-15 (5th Cir. 1998) (during a lockdown caused by violence in the
prison, inmate refused to face the wall and assume a “non-threatening
position” to receive food in his cell). Defendants do not point to any such
safety concerns here, and none are apparent from the record.
7 Defendants cite to Wilkins’s medical records for the proposition
that Wilkins cannot “proffer competent, admissible evidence that any
perceived symptoms were actually caused by his diet’s non-renewal”
(Doc. 36 at 10, ¶ 34), but it is unclear how the cited records support that
statement. Nor is Wilkins required to specifically establish damage to his
“long-term health” (Doc. 37 at 20) to sustain an Eighth Amendment
claim; the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” is sufficient.
, 182 F.3d at 197.
“non-compliance” or a “refusal to follow treatment” that essentially
waives an inmate’s claim to a medical diet8, but that position is not
supported by case law. Commissary purchases are not dispositive of an
inmate’s dietary needs, particularly where there is no evidence that the
person has consumed the disputed food.9 , 95 F.4th at 855,
860; , 2023 WL 2527353, at *6 (finding an issue of fact as to an
inmate’s dietary needs where the record was “unclear” if he had
consumed his non-compliant commissary purchases);
, No. 7:18-CV-00504, 2021 WL 969201, at *11 (W.D. Va. Mar. 15,
2021); , No. 2:19-CV-00366-
JPH-MJD, 2020 WL 2097783, at *2 (S.D. Ind. May 1, 2020) (inmate
8 , , (Doc. 37 at 25) (“Plaintiff’s failure to conform to the rules
of his therapeutic diets to satisfy his wants does not enable him to
produce competent, admissible evidence to claim Defendants did not
meet, or attempt to meet, his medical needs.”).
9 Defendants’ reliance on , No. 13-CV-1973, 2013
WL 3914644 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2013), is unpersuasive. In that case, a
prisoner refused medication and then tried to claim that the same drug
was medically necessary. . at *5. By contrast, Wilkins has
consistently claimed that he has a medical need for a gluten-free diet,
and defendants present no evidence that he ingested any food contrary
to that diet before they revoked it.
showed reasonable probability of success on the merits after his “gluten-
free diet for twelve years [was] discontinued” based on commissary
purchases).
Clearly, the DOC can consider Wilkins’s tray choices or commissary
purchases as they “ for a therapeutic diet.” DC-ADM 610,
§ 2(D)(7) (emphasis added). It can impose “appropriate discipline” on
inmates for taking food to which they are not entitled, as it has
apparently done in the past. (Doc. 40-5 at 2). It can also limit
Wilkins’s use (or abuse) of the commissary. DC-ADM 815, § 2;
, 2008 WL 2699988, at *2; , No. 05-CV-469-S-
LMB, 2007 WL 2782246, at *14 (D. Idaho Sept. 21, 2007) (“[P]risoners
have no right to barter . . . and inmates’ desire to barter need not be
accommodated.”). What the DOC cannot do is knowingly deprive Wilkins
of a nutritionally adequate diet as a tool to enforce these rules, and the
record suggests that at least a genuine dispute exists that it is doing so
now. Because the record does not show defendant Miller’s personal
involvement in this alleged violation, summary judgment will be granted
as to Miller but denied as to Wilson.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. We
agree that given the unusual facts of this case, there was not clearly
established law from which every reasonable official could infer that
Wilson’s conduct was unconstitutional. Therefore, she is entitled to
summary judgment on Wilkins’s claim for money damages, leaving only
his claim for injunctive relief.
Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages
liability unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.
, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). Qualified immunity applies to
government officials performing discretionary functions unless (1) the
“facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate a
constitutional violation,” and (2) the alleged right was clearly established
at the time of the violation. , 88 F.4th 275,
281 (3d Cir. 2023). For a right to be clearly established, courts “do not
require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed
the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” ,
575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015) (quoting , 563 U.S. 731, 741
(2011)). A clearly established right is one so apparent that “every
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is unlawful.”
, 957 F.3d 165, 169 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting
, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “Thus, so long as an official
reasonably believes that his conduct complies with the law, qualified
immunity will shield that official from liability.” , 669
F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012).
Although the evidence precludes summary judgment, we do not find
clearly established law sufficient to put these issues “beyond debate.”
Specifically, we do not find case law that clearly delineates a prison
official’s obligations when a prisoner continually obtains food that is
“non-compliant” with his needed medical diet, but is not consuming that
food.10 Therefore, summary judgment will be granted on Wilkins’s claims
10 For example, , 95 F.4th 852 (4th Cir. 2024),
although instructive, is distinguishable from this case. In , the
plaintiff reported “vomiting blood” and “sharp abdominal pain” to a
prison doctor, was sent to an emergency room, and returned to the prison
with a diagnosis of Celiac disease and instructions for a “strict gluten free
diet.” That diet was discontinued by the same doctor within a week, based
in part on “reports” that the prisoner had obtained gluten-containing
foods from the commissary. 95 F.4th at 855. Although
demonstrates that commissary use is not dispositive of medical need,
there is no indication that the plaintiff in that case was trying to possess
gluten-containing foods on an ongoing basis.
for monetary damages, and the case will proceed on his claim for
injunctive relief against Wilson.
V. MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
Wilkins also requested preliminary injunctive relief. As described
above, the record suggests that Wilson is denying Wilkins a medical diet
despite her awareness of his need for that diet. Therefore, we will order
that Wilkins be re-evaluated and provided a medically appropriate diet.
Preliminary injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy,” for
which the movant “must establish entitlement to relief by clear
evidence.” , 897 F.3d
518, 526 (3d Cir. 2018). On a request for preliminary injunctive relief,
courts consider four factors: (1) whether there is a “reasonable
probability” of success on the merits, (2) whether denial would cause
irreparable harm to the plaintiff, (3) whether the relief would cause
greater harm to the non-moving party, and (4) whether the relief would
be in the public interest.
, 39 F.4th 95, 102-03 (3d Cir. 2022). The first two
factors are “prerequisites that the moving party must establish.” .
(citing , 949 F.3d 116,
133 (3d Cir. 2020)). These two factors “are correlative: that is, the weaker
the merits showing, the more will be required on the showing of
irreparable harm, and vice versa.” , 452 F. Supp.
3d 150, 163 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (citations omitted). In the prison context,
“[p]reliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no
further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires
preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct
that harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a).
Wilkins has demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on
the merits of his Eighth Amendment injunctive relief claim. Most
prominently, the evidence suggests that the medical staff have
acknowledged his apparent need for the diet even after it was
discontinued, and that “if [Wilkins] agreed to sign the therapeutic rules,
[Wilson] would approve his diet again.” § IV.B, . The evidence
indicates that Wilkins has suffered from gas, bloating, stomach pain,
diarrhea, and excessive bowel movements, which can constitute
irreparable harm justifying preliminary injunctive relief. ,
, 2020 WL 2097783, at *2-3 (Celiac inmate’s “pain, cramps, and
diarrhea” following revocation of gluten-free diet constituted irreparable
harm); , No. 1:18-CV-03651-JRS-
MPB, 2020 WL 374436, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 23, 2020); ,
No. 12-CV-01171-JST, 2014 WL 4802745, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2014).
Defendants argue that Wilkins is not suffering irreparable harm
because he can still “opt for those trays and foods which he knows to be
non-allergenic.” This characterization ignores the undisputed evidence of
what he is actually eating. After the diet was revoked, he initially relied
on commissary to obtain gluten-free food, but he reported to the medical
staff that it “became too expensive for him to maintain.” By defendants’
own admission, the “regular” trays now served to Wilkins are unsuitable
for someone with Celiac disease. (Doc. 36-9, ¶ 12). Defendants’
analogy to a case in which a prison provided “several food lines in the
dining room from which inmates [could] self-select” ( , No.
3:10-CV-2401, 2012 WL 1677278, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2012)) is
unpersuasive, particularly when defendants are simultaneously arguing
that Wilkins should not have “an experience.” (Doc. 37 at 25).
The third factor, the possibility of greater harm to the non-moving
party, favors Wilkins. In the prison context, courts must treat such
concerns “with great caution because of the intractable problems of
prison administration.” , 721 F. App’x 109, 111 (3d
Cir. 2018) (quotation and citation omitted). However, in this case, a
narrowly tailored injunction imposes no greater burden on the DOC than
what it has done for years to accommodate Wilkins’s dietary needs,
consistent with its constitutional obligation to any inmate for whom it is
unsafe to eat gluten or corn.
As to the fourth factor, we find that limited, narrowly drawn
injunctive relief is in the public interest. Although “[t]he public has an
interest in judicial deference to prison officials,” , No. 24-
CV-6077, 2025 WL 823946, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2025), it also has an
interest “that government employees, including prison officials and staff,
do not violate the Constitution.” , No. 2:23-CV-187, 2023
WL 6130605, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2023). We defer to the prison’s
medical professionals to assess Wilkins’s medical needs, as that is the
“least intrusive means” to secure his constitutional rights. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a). However, we will order that he receive an updated medical
evaluation, to ensure that he is not deprived the constitutional minimum
of a “nutritionally adequate” diet for a non-medical reason.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on (1) all retaliation claims, due to the lack of evidence of a
retaliatory basis for their actions; (2) all claims against Miller, due to her
lack of personal involvement; and (3) all claims for monetary damages,
because defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The case proceeds
on Wilkins’s Eighth Amendment injunctive relief claim against Wilson.
Wilkins’s request for preliminary injunctive relief will be granted in
part. Within 21 days of this memorandum and order, Wilson and/or other
appropriate staff must medically evaluate Wilkins for a therapeutic diet.
Wilson must file a notice with the Court (1) describing the outcome of the
evaluation; (2) specifying the diet, if any, for which Wilkins has a medical
need; and (3) confirming that Wilkins is receiving the necessary diet. If
the evaluation indicates that Wilkins does not require a therapeutic diet,
the notice shall detail the basis for that conclusion, with reference to up-
to-date medical evidence.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: June 25, 2026
JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.
United States District Judge