Young

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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JAMIE E. YOUNG,

Plaintiff, ORDER

18-CV-4216 (JS)(JMW)

‑against‑

MARK LUGO, et al.

Defendants.

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APPEARANCES

For Plaintiff Frederick K. Brewington, Esq.

Jamie Young: Albert Darnell Manuel, III, Esq.

Cobia Malik Powell, Esq.

Law Offices of Frederick K. Brewington

556 Peninsula Boulevard

Hempstead, New York 11550

For Defendant

Dr. Carl Goodman: Greg M. Mondelli, Esq.

Amy E. Bedell, Esq.

Carl A. Formicola, Esq.

Jessica D. Klotz, Esq.

Lewis Johs Avallone Aviles, LLP

1377 Motor Parkway, Suite 400

Islandia, New York 11749

SEYBERT, District Judge:

Pursuant to Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Defendant Dr. Carl Goodman (“Dr. Goodman”) objects to

several portions of the February 6, 2026 Report and Recommendation

issued by Magistrate Judge James M. Wicks. (“R&R”, ECF No. 243.)

Specifically, Dr. Goodman objects to the R&R’s recommendation that

this Court deny his Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”, ECF No.

220) on claims “for Fourth Amendment violations, assault and

battery, medical malpractice, and false imprisonment” made by

Plaintiff Jamie Young (“Plaintiff”) related to a sedation and

rectal examination of Plaintiff while in law enforcement custody

on December 14, 2017. (See Obj., ECF No. 247; Supp. Obj., ECF No.

250; Reply, ECF No. 252.) Judge Wicks reached this conclusion by

finding Dr. Goodman conducted the examination under color of state

law and is not entitled to qualified immunity. Although this Court

agrees with Judge Wicks’s state-action analysis and conclusion, it

finds Dr. Goodman is entitled to qualified immunity. (See

generally R&R.) Dr. Goodman’s objections are thus SUSTAINED in

part and OVERRULED in part, such that Dr. Goodman’s Motion is

GRANTED, as provided for below.

BACKGROUND

I. Undisputed Facts

The Court draws all undisputed facts from the Rule 56.1

materials submitted by Plaintiff and Dr. Goodman (collectively,

the “Parties”). (See Pl.’s 56.1 Response, ECF No. 221-16, attached

to Opp’n; Defs.’ 56.1 Response, ECF No. 222-1, attached to Reply.)

On December 14, 2017, Parole Officer and Defendant Mark Lugo

(“Lugo”) arrested Plaintiff pursuant to a warrant for allegedly

violating his parole by fraternizing with Shati Roy (“Roy”), a

known parolee. (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff was serving

parole for several convictions from 1996, including for multiple

drug-related crimes. (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 6; Certificate of

Incarceration, ECF No. 220-44, attached to Motion.) Plaintiff has

a history of cocaine abuse and has spent time in drug

rehabilitation, which is reflected in his medical records. (Pl.’s

56.1 Response ¶¶ 8, 52; Brookhaven Hospital Medical Records, ECF

No. 220-36, attached to Motion.) Lugo testified that, at the scene

of the arrest, Roy was searched and found to be in possession of

crack cocaine in his body. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.)

After he was arrested and taken into custody, Lugo and

Parole Officer and Defendant Orrison McLean drove Plaintiff to the

Suffolk County Police Department’s Fifth Precinct. (Id. ¶ 5.)

During this car ride, Plaintiff became “fidgety in the back seat”

and allegedly “continued to move around.”1 (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11 (reciting

Lugo’s testimony).) After arriving at the Fifth Precinct, Lugo and

Parole Officer and Defendant Alberto Acevedo (“Acevedo”) asked

Plaintiff to bend down and squat after he had already removed his

clothes. (Id. ¶ 18.) During the search, Lugo observed something

in Plaintiff’s rectum resembling a “bubble.” (Id. ¶¶ 20-22.)

1 Plaintiff disputes that he put his hands in his pants during the

car ride, but does not dispute that he became “fidgety” or made

certain “movements” while in the car. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.)

Although Plaintiff maintained the “bubble” was a hemorrhoid, Lugo

believed it may have been a bag of drugs. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 26.)

After the search and at the direction of his supervisor,

Lugo transported Plaintiff to Brookhaven Memorial Hospital Medical

Center (“Brookhaven Hospital” or the “Hospital”), accompanied by

Parole Officer and Defendant Alonzo Payton (“Payton”). (Id. ¶¶ 28,

32.) Upon arriving in front of Brookhaven Hospital, Plaintiff

exhibited several instances of erratic and non-compliant behavior,

including: refusing requests from Lugo and Payton to exit the

vehicle (Id. ¶ 37); physically resisting attempts from Lugo and

Payton to pull him from the vehicle, including by kicking Lugo

(Id. ¶¶ 38-41); and screaming that he did not want to be there

(Id. ¶ 47). Plaintiff remained in law enforcement custody

throughout his time at Brookhaven Hospital. (Id. ¶ 43.) Once

Plaintiff entered the building, he continued yelling that he did

not want to be there and refused to check in during the intake

process. (Id. ¶ 47; Defs.’ 56.1 Response ¶ 4.)

As part of the intake process, Nurse Henry Hernandez

(“Hernandez”) created a triage note (the “Triage Note”) explaining

Plaintiff’s medical history, which included “hypertension, back

pain, Cocaine/dope abuse, and that he had undergone back surgery

with screws and plates, facial reconstruction, and left leg

surgery.”2 (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 52; see also Defs.’ 56.1 Response

¶ 13.) The Triage Note’s information on past cocaine abuse was

ultimately included in Dr. Goodman’s medical record. (Pl.’s 56.1

Response ¶ 88.) Following the intake, Plaintiff was taken into a

room in “Trauma 1” via a wheelchair, where he remained agitated

and refused treatment “at the top of his lungs.” (Id. ¶¶ 62-63

(citing Pl.’s Dep. Tr., ECF No. 220-11, attached to Motion).)

Dr. Goodman, an attending emergency physician at

Brookhaven Hospital, first observed Plaintiff being brought into

Trauma 1 accompanied by several uniformed and plain-clothes

officers with “a fair amount of commotion.” (Id. ¶¶ 58, 73 (citing

Goodman Dep. Tr., ECF No. 220-23, attached to Motion).) Later that

night, Plaintiff told Dr. Goodman he denied swallowing drugs or

putting anything in his rectum. (Id. ¶ 95.) On the other hand,

the officers told Dr. Goodman they believed Plaintiff had “a rectal

foreign body, possibly contraband.” (Id. ¶¶ 84-85.) It is

undisputed law enforcement provided the basis for Dr. Goodman’s

belief that Plaintiff may have had contraband in his rectum.3 (Id.

¶ 108.) Dr. Goodman testified, and Plaintiff also emphasizes in

his 56.1 materials, that he was calm at times while his agitation

2 The Parties dispute whether the information on “cocaine/dope

abuse” came from law enforcement or auto-populated from a previous

Hospital visit. (Id. ¶ 90.)

3 All of Dr. Goodman’s interactions with Plaintiff were conducted

with law enforcement present. (Id. ¶ 82.)

was “waxing and waning” throughout the night. (Id. ¶ 80; Defs.’

56.1 Response ¶ 12.)

Before conducting an examination, Dr. Goodman consulted

via telephone with the Hospital’s legal counsel, Jessica Terranova

(“Terranova”). (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 115.) Dr. Goodman told

Terranova he did not know how to proceed because he had a patient

in law enforcement custody, refusing treatment, and acting

agitated. (Id. ¶¶ 119-20.) Terranova asked Dr. Goodman whether

Plaintiff had capacity or was consenting; Dr. Goodman told her

Plaintiff did not consent. (Id. ¶ 124.) She then instructed Dr.

Goodman to have an informed consent discussion with Plaintiff and

to document the discussion in the chart. (Id. ¶ 125.) Terranova

further told Dr. Goodman “not to do the search of the patient at

the request of law enforcement, but to do whatever Dr. Goodman

felt within his professional medical judgment was necessary for

the care and treatment of the patient.” (Id. ¶¶ 126-27.) Dr.

Goodman never discussed any of his treatment plans with Terranova,

including sedation methods. (Id. ¶¶ 124-27.)

After the call with Terranova, Plaintiff was

subsequently transferred from a wheelchair to a gurney and

connected to a monitor and blood pressure cuff. (Id. ¶¶ 134, 140.)

Dr. Goodman then injected Plaintiff with ketamine to sedate him

while Lugo and Payton restrained Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 150, 155.)

Just prior to the injection, Plaintiff was still agitated. (Id.

¶ 150.) During the sedation, Plaintiff’s abdomen and pelvis were

x-rayed, and the results of the x-ray appeared to show no foreign

body. (Id. ¶ 166.) Despite knowing the x-ray appeared negative,

Dr. Goodman then externally examined Plaintiff’s rectum. (Id. ¶

168.) After this, he performed a manual rectal examination with a

lubricated and gloved index finger (the “Examination”). (Id. ¶¶

170-71.) The Examination revealed only hemorrhoids. (Id. ¶¶

175-76.) Plaintiff was discharged back into law enforcement

custody. (Id. ¶ 184.) There is no evidence Dr. Goodman performed

a psychological evaluation, or other diagnostic tests, before

conducting the sedation and Examination. (Defs.’ 56.1 Response ¶¶

10, 14.)

II. Disputed Facts

The Parties dispute whether Dr. Goodman’s actions

reflected his own medical judgment or were undertaken merely at

the behest of law enforcement. (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 129.) Other

purported interactions bearing on this point are also disputed.

For example, Plaintiff testified Dr. Goodman, Lugo, and Acevedo

had a pre-sedation “sidebar” conversation about 20-to-30 feet away

from him in the Hospital, which he could not hear; however, Dr.

Goodman testified he does not recall such a conversation. (Id. ¶¶

96–102.) Plaintiff states that, after the “sidebar,” Dr. Goodman

told him he would be “put to sleep,” to which Plaintiff responded,

“[d]on’t f***king touch me [ . . . ] I don’t want to be here,” and

continued to refuse examination. (Id. ¶¶ 105–06.) The Parties also

dispute the extent to which less invasive examination options,

short of ketamine administration and a rectal examination, were

available. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 94; Defs.’ 56.1 Response ¶ 22.)

Several other facts remain in dispute. For example,

during the car ride to the Fifth Precinct, the Parties disagree

about whether Lugo observed Plaintiff put his hands down the back

of his pants (Id. ¶ 10) or repeatedly bang his head against the

car window (Id. ¶ 36). Further, the Parties dispute whether the

information regarding Plaintiff’s alleged head-banging played a

role in Dr. Goodman’s subsequent decisions. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 83, 86.)

Although the Parties generally agree Plaintiff screamed throughout

his time at the Hospital with intermittent calm periods, they

disagree on some specifics: Dr. Goodman said Plaintiff’s agitation

made it difficult to communicate with him, while Plaintiff asserts

Dr. Goodman never attempted to interview him. (Id. ¶ 79.) Although

Dr. Goodman testified he attempted to validate information “to the

extent possible,” Plaintiff faults the Doctor for failing to order

either a psychological evaluation or toxicology screening, and for

not informing Terranova that he planned to use ketamine. (Pl.’s

56.1 Response ¶¶ 92, 110.)

III. Relevant Procedural Background

A. Commencement of Action and Substantive Claims Against

Dr. Goodman

On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff commenced this action

against several Defendants, including Dr. Goodman. (See Compl.,

ECF No. 1.) On December 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed the operative

Second Amended Complaint. (“SAC,” ECF No. 151.) The SAC generally

alleges Dr. Goodman acted jointly with law enforcement to violate

Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights and commit several state-level

torts. (See generally SAC.) Specifically, the SAC alleges Dr.

Goodman violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting

an unreasonable, warrantless, nonconsensual body cavity search and

using excessive force by sedating and restraining Plaintiff, and

further violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting

him to cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. ¶¶ 39-59; 78–84.)

Plaintiff also asserts state-law claims for assault, battery,

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress,

negligence, medical malpractice, and false imprisonment.4 (Id. ¶¶

92–126.)

4 The Constitutional claims are made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff also asserted claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of

process, fabrication of evidence, and violation of substantive due

process rights, which have been voluntarily withdrawn against Dr.

Goodman. (R&R at 21-23, 25.)

B. Dr. Goodman’s Motion & Plaintiff’s Opposition

On February 29, 2024, Dr. Goodman served his motion for

summary judgment, advancing two principal arguments against the

constitutional claims in his Support Memo. (See generally Support

Memo, ECF No. 220-48, attached to Motion.) First, Dr. Goodman

contends that, as a private physician employed by a private

hospital, his actions are not attributable to the State and reflect

only his own medical judgment. (Support Memo at 4–10.) Second,

even assuming state action, Dr. Goodman argues he is entitled to

qualified immunity because: (1) his conduct was reasonable under

the circumstances; and (2) no clearly established authority would

place a reasonable physician on notice that his conduct was

unconstitutional. (Id. at 14-23.) Should the Court dismiss the

federal claims, Dr. Goodman contends it should also decline

supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. (Id. at 33.)

On March 29, 2024, Plaintiff served his Opposition,

arguing several factual disputes render summary judgment

inappropriate. (See generally Opp’n.) Plaintiff contends Dr.

