Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SUSQUEHANNA LEGAL AID FOR No. 4:26-CV-00849

ADULTS AND YOUTH,

(Chief Judge Brann)

Plaintiff,

v.

UNION COUNTY CRIMINAL

JUSTICE ADVISORY BOARD,

UNION COUNTY MENTAL

HEALTH ADVISORY COMMITTEE,

JUDGE JEFFREY ROWE,

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS NON-

JUDICIAL CAPACITY, JUDGE

MICHAEL PIECUCH,

INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS NON-

JUDICIAL CAPACITY, JOHN DOES

1-20, MEMBERS OF THE

CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADVISORY

BOARD, AND JOHN DOES 21-40,

MEMBERS OF THE MENTAL

HEALTH ADVISORY COMMITTEE,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JUNE 24, 2026

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Susquehanna Legal Aid for Adults and Youth (“SLAAY”) initiated

this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Union County on March 4, 2026,

asserting constitutional and statutory claims arising from its alleged exclusion from

certain county advisory bodies.1 The Union County Criminal Justice Advisory Board

and Union County Mental Health Advisory Committee (“Defendants”) subsequently

removed the matter to this Court on April 2, 2026.2

On April 9, 2026, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a supporting brief.3

Plaintiff filed no response. Consequently, on May 15, 2026, this Court entered an

Order directing Plaintiff to respond to the pending motion no later than May 29,

2026, and expressly warned that failure to do so would result in the motion being

deemed unopposed and the Court’s consideration of dismissal under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 41(b).4

Plaintiff did not respond. Nor did Plaintiff request an extension of time, seek

reconsideration of the Court’s Order, or otherwise prosecute this action. Because

Plaintiff has failed to prosecute its claims, dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate.

II. LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that a defendant may move to

dismiss an action when a plaintiff fails to prosecute or fails to comply with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or a court order.5 The rule further recognizes the

1 See Doc. 1-2.

2 Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1-6.

3 See Docs. 4, 5.

4 See Doc. 6.

5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

district court’s inherent authority to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to

prosecute.6

Before dismissing an action under Rule 41(b), courts within the Third Circuit

must balance the six factors (“Poulis factors”) identified in Poulis v. State Farm Fire

& Casualty Co.7 Those factors are:

(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice

to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and

respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the

conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5)

the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an

analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the

claim or defense.8

In conducting this analysis, “no single Poulis factor is dispositive” and “not

all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.”9

III. ANALYSIS

The Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint. Each

factor is discussed in turn.

A. The extent of the party’s personal responsibility.

The first Poulis factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. The United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has distinguish between attorney misconduct

6 See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962).

7 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984).

8 Id. at 868-69.

9 Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

and client misconduct.10 Here, however, Plaintiff is a legal-services organization

represented by its own counsel, Paige Martineau, Esq.11 Thus, Plaintiff itself bears

responsibility for prosecuting this action and is not subject to decisions made by

counsel that are without its control.

After Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on April 9, 2026, Plaintiff

failed to file any response.12 This Court thereafter entered an Order directing Plaintiff

to respond no later than May 29, 2026.13 Plaintiff failed to respond to that Order and

offered no explanation for its noncompliance. Because Plaintiff bears sole

responsibility for these failures, this factor strongly favors dismissal.14

B. Prejudice to the adversary.

The second Poulis factor also favors dismissal. Prejudice includes the burden

imposed by a party’s failure to move litigation toward resolution.15 Defendants

removed this action to federal court and promptly moved to dismiss the complaint.16

10 See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.

11 Martineau v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 4:25-CV-01848, 2025 WL 2969152, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17,

2025); See also John Beauge, Emergency Law License Suspension Sought for Central Pa.

Attorney After String of Complaints, PENNLIVE, Feb. 19, 2026,

https://www.pennlive.com/news/2026/02/emergency-law-license-suspension-sought-for-

central-pa-attorney-after-string-of-complaints.html (last visited June 16, 2026) (stating “Paige

J. Martineau, who operates Susquehanna Legal Aid for Adults and Youths (SLAAY) in

Williamsport . . .”).