Goodman’s conduct is fairly attributable to the State because it

was undertaken at the behest of, and in coordination with, law

enforcement to further law enforcement objectives. (Opp’n at

7-12.) Moreover, Plaintiff contends qualified immunity is

inapplicable because clearly-established precedent bars invasive

body cavity searches conducted without consent, a warrant, or

adequate justification, and because Dr. Goodman’s conduct was not

reasonable. (Id. at 14–17.) Plaintiff also maintains the state-law

claims should independently survive summary judgment. (See Id. at

22.)

C. Judge Wicks’s R&R

On April 4, 2025, this Court referred the Motion to Judge

Wicks for a Report and Recommendation, which was returned on

February 7, 2026. (See generally R&R.) The R&R recommends granting

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims for malicious prosecution,

abuse of process, fabrication of evidence, cruel and unusual

punishment, substantive due process, intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress, and negligence, while denying

summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims and state-law

claims for assault and battery, medical malpractice, and false

imprisonment. (Id. at 44-45.) With respect to state action, Judge

Wicks recommends the Court find Dr. Goodman acted under color of

state law, as law enforcement officers initiated the investigation

into Plaintiff, supplied the information underlying the

Examination, and performed investigative activities typically

attributable to police at law enforcement’s request. (R&R at 14-

15.)

Judge Wicks further recommends against granting summary

judgment on qualified immunity, contending factual disputes exist

as to the necessity, purpose, and manner of the Examination,

including: whether Dr. Goodman possessed reasonable suspicion to

conduct the Examination; why the Examination proceeded despite the

negative x-ray; whether less invasive methods existed; why Dr.

Goodman did not inform Terranova of his intent to administer

ketamine before the Examination; and the extent to which the

Examination reflected Dr. Goodman’s medical judgment. (Id. at 16-

21.) As to probable cause, the R&R noted some of the information

law enforcement relayed to Dr. Goodman was disputed, including

whether Plaintiff banged his head on the car window and whether

officers observed Plaintiff reach into his pants in the police

vehicle. (Id. at 17-18.)

The R&R’s discussion regarding whether any precedent

clearly established Dr. Goodman’s conduct as illegal is much

briefer. Relying on Sloley v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30, 38 (2d Cir.

2019) and Sanchez v. Bonacchi, 799 F. App’x 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2020),

in a single sentence, the R&R explains that “the right to be free

from unreasonable body cavity searches without reasonable

suspicion has been clearly established under recent precedent from

this Circuit.” (Id. at 18.) However, shortly after the R&R issued,

the Supreme Court issued its decision in Zorn v. Linton, which

bears on the “clearly established” analysis and is addressed below.

146 S. Ct. 926 (2026).

D. Dr. Goodman’s Objections & Plaintiff’s Response

On March 20, 2026, Dr. Goodman filed his Objections to

the R&R, primarily objecting to Judge Wicks’s rulings on state

action and qualified immunity. (See generally Obj.) On April 7,

2026, at this Court’s directive, Dr. Goodman submitted a

Supplemental Objection addressing the applicability of the Supreme

Court’s decision in Zorn. (See generally Supp. Obj.) The

Supplemental Objection contends that, under Zorn, Dr. Goodman did

not violate clearly established law, as no relevant precedent had

the requisite “high degree of specificity” needed to clearly

proscribe Dr. Goodman’s conduct. (Supp. Obj. at 3-4 (citing Zorn,

146 S. Ct. at 931).)

On May 1, 2026, Plaintiff filed his Reply, asserting

Judge Wicks was correct on state action and qualified immunity.

(See generally Reply.) He further maintains Zorn does not alter

this conclusion, because existing precedent suffices to clearly

establish Dr. Goodman’s conduct as illegal, and because Zorn does

not require a case “directly on point.” (Id. at 10 (citing Zorn,

146 S. Ct. at 935 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting)).) Plaintiff also

argues remaining state-law claims and punitive damages issues are

properly reserved for trial. (Reply at 17–21.)

Discussion

I. Applicable Law, Generally

A. Reports and Recommendations

A district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate

judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(3).

A party objecting to an R&R “must lodge a specific objection to

some specific aspect of the R&R,” and “[w]hen a timely filed

objection raises and properly briefs arguments previously rejected

by the magistrate judge, the district judge must review those

arguments de novo.” Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158

F.4th 349, 361 (2d Cir. 2025). The Court need not review the

findings and conclusions to which no proper objection has been

made, and an objection “may not simply rest on the briefs

considered by the magistrate judge.” Id.; see also Thomas v. Arn,

474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).

B. Summary Judgment

The Court shall grant summary judgment under Rule 56(a)

when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is material for the purposes

of resolving a summary judgment motion “when it might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Adamson v. Miller,

808 F. App’x 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2020). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’

if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. (quoting Jeffreys v. City

of N.Y., 426 F.3d. 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005)).

“The movant bears the burden of ‘demonstrat[ing] the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.’” Nick’s Garage,

Inc. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 875 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2017)

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The

burden of persuasion may be satisfied by either: “(1) [ ]

submitting evidence that negates an essential element of the non-

moving party's claim, or (2) by demonstrating that the non-moving

party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element

of the non-moving party's claim.” Id. (further citation omitted).

Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party

must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts” and instead must offer “some hard

evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly

fanciful.” Stein v. County of Nassau, 417 F. Supp. 3d 191, 197

(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (citations omitted).

“Summary judgment is inappropriate when the admissible

materials in the record make it arguable that the claim has merit.”

Kaytor v. Elec. Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). In reviewing the record,

the Court “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence” as such determinations are to be made by the jury, not

the judge. Id. (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. Inc.,

530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). Accordingly, where an issue as to a

material fact cannot be resolved without weighing the credibility

of a witness, summary judgment is improper. Id. at 545-46.

II. Defendant Was a State Actor

A. Applicable Law

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of

the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Feingold

v. N.Y., 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). Courts generally apply three tests to

determine whether a private party may be treated as a state actor:

(1) the “compulsion” test, which asks whether the private party

acted pursuant to the State’s coercive power or control; (2) the

“joint action” or “close nexus” test, satisfied where the State

provides significant encouragement, the private party is a willful

participant in joint activity with the State, or the private

party’s functions are “entwined” with state policies; and (3) the

“public function” test, which considers whether the private entity

“has been delegated a public function by the State.” Rene v.

Mustafa, No. 16-CV-4072, 2024 WL 1332556, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.

28, 2024) (quoting Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program,

Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008)).

State-action disputes often arise where public law

enforcement officers and private medical personnel interact. For

example, in Falls v. Pitt, a Southern District court determined a

private nurse acted under color of state law when she performed an

anal cavity search and x-ray at the direction of police officers,

who were searching for narcotics pursuant to a warrant. No.

16-CV-8863, 2021 WL 1164185, at *50-51 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2021).

The Court concluded that, although the nurse may have had a

competing medical interest in identifying contraband, she was

primarily performing a law-enforcement function. Id. at *50. By

contrast, in Williams v. City of N.Y., private hospital employees

were not deemed state actors where NYPD officers transported the

plaintiff to the hospital and relayed information to staff, who

then exercised independent medical judgment in determining

treatment. 2017 WL 4158903, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2017);

see also Fisk v. Letterman, 401 F. Supp. 2d 362, 376 (S.D.N.Y.

2005) (“[c]ommunications between a private and a state actor,

without facts supporting a concerted effort or plan between the

parties, are insufficient to make the private party a state

actor”).

B. Application

This Court agrees with Judge Wicks’s state action

analysis and finds sound his application of Falls. (R&R at 13–14.)

As Judge Wicks explained:

So too here, based on the record before the

Court, Goodman would not have performed his

cavity search on Plaintiff had he not

discussed Plaintiff’s circumstances with law

enforcement prior. (See ECF No. 221-6, Goodman

Dep. Tr. at 149:22-25, 150:2-6 (Goodman

answering “yes” when asked if law enforcement

requested an examination for a foreign body);

68:7-19 (Goodman testifying that he obtained

Plaintiff’s medical history from law

enforcement before conducting the search)).

Notably, “[t]he police provided the basis for

Dr. Godman to think the Plaintiff had a

foreign body in his rectum.” (ECF No. 221-16

at ¶ 108; see also ECF No. 220- 23, Goodman

Dep. Tr. at 85:8-12 (establishing the “only

basis” of Goodman thinking Plaintiff had a

foreign body in his rectum was what the police

told him)). Further, in order for Plaintiff to

be “cleared for confinement,” law enforcement

needed to have the Hospital staff “check out”

the potential secretion inside of Plaintiff.

(See ECF No. 221-7, Lugo Dep. Tr. at

193:21-25, 194:2-18 (Parole Officer Lugo

testifying that he “asked the doctor” to check

out the concerns they had about the potential

for drugs inside Plaintiff, and “then the

doctor did the job they had do to”).

Similarly, to ensure Plaintiff’s “benefit and

safety,” Goodman needed to “validate the

information” presented by law enforcement by

performing the search he did. (See ECF No.

221- 16 at ¶¶ 110, 111.)

(R&R at 13-14.)

Dr. Goodman argues Falls is distinguishable because,

there, the nurse acted pursuant to a warrant, documented law

enforcement's directive in her notes, and told the plaintiff she

was authorized to search, while, here, Dr. Goodman purportedly

relied on independent medical judgment. (Obj. at 2-3 (citing

Falls, 2021 WL 1164185, at *50).) But viewing the

Examination-related facts in a manner most favorable to Plaintiff

—as we must have done at this stage—it is difficult to imagine the

Examination taking place without any input from law enforcement.

In addition to the dispute over whether Dr. Goodman used his own

judgment in ordering the Examination, there is no dispute that (1)

law enforcement supplied the information forming the basis for Dr.

Goodman’s suspicion of contraband, and (2) Dr. Goodman never

interacted with Plaintiff without law enforcement present. (See

Infra p. 5.) These undisputed facts establish the Doctor was a

willful participant in a joint activity with the officers, who are

state actors. This is sufficient to establish Dr. Goodman was

acting under color of State law. See Ciambriello v. County of

Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Court

OVERRULES Dr. Goodman’s objection on state action and ADOPTS Judge

Wicks’s recommendation on the same.

III. Defendant is Entitled to Qualified Immunity

A. Applicable Law

Qualified immunity shields state actors “performing

discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Where applicable, qualified immunity offers “ample protection to

all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” Sacaza v. City of N.Y., 169 F.4th 363, 369 (2d Cir. 2026)

(quoting Dufort v. City of N.Y., 874 F.3d 338, 354 (2d Cir. 2017));

see also Torres v. Vill. of Sleepy Hollow, 379 F. Supp. 2d 478,

482 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)) (qualified immunity available to private

individuals acting under color of state law). “The issues on

qualified immunity are: (1) whether plaintiff has shown facts

making out violation of a constitutional right; (2) if so, whether

that right was ‘clearly established’; and (3) even if the right

was ‘clearly established’, whether it was ‘objectively

reasonable’” for the State actor to believe “the conduct at issue

was lawful.” Monroe v. Gould, 372 F. Supp. 3d 197, 204 (S.D.N.Y.

2019) (quoting Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154

(2d Cir. 2013)). “Courts may use their discretion in deciding the

order in which to approach a qualified immunity analysis.” Sacaza,

169 F.4th at 370 (citing Coollick v. Hughes, 699 F.3d 211, 219-20

(2d Cir. 2012)). “To be entitled to qualified immunity at the

summary judgment stage of a case, a defendant must show that, even

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

the defendant’s actions did not violate clearly established law.”

Falls, 2021 WL 1164185, at *28 (citation omitted).

A right is clearly established only when it is

“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Rivas-

Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting Mullenix v.

Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). To find a right is clearly

established, courts ordinarily “need to identify a case where an

officer acting under similar circumstances was held to have

violated” the Constitution. Escondido v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 43

(2019) (further citation omitted); see also Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at

930 (citing Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5) (“[a] right is not

clearly established if existing precedent does not place the

constitutional question ‘beyond debate’”). “The relevant

precedent must define the right with a ‘high degree of

specificity,’ so that ‘every reasonable official would interpret

it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.’”

Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930 (citing District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583

U.S. 48, 63 (2018)). “Principles stated generally, such as that

‘an officer may not use unreasonable and excessive force,’ do not

suffice.” Id. (citing Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2021)).

Those acting under color of state law will receive qualified

immunity “unless they could have ‘read’ the relevant precedent

beforehand and ‘know[n]’ that it proscribed their specific

conduct.” Id. (citing City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan,

575 U.S. 600, 616 (2015)).

B. Application

In recommending denial of summary judgment, Judge Wicks

concluded “the right to be free from unreasonable body cavity

searches without reasonable suspicion has been clearly established

under recent precedent from this Circuit,” citing to Sloley and

Sanchez. (R&R at 18.) Neither decision, however, clearly

proscribes Dr. Goodman’s specific conduct or defines any purported

right against the Examination “beyond debate”.

In Sloley, two state troopers conducted a strip and

visual body cavity search of a plaintiff following his misdemeanor

arrest, which was prompted when a drug-sniffing dog showed interest

in his vehicle. 945 F.3d at 36. The Second Circuit denied summary

judgment because clearly established law required “a specific,

articulable factual basis supporting a reasonable suspicion to

believe the arrestee secreted evidence inside a body cavity,” and

factual disputes existed as to whether such suspicion was present.

Id. at 40 (citing People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 311 (2008)). The

Circuit emphasized that no undisputed facts suggested the

plaintiff was secreting drugs in his rectum, and no evidence

indicated he engaged in suspicious movements, fidgeting, or had a

history of rectally concealing drugs. Id. at 46.

In Sanchez, a post-trial ruling, the Second Circuit

applied Sloley and concluded a manual body cavity search undertaken

incident to arrest and without reasonable suspicion violated

clearly established law. 799 F. App’x. at 62. The Second

Circuit’s decision offered little factual discussion, but the

district court’s Sanchez opinion indicated the jury determined an

officer conducted a manual body cavity search while executing a

search warrant. See Sanchez v. Bonacchi, No. 5:14-CV-0452, 2018

WL 4275986, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2018), rev'd and remanded,

791 F. App’x 218 (2d Cir. 2019), opinion vacated and superseded,

799 F. App’x 60, and aff'd, 799 F. App’x 60 (2d Cir. 2020).5 The

Second Circuit determined this search was conducted without

reasonable suspicion. Sanchez, 799 F. App’x at 62.

The undisputed facts show Dr. Goodman faced

circumstances far different from those in Sloley and Sanchez. Even

viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, none of

the following high-level facts are disputed: Plaintiff arrived at

the Hospital behaving erratically, including by screaming “at the

top of his lungs”; medical records reflected a history of

5 The R&R did not cite to the district court’s Sanchez opinion.

Plaintiff’s “cocaine/dope abuse”; law enforcement officers

reported to Dr. Goodman their belief Plaintiff was rectally

concealing narcotics; and Plaintiff denied the assertions. (See

infra pp. 4-5.) This undisputed level of chaos, and allegations

pointing directly to Plaintiff’s rectum, are far different from

Sloley, where no facts pointed to the body cavity, and Sanchez,

which addressed a lack of reasonable basis to believe the detainee

was rectally concealing drugs. Sloley, 945 F.3d at 36; Sanchez,

799 F. App’x 60.

Moreover, neither Sloley nor Sanchez addressed a

scenario involving potential exigent medical circumstances in

addition to the law-enforcement interests. Even assuming the

Examination was conducted primarily for law-enforcement reasons,

the presence of supplemental medical considerations distinguishes

this case from precedent involving purely investigative searches:

here, there was the potential risk of a bag of drugs exploding,

which could have been fatal. Further creating distance from Sloley

and Sanchez is Dr. Goodman’s consultation with counsel before

beginning the Examination, which bolsters the reasonableness of

his conduct and demonstrates it was not clear to him, a reasonable

actor, that performing the Examination would violate Plaintiff’s

rights.

Nor does the previously-discussed Falls case clearly

establish Dr. Goodman’s conduct as illegal. Although Falls

concluded the defendant nurse was entitled to qualified immunity,

it declined to grant summary judgment due to a “he-said, she said”

factual dispute about whether the nurse used lubricant in the

search, and collected cases suggesting lubricant may be necessary

for a reasonable search. Falls, 2021 WL 1164185, at *53. No such

dispute exists here, as neither party disputes Dr. Goodman used

lubrication in his Examination. (Pl.’s 56.1 Response ¶ 179.)

Falls’s focus on lubricant also fails to render it an authority

Dr. Goodman “could have ‘read’ [ . . . ] beforehand and ‘know[n]’

that it proscribed [his] specific conduct,” including whether he

should have assessed other examination methods. Zorn, 146 S. Ct.

at 930 (citing Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63). Moreover, none of the

aforementioned precedents involve parolees, who “have severely

diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their status

alone.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006); see also

Rivera v. Madan, No. 10-CV-4136, 2013 WL 4860116, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 12, 2013) (“Courts must ‘examin[e] the totality of the

circumstances’ surrounding the search, which includes the

Plaintiff’s status as a parolee.”) (quoting United States v.

Knights, 534 U.S. 112,118 (2001)).

In an attempt to show Dr. Goodman violated a clearly

established right, Plaintiff’s Reply cites several additional

cases beyond Sloley and Sanchez. These fare no better. For

example, Schmerber v. California is cited for the broad proposition

that “intrusions into the human body” must meet Fourth Amendment

standards of reasonableness. 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). This is

far too amorphous a concept to define any right at issue with a

“high degree of specificity.” Zorn, 146 S. Ct. at 930 (citing

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 105 (2021)) (“principles stated

generally” do not suffice to clearly establish a right). In any

event, Schmerber is not a qualified immunity case and did not

address body cavity searches.

The cases Plaintiff proffers that specifically involve

rectal searches are also distinguishable. Travis v. Village of

Dobbs Ferry, for example, involved a plaintiff who was subjected

to a strip search unsupported by any reasonable suspicion. 355 F.

Supp. 2d 740, 743-46 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Moreover, Travis addressed

extreme facts: Police spent two months monitoring the plaintiff,

who had no criminal record, for drug activity. Travis, 355 F.

Supp. 2d at 744. Police, who monitored the plaintiff based on an

uncorroborated tip, never observed her participate in drug

activity and did not find drugs in her car after she consented to

a search. Id. at 745-46. In her decision, Judge McMahon explained

the facts “of this particular case are as outrageous as any I have

seen. The behavior of the defendants was completely unreasonable.”

Id. at 754.

Similarly, Monroe v. Gould involved a plaintiff who,

after being arrested for misdemeanor drug and weapon charges, was

subjected to a body cavity search in a police station absent any

reasonable suspicion he “was concealing contraband inside his

body” and defendants did “not point to plaintiff’s physical

appearance, apparent discomfort, or any suspicious actions or

other articulable facts which might have suggested he was hiding

something inside his body.” 372 F. Supp. 3d 197, 204-05 (S.D.N.Y.

2019) (emphasis in original). Here, by contrast, Dr. Goodman was

informed Plaintiff might possess rectally-concealed narcotics

based on law enforcement’s own search, and independently observed

erratic conduct throughout the evening. (See infra pp. 4-5.)

Plaintiff’s reliance on Harris v. Miller, is likewise misplaced,

as it turned on a “violent and forceful” strip search of a female

inmate by male officers and focused its reasoning heavily on the

cross-gender nature of the search, which is not at issue here.6

818 F.3d 49, 60 (2d Cir. 2016).

6 Plaintiff also cites to United States v. Gonzalez, 111 F. Supp.

3d 416, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), a suppression case where a court

declined to find probable cause due to a non-credible witness. As

this Court may not make credibility judgments at this stage, this

precedent is also unavailing. In another case Plaintiff cites to,

Santiago v. City of Yonkers, No. 13-CV-1077, 2015 WL 6914799, at

*7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2015), a court declined to grant summary

judgment on a search-based claim due to a factual dispute about

whether an officer “inserted his fingers into plaintiff’s rectum

—in the context of either a sexual assault or a manual cavity.”

No such factual dispute is present here.

In short: Because the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in

Zorn requires far more than generalized Fourth Amendment

principles, and because Plaintiff identifies no precedent

proscribing the illegality of Dr. Goodman’s conduct with the

required “high degree of specificity,” the Court SUSTAINS Dr.

Goodman’s objection as to qualified immunity.

C. Remaining State Law Claims

Although federal courts have supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims, “a district court ‘may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction.’” Kolari v. New York-

Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). District courts have wide latitude in

deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Id.

at 122. Because there are no remaining claims for which this Court

has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and

accordingly DECLINES TO ADOPT Judge Wicks’s R&R to the extent it

recommends exercising jurisdiction over the state-law claims.

IV. Unobjected Portions of the R&R

As Judge Wicks noted in the R&R, “failure to object

timely to a magistrate’s report operates as a waiver of any further

judicial review of the magistrate’s decision.” Caidor v. Onondaga

Cnty., 517 F.3d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 2008). The Court accordingly

ADOPTS the portions of Judge Wicks’s R&R that were not specifically

objected to.

Conclusion

For the stated reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dr.

Goodman’s Objections are SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part.

Accordingly:

I. The Court ADOPTS the Judge Wicks’s Report and

Recommendation to the extent it recommended granting

summary judgment as to the malicious prosecution, abuse of

process, fabrication of evidence, cruel and unusual

punishment, substantive due process, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of

emotional distress, and negligence claims; and

II. The Court DECLINES TO ADOPT Judge Wicks’s Report and

Recommendation to the extent it recommends denying summary

judgment as to the Fourth Amendment, assault and battery,

medical malpractice, and false imprisonment claims.

Having adopted in part and rejected in part Judge Wicks’s

R&R, the Court rules in the following manner:

I. Because Dr. Goodman is entitled to qualified immunity, the

Court GRANTS his Motion for Summary Judgment as to the

remaining federal claims; and

II. Because there are no remaining federal claims, the Court

declines to take jurisdiction over the remaining state law

claims.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ JOANNA SEYBERT

Joanna Seybert, U.S.D.J.

Dated: June 9, 2026

Central Islip, New York