12 Docs. 4, 5.

13 Doc. 6 at 2.

14 Cf. Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that since Plaintiff was

proceeding pro se, his failure to comply with a court order was his responsibility).

15 See Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222-23 (3d Cir. 2003).

16 Docs. 1, 4, 5.

Plaintiff’s refusal to respond has required Defendants to continue defending an

action that Plaintiff appears unwilling to prosecute. Plaintiff’s inaction has also

impeded the efficient resolution of the litigation and unnecessarily prolonged the

proceedings. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

C. A history of dilatoriness.

The third Poulis factor, history of dilatoriness, is neutral, as the case is in its

early stages and there is no such history to consider.17

D. Whether the conduct was willful or in bad faith.

The fourth Poulis factor also weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. The Third

Circuit has held that “willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.”18

The Third Circuit has also held that willfulness, and not mere negligence or

inadvertence, occurs when a party fails to comply with court orders, resulting in the

prolongment of proceedings.19 Although a court need not find subjective bad faith,

dismissal is appropriate where the record demonstrates deliberate disregard of

litigation obligations.20

This Court expressly advised Plaintiff that failure to respond could result in

dismissal proceedings pursuant to Rule 41(b).21 Despite that warning, Plaintiff

17 See Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868-69 (asserting that no single factor is dispositive, and not all factors

must weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal may be imposed).

18 Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 875 (3d Cir. 1994).

19 Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191.

20 Id.

21 Doc. 6 at 2.

neither filed a response nor requested additional time. Plaintiff likewise failed to

communicate with this Court in any fashion following entry of the May 15, 2026

Order. Given Plaintiff’s status as a legal-services organization and Ms. Martineau’s

position as a licensed attorney, this Court cannot attribute Plaintiff’s failure to

respond to unfamiliarity with federal civil procedure. Rather, the record supports the

conclusion that Plaintiff consciously disregarded its obligations. Accordingly, this

factor strongly favors dismissal.

E. The effectiveness of alternative sanctions.

The fifth Poulis factor favors dismissal. Before dismissing an action, courts

must consider whether lesser sanctions would adequately address the misconduct.22

This Court concludes that alternative sanctions would be ineffective. Plaintiff

ignored a dispositive motion and subsequently ignored a Court Order. Plaintiff has

already demonstrated an unwillingness to participate in the litigation and under these

circumstances, no sanction short of dismissal appears capable of moving this case to

conclusion.

F. The meritoriousness of the claim or defense.

The sixth Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal. In assessing the

meritoriousness factor, the Court need not definitively resolve the merits of the

22 Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869.

underlying claims. Rather, the Court must determine whether the allegations of the

pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery.23

In their brief in support, Defendants assert substantial arguments challenging

both the procedural and substantive viability of Plaintiff’s claims.24 Defendants

contend that Plaintiff failed to effect proper service under Pennsylvania law prior to

removal and has not remedied that deficiency following removal.25 Defendants

further argue that the Union County Criminal Justice Advisory Board and Union

County Mental Health Advisory Committee are not “persons” subject to suit under

42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, or 1986.26 Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of

Plaintiff’s constitutional and statutory claims on multiple additional grounds.27

Having reviewed the complaint, the motion to dismiss, and Defendants’

supporting papers, this Court concludes that Defendants have raised substantial

questions regarding whether Plaintiff can maintain the causes of action asserted in

this case. Plaintiff’s failure to file a response has left those arguments entirely

unrebutted despite being afforded an opportunity to do so.28 Accordingly, this Court

finds that the sixth Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

23 Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70.

24 See Doc. 5.

25 Doc. 5 at 5-6.

26 Doc. 5 at 6-7.

27 See generally Doc. 5 (specifically, subheadings C, D, E, F, and G).

28 See Doc. 6 at 2.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